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Abstract 
Arto Luukkanen 
The Party of Unbelief — The Religion Policy of The Bolshevik Party, 
1917-1929. 
The main objective of this dissertation is to study the religious policy of 
the Soviet Bolshevik party during the years 1917-1929 by utilizing 
historical methods. The Bolshevik religious ideology was influenced by 
Left-Hegelian philosophy, Marxist materialism and the anti-clerical 
attitudes of the Russian intelligentsia. The period under examination 
can be divided into four separate sections. During the civil war (1917-
1920) the ruling regime limited its official religious policy to legislative 
acts in church-state relations and its main political objective was to 
isolate the Russian Orthodox church, the ROC. The mission of 
executing Soviet religious policy was given to the NKYust's 
"Liquidation Committee" and to the Soviet security organs. The 
introduction of the early NEP policy (1921-1923) did not automatically 
represent a relaxation of the religious policy but, on the contrary, the 
Bolshevik government, especially Lenin and Trotsky, engaged in 
general attack against the ROC during the so-called "confiscation 
conflict". Trotsky and his "Liquidation Committee" conducted this 
anti-religious campaign in order to obtain money and to undermine the 
role of religions in the Soviet society by fomenting pro-government 
schisms inside the religious organizations. 
After Lenin lost his grip on power, the "triumvirate" and especially 
Stalin outmanoeuvred Trotsky in the anti-religious work by organizing 
their own antireligious cabinet (CAP). This change was rationalized by 
certain slogans of the high NEP (1924-1927) which underlined the 
importance of seeking reconciliation in the Russian countryside. 
Moreover, foreign pressure also played into the hands of the 
"triumvirate". This policy of appeasing the peasantry also implied a 
relaxation in the antireligious campaign. The 12th and 13th party 
congresses represented the beginning of the high NEP and of "detente" 
in Soviet religious policy. The more moderate party leaders wanted to 
stabilize the Russian countryside by making concessions to religion 
while at the same time hard-liners attempted to brake the normalcy of 
the NEP in this area. 
The NEP could not survive the introduction of the Cultural 
Revolution (1928-1929). The criticism from the left-opposition 
gradually undermined the fundamentals of the NEP's civil peace. Stalin 
was also anxious also to utilize this mood in order to get rid of his 
"rightist" allies and to this end encouraged the Cultural Revolution by 
supporting Komsomol's drive to politicize Soviet society. In the 
religious policy former religious political organs were disbanded and 
their responsibilities were transferred to the VTsIK. The battle between 
moderates, so-called culturalists and hard-liners (interventionists) was 
one of the most characteristic features of anti-religious activity at that 
time. As a conclusion, it must be stated that the Soviet religious policy 
was always dependent on the general political objectives of the party 
leaders. The development of the Soviet religious ideology must 
6 	 therefore be studied in association with other major political battles. 
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Abbreviations and Terms 
AGMIR 	 Arkhiv Gosudarstvennyi Muzei Istorii Religii 
(Archive of State Museum concerning History of 
Religion) 
AK 	 Azbuka Kommunizma (ABC of Communism) 
APO 	 Agitatsionyi i Propagandicheskyi Otdel (The 
Agitation and Propaganda Section, Agitprop) 
APRF 	 Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (The 
Archive of the President of the Russian Federation) 
ARA 	 American Relief Association 
ARCP(b) 	 See RSDWP 
AT 	 Arkhiv Trotskogo (Trotsky Archive) 
AUCP(b) 	 See RSDWP 
BB 	 Bonch-Bruevich, V.D. Izbrannie Sochineniya 
(Bonch-Bruevich, V.D. Selected Works) 
BDOFA 	 British Documents of Foreign Affairs 
bednyak 	 poor peasant 
BKh 	 Biograficheskaya Khronika. Vladimir Ilich Lenin. 
(Biographical Chronicle. Vladimir Ilich Lenin) 
BSE 	 Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya (The Great 
Soviet Encyclopedia) 
CAP 	 The Commission of Antireligious Propaganda 
Cheka 	 Chrezvychainaya Komissiya (The Extraordinary 
Commission) 
Comintern 	 Kommunisticheskyi Internatsional (The Communist 
International) 
CPSU 	 See RSDWP 
d. 	 delo (file) 
desyatina 	 1.09 hectare 
DMV 	 Delo Mitropolita Veniamina (The Case of 
Metropolitan Veniamin) 
DO 	 Deyateli Oktyabrya o religii i tserkvi (The Public 
Figures of the October [Revolution] on Religion and 
the Church) 
DOBFP 	 Documents on British Foreign Policy 
DSV 	 Dekreti Sovetskoi Vlasti (The Decrees of the Soviet 
Power) 
ES 	 Entsiklopedicheskyi Slovar (The Encyclopedic 
Dictionary) 
Evsektsiya 	 Evreiskaya Sektsiya (The Jewish Section [of the 
Bolshevik Party]) 
f. 	 fond (collection) 
FMLP 	 The Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy 
GARF 	 Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (The 
State Archive of the Russian Federation) 
Glavpolitprosvet Glavnyi Politiko-Prosveshchenskii Otdel (The 
Central Administration of Political Education) 
GPU 	 Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie (The 
State Political Administration) 
Heder 	 Jewish religious school 
10 	 IPSS 	 Izbranniye Proizvedeniya Skvortsov-Stepanova I.I. 
(Selected Works of Skvortsov-Stepanov 
IzvTsK KPSS Izvestiya Tsentralnogo Komiteta KPSS (The News 
of the Central Committee of the CPSU) 
K 	 Konferentsiya RKP(b) (The Conference of the 
RCP(b)) 
Komsomol 	 Kommunisticheskii Soyuz Molodezhi (The Young 
Communist League) 
KPSS 	 Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Sovetskogo Soyuza 
(The Communist Party of the Soviet Union) 
Kulak 	 rich peasant 
1., 11 	 list, listy (leaf, leaves) 
LS 	 Leninsky Sbornik (The Lenin Collection) 
MEW 	 Marx-Engels Werke (The Collected Works of Karl 
Marx and Friedrich Engels) 
MVD 	 Ministerstvo Vnutrennykh Del (Ministry of Internal 
Affairs) 
Narkomnats 	 Narodnyi Komissariat po Delam Natsionalnostei 
(People's Commissariat of Nationalities) 
Narkompros 	 Narodnyi Komissariat Prosveshcheniya (People's 
Commissariat of Enlightenment) 
Narodnaya Volya People's Will (Liberty), a Russian terrorist 
organization, See SRs 
NEP 	 Novaya Ekonomicheskaya Politika (New Economic 
Policy) 
NKID 	 Narodnyi Komissariat po Inostrannym Delam 
(People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs) 
NKVD 	 Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennykh Del (People's 
Commissariat of Internal Affairs) 
NKYust 	 Narodnyi Komissariat Yustitsii (People's 
Commissariat of Justice) 
NKZem 	 Narodnyi Komissariat Zemledeliya (People's 
Commissariat of Agriculture) 
NR 	 Neizvestnaya Rossiya (The Unknown Russia) 
oblast 	 province, administrative unit 
obshchina 	 Russian peasant commune 
OGPU 	 Obedionennoe Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe 
Upravlenie (The Unified State Political 
Administration) 
okrug 	 administrative region between region and district 
op. 	 opis (inventory) 
Orgburo 	 Organizational Bureau, TsKa 
Orgkomsekt 	 Organizationalnyi Kommissiya Sektanstvo 
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(Organizational Commission of Sectarians) 
ORTs 	 0 Religii i Tserkvi (On Religion and Church) 
OZET 	 Obshestvo po Zemelnomu Ustroistvu 
Trudyashikhsya evreev (Society for Settling Jewish 
Toilers in Agriculture) 
PC AP 	 Protocols of the Commission of Antireligious 
Propaganda 
PCSRQ 	 Permanent (working) Commission for the Study of 
Religious Questions 
Politburo 
	
Political Bureau, TsKa 
Politotdel 	 Political department 
Pomgol 	 Soviet Commission for Helping the Starving in the 
Volga area 
Pp 	 Politburo protocols 
PSS 	 Polnoe Sobranie Sochineniya V.I. Lenin (The 
Collected Works of V.I. Lenin) 
raion 	 district, administrative unit 
raskol 	 schism 
RdO 	 Rapport de I'OGPU 
ROC 	 The Russian Orthodox Church 
Rosta 	 The Russian news-agency 
RP 	 Russkoe Proshloe (The Russian Past) 
RSDWP 	 Rossiiskaya Sotsial-Demokraticheskaya Partiya. 
Later RKP(b), Rossiiskaya Kommunisticheskaya 
Partiya (Bolshevikov) (The Russian Communist 
Party (Bolsheviks) 
RSFSR 	 Rossiiskaya Sovetskaya Federativnaya 
Sotsialiticheskaya Respublika (Russian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic) 
RTsKhIDNI 	 Rossiiskyi Tsentr Khranenniya i Izucheniya 
Dokumentov Noveishei Istorii (The Russian 
Centre of Conservation & Study of Records for 
Modern History) 
S 	 Sezd Rossiiskoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii 
(Bolshevikov) (The Congress of the Russian 
Communist Party (Bolsheviks)) 
Secretariat 	 Bureau of Secretaries, TsKa 
serednyak 	 "middle" peasant 
Sharia 	 Islamic law 
Skhod 	 village assembly 
"Smena-Vekh" 	 "Changing Landmarks" movement 
12 	 Sobor 	 Orthodox ecclesiastical assembly 
Sovnarkom 	 Sovet Narodnykh Komissarov (The Council of 
People's Commissars) 
SR 	 Sotsial-Revolytsioner (Social-Revolutionary, SR 
party) 
SS 	 Sochinenya I.V. Stalin (The Collected Works of 
I.V. Stalin) 
SSLKSM 	 Sezd Vsesoyuznogo Leninskogo 
Kommunisticheskogo Soyuza Molodezhi 
(Congress of Leninist All-Union Young 
Communist League) 
SSR 	 Sezdyi Sovetov RSFSR v postanovleniyakh i 
rezolyutsiyakh (Congresses of Soviets of RSFSR 
on decisions and resolutions) 
SSS 	 Sezd Sovetov Soyuza SSR (Congress of Soviets 
of Union of SSR) 
ST 	 Sochineniya Trotsky L.D. (The Works of Trotsky 
L.D.) 
SUR 	 Sobranie Uzakonenyi i Rasporyazhenyi (The 
Collection of Legislation and Decrees) 
SZR 	 Sobranie Zakonov i Rasporyazhenyi (The 
Collection of Laws and Decrees) 
TRRR 	 The Russian Revolution and Religion 
TsGAOR 	 Tsentralnyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Oktyabrskoi 
Revolyutsii (The Central Archive of the October 
Revolution) 
TsGA RSFSR 	 Tsentralnyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv RSFSR 
(The Central State Archive of the RSFSR) 
TsIK 	 Tsentralnyi Ispolnitelnyi Komitet (The Central 
Executive Committee) 
TsKa 	 Tsentralnyi Komitet (The Central Committee) 
TTP 	 The Trotsky Papers 
uezd 	 administrative unit 
VKP(b) 
	
Vsesoyaznaya Kommunisticheskaya Partiya 
(Bolshevikov) (The All-Union Communist Party 
(Bolsheviks)) 
VSS 
	
Vserossiiskyi Sezd Sovetov (All Russian 
Congress of Soviets) 
VTsIK 	 Vserossiiskyi (Vsesoyuznyi) Tsentralnyi 
Ispolnitelnyi Komitet (All-Russian (All-Union) 
Central Executive Committee) 
VTsU 	 Vyshee Tserkovnoe Upravlenie (The Supreme 
Church Administration) 	 13 
Y 	 Yaroslaysky, Em. (The Collected Works of E.I. 
Yaroslaysky) 
Zemlya i Volya 	 Land and Will (Liberty), a Russian revolutionary 
organization, See SRs. 
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I Sco pe 
1. INTRODUCTION 
a. Goals of the study 
The Soviet Union has collapsed and historians all over the world are 
trying to find explanations for the rapid process which transformed one 
of the mightiest military powers into the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States. One of the reasons' put forward for the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union usually involves the economic failure of the Soviet 
system. The collapse of productive industrial power, the vast budget 
deficit, and astronomical investments in the military were apparent 
factors in the decline of Soviet totalitarianism. Unfortunately, 
researchers and scholars have usually emphasized only these "hard" 
aspects in their evaluations of former Soviet society. Nevertheless, 
divisions, armies, and nuclear weapons were unable to save the Soviet 
system.2 Few researchers have concentrated on analysing the neglected 
"soft" factors, such as the mentality of closed societies, the ideological 
fundamentals of the totalitarian state, the rise of nationalistic feelings, 
and the renaissance of religion. But contrary to all the wisdom of the 
twentieth century and the tendency to relegate religion to being a thing 
of the past, the claim of Dennis J. Dunn appears to be extremely 
pertinent: 
"...regimes that abandoned or neglected their religious roots are 
inherently unstable, and their future might not be unlike that of the 
shah of Iran... "3 
1 	 For other explanations, see Chavetz 1992, 151-169; Iivonen 1992, 324-347. 
2 	 In the opinion of most scholars the Soviet Communist system appeared very stable. 
Statements regarding possible instability in the USSR however courageous they 
sounded were not to be taken seriously. Very many would probably have agreed 
with the sceptical view of Zbigniew Brzezinski when he speculated on the 
possibility of secessionist movements in the former USSR. Albeit this famous 
American observer did not count out the possibility of disintegration, he remarked: 
"...now would these conditions... suffice to activate and make a secessionist 
aspiration politically significant? My judgement on the whole would be negative". 
Brzezinski 1971, 78. 
3 	 Dunn 1987, 12. 
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As Helene Carrere D'Encausse has suggested, the diversity and inten-
sity of nationalistic feelings were contributing factors in the Soviet 
leadership's failure to create a Homo Socialisticus4 from the ashes of 
the old Russian culture and, despite all their efforts, nationalities, reli-
gions, and different ethnic groups are nowadays asserting their identity 
in the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
This dissertation will focus on the development of the communist 
party's religious policy from the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 to the 
end of the NEP period in 1929. It will also examine the start of the 
so-called "Cultural Revolution" (1928-1932) and the beginning of 
Stalin's hegemony. During the course of 1929 the last vestiges of 
opposition to the General Secretary from old Bolshevik leaders were 
crushed and his fiercest opponent, L.D. Trotsky (Bronstein, 1879-
1940), expelled abroad. The year 1929 represents the starting point of 
Stalinism, a new epoch with its own dilemmas and problems. 
20 
	
	
This research will analyze the role of religion in the Soviet lea- 
dership's political thinking and political actions during the period in 
question. The study employs an historical methodology: by examining 
the different ideas, arguments and political acts of the Soviet leaders, 
and especially the debates and resolutions of party assemblies from 
1917 to 1929, we are able to achieve an extensive overview of 
Bolshevik religious policy. The aim is to present the general outlines of 
Bolshevik religious policy mostly in relation to the Russian Orthodox 
Church, but in addition a certain amount of attention will be paid, for 
example, to the sectarian movement, Catholics, Jews and Moslems.5  
It is justifiable to study Soviet religious policy in relation to the 
ideology and history of the communist party because in Soviet 
totalitarian society communist ideology served two purposes: firstly it 
justified Bolshevik rule, and secondly it justified the existence of an 
4 	 D'Encausse 1978, 265-274. The well-known Russian writer Mikhail Geller has 
noted in his book "MaulHHa H BHHTHKH" (A Cog in the Wheel), the importance of 
creating the New Man, the so called Homo Sovieticus to socialist society. In order 
to achieve this end, one had to atomize society and dissolve all individuality in it, 
sundering bonds based on religion, family, historical memory and language. Geller 
recognizes four different categories in the plan for creating The New Man: 
"HH(paHTHJIH3auHA" ("infantilization"), "HauHoHaJIH3auHA BpeMeHH" (national-
ization of time), "HaeonorM3auHB" ("ideologization") and "ToranHrapH3auHA" 
("totalitarianization"). Geller 1985, 7, 29-33, 36-39, 48-49, 60, 89-90. 
5 	 The correlation between religion and nationalism offers a practical view when 
investigating the religious policy of the Bolshevik party. In investigating the 
relationship between religion and nationality Bohdan R. Bociurkiw has 
distinguished six different categories of Soviet religious organizations: (I) the 
former Imperial Church (ROC); (2) national churches; (3) traditional native sects; 
(4) transnational religious communities; (5) ethno-religious diasporas; and (6) 
modem cosmopolitan sects. Bociurkiw 1990, 150. 
elite, i.e. the communist party. The party was the source of power and 
thus, in studying religious policy in the Soviet system, it is essential to 
examine the role of the leading party. What was the ideological back-
ground of the Soviet leaders? How did the communist leaders' critique 
of religion develop before and after the revolution? Were there any 
disagreements or different ideological approaches towards religion 
inside the ruling regime? And how were ethnic problems reflected in 
this ideology? 
In Marxist ideology and in Marxism-Leninism6 both nationalism 
and religion were seen as relics of the old capitalist era. Both religion, 
as a part of "delusive knowledge", and national "chauvinism", as an 
obstacle to Marxist class struggle, had to be defeated before the 
emergence of the new socialist order could be achieved. For instance, 
Gerhard Simon's definition of nationalism also fits religiosity when he 
states that both were acting against the class structure of society and 
that both of them "strove to overcome class antagonism" for the sake of 
mutual religious commitments or national affiliations and the 
mobilization of different social strata in pursuance of a common 
religious or national objective.7 As a matter of fact, it seems obvious 
that during this epoch of the "death of old ideologies" ethno-religious 
bonds would appear more stable than those of universal doctrines. As 
John A. Armstrong has pointed out in this context: 
Apart from questions of transcendental faith, it is hardly deniable 
that, throughout millennia, religion constituted a far stronger source 
of identity than either class or nation. In fact, as [the] term 
"ethno-religious" implies, the categorical distinction between 
religion and ethnicity is slippery...8 
An examination of the ideological and historical contribution of 
Vladimir Ilich Lenin (Ulyanov, 1870-1924)  forms, of course, the basis 
of this study. If we want to comprehend the development of the 
religious policy of the Bolshevik party and attempt to evaluate different 
viewpoints and disputes inside the Soviet leadership concerning 
religion, it is essential to acquaint ourselves with Lenin's religious 
ideology by analysing his political doctrine and beliefs. From the 
6 	 This term is a general term for the ideology of the Soviet regime. The official 
handbook of Soviet philosophy, "The Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist 
Philosophy", defines Marxism-Leninism as: "...a whole and logical doctrine, which 
contains three basic backgrounds.- philosophy, political economy and the theory of 
scientific communism...". FMLP 1973, 11. 
7 	 Simon 1991, 12-13. See also Bociurkiw 1990, 159. 
8 	 Armstrong 1992, 27. 
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beginning of the 1917 Revolution he was the key figure of the Soviet 
state and the Russian Communist Party9 and the "primus inter pares" 
among the Bolshevik ideologists. Moreover, after his death in 1924, 
Lenin's political legacy was promoted as the official ideology of the 
Soviet Union. This so-called "Lenin cult" prospered after his death and 
also became a very significant factor in the bitter power struggle 
between rival party-leaders.10 
Lenin's position as the principal ideological authority remained 
unchallenged until the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. In fact, the 
legitimacy of the Soviet regime was extremely dependent on V. I. 
Lenin's political heritage. Every Soviet leader after Lenin (even M.S. 
Gorbachev) emphasized the importance of Leninism and every 
"Vozhd" after 1924 has claimed to be the ideological heir of Lenin." 
Moreover, Lenin's "Collected Works" and "original Leninism" have 
frequently been used as ideological weapons in power struggles 
22 
	
	
between competing party factions. Even during the "perestroika" era 
the figure of Lenin was used by the official party machinery to ensure 
and stabilize the CPSU's position in Soviet society.'2 
Although most attention in this study will be paid to the political 
thinking of official party leaders, such as V.I. Lenin and I.V. Stalin 
(Dzhugashvili, 1879-1953), other significant figures must also be taken 
into consideration. L.D. Trotsky, as spokesman of the "left" Bolshevik 
wing, was a very remarkable political figure in Soviet Russia from 1917 
9 	 The history of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (RSDWP) is 
officially counted from the first party congress convened in Minsk in 1898, but 
actually the party took shape in 1903 during its second congress. In 1918 the 
Bolshevik wing renamed itself the All Russian Communist Party (bolsheviks), 
ARCP(b). In 1925, a few years after the creation of the Soviet Union, the party 
renamed itself the All Union Communist Party (bolsheviks), AUCP(b). Finally, the 
party was renamed the Communist Party of The Soviet Union (CPSU), henceforth 
referred to in this monograph as the Bolsheviks. 
10 	 The corpus of Lenin's writings, as Daniel Peris has pointed out, was apotheosized as 
the font of Bolshevik wisdom and political culture. In different political debates 
opposing party factions quoted from the written legacy of Lenin. Peris 1991, 718. 
11 	 Service 1985, 2-3. During the short period of transition, perestroika, some Soviet 
writings tried to maintain that Gorbachev 's policy regarding religion was truly 
Leninist and that earlier policies had not been. Olcott 1990, 372. Nonetheless, the 
search to elucidate who were "true" Leninists and who were not poses problems for 
historical researchers. 
12 	 John Gooding has remarked that during the years 1985-1991 reformists in the CPSU 
needed Lenin "in order to set the country on a radical trajectory". Reformists also 
required Lenin's political stature to ensure that demands for change would not 
became so radical as to get out of control (Lenin was not really in favour of a 
multiparty system and democracy). The new "perestroika" cult of Lenin was an 
attempt to save the position of the party by utilizing the popularity of Lenin. Lenin is 
still very popular among ordinary Russians. For Gooding a sign of this respect was 
the fact that after the "coup d'etat" of August 1991 Lenin's mausoleum was not 
interfered with, unlike F.E. Dzerzhinsky's (1877-1926) statue, which was 
destroyed. Gooding 1992, 403-405, 412. 
to 1927. The role of Grigory Evsevich Zinovev (Radomyslsky, 1883-
1936) and the ideological contributions of N.I. Bukharin (1888-1938), 
A.I. Rykov (1881-1938) and M.I. Kalinin (1875-1946), who were 
pace-setters of the "right" and moderate communist faction, will also be 
examined. In this context we must take into account the political 
alliance, the so-called "triumvirate" of Stalin, Zinovev and L.B. Ka-
menev (Rosenfeld, 1883-1936) which came into being from 1922 to 
1925. Later Stalin emerged as an ally of the so-called "right-wing" of 
the Bolshevik party and for a time he partly shared their estimations for 
a more prolonged development in modernizing industry and in 
collectivizing agriculture. One of the principal associates of Stalin was 
Emelyan Israelevich Yaroslaysky (Gubelman, Minei Israelevich, 1878-
1943), who was gradually promoted to the position of director of atheist 
work in the Soviet Union. His role as the highest official of Stalinist 
religious policy raises many questions. He did not directly belong to 
Stalin's personal henchmen, as we can see from Niels Erik Rosenfeldt's 
monographs, but nonetheless he was one of the most loyal supporters of 
Stalin.' 3  
This study will be divided into four major chronological sections. 
The second part of its introductory chapter, "The roots of the study", 
examines the ideological heritage of Russian communists and looks at 
the general political situation in Imperial Russia and the role of the 
Russian "intelligentsia", together with the religious-political circum-
stances of pre-revolutionary Russia. The radicalism of the religious 
sects and the conditions of the ethnic minorities within Russia 
constituted fertile soil for revolutionary activity. Moreover, the 
development of Lenin's pre-revolutionary political doctrine and his 
religious ideology will be studied. This chapter will examine the 
development of Lenin's doctrine of class struggle before 1905 and 
study how the 1903 party programme of the Russian Social Democratic 
Worker's Party (RSDWP) dealt with religion. Some questions 
concerning nationality problems in Russia are also examined in this 
context. The year 1905 is important for its implications for Lenin's 
ideology. The ideological wavering of the "god-seekers" and the 
"zubatovian" workers' union were doctrinal threats for Lenin's 
Bolshevik faction. 
The second chapter, "Storm and Wind" — religious policy after the 
October Revolution and during the civil war (1917-1920)", explains 
how the October Revolution and the conflict of the new atheist rulers 
13 Niels Erik Rosenfeldt: "Knowledge and Power, The Role of Stalin's Secret 
Chancellery in The Soviet System of Government. Copenhagen. 1978;" "Stalin's 
Styrets Nervcenter, Nye Studier I Kilderdeme Til Det Sovjetiske Kommunistpartis 
Hemmlige Kancelli". Kobenhavn Universitets Slaviske Institut. Kobenhavn. 1980. 
See also Gill 1990, 72. 
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with traditional belief systems interacted. An official relationship 
between the ROC and the Soviet regime was established on 20 January 
1918. In order to understand this legal act, we must view it in 
connection with the contemporary political situation in the Soviet state. 
The most important question in this context is: how did the changing 
political circumstances affect the religious political line of the Soviet 
leaders? The study of the internal debates and the process of decision 
making of the Soviet leadership gives a more fruitful view of the 
development of the Soviet religious policy. One of the basic hypotheses 
of this study is that the state was under the control of the party; the 
totalitarian system of the "party-state" was a fusion in which the 
communist oligarchy exercised its will by means of a new tool - the 
state machine.14 The Bolshevik revolution, the role of the new 
legislation and the intentions of the new rulers bring to the fore new 
questions. By what methods and organs did the party execute its early 
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religious policy? What was the attitude of the ruling regime in general 
towards religions during the civil war? Were there any modifications in 
the religious political doctrine or attempts at achieving a "modus 
vivendi" between the atheist rulers and the ROC? What was the role of 
national minorities and sectarians during the civil war? 
In the third chapter, "Trotsky's control of early NEP religious policy 
(1921-1923)", the influence of the NEP period on Soviet religious 
policy in general will be studied and the incident of the "con-
fiscation-conflict" focused on. In addition to many other questions, it 
examines the content of the NEP policy in relation to religious 
organizations. How, for example, was this policy implemented? Who or 
what organs were put in charge of religious-political affairs after the 
civil war, when the government had time to concentrate on dealing with 
civil politics? Trotsky's leading role in the religious policy of the ruling 
party deserves special attention. 
The fourth chapter, "The role of religion in the power struggle at the 
height of the high NEP (1924-1927)", outlines in more detail how the 
contest for supreme power, with its ideological confrontations, dealt 
with religion. How did the death of Lenin affect religious policy and 
how did an open power struggle arise in the religious political debates 
before the 13th congress? Moreover, how did the sectarian movement 
and Soviet Catholics adjust to conditions at the height of the high NEP 
and how did an ecclesiastical schism develop inside the ROC? 
The fifth chapter, "The "Storming of Heaven" — The impact of the 
Cultural Revolution and the years of the "Great Turn" (1928-1929)", 
will examine the beginning of the Cultural Revolution and its impact on 
14 	 Rupnik 1988, 132. See also Rigby 1979, 176-179; Pipes 1980, 243-246. 
the position of religious organizations. It investigates how the struggle 
between Komsomol "activists" and moderate "rightists" inevitably led 
to the introduction of a more aggressive religious policy. During 
Stalin's Cultural Revolution, the so-called "korenizatsiya" policy15 was 
altered and the so-called "sblizhenie" policy16 took its place in relation 
to such ethnic minorities as Jews and Moslems. In this respect, I.V. 
Stalin's role as a representative of a new "Red, anti-semitic Russian 
patriotism" arouses interest. As Mikhail Agursky has remarked, I.V. 
Stalin sympathized with Russian nationalism and promoted "National 
Bolshevism" as one of the cornerstones of his ideology.17 
Although this dissertation does not strive to propound any new 
theory concerning Soviet church-state relations, such as Pedro Ramet 
has done in his "Cross and Commissar"18, the author of this monograph 
follows in his footsteps in endeavouring to elucidate certain matters 
which could shed light on the actual decision-making process inside the 
leadership of the Soviet regime. For instance, what were the discussions 	 25 
and debates which emerged inside the leading Soviet organs and were 
there any secret organs at work inside the party? What was the role of 
open discussion? How did the Central Committee and Party congresses 
and conferences deal with religion? How did the changing power 
struggle affect ideological confrontations and the implementation of 
religious policy? Another absorbing question is how Stalin adapted 
Lenin's views on religion. Were Stalin's tendencies to emphasize "Red 
patriotism" and rehabilitate the outmoded nationalistic tradition clearly 
visible during the 1920s? Stalin's "Red patriotism" and his underlining 
of certain old symbols of Imperial Russia as well as the Great-Russian 
revivalism were part of his policy during the late 1930s and afterwards. 
But during the 1920s the tradition of "orthodox" Marxism and 
internationalism were still significant forces in party politics.19 
15 	 By the "korenizatsiya-policy" is meant the early policy of the Bolsheviks towards the 
various nationalities in the Soviet state. It signified the promotion of language and 
national cultures in these national regions. Moreover, the communist party actively 
recruited local national cadres and used local languages in administration in order to 
nurture the new Soviet state apparatus on its cultural periphery. Crawford 1992, 86. 
16 	 As The Great Soviet Encyclopedia has later stated, one attribute of the Soviet 
nationality policy was to bring peoples together (nomiTHxa c6nHNcetHHsi). BSEb, 
292. During L.I. Brezhnev's (1906-1982) time this conventional view, i.e. that 
national cultures were growing together, was even given an official ideological 
justification. It was claimed that in the Soviet Union national groups were 
developing and at the same time coalescing. Gleason 1993, 85. See also 
Rakowska-Harmstone 1986, 236-237; Dunlop 1992, 324. 
17 	 Agursky 1987, 296, 316-317, 324-325. Mikhail Agursky defines National 
Bolshevism as "...the ideology of a political current that legitimizes the existing 
Soviet political system from a Russian national point of view, contrary to its 
exclusive Marxist legitimacy". Agursky 1986, 87. See also Kolsto 1984, 1-29. 
18 	 Ramet 1987, 177. 
19 	 Gill 1990, 13. 
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b. Earlier studies, basic concepts and limitations 
Scientific studies which deal in one way or another with this topic can 
roughly be divided into five categories. Each of these categories 
contains numerous monographs and articles.20 
1. Studies in the history of the ROC 
2. Studies in the history of the Soviet Union 
3. Studies of individual political thinkers (personal histories of 
Soviet leaders) 
4. Studies of the Soviet political system or philosophical doctrine 
5. Studies of the relationship of nationalities and Soviet power 
One of the foremost and most reliable scientific works on the history of 
the ROC and the development of religious policy in the Soviet Union is 
John S. Curtiss' "The Russian Church and the Soviet State 1917-
1950". As Richard Stites has remarked, this work is still a recom-
mendable general study of the relationship between the ROC and the 
Soviet regime.21 Curtiss succeeded brilliantly in connecting the general 
historical context of Soviet Russia with transformations in Soviet 
religious policy. 
There are not so many scientific studies in this first category which 
have concentrated on investigating the relationship between the church 
and ruling regime. Most of the earlier monographs such as Trevor 
Beeson's "Discretion and Valour", "Patriarch and Prophets: Persecution 
of the Russian Orthodox Church Today" by Michael Bourdeaux22, 
Dimitry V. Pospielovsky's trilogy "A History of Atheism in Theory and 
Practise, and the Believer I—III" and "Candle in the Wind" edited by 
Eugene B. Shirley Jr. and Michael Rowe23 have been content with 
drawing the general outlines of the ROC's history and providing quite 
20 	 Disinterested and politically neutral studies made by Soviet authors investigating 
this issue are few. Soviet studies concerning Lenin's political activities have 
suffered from a dogmatic approach. Some dissidents like R. Medvedev and B. 
Kagarlitsky were not able to publish their monographs until after 1985 when a 
certain degree of openness emerged in Soviet research. During the time of 
"perestroika" newspapers such as Voprosy Istorii, Moskovskie Novosti, 
Kommunist, Argumenty i Fakty and Ogonek promoted discussion on sensitive 
political topics of the Soviet era. Soviet researchers, nevertheless, had many 
restrictions placed on them during the time of "perestroika". Spring 1987, 27. As a 
rare exception, we could mention V.A. Alekseev's excellent monograph "Illusions 
and dogmas", published on the eve of the 1991 "coup". See Alekseev, 1991. 
21 	 Stites 1989, 274. 
22 "Patriarch and Prophets. Persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church Today." 
Keston Books. London. 1970. 
23 	 "Candle in The Wind — Religion in the Soviet Union." Edited by Eugene Shirley Jr. 
and Michael Rowe. Foreword by Richard Schifter. Ethics and Public Policy Centre. 
Washington D.C. 1989. 
impressive religion-by-religion analysis in this sphere. Some of the 
studies applying a Marxist critique of religion display a systematic 
approach and contain profound analysis.24 
However, there are many pitfalls in this field. One particular problem 
in some books on church-state relationships is that there is a danger of 
seeing the Bolshevik party as an ideological monolith. The lack of 
primary sources may have led to such inaccurate conclusions. However, 
during the 1920s the Bolshevik party debated intensely what attitude it 
should adopt in relation to religious organizations. Moreover, if we, for 
example, compare Lenin's different writings on the subject systemati-
cally, without any historical approach, we may end up with 
anachronistic conclusions.25 The main problem with a systematic 
approach is the difficulty of seeing the effects of the changing political 
situation in the religious political sphere. As Dimitry V. Pospielovsky 
correctly remarks, simply drawing conclusions on different labels such 
as "moderate" or "hawkish" without deeper political analysis, may lead 
to simplistic conclusions. In the changing political situation of the 
1920s these different labels could be attached to the same person at 
different moments.26 
The second category consists of authorities such as Edward Hallett 
Carr, whose majestic series "A History of the Soviet Union" gives a 
profound analysis of the emerging Bolshevik revolution, the 
development of Bolshevik doctrine in the USSR and the practice of 
national self-determination. Another authority in this field is Richard 
Pipes. His study entitled "The Formation of the Soviet Union, 
Communism and Nationalism 1917-1923" is an outstanding piece of 
scholarship and investigates the views of Soviet leaders on nationality 
and the implications of such views for religious minorities such as Jews 
and Moslems. One of the most distinguished investigators of individual 
political figures has been Isaac Deutscher, the author of a trilogy on 
Trotsky and a biography of Stalin. His personal and cultivated view of 
the power struggle inside the communist regime is in a league of its 
own, although he has come in for criticism too 27 
24 	 See, for example, Delos B. MacKown, "The Classical Marxist Critique of Religion: 
Marx, Engels, Lenin, Kautsky". The Hague. 1975. 
25 	 One example of this kind of systematically impressive but inaccurate thinking is 
when Gustav Wetter tries to find a solution to the problem: "Is this (Soviet ideology) 
also essentially an antireligious one?" and examines it in relation to the slogan 
"religion — private matter". However, it seems obvious that Lenin's ideological 
writings provides material for many interpretations. Wetter 1963, 23. See also 
Weber 1980, 167. 
26 	 Pospielovsky 1987, 33-34 
27 	 Beilharz 1987, 150-153, 173-176. Regarding certain critiques and opinions about 
Carr and Deutscher, see Pethybridge 1990, 6-7, 16-17. 
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The third and fourth categories contain authors such as Robert 
Service, Robert Tucker, Ronald W. Clark, Frederick F. Copleston, Tibor 
Szamuely and Merle Fainsod. Their studies concerning the Soviet 
political leadership and the Soviet political system have particular 
relevance for this dissertation mainly because the Soviet system 
considered religious organizations as posing a political challenge to its 
legitimacy. 
The last category consists of authors such as Chantal 
Lemercier-Quelquejay, Helene Carr6re D'Encausse, Alexander 
Bennigsen, Gerhard Simon and Zvi Gitelman who have made studies 
dealing with the nationality question. Analyses of the effect of power 
struggles on religious policy have been rare. Moreover, questions 
related to nationality and religion have been discussed in secondary 
connections only, but there have, nonetheless, been some pioneering 
attempts to survey the relationship between religion and nationalism. 
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Nevertheless, one of the basic hypotheses of this study presumes that 
ties between religion and nationality (ethnicity in the case of Jewish 
and Moslem populations)28 were linked together in the ideology of 
the Soviet leadership in general and that in their religious policy in 
particular the role of the nationality question was significant. Only from 
this standpoint can the similarities between Imperial Russian and 
Soviet Russian national and religious policies be explained. For 
both regimes, religion served to clarify a person's nationality and 
identity.29 
For example, Jewish symbols of identity, religion and ethnicity were 
partly fused together in the former Soviet Union. Soviet Jews bore 
internal passports where their official nationality was designated as 
Jewish.30 It is also quite legitimate to maintain, as Pedro Ramet does, 
that religious organizations worked in the Soviet Union as "vehicles for 
the preservation, defence, and reinforcement of ethnic sentiment"31. 
Following from this, an investigation of the religious policy of the 
former Soviet regime presupposes a more or less profound examination 
of national and religious policies as interlinking themes. As Pedro 
Ramet has said, for Marxists, 
28 	 Alexander Bennigsen has defined the word "Muslim" as having no religious 
significance in his article "Islamic or Local Consciousness among Soviet 
Nationalities". Nevertheless, he has acknowledged the significance of religious 
consciousness among Muslims as a reality in pre-revolutionary Russia and in the 
early Soviet period. Bennigsen 1971, 168, 181-182. 
29 	 Dunn 1987, 1, 4-11. See also Garrard 1991, 134-140; Klier 1991, 214. 
30 	 Gitelman 1992, 75. 
31 	 Ramet 1989, 411. 
...religious policy and nationalities policy are parts of an organic 
whole and neither should be thought to be autonomous or 
independently elaborated...32 
Dennis J. Dunn has accurately noted that because for most of the 
modern historical period Eastern European nationalities lacked their 
own nation states, national consciousness drew on a variety of sources 
of inspiration, including religion, language, history and race. It is 
obvious that religion was the key factor influencing the formation of 
nations in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. The second major reason for 
the strong ties between nationalism and religion is that the now 
collapsed communist regimes adopted atheism and internationalism as 
part of their official ideology. Religion and nationalism were compelled 
to withdraw into the margins of communist society where they found 
each other as natural allies.33  
The fundamental concepts dealt with in this monograph can be seen 
from its title: "The Party of Unbelief — The Religious Policy of The 
Bolshevik Party, 1917-1929". As John Anderson has remarked, 
religious policy appears to be one area in which ideology seems to be a 
predominant factor. Nonetheless, Anderson has realized that 
ideological premises have not prevented the adoption of a variety of 
different policies towards religion.34  
The expression "religious policy" does not need to be defined 
especially, but it should be noted that the pre-revolutionary Russian 
Encyclopedic Dictionary defines the term "church policy" (uepKosxast 
non HTHKa) in two ways. Firstly it defines it as the activities of the 
church towards the state and society. The second definition is much 
more pertinent for this study: "church policy" is the policy of the state 
in its relations towards existing churches.35 But because this study also 
examines other religious groups such as Jews and Moslems it is 
justified to use a wider expression like "religious policy". In this study 
the term "religious policy" represents the ideological views, political 
attitude and measures taken by the Soviet regime towards the ROC, 
32 	 Ramet 1989, 38. 
33 	 Dunn 1987, 11-12. 
34 	 "...amongst the considerations of the policy makers are to be found those relating to 
the needs of the economy, national issues, questions of socialization and control, 
foreign pressure, and in some cases the preferences of individual leaders..." 
Anderson 1991, 701. 
35 	 ... `uepxoBHas nOIHTHKa - 1. 110.1HTHKa UepKBH. T.e. aeATe.IbHOCTb UepKOBHOrO 
ynpaBleHHA. HanpaaneHHaA K OCynteCTBleHHIO 06IUHX 3a,la4 UepKBH B eC 
OTHOtneHHAX K rOCYAapCTBy H OÖCueCTBy. 2. I1OIHTHKa rocyaapCTBa no 
OTHOWeHHIO K CyuteCTBYK)UtHM B HeM uepKBAM". ES, 72. Understandably, the 
Great Soviet Encyclopedia does not mention the term "church policy", although it 
examines in depth state-church interactions in Soviet Russia. BSEa 1934, 186-188. 
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different religious sects and two particular ethno-religious minorities in 
Russia, Jews and Moslems. Furthermore it must be stated that the ruling 
communist regime itself used this expression to describe its tactical and 
strategic objectives and to define its political initiatives in relation to 
different religious organizations.36 
"Ideology" is a term which also features in this study. Ideology can 
be perceived as the totality of ideas that strives for the maintenance of 
an existing social order.37 This definition is, however, too narrow for 
this study and does not do justice to the Marxist or Soviet interpretation 
of ideology. Too narrow a definition of the term "ideology" may lead us 
to draw misleading conclusions.38 Moreover, as Michael Waller has 
remarked, the problems with using this term are related to utilizing it 
too restrictively.39 
This term was originally used by A.L.C. Destutt de Tracy (1754-
1836) to manifest the empirical analysis of the human mind. The 
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leaders of the French revolution used it to describe the official 
republican doctrine of education which sought to give rational 
schooling to all citizens and free them from prejudices and 
superstitions.4° According to Alan Swingewood, Marx and Engels 
understood ideology as being connected with terms such as alienation, 
mystification and reification. They identified it with the "bourgeois" 
tradition of philosophy or related it to earlier forms of "mechanistic 
materialism"4' 
Following the French example, the Bolshevik revolution interpreted 
ideology as the body of political programmes directing people towards 
happiness. This was transferred to the Soviet system and it meant that 
all political questions were interpreted and discussed in ideological 
terms. It was at the same time a methodology for the analysis of social 
questions and a policy tool inside the Soviet leadership, although 
without providing direct guidelines for policy implementation.42 
36 	 See, for example, RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.318 (Pp 32, 19/10-22). 
37 	 See Karl Mannheim, "Ideology and Utopia. An Introduction to the Sociology of 
Knowledge". Routledge & Kegan Ltd. 1960. London. 
38 	 Bercken 1989, 18. See also Mayer 1988, 48-49. 
39 	 Waller 1988, 21; Pravda 1988, 227. 
40 	 Aiken 1956, 16. 
41 	 Swingewood 1975, 60-61. See also Aiken 1956, 17; Miller 1984, 45-50. 
42 	 Mah 1987, 5. As Graeme Gill has noted, the adopted policy of the ruling regime did 
not necessarily have to be in accordance with ideological tenets (such as the NEP 
policy) in order to be official, but if some political opinion could claim to be really 
"orthodox", it had a good chance of being adopted as the official line of the Soviet 
state. Nevertheless, Gill has remarked in this context that "...while the ideology, 
through the methodology it embodied, helped to structure the approach of the 
party's leaders to the problems confronting them, it offered no simple solutions. 
This was one of the important characteristics of the period: the ideology was not a 
dogma or an orthodoxy, but a living and developing intellectual universe". Gill 
1990, 107. 
During Lenin's lifetime it had no living authority whose word in 
ideological matters would have been categorical. Not even Lenin could, 
despite his eminence and authority, claim to be the living ideological 
fountain of Marxist orthodoxy. As Graeme Gill has stated, during 
Lenin's political career ideology was: 
...a flexible body of ideas which provided both a form of intellectual 
legitimation for the regime and a source of broad principles of 
policy. But the policy direction offered by the ideology was neither 
clear-cut nor monist; a variety of policies could be extracted from the 
ideological principles, with a number of policies being able to claim 
ideological rectitude.. 43 
According to the Soviet interpretation of the 1920s, the concept of 
ideology was seen simply as a mechanical image of class 
consciousness. M.N. Pokrovsky (1868-1932), one of the leading Soviet 
historians and scholars in the 1920s, stated that ideology was 
...a reflection of reality in the minds of men through the prism of 
their interests, mainly class interests..44 
After the death of Lenin this variety slowly vanished and ideology 
became more petrified and standardised under Stalinism. The struggle 
for power affected ideology and it emerged as a weapon and a 
rationalization or a justification of the prevailing policy. The process of 
narrowing the limits of acceptable ideological debate was a result of 
Stalinist policies inside the party. In the spring of 1929 policy debates 
vanished as a result of ideological unification. Membership of the party 
demanded ideological orthodoxy and total submission to the general 
party-line 45 As Alain Besancon has pointed out, Lenin's ideology was a 
rational theory which required complete commitment, almost religious 
belief in the "great thing". The difference between conventional 
religion and Soviet ideology (later Marxism-Leninism) was, as Christel 
Lane has suggested, that the latter does not give as comprehensive a 
conception of the world. She proposes that the Soviet ideology could be 
best described as a "political religion".' 
So in accordance with the above, while the official ideology seemed 
on the surface to be very dogmatic, in practice political manoeuvres 
43 	 Gill 1990, 184. 
44 	 Aron 1963, 293 
45 	 Gill 1990, 107, 184-186. 
46 	 Besancon 1981, 2-5; Lane 1981, 40-41. See also Bercken 1989, 16-21. 
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allowed for more flexible Marxist interpretations which resulted in an 
elastic implemention of religious policy. The problem we face here is 
analogous to that of Biblical interpretation. The scriptures of the 
Marxist "apostles"47 provided a universal "gospel" for the Marxist 
movement. Nevertheless, the main question for Soviet Marxists was 
how to interpret these "holy scriptures" correctly.48 One of the main 
hypotheses in this study is that the practical execution of Soviet 
religious policy proved to be more dependent on the general political 
battles over the hegemony of the party than on ideological arguments. 
In modern Marxist understanding the term "ideology" refers to a 
class society and ideology serves as an organized system for the 
understanding of the interests of a particular class 49 The foregoing 
definitions of the term ideology reveal how in Marxism-Leninism in 
general and in Soviet studies in particular this term has its own special 
meaning. The one additional concept which is used in this study is 
32 	 "doctrine", a term originally derived from religious use.50 
47 	 This concept of borrowing from higher authority in ideological confrontation was 
very common in the Russian socialist movement. George H. Sabine has compared 
this, aptly, to the practice of using biblical verses in religious debate. Sabine 1966, 
806-808. 
48 	 The famous Russian emigrant historian Andrei Sinyaysky has also noted the 
similarities between Soviet ideology and religion by commenting that communist 
ideology would enter history not only "as a new sociopolitical order and economical 
system but also as a new great religion denying all others". Sinyaysky 1990, 6. The 
reason for this understanding of ideology as a major motivation of behaviour may be 
found in the fact that in the Orthodox faith the ideological and intellectual 
dimensions were so close to each other. As Christel Lane has suggested, believing in 
transcendental force has always presupposed belief in particular dogmas. Lane 
1978, 55. 
49 	 Kai Nielsen gives us an example of Marxist understanding of ideology: "a system of 
ideas, theories, beliefs, attitudes, norms and social practices that (a) is characteristic 
of a class society or of a class or other primary social group in class society and that 
(b) serves principally the interests of a class, typically a class in that society, or other 
primary social group while typically at least, putting itself forward as answering to 
the interests of the society". Nielsen 1989, 98. 
50 	 Iivonen 1990, 13. The close relationship between "ideology" and "doctrine" can be 
seen from the definition of Alfred G. Mayer:"...Soviet ideology as the body of 
doctrine taught in courses on dialectical and historical materialism, political 
economy, scientific communism and the history of the party, in short, the sum total 
of what the new Programme of the CPSU describes as "the scientific world 
view...the basis of which is constituted by Marxism-Leninism as a well integrated 
system of philosophic, economic and socio-political positions". Mayer 1988, 44. 
Alex Pravda makes a basic distinction between ideology and doctrine by 
emphasizing that ideology operates as a policy or a control mechanism, while 
doctrine affects form and style rather than the content of policy. Pravda 1988, 241. 
2 
c. Sources of the study 
The rapid social changes during "perestroika" and the collapse of the 
Soviet regime after August 1991 have posed many interesting 
challenges for scholars investigating Russian/Soviet history. New 
primary sources are more available for researchers, though at the time 
of this writing there are still some important archives such as the 
Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF) and various 
archives of the Soviet security organs to which foreign scholars have no 
access. 
The primary sources utilized in this study consist of the minutes and 
protocols of different organs of the state or party as well as personal 
files and other archive material. The main archives used in this study 
are the State Archive of the Russian Federation — GARF FAPD. 
rocyJLapcTseHHblll apxus Poccnlhcxoh (DeiepauuH (comprising the 
former TsGAOR51 and TsGA RSFSR52), and the party archives, the 
Russian Centre for the Storage & Study of Documents of Recent 
History, RTsKhIDNI PIUXHRHH. POCCHHCKHH ueHTp xpallexxsl H 
H3yvleHHA aOKyMeHTOB HOBeI3wei1 HCTopH4.53 
Published sources used in this study can be divided into three 
categories. First the published works of Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin and other 
leaders of the Bolshevik regime. The second group of sources consists 
of the published protocols and stenographic minutes of the congresses 
and conferences of the Bolshevik party. Some of these were published 
before Stalin's "school of falsification" and some in the post-Stalin 
period.54 The third group consists of miscellaneous sources: archive 
material, edited volumes of the Trotsky archive,55 party resolutions,56 
51 	 The former Central State Archive of the October Revolution. Henceforth referred to 
as GARFI. 
52 	 The former State Archive of the RSFSR. Henceforth referred to as GARF2. 
53 	 The Central Party Archives/former Institute of Marxism-Leninism for the Central 
Committee of the CPSU (I.1eHTpanbHb1N IIapTHiiHb1 Ft ApxHB HHCTHTyTa 
MapKcH3Ma-JIeHHHH3Ma rip UK KHCC). My colleague, Varpu Myllyniemi MA 
has also kindly provided me with some exemplary material from the Archive of 
State Museum conceming History of Religion (AGMIR) from St. Petersburg. 
54 	 The Central Committee of the CPSU has published some useful documents and 
minutes of the Central Committee and Politburo. See Izv TsK KPSS 1990, No.4. 
55 	 Even during "perestroika" some documents from this archives were published in 
Russian. ApxHs Tporuxoro. KOMMyHHCTH9eCKaS onnosuuHH B CCCP. TOM I—
IV. 1923-1927. ApocslaBnb. PeaaKTop-cocraBHTenb 1O.'eJ1bWTHHCK1111. 
HsaareJrbcKHN ueHTp "Teppa". 1988. See also The Trotsky Papers I—II, 1917-
1922. Edited and annotated by Jan Meijer. The Hague. 1971. 
56 See, for example, KOMMyHHCTH9eCKa$ IIapTHA CoseTcxoro Coro3a B 
pe3oJllouHHx H peweimsx Cbe3LOB. KOHCI)epeHUHIi H nneHyMOB UK (1898-
1970). Tom I—III. I43a. BOCbMOe. aonoJleH Hoe H HCnpaBJIeHHOe. MOCKBa. 1970. 
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printed volumes of early Soviet legislation57 etc.58  
The documents from the Party Archives and from the State Archives 
represent the most valuable sources utilized in this study. Originally 
these documents were intended only for the small inner circle of the 
ruling party. This can be seen from the special captions employed. 
Classifications such as cexpeTHo. coseplueHHo cexpeTHo. cpo9Ho 
cexpeTHo, cTporo..-cexpeTHo. a6conyTHo cexpeTHo, XpaHHT 
KodnHpaTHBHo!. ceKpeTHbIH OTAesi were often prefixed to those 
papers. These captions reveal how the tradition of conspiracy prospered 
inside the Bolshevik party especially after the October revolution. The 
main reason for this secrecy was the desire to minimize the spread of 
any information which could shed light on the party's political 
activities. In this respect this new archive material is of crucial 
importance, as these authentic documents allow one to investigate the 
actual process of debate and decision-making inside the ruling regime. 
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Moreover, working with this new archive material allows one to 
evaluate critically earlier studies in this field and to conduct source 
criticism of hitherto available material. This is an essential method 
when inspecting official Soviet sources, as it is much easier when we 
are able to compare official published material with archive material. 
For example, Soviet archives preserve authentic documents of party 
officials who were later purged from the ruling regime. Moreover, the 
earlier categorization of the sources59 is now less enigmatic than before. 
Tracing the different positions in this field and evaluating the 
decision-making processes in the area of religious policy was earlier 
quite difficult as official Soviet sources formerly tried to give a 
harmonized picture of Soviet policy. 
57 	 See, for example, IleKperbl CoBercxoti BnacTH. 1-3. MocKBa. 1957; Co6paHHe 
Y3aKOHeHH4t H PaCnOpsnKeHHI4 Pa604ero- H KpeCTbAHCKOro IIpaBHTe.rlbCTBa. I 
1917-1918: Orten 1. 1-90, 93-99. YKa3are3b II 1919: 1-69. YKa3arenb. III 
1920: 1920:1-100. YKa3arenb: OrseneHHe L1epKBH or FocyuaperBa B CCCP. 
I1.B.FHIynMHOB. Printed originally in Moscow in 1926, followed by a supplement, 
Moscow 1928. Richmond, Surrey. 1971. 
58 	 For other source material, see the "catechism" of the 1919 party programme: 
A36yKa KOMMyHH3Ma. IHonynspHoe o6bRCHeHHe npOrpaMMbl POccHflCKOH 
KOMMyHHCTH4eCKOH rlapTHH 60nbWeBHK0B. rocyaapcTBeHHoe H3AaTenbCTBO. 
IIeTep6ypr. 1920. See also British documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and 
Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. General Editors: Kenneth 
Bourne and D. Cameron Watt. Part II. From the First to the Second World War. 
Series A. The Soviet Union, 1917-1939. Ed. Dominic Lieven. University 
Publications of America. 1986. 
59 	 See, Rosenfeldt 1978, 18. 
2. THE ROOTS OF THE STUDY 
a. Historical and ideological background of Bolshevik 
religious ideology 
When examining the roots of this study, it is essential to acquaint 
oneself with some of the factors which influenced the ideological 
background of the Russian Bolshevik party. One such factor is the 
philosophy of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) as well as 
those ideological ingredients which Marxism inherited from 
Hegelianism. One of the concepts which later proved important for both 
Hegelianism and Marxism is "dialectics", which for Hegel was a 
universal method of enacting the truth in philosophy, religion, logic, 
history, etc. Marxist philosophy adopted this view too, and regarded 
dialectics as a universal method, but only in the sphere of the material 
world: productive forces and history. According to Marxists, the history 
of mankind was not governed by the development of the Spirit; the 
existing order was based on dialectically developing material forces6° 
The second significant concept in this field which Marxism adopted 
from Hegel was the teleological concept of history. According to Hegel, 
mankind was developing through means of a Universal Spirit towards 
the culmination of history. The Marxist concept, on the other hand, 
underlined that history obeys only material principles, i.e. the laws of 
production, which could lead to only one chiliast goal in history and 
society — communism. Marxist thinking maintained that history and 
society together composed a totality of facts which were on the way to 
the telos of communist society.61  
The Left-Hegelian movement, which emerged after the death of 
Hegel in 1831, steered Hegelian thinking in a radical direction. 
Left-Hegelians declared themselves genuine inheritors of the Hegelian 
philosophical system and criticized the conservative, existing political 
order. For them, Hegel's logic of rationality required changing the 
autocratic and unreasonable existing order which hindered the 
fulfilment of the concept of reason. Unlike Hegel, they believed that 
this would come into existence not on a spiritual and transcendent level, 
but in history and in the material world.62 
66 	 Taylor 1975, 131; Heidegger 1988, 65-66. See also Wood 1990, 1-4. 
61 	 See Althusser 1972, 174-176, 181-186 and Gorman 1982, 96. See also Dickey 
1987, 144-150. On Hegel's influence on Russian radicals, see Riasanovsky 1965, 
56, 118-119, 167, 170. 
62 	 Hook 1958, 77-80; Gorman 1982, 70-71. 
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The culmination of the Left-Hegelian criticism was the philosophy 
of L. Feuerbach (1804-1872) and the biblical critique of D.F. Strauss 
(1808-1874). Other young Hegelians had denounced the idea of God in 
an academic way, but "Das Leben Jesu" of D.F. Strauss and 
Feuerbach's work "Das Wesen des Christentums" drew wider public 
attention to these questions. Strauss's audacious monograph concerning 
the historicity of the four Gospels also deepened the differences among 
the Left-Hegelians themselves. Furthermore, Feuerbach justified his 
views by stressing that the content of religion and its objects could only 
be explained by anthropology. For Feuerbach religion was part of 
human activity and had no other justification than man himself. 
According to him, the origin of all deities lay in the fact that man did 
not dare take full responsibility for himself; he was alienated from his 
true nature and projected his best attributes towards God. Feuerbach 
concluded that religion was simple alienation and fatalism; the only 
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rational object of faith was the human himself, his abilities and 
actions 63 
Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) 
developed their philosophical concept system partially from 
Feuerbach's epistemological concepts and partially from Left-Hegelian 
tradition. For them Hegel's concept of the rationality of being 
demanded that conscious human activity should turn this rationality to 
praxis — to change the world by revolution. Marxist understanding 
presupposed that the history of mankind had given rise to a 
contradiction between labour and capital — the difference between 
exploiters and the exploited. According to them, history was conducted 
not by a Spirit, but by productive forces and the material basis which 
determined them. The consciousness of man, institutes of society, and 
also religion were part of the superstructure of society; an exploitative 
form of production was then reflected in the alienation of man from his 
realessence.64 
In its religious ideology Marxism underlined that the premise of any 
critique of society was the critique of religion. Religion was an 
erroneous understanding of reality which of necessity led to an 
imaginary understanding of the world; a believer becoming alienated 
from his genuine being. The exploited majority of mankind, the 
proletariat, escaped from this reality by having recourse to religious 
"opium" and unconsciously awaited its redemption from the yoke of 
capitalism. At the same time, this "opium" was exploiting the 
63 	 McLellan 1969, 2-8, 20-22, 31-33, 43-47. 
64 	 MEW 3, 69-70. "Deutsche Ideologie. Feuerbach"; Swingewood 1975, 89-93; 
Gorman 1982, 26. 
consciousness of workers by making them resigned to their lot.65  
Summa summarum, religion was only moonshine and metaphysics; 
mesmerizing illusion which the proletariat consumed in their despair. 
The role of religion was always reactionary, although Engels in 
particular was ready to acknowledge that in the early Christian era 
religion had expressed the genuine anguish of the exploited masses 66 
Another important ingredient in the development of Bolshevik 
religious ideology was the authoritative status of the ROC which 
aggravated the religious-political situation in pre-revolutionary Russia. 
Orthodox Christianity, the dominant faith in Imperial Russia, was 
deeply anchored in the autocratic system. It enjoyed privileges and had 
a special legal status as the only official church for Russians. Some 63% 
of the population (83 million) of the Russian Empire belonged to the 
ROC, while its nearest competitor, the Old Believers, with 
approximately 11 million followers, formed the second largest religious 
group in the Empire. Nonetheless, this high status was not enough to 
save the ROC from being absorbed by the autocratic state. In 1721 the 
ROC was subordinated by the "ecclesiastical reforms" introduced by 
Peter the Great (1682-1725). The founder of the modern Russian state 
could not tolerate an independent church and the ROC was forced to 
fuse with the ruling regime. The results of his reform were devastating 
for the independence of the ROC. Clergymen were now placed directly 
under state control and in most people's minds the church and state 
were identical. The most influential change was, however, the 
de-capitation of the church: the office of the Patriarch was abolished 
and replaced by the Holy Synod as the highest authority of the church. 
The Over-Procurator, nominated by the Czar himself, was now the real 
head and the supervisor of Russian Orthodoxy.67 
Although the ROC had lost its independence, the material basis of 
the ROC and especially its monasteries prospered up until the October 
Revolution. According to the Holy Synod of 1914, there were 57 000 
churches and 24 000 chapels along with 110 000 priests and deacons in 
the Russian Empire. In addition the ROC had over 800 monasteries, it 
possessed over 7 million desyatin of land and was engaged in many 
different commercial enterprises.68 
But, on the other hand, the education and social situation of the 
priests was in sharp contrast to the abundance of the ROC 's material 
65 	 MEW 1, 378. "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung"; 
Althusser 1972, 176. 
66 	 McLellan 1969, 95; Thiemann 1984, 54-55. 
67 	 Cunnigham 1981, 15; Waldron 1989, 103-107. See also Smolitsch 1964, 10. 
68 	 Armstrong 1967, 31; Seton—Watson 1967, 222-223, 534-535. 
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wealth. The educational level of the Russian clergy was notoriously low 
and the social contrast between the "white" lower clergy and the 
"black" higher clergy deepened social tensions among priests. The poor 
"white" clergy working in the countryside were struggling at almost the 
same economic level as their flock. And the "black" priest-monks, who 
despite the fact that they could advance in their career, were, 
nonetheless, strictly supervised by the Holy Synod.69 
The dominant state church was not the sole agent in the field of 
religion: other denominations and religious groups existed too. These 
different groups were often connected with specific nationalities and 
the Russian autocracy usually treated nationality and religion as one. 
For example, in Poland and Lithuania Roman Catholics predominated, 
while Estonia and Finland were overwhelmingly Lutheran. The 
Lutheran Churches in Finland and in the Baltic region could operate 
relatively freely under their old privileges, but the situation with regard 
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to other religions and nations was not so stable. In addition to these 
"official" denominations, there was a substantial Catholic population in 
Western Ukraine and large ethnic minorities such as Jews, especially in 
Ukraine (the so-called Pale of Settlement). As the Russian Empire 
extended further east it came into contact with Moslems in the 
Caucasus and in Siberia. After the middle of the 19th century the 
government intensified its "Russification" policy towards the 
nationalities and religions of the Russian Empire and the Jewish 
population especially experienced semi-official persecution.70 
Along with these national groups, there existed different sects, both 
domestic and of foreign origin, which competed with the Orthodox 
faith in Russian minds. Numerous groups of starovertsy (Old Believers) 
formed the oldest and most influential religious competitor inside the 
Russian Empire. From the beginning, this movement constituted the 
protest of the old-fashioned Russian countryside against modern, urban 
influences, although many significant Russian businessmen emerged 
later from the ranks of the Old Believers. The Russian state at first 
persecuted Old Believers, but gradually the authorities became more 
tolerant of them. The autocracy tried only to curtail the most radical 
manifestations of the Old Believer movement. On the other hand, 
Russian radicals in time also came to realize the importance of the Old 
Believers and attempted to co-operate with them and radicalize them. 
Russian political radicals interpreted the religious protest of these 
people as a political challenge against the autocracy.71  
69 	 Freeze 1983, 472-473. See also Gagarin 1970 (1872). 
70 	 Waldron 1989, 102. See also Thaden 1984. 
71 	 Struve 1967, 131-139; Venturi 1983, 113-114, 117-118, 198-200, 577-579. On 
the Russian sectarian movement, see Karl Konrad Grass, "Die Russischen Sekten I— 
One particular group worth mentioning are the sects of foreign 
origin. These movements had an influence over the peasant in the 
Russian countryside, especially through their ultra-democratic gospel. 
Foreign groups such as the Stundists, a sect of German origin,72 played 
an important part in spreading literacy among the peasantry. Many poor 
Russian peasants adopted this faith which preached democracy 
between believers and collective ownership. The ruling autocratic 
regime took a negative attitude towards this political radicalism and 
persecuted these sects with all its might. Suspicion that revolutionaries 
might gain a foothold among these sects caused officials to ban 
Stundism and persecute other radical domestic sectarians such as the 
Dukhobors, "those who fight for the Spirit".73  
The Bolshevik religious doctrine had its origins in the tense pre-
revolutionary social situation in Russia, i.e. the antagonism between the 
state church and the radical intelligentsia. On the one hand, the 
Orthodox religion and clergy were utilized as tools in support of 	 39 
Czarism. On the other the privileged and at the same time subordinated 
position of the ROC in pre-revolutionary Russian society complicated 
its relations with the Russian intelligentsia. It was generally held by the 
radical intelligentsia that the ROC, which supported the autocracy, was 
an obsolete and reactionary institution. These western-orientated 
radicals saw the autocracy and the ROC as being identical.74  This 
submissive position of the Orthodox church proved fatal for the ROC. 
Due to the above factors a "spiritual vacuum" was formed in pre-
revolutionary Russia. On the eve of 1917 the ROC had become 
somewhat discredited in the eyes of the populace. It had steadily lost the 
loyalty of the Russian intelligentsia, which looked with suspicion at all 
attempts to revitalize Orthodoxy. Moreover, the official church had 
suppressed the protest of dissident religious thinkers such as L. N. 
Tolstoi (1828-1910) or V. M. Solovev (1853-1900), viewing them as 
heretics and all attempts to revitalize the ROC failed. At the same time, 
large masses of the people were indifferent to the their church and Old 
Believers and sectarians were able to attract those peasants who were 
stirred by religious feelings. When the church lost its powerful 
III." Leipzig, 1966; Alexandr Ilich Klibanov, "History of Religious Sectarianism in 
Russia (1860s-1917)". Oxford, 1982. See also how Mikhail A. Bakunin (1814-
1876) attempted to win over certain representatives of the Russian sectarians to 
anarchism: Kelly 1987, 160-161. 
72 	 Revolutionary propaganda seemed to especially suit Protestant sects. According to 
Andrew Q. Blane, this was due to a concept familiar to Protestants, that of building 
the ideal society on Earth. Blane 1971, 302. 
73 	 Seton-Watson 1967, 473-474; Brooks 1985, 25-27; Waldron 1989, 112. 
74 	 Zernov 1963, 197-198; McLellan 1987a, 90-91. 
supporter during the revolution, the vacuum was filled with more 
"concrete" beliefs.75 As Richard Pipes has noted, "this [spiritual] 
vacuum was filled with secular ideologies which sought to realize on 
this earth the paradise that Christianity had promised to provide in the 
next".76 
The tradition of Russian radical thought is also a very significant 
factor to be borne in mind when examining the development of the 
religious ideology of the Soviet ruling regime. It goes without saying 
that Bolshevism was ideologically rooted in the Russian radical 
revolutionary tradition. The birth of this Russian radicalism can, with 
good reason, be traced to the mutiny of the "Decembrist" officers in 
1825. After this mutiny a long dispute began between Western-minded 
reformers and Slavophiles who sought the ultimate answer to the 
problems of Russian society in the country's past. The initiator of this 
discussion was P.I. Chaadaev (1794-1856) who in his "Philosophical 
40 
	
	
Letters", published in 1820, introduced the idea of the Westernization 
of old Russian society. According to him, there was nothing in Russian 
history or society which was worth preserving; everything that was 
important or useful in Russia was of Western origin. By themselves 
Russians had hardly created anything worthwhile. He criticized the 
autocracy especially, which had isolated Russia in the cultural and 
economic sphere. The Orthodox religion had prevented the natural 
development of the Westernization of Russian society. However, 
Chaadaev did not oppose religion as such, but believed in the possibility 
of an imminent "Kingdom of God" where religion would be the 
foundation for all moral life.77 
Chaadaev's opinion of the necessity of Westernizing Russian society 
was repeated in the philosophical debates of later Russian generations. 
One initiator of this debate was the so-called Stankevich's 
Philosophical Circle which promulgated the ideas of nineteenth century 
classical German philosophy among the Russian intelligentsia. One of 
the important representatives of this dissident generation was Vissarion 
Belinsky (1811-1848), whose writings range from literary criticism to 
criticism of Russian society. He belonged to the camp of Westemizers 
and believed that Czarism had betrayed the example of Peter the Great. 
Peter had been a real reformer of Russia but the later autocracy had not 
been able to fulfil Peter's goal of modernizing Russian society and had 
degenerated into Oriental despotism. The autocracy had also neglected 
its duty to educate and reform the ancient society and had put its hope in 
75 	 Pipes 1974, 243-245. 
76 	 Pipes 1974, 245. 
77 	 Anderson 1967, 196-198; Walicki 1980, 85-91. See also Copleston 1986, 26-32. 
mysticism and prayer rather than in civilisation.78  
The second imposing member of the Stankevich's Circle was the 
journalist and writer A.I. Herzen (1812-1870). He was the founder of 
Russian agrarian socialism and among his numerous activities he found 
time to edit the first famous emigre newspaper, Kolokol. Like 
Chaadaev, he believed that Russia had nothing to give to the history of 
mankind, but later when he was exiled to the West, he modified his 
views. Herzen started to emphasize that the ordinary people, the narod, 
were capable of reforming Russia, unlike the rotten autocracy with its 
privileges. Herzen's most famous philosophical contribution was the 
idea of the obshchina, the agricultural commune, which he saw as the 
answer to the burning social questions of Russia. Both Belinsky and 
Herzen were representative of the anticlerical faction among members 
of the Russian intelligentsia. They fiercely opposed religion and the 
church as well as the autocracy and believed that the ROC actively 
impeded the progress of liberty. Herzen and his generation were also 
influenced by Left-Hegelian thinking in general and studied Marxist 
thought with keen interest.79 
However, the Russian intelligentsia before the middle of the 19th 
century, the generation of Belinsky and Herzen, was still convinced of 
the possibility of peaceful reform or dialogue between the autocracy 
and radicals, unlike M.A. Bakunin and p.N. Tkachev (1844-1885), who 
were much more critical of traditional values than were their 
forerunners. The rise of Left-Hegelian thought and the outbreak of 
revolutions in Europe, together with emerging Marxism, had an 
influence in Russia. In the 1860s there emerged a new generation of 
"nihilists" who opposed both the official and spiritual authorities. The 
ideological teachings of these "angry young men" were opposed to 
everything which could not be rationalized; they approved only of 
material values and denied everything related to tradition, romantics, 
metaphysics and religion.80 Mikhail Bakunin, as a representative of the 
Russian anarchists, objected fervently to the fusion of state and church 
and believed that real freedom in Russia could not be possible until the 
destruction of both institutions. Tkachev's main legacy to the Russian 
revolutionary tradition was his idea of making revolution with the help 
of a conscious and disciplined revolutionary party.81  
The autocracy responded to this criticism with punitive methods and 
was reluctant to compromise with Russian radicals. A well-known 
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representative of this generation was N.G. Chernyshevsky (1822-
1889), a student of theology who later became a radical writer and 
essayist. His books opposing the autocratic regime caused officials to 
exile him to Siberia for 14 years. His novel "What is to be done?" also 
influenced the young Vladimir Ilich Lenin. This book articulated the 
future praxis and programme of the Russian radical intelligentsia. But 
more importantly, it presented an archetype for revolutionary heroes; it 
showed role-models for new kinds of activists who would deny 
themselves, go among the people as "professional revolutionaries" and 
sacrifice themselves for the sake of the people.82 
One practical outcome of the suppression of the intelligentsia was 
the birth of the narodnovoltsy movement. A young radical generation, 
inspired by Herzen's and Chemyshevsky's ideas towards the end of 
1860s, went to the countryside in order to enlighten the Russian people 
and raise them against the autocracy. This romantic crusade resulted in 
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failure; the peasant population rejected all attempts to radicalize them. 
As a result of this frustrating experience, the narodnovoltsy movement 
split into two, "Narodnaya Volya" — the People's Will, a terrorist group 
which later murdered Czar Alexander II in 1881, and the more 
moderate "Zemlya i Volya" movement.83  
The collapse of the "People's Will" prepared the soil for a new 
revolutionary movement based on Marxism. This emerged in Russia in 
the 1880s and 1890s and won support especially among students and in 
academic circles because it seemed to offer a scientific and concrete 
answer to the problems of Russian society.84 The "father" of this 
philosophy in Russia was Georgy Valentinovich Plekhanov (1856-
1918), who became one of the most authoritative spokesmen of Russian 
Marxism. He had once belonged to the moderate wing of the narodnik 
movement but later started to criticize the narodnovoltsy and turned to 
Marxism. Plekhanov believed that neither individual acts of terror nor 
educational activities among the peasants would destroy the autocracy; 
the only possibility was to build a Marxist organization for 
class-struggle and organize industrial workers for revolution.85 
Plekhanov's religious ideology had two sources, the tradition of the 
Russian intelligentsia and the Marxist heritage. As a member of the 
Russian intelligentsia he had adopted the clichés of his time. For 
Plekhanov, as for many other members of the intelligentsia, the ROC 
was an obstacle to freedom and civilliberties. He shared the typical 
82 	 Carr 1969, 41-43; Copleston 1986, 104. 
83 	 Baron 1963, 78-83; Bryner 1985, 70. 
84 	 Seton-Watson 1967, 550-551; Ulam 1968, 143-144. 
85 	 Seton-Watson 1967,532-533,561-565. 
view of the intelligentsia in maintaining that religious beliefs could be 
justified only for an uneducated peasantry but should be anathema for 
educated people. For someone to call himself a socialist and express 
religious convictions was unacceptable; there could not be any kind of 
ideological accommodation between religion and socialism. As a 
standard-bearer of the "orthodox" Marxist tradition, he criticized those 
German Social Democrats who believed that religion was a private 
matter. Plekhanov urged that every socialist should fight against 
religious ideology and attempt to enlighten (although not with brute 
force) such comrades who held religious opinions.86 As George Kline 
and David McLellan have remarked, Plekhanov believed that the origin 
of religion was based on animism and religion would yet be seen as an 
interlude in the development of human history. Nevertheless, 
Plekhanov made a distinction between religious feeling and religious 
ideas. For him religious feeling was to some extent a sign of aesthetic 
values. He believed that in the future, in a socialist society, churches 	 43 
would serve the people as theatres and concert halls.87 
Finally, one other significant factor which influenced the religious 
ideology of the Soviet oligarchy has to do with personal biography. The 
personal experiences and histories of the Soviet leaders must be looked 
at. When we glance briefly at the personal biographies of the three 
leading Bolshevik figures we notice distinctions between typical 
representatives of the Russian intelligentsia (Lenin, Trotsky) and 
representatives of the half-educated elements of the intelligentsia 
(Stalin).88 
The founder of Bolshevism, Vladimir Ilich Ulyanov (Lenin), was 
born on 10 April 1870 in Simbirsk in the family of school inspector Ilya 
Nikolaevich Ulyanov (1831-1886). Lenin's family and especially his 
father were religious, educating their son in accordance with Orthodox 
tradition. However, these early religious teachings had little effect; the 
young Lenin was quite early on influenced by the Russian anticlerical 
and antireligious tradition. Chernyshevsky's literary works and 
especially his novel "What is to be done?" introduced him to the ideas 
of the radical intelligentsia. The real hero of this novel, Rakhmetov, 
resembled in his monomania the later Lenin, who would come to 
possess the same qualities. Lenin was indeed the ultimate rigorist, a 
professional revolutionary with few interests outside his Party. Among 
others, he was also inspired by the poet D.I. Pisarev (1840-1868) who 
wrote about dreaming of a new world, the altruistic possibility of 
86 	 Plekhanov 1956, 469-471. 
87 	 Kline 1968, 136-137, 139; McLellan 1987a, 92-95. 
88 	 Deutscher 1967, 24. 
suffering for this world.89 
Nevertheless, nothing in his childhood indicated that he would 
become the future leader of the Bolsheviks. Trotsky maintained that the 
events of 1886 were the turning point for Lenin. He believed that the 
death of Lenin's father shook the basis of the young Vladimir's 
religious convictions. Trotsky "psychologized" that the non-rational 
nature of the ROC's answers at that critical moment destroyed 
Vladimir's earlier religious beliefs. The crisis continued in 1887 when 
his older brother, Alexander Ilich Ulyanov (1866-1887), was im-
prisoned for revolutionary activity and shortly afterwards executed. 
Lenin's subsequent expulsion from school for rebellious behaviour no 
doubt further embittered him. According to Trotsky, the young Vladimir 
then became acquainted with the writings of Marx which gave him a 
rational explanation for his great personal tragedy and directed him 
towards only one logical solution; to continue his brother's work with 
44 	 more specific methods.90 
Trotsky's early days may be seen as a prototype for many Russian 
revolutionaries of Jewish origin. Lev Davidovich Bronstein, a son of a 
prosperous Jewish agricultural settler, was born in 1879 and grow up in 
Yanovka in Ukraine. Cosmopolitanism was perhaps the most influential 
element in his early education. Although he received the traditional 
Jewish education in a heder, a Jewish religious school, he also later 
became acquainted with the teachings of the ROC and other religious 
denominations. But as a typical representative of the Russian and the 
Jewish intelligentsia of his day, Trotsky rejected religious teachings on 
rationalist grounds, the traditional Jewish or Orthodox dogmas being 
too narrow-minded for him. For Trotsky, as for many other Russian 
revolutionaries, the teachings of traditional beliefs represented an 
obsolete and irrelevant part of human history. Nevertheless, he was 
familiar with religious doctrines and utilized expressions, metaphors 
and language rooted in religion. He even started his revolutionary 
career by working among radical religious sects 91 
Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili (Stalin) represented a different 
social group to that of Lenin and Trotsky, who were both from educated 
and fairly prosperous backgrounds. Pre-revolutionary Russian society 
could have offered many possibilities for advancement to both Lenin 
89 	 PSS 6, 172-173 "tiro .senarb. Ha60nesmHe BonpocbI Hamero aBHa<eeJsi; Carr 
1969, 43; Copleston 1986, 110, 122-123. As Robert C. Williams has remarked, this 
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and Stalin, but for a boy like Iosif an ecclesiastical education offered the 
only way to social progress. Maybe as a result of this background, 
turning to socialism was for him something more concrete than it was 
for Lenin and Trotsky. For the Russian semi-intelligentsia, the radical 
antireligious and anticlerical tradition was not a self-evident truth. 
Stalin came from a religious background and, in his case, Bolshevism 
replaced the Orthodox faith and his Georgian nationality as a new form 
of dogma. For Stalin joining the Russian revolutionary tradition and 
adopting socialist principles represented the abandonment of his old 
faith. Giving up the Orthodox religion and Georgian nationality 
symbolized something nearly mystical for him. As his later speeches 
testify, turning to socialism was for him an initiation into a new godless 
and international brotherhood. It also explains why Stalin had an 
ambiguous attitude towards the tradition he had joined. On the one hand 
he accepted it, but on the other he retained mental reservations towards 
the heights of the intelligentsia's thinking. For him it was more a tool 	 45 
than a value in itself.92 
This may perhaps explain why his attitude towards traditional values 
was always complex. As a Marxist he was compelled to reject both his 
old Orthodox religion and Georgian nationality as harmful prejudices, 
but it is justified to claim that he never characterized religion with 
Lenin's aggressive animosity or the intellectual disdain of Trotsky. 
Stalin was not mentally shackled by the ideas of the Russian 
intelligentsia and perhaps therefore he could modify his ideological 
thinking in accordance with practical needs, even to an extreme degree. 
As Robert B. Tucker has commented, Stalin could integrate his 
Bolshevism with Russian nationalism and saw himself personally as a 
representative of a "resurrected Russian statehood".93  
In conclusion we may state that the ideological roots of Bolshevik 
religious doctrine can be traced to German classical philosophy and 
especially to Hegelian thought. Hegelian philosophical concepts and 
Left-Hegelian tradition became fused in Marxism which rejected the 
ideas of transcendency, i.e. religion as an alienated form of con-
sciousness. Religion for them was a harmful obstacle to progress in 
society. It was an opiate which the exploited proletariat hung on to, thus 
weakening its desire for a better lot on Earth. Also, we may sum up that 
the Russian revolutionary tradition was at the same time anti-autocratic 
and anticlerical; criticizing both the "rotten" state and the "decayed" 
church. This anticlericalism was passed on to the Bolshevik party. 
92 	 Deutscher 1967, 26, 35; Tucker 1990, 3-4, 7. See also Nikolai Berdyaev, "The 
Russian Revolution". Ann Arbor, Michigan Press. Michigan 1966. 
93 	 Tucker 1990, 5-6. See also Billington 1970, 534-535. 
b. The religious-political programme of the RSDWP, 
the challenge of sectarians and Christian socialism 
When tracing the formation of Bolshevik religious ideology before the 
October Revolution it is useful to study it through Lenin's revolutionary 
career. Ideologically Lenin was, as we have seen, a mental product of 
the Russian radical tradition. Like Plekhanov, he was an "orthodox" 
Marxist and a convinced atheist with little understanding for doctrinal 
compromises in this area. This can be seen clearly from his early 
writings in which religion appeared to him to be a "delusion" which 
ensured that the exploiters could maximize their profits undisturbed. 
According to him, the church and the pub were both harmful diluters of 
the workers' political activity.94 
However, the practical political situation in Russia restricted his 
ideological reservations as the Social Democrats were working under 
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	 the yoke of political suppression. This gave rise to many local 
peculiarities and modifications in Marxist class-struggle tactics. 
Opposition to the regime was illegal in the Russian Empire and many of 
the RSDWP's leaders such as Lenin and Plekhanov were exiled to 
Europe. For example, the first Russian Social Democratic party 
congress, convened in Minsk in 1898, was disrupted by the police 
almost immediately after its opening and its leaders were put in 
prison.95  
During these formative years the RSDWP belonged to a large 
anti-autocratic front together with many other Russian radical 
movements. This may perhaps explain why before the 1905 revolution 
the Bolsheviks actually criticized religion and the church so little. For 
example, Lenin did not particularly underline this part of his ideology 
or write any specific attacks against the ROC or religion before 1905. 
We may presume that this was a deliberate tactic; the future Bolshevik 
party was still a marginal political group among other radical Russian 
factions. Moreover, Iskra, the Party's newspaper, was only gradually 
increasing its circulation among the Russian workers. 
Russian Marxists, and Lenin in particular, saw clearly the limitations 
and possibilities of this situation. As the Russian Empire was still under 
a medieval political order, its industry still underdeveloped and the 
bourgeois class and proletariat virtually non-existent, Lenin was 
obliged to make unique modifications to Marxism. According to 
general Marxist understanding, Russia needed a bourgeois revolution 
94 	 PSS 6,74 "LITo aeaaTb. Ha6o1esmHe sonpocbl Hauiero aBH)KeHHR'; PSS 6, 264- 
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and consequently the bourgeois class had a dual role. It had a historical 
mission to first accomplish the goals of the bourgeois revolution, before 
the emergence of a socialist revolution and a socialist society. Along 
with other Marxists in general, Lenin believed that the Russian 
bourgeoisie was obliged to overthrow the autocracy before its own 
destruction by a revolution of the proletariat. These duties also included 
the duty to enact civil liberties, i.e. to separate church and state. This 
can be seen from the RSWDP's newspaper, Iskra, when it declared on 1 
August 1903 that the bourgeois society which would emerge after the 
autocracy should secularize Russian society. Or, as Lenin explicitly put 
it, the positive goals of bourgeois political demands could be reduced to 
one word: democratism. So before the 1905 revolution Lenin was a 
standard bearer of general Marxist assumptions and supported the idea 
of democratic liberties for all Russian political parties. But even from 
the beginning he underlined that the Russian bourgeoisie was too weak 
alone to carry out the democratic revolution without the help of the 	 47 
proletariat. Due to its ambiguous class nature, the Russian bourgeois 
was always "flirting" with autocracy and could not alone play its 
progressive class role in accomplishing the bourgeois revolution.96 
As Lenin stated in his early demands, the RSDWP should become 
the leader of the reluctant bourgeoisie and the leader of all other groups 
which suffered under the yoke of the autocracy. Lenin, like other 
revolutionaries, was aware of the protests of persecuted national 
minorities, persecuted religious denominations, as well as religious 
sects. He believed that these groups would become important allies of 
the RSDWP. Lenin suggested that the party should support the 
bourgeois slogans of democratism and gather allies from the ranks of 
the persecuted nationalities, religions and sects 97 
The Minsk congress had given Lenin the assignment of drawing up a 
Russian party programme. In its earliest drafts he explained that the 
first mission of the RSDWP was to accomplish political freedom. At 
first this moderate draft also included demands for religious freedom 
and demands for national equality.98 Later, in 1902, he altered it and 
included demands concerning the separation of state and church and 
school and church. The 1902 draft also included demands for the right 
96 	 PSS 1, 279-280, 294-295, 298-300 "MTO TaKoe a.py3bs Hapoaa H KaK OHH 
BOK)K)T HpOTHB couHaJFaeMOKpaTOB? (OTBeT Ha CTaTbH "PyCCKOrO BoraTCTBa" 
npOTHB MapKCHCTOB) : Iskra, 1 August 1903, No. 45. See also McKenzie 1964, 
68-71; Deutscher 1967, 42-43. 
97 	 PSS 2, 446-451, 452-453. "3aaa'IH pyccKHx couHa_i-aeMoKparos"; PSS 6, 69, 
80-83. "'ITo aenaTb. Ha6oneswee sonpocbI Haulero ,tBH)KeHHA". 
98 PSS 2, 85. "IlpoeKT H O6bICHeHHe nporpaMMbl couHan-aeMOKpaTH9ecKo 
napTHH". 
to self-determination for nations.99 
This programme was first published in the RSDWP's newspaper 
Iskra and its religious policy demands aroused discussion. For example, 
one representative of the Russian clergy wrote an open letter to the 
editors of Iskra claiming that the RSDWP's programme coincided with 
the "ideas of religion and the spirit of Orthodoxy". This moderate priest 
believed that the autocracy had subordinated the church and that the 
only way forward was to break the chains with the state. In an 
accompanying remark the editors of Iskra stated that the RSDWP 
supported these demands, adding that every progressive party should 
include demands forthe separation of church and state in its 
programme. Although the editors welcomed this letter, they were 
nonetheless against a close co-operation between social democracy and 
religion. The belief that religion or even a liberated church could work 
for liberty or for social change was, in their view, an illusion. Iskra 
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expressed the view that the role of the church was always conservative 
and hostile to knowledge and real human ethics. Social democracy 
would always fight to liberate people from every kind of slavery and it 
had declared war on religious ideas and the church. However, socialists 
did not want to exclude the possibility that some priest or other church 
member would leave the church and take up the cause of socialism. m° 
This much-debated programme was later accepted at a stormy party 
congress which was convened in 1903 in Brussels and London. 
Although this congress became famous, mostly because it resulted in 
the Bolshevik-Menshevik division, it must be acknowledged that this 
bitter split was not its only outcome. One of the few things the congress 
could discuss without rancour was the general draft of the party 
programme drawn up by Lenin. And in accordance with the general 
understanding of Russian Marxists, the final draft included a special 
"minimum part" for a democratic republic and a "maximum" one for 
more distant demands. Among other things, this "minimum part" 
included the official religious policy programme of the Bolsheviks. It 
included demands for freedom of conscience, separation of church and 
state and secular education. The accepted minimum programme also 
demanded self-determination for all the nationalities of the Russian 
Empire. These demands were indeed quite "democratic" and some of 
them can be found in the programmes of other revolutionary groups 
too. 101  
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We may also note the attention which this congress paid to 
sectarians. It heard a lecture from V.D. Bonch-Bruevich (1873-1955), a 
close friend of Lenin and a scientist, who had studied profoundly the 
role and teachings of the Russian sectarian movement. He had come to 
the conclusion that the RSDWP could utilize the latent revolutionary 
sentiment among Russian sectarians. In his lecture he explained those 
social elements which determined the life of sectarians and stressed that 
Russian sectarians were usually in one way or another struggling 
against the autocracy. Bonch-Bruevich believed that sectarians 
constituted a potential revolutionary force to which the party should 
direct its attention. Before utilizing their radicalism, the RSDWP would 
have to acquaint itself with the social differentiation among the 
sectarian movement and see how their demands varied from 
dogmatic-religious slogans to purely political declarations. 102 
Lenin had earlier devoted attention to the political protest of the 
sectarian movement. In his article "To Agrarian Toilers" (1903) he 
presented himself to them almost as a spokesman for religious liberty. 
He warmly supported demands for religious freedom by maintaining 
that everyone had a right to believe or proclaim his belief without 
hindrance from officials. He also attacked the privileged position of the 
ROC and demanded secular education for Russians. In the London 
congress of 1903 Lenin was prepared to use this religious protest for the 
benefit of his party and suggested that the party should organize a 
newspaper for sectarians. This was accepted and the paper "Sredi 
Sektantov" (Among Sectarians) was given the mission of addressing 
suitable RSDWP propaganda to sectarians and appealing to sectarians 
who had come under Social Democrat influence. i°3 The editing of this 
newspaper was later entrusted to Bonch-Bruevich, who only managed 
to edit nine volumes before it had to be closed down as a result of 
financial difficulties. Prior to this the newspaper "Rassvet" (Dawn) 
spread agitation among sectarians and was able to link religious themes 
and Social Democratic propaganda in an interesting way. m4 
But does the simple desire to entice rebellious sectarians into the 
ranks of the RSDWP explain this tactical manoeuvre to appease 
sectarians? One possible explanation of Lenin's will to appease 
102 BB I, 158-188. "Pacxon H ceKTaHcrso B PoccHH. ,aoKnaA B.Tj. BoHn-EpyeBHva 
BTOpOMy 09epeAHOMy Cbe3Ay POCCHNCKOH COuHan-AeMOKpaTH9ecKON pa60veN 
napTHH". 
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Tumarkin 1983, 19-20. 
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sectarians and the bourgeois class is the simple fact that the Bolsheviks 
were heavily dependent on the financial support of the industrial 
magnate S.T. Morozov (1862-1905), who was of Old Believer stock. 
He had earlier played an important role as spokesman of the Russian 
business community which was hoping for radical reforms and an 
intensified tempo of industrialization in Russia. In order to advance 
these reforms, Morozov had cultivated connections with the Russian 
liberal intelligentsia and also with the Bolsheviks. Maxim Gorky 
(Aleksei Maximovich Peshkov, 1868-1936) had been the initiator of 
this relationship and due to his efforts Morozov regularly supported 
Lenin's Bolsheviks with considerable sums of money.1°5  
This peculiar co-operation between a rich Old Believer who was 
seeking the Westernization of Russia through revolution and atheist 
Bolsheviks who were organizing this revolution with the help of money 
from a capitalist of sectarian extraction, continued undisturbed until the 
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revolution of 1905 which totally changed the situation in Russian 
society. The war against Japan was a catastrophe and domestic 
disturbances spread along with revolutionary waves, shaking the roots 
of the autocracy. The situation was intensified on 9 January 1905 when 
a priest named Georgy Apollonovich Gapon (1870-1906) led 
demonstrators against guards in St Petersburg. The demonstration was 
violently dispersed and this incident was the starting point for the 1905 
revolution. The movement he led was originally an interesting mixture 
of Christian socialism and anarchism. In order to seek protection and to 
show loyalty Gapon had organized contacts with the secret police, one 
of whose leaders in St Petersburg, S.V. Zubatov (1864-1917), had 
hoped to fight against socialism and anarchism by establishing a loyal 
workers' movement. Gapon's Zubatovian Movement, as it came to be 
known, combined the aim of some officials to use Christian socialism 
against radical revolutionaries with Gapon's own desire as a member of 
the "white" clergy to improve the social condition of workers. This 
movement became very popular and unlike the RSDWP it attracted 
thousands of supporters.106 
The activity of this movement was at once both a pleasant and an 
unpleasant surprise for the RSDWP. The events in St Petersburg had 
indicated how much the autocracy was in a state of decay, but the fact 
that the riotous demonstration was initiated by a priest who had links 
with the secret police came as a shock for the exiled leaders of the 
105 	 Valentinov 1991b, 77-78. See also Williams 1986,49,58-59. 
106 Pipes 1979, 312-313; Ascher 1988, 89-92. 
RSDWP.107 This reserved attitude can be seen from Lenin's writings on 
the events in St Petersburg. To Lenin this man was anyway a puzzle. 
According to Lenin, Gapon was perhaps a sincere Christian socialist 
who unconsciously worked as a tool of the government. On the one 
hand he was the hero of the St Petersburg workers who had ignited the 
revolution in Russia. On the other hand he was a priest, believed in 
god108 and worked under the protection of the secret police. Lenin 
claimed that Gapon had expressed the vain hopes of that section of the 
people who believed that the Czar could help them. He was of the 
opinion that in a more particular way, Gapon was working 
unconsciously for the cause of the Social Democrats.109 
As an interesting epilogue, it should be mentioned that in 1905 Lenin 
and Gapon finally met. According to Lenin's wife, N.K. Krupskaya 
(1869-1939), other Russian Social Democrats such as Plekhanov 
despised Gapon because he was a priest. Lenin, however, was anxious 
to meet and talk with him when he realized that Gapon had good 	 51 
relations with the workers and tried to convert the priest to his own 
cause. Nevertheless, as Krupskaya remarked, Gapon showed little 
interest in Lenin's opinions and was "blinded by his ecclesiastical 
psychology". In addition, we may note how Trotsky also commented 
enthusiastically on Gapon's revolutionary activities in St Petersburg. 
He declared that the revolutionary proletariat would always preserve 
the memory of Gapon. Later in an article addressed to Russian peasants 
he referred to Gapon as an "honest, young priest") i° 
Nevertheless, the activity of Gapon and the strength of Christian 
socialism indicated that religion was still a significant social force in 
Russia and, more importantly, that it constituted a challenge to his 
revolutionary movement. George F. Putnam has even estimated that the 
challenge of Christian socialism offered a relevant political alternative 
to Marxism in pre-revolutionary Russia." 
In his article "Socialism and Religion" (1905) Lenin responded to 
this ideological challenge by repeating the Marxist critique of capitalist 
society which was based on economic exploitation. Religion, Lenin 
stated, originally constituted a form of vulnerability in the face of 
107 	 Ulam 1968, 205-207, 231-238. 
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nature and now constituted a form of resignation in the face of capitalist 
exploitation. Its role was to keep the proletariat humble and un-
conscious of the real reasons for their misery.112 
Lenin interpreted Marx in the Russian context and commented that 
religion was one kind of mental "moonshine". In this way, he gave to 
Marx's interpretation a particular meaning. Marx had criticized religion 
on a theoretical level by implying that religion was an opium which 
people consumed in their despair. It seems most likely that for him 
religion represented more a natural product of exploitation than a cause 
of misery. Lenin, however, as a result of Russian historical cir-
cumstances, saw religion as a kind of opium which the upper classes 
were willingly serving up to the proletariat in order to keep them in 
darkness."3  
As a portent of things to come, Lenin emphasized that the modern 
worker had abandoned the yoke of religion and was now building a new 
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world and no longer believed the priest. Lenin also explained the 
religious policy programme of the RSDWP. As the assumption of a 
bourgeois revolution followed by a proletarian revolution presupposed, 
religion should be made a private matter in relation to the state but not 
in relation to the party. Here we may see how at this time Lenin already 
believed that the transition period between these two revolutions would 
be brief. According to him, the separation of church and state, the end 
of religious discrimination and the abolition of the special legal status 
of the ROC would be basic goals which the coming revolution would 
accomplish.114 
Lenin's desire to make a distinction between the state's neutral 
attitude towards religion and the ideological attitude of the party 
towards religion is quite revealing, as it indicates that at that time Lenin 
still believed there would be a transitional phase between the coming 
bourgeois and proletarian revolutions. Nevertheless, even if the future 
post-revolutionary state were neutral in its relation to religion, it was 
impossible to keep religion as a private matter for party members. This 
dilemma, "private matter", later proved to be significant for Bolshevik 
religious ideology. Lenin recognized the criticism which Engels had 
voiced against the German party programme in Erfurt (1891). The 
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Erfurt programme had demanded the secularization of the state and the 
educational system but had simply remarked that religion as such was a 
"private matter". Lenin stressed that the expression "private" should not 
be interpreted as neutralism. Religion should be a private matter only in 
relation to the state not in relation to the party. Nevertheless, he believed 
that the fight against religion was not the primary mission of the party, 
but that it was subordinated to the general battle against capitalism.' 15 
The revolution of 1905 was a failure and within a few years 
revolutionary fervour subsided. In this situation the autocracy showed 
that it could be conciliatory towards sectarians and other religious 
organizations when it granted liberty to the Old Believers and other 
religious groups in Russia. This pacified their radicalism and made 
them more reluctant to follow the call of the revolutionaries. In 
addition, S.T. Morozov committed suicide in May 1905, which meant 
that the Bolsheviks lost an important source of finance. The ruling 
autocracy also showed some willingness to consider the possible 
independence of the ROC. A special commission was convoked to 
discuss the situation but, nonetheless, the ROC remained subordinated 
to the state until the February revolution of 1917. As for the mood of the 
Russian intelligentsia, the 1905 revolution represented a turning point. 
The disturbances and riots had shocked many "prodigal sons" of the 
Russian intelligentsia 116 who had been "flirting" with revolution; now 
they flocked back to civilized society. The rationalism, in vogue for 
many years, gave way to a new mood of mysticism and as a sign of a 
new era the Russian intelligentsia become more interested in old 
traditional values. This turning back to the past was evident even before 
the 1905 revolution. Gradually from the beginning of the 20th century 
certain members of the intelligentsia had created a discussion circle 
called Vekhi (Landmarks).117 In particular, after the 1905 revolution it 
questioned the past thinking of Russian radicals and classified their 
values as immoral and nihilist. Vekhi writers acknowledged traditional 
values and they identified themselves as Christians.' 18 
Some former Marxists and colleagues of Lenin converted to this new 
way of thinking, S.N. Bulgakov (1871-1944) and N.A. Berdyaev 
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(1874-1948) being the most famous. Several societies and groups had 
earlier reflected the ideas of these former Marxists. The St Petersburg 
Religious Gatherings (1901-1903), the St Petersburg Religious—Philo-
sophical Society (1907-1908) and the Moscow Religious—Philosophi-
cal Society (1905-1908) dedicated to the memory of Vladimir Solovev 
were the main forums in the intelligentsia's rising interest in religion.' 19 
However, their activity was not so serious threat to the Bolshevik fac-
tion as the ideological wanderings of A.A. Bogdanov (Malinovsky, 
1873-1928), one of the most intimate colleagues of Lenin, and A.V. 
Lunacharsky (1875-1933). The defeat of the 1905 revolution had 
disillusioned both Bogdanov and Lunacharsky and as a result they had 
fallen under the influence of the philosophy of Ernst Mach (1838-
1916) and Richard Avenarius (1843-1896). This philosophical 
searching for the right interpretation of Marxism caused them to seek to 
reform "dry" Marxist epistemology along "empiriocritical" lines. In 
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order to improve Marxism and the concept of materialism, Lunacharsky 
even envisaged a future proletarian religion without a deity. The famous 
Russian writer Maxim Gorky supported Lunacharsky and together they 
challenged Lenin by establishing their own competing faction inside 
the Bolshevik Party, a group which received the nickname "the 
godbuilders".120 
Lenin fought fiercely against these "heretics", partly because they 
presented open criticism against his leadership in the Bolshevik party, 
and partly because of their independent-minded interpretation of 
Marxism. In order to condemn them, Lenin wrote a monograph entitled 
"Materialism and Empiriocriticism" (1909). This was mainly directed 
against Bogdanov and he tried to have this Marxist theoretician 
expelled from the Bolshevik party. He also tried personally to persuade 
Gorky and Lunacharsky to abandon their "godbuilding" activities. In 
his personal letters to Gorky he revealed how he rejected the idea of any 
kind of religion, even a materialist one. For Lenin adapting religion or 
attempting to reform it was an obnoxious idea. He rejected the notion of 
using any kind of religious manifestation in propaganda almost with 
pathological distaste. Religion in all its forms was for him "necroph-
ilia", a reformed religion might even attract more people than old-
fashioned beliefs. Therefore, he declared in a private letter to Gorky, he 
119 See Putnam 1977,56-84. 
120 According to George Kline, the "godbuilders" were influenced by the tradition of 
Russian radicalism which was dedicated to building a better and more sacred world. 
Moreover, this movement turned Hegel's philosophical terms (Spirit, Absolute) 
towards the immanent world. Kline has also stressed the importance of the 
Nietzschean renaissance at the beginning of the century for the "godbuilders". Kline 
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found it easier to accept an old-fashioned priest molesting children than 
a reformed priest with refined methods.121  
In summing up we may state that one of the most significant reasons 
for Lenin's sharp critique against religion at this time was his bitter 
ideological and political confrontation with his party colleagues. The 
philosophical wavering of certain Bolsheviks, the "godbuilding" move-
ment, as well as Bogdanov's challenge, intensified Lenin's ideological 
stand. From Lenin's point of view, the post-revolutionary situation after 
1905 had given rise to a multitude of doctrinal heresies including one of 
the most serious ideological sins, compromise with religion. 
Nevertheless, Lenin's rivals did not want to combine religion with 
Marxism for the sake of theism; Bogdanov and Gorky simply wanted to 
introduce some moral values into Marxist materialism. They did not 
want to emphasise belief in a supernatural God but, rather, belief in 
people themselves. Instead of hard, "Leninist" party discipline they 
wanted to stress morals and ethics which would receive justification 
from people themselves. Lenin at first objected to these ideas because 
they contradicted his understanding of materialism. But at the same 
time he also opposed them because the holders of such ideas were 
contesting his political leadership inside the Bolshevik party. 
c. The nationality question and religion in Bolshevik 
thinking 
The question of religion and nationality were closely inter-related in 
orthodox Marxist thinking. This view, supported by Marx, Engels, 
Plekhanov and Lenin, implied that both religion and nationality were 
part of the super-structure of the exploiting societies and they would 
wither away when the socialist society had destroyed the roots of both 
phenomena. Marx and Engels were quite academic in this matter, 
underlining the determinism of this development. But Lenin, along with 
many other Marxist thinkers, expressed the view that the proletariat 
should play an active part in getting rid of these two obstacles to the 
advancement of the class struggle.' 22 
121 PSS 26, 224-226, 232-234."Kpax II Hxrepnaunoxana'; PSS 48, 227. "A.M. 
TopbKoMy". For more on Bogdanov's role as a Bolshevik theoretician, see Gloveli 
1991, 34-38; and especially Ilmari Susiluoto, "The Origins and Development of 
Systems Thinking in The Soviet Union. Political and Philosophical Controversies 
from Bogdanov and Bukhann to Present-Day Re-Evaluations". Suomalainen 
Tiedeseura. Helsinki. 1982. 
122 Compare MEW 4, 480-481. "Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei" and Kline 
1968, 132-134. See also Pipes 1980, 32-34. 
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According to Marxist doctrine, the international proletariat con-
stituted a "totality" without a fatherland. Economic development and 
the accumulation of capital would lead ultimately to the assimilation of 
minor nationalities. At the same time, the proletariat would also became 
more international and as an outcome of the victorious socialist 
revolution all nations would form an harmonious international family. 
In order to advance and speed up this international development, the 
founders of Marxism established the so-called First International in 
London 1864.123 
Later Social Democrats realized that the "orthodox" Marxist 
nationality policy was difficult to apply in the circumstances of Eastern 
Europe. The empires of Austria and Russia were composed of many 
different nationalities and in reality one important factor in defining 
nationalities in these regions was religion. This prominence given to 
nationality problems was in striking contrast with Marxist under- 
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standing in which both nationality and religion were seen as part of the 
upper structure of society.124  The Austrian Social Democrats Karl 
Renner (1870-1950) and Otto Bauer (1881-1938) consequently de-
veloped a theory of "national cultural autonomy" which attempted to 
resolve this problem by acknowledging both Marxism and the 
importance of nationality. In accordance with this policy, the Austrian 
Social Democratic Party established in every national region its own 
particular, national party section. They also tried to form special kinds 
of culturally autonomous party organs.125 
The "Austro-Marxists" believed that Social Democrats should 
recognize national communities as a valuable and secure form of social 
organization. In contrast to classical Marxist understanding, Renner 
and Bauer presumed that the development of a class-struggle would not 
obliterate the differences between nationalities but instead magnify 
them. The final victory of socialism would partially be the result of this 
differentiation of nations. The nationality question would then be 
reduced to the same level as the question of religion; nationality would 
be a private matter.126 
In the Russian Empire nearly all radical political groups 
acknowledged the importance of the nationality question. In line with 
this trend, Lenin and his party attempted to exploit the dissatisfaction of 
national minorities. The events of the 1905 revolution had drawn 
attention to the nationality question and the dilemma of self- 
123 	 MEW 4, 479, 482. "Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei"; Pipes 1980, 21-22. 
124 Dunn 1987, 10-11. 
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determination had also troubled the Jewish subgroup of the Russian 
Social Democratic Party. This independent-minded section of the 
RSDWP, known as the Bund had adopted the programme of the 
"Austro-Marxists" eagerly and in the London congress of 1903 had 
even demanded special autonomy for themselves inside the party. As a 
result of this "heresy", the Bund was temporarily expelled from the 
RSDWP and the party denied that Jews comprised a national culture 
despite the fact that they possessed special customs and religious rites 
of their own. Nevertheless, the problem of how to approach the 
nationality question remained unsolved. The RSDWP's 2nd congress 
simply decided to adopt the right to self-determination and the right to 
statehood for every nation but did not develop any particular nationality 
programme for the Russian Empire.127 
As a logical outcome of this unclear definition in the party prog-
ramme, the concept of nation was put under extraordinary scrutiny 
within the RSDWP. What was a nation? Could, for example, the Jewish 	 57 
people also claim to be a nation? In order to answers these and other 
questions, and to fight against "Austro-Marxism", Lenin gave Stalin the 
assignment of writing an article on Bolshevik nationality policy and 
even helped him to find the "right" conclusions.)28 Stalin's article 
"Marxism and the Nationality Question" can be viewed as a study 
which articulated in greater detail Lenin's ideas about nationality 
problems. 
Stalin began his article by defining a nation as a community with 
historical roots and a common language, territory, economic life and 
psychological make-up.129 After outlining the theoretical part of his 
study, he attacked the Austrian Social Democratic concept of "national 
cultural autonomy" and maintained that Bauer had accepted a "bour-
geois" concept of the nation. Stalin accused the Austrian socialists of 
preparing the ground for nationalism.130 The second target of Stalin's 
attack was the Bund and its demands for national autonomy within the 
party. In conclusion Stalin declared that the Jewish people did not 
comprise a nation as they lacked a common territory and language. 
Their "religious rites" or "decayed psychological remnants" as he 
termed them would not be sufficient to preserve the Jewish nation in the 
face of pressure from other nations.131 
127 	 KPSS I, 63; Pinkus 1988, 43, 50-52; Iivonen 1990, 108. 
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Lenin agreed with Stalin in his attacks on Jewish nationalism and 
accused the Austrian Social Democrats of reducing the nationality 
question to absurdity by regarding it as a personal, private matter. As 
Lenin commented, Jewish people did not constitute a nation, only a 
caste. On the other hand, Lenin acknowledged that the Jewish people 
had been severely persecuted over the centuries and that they had been 
most active in the Russian revolutionary movement. In this way, the 
Bund's slogans concerning Jewish national culture were playing into 
the hands of "rabbis and bourgeois". For Lenin a Jew who would fight 
against these slogans was the best representative of the Jewish people. 
In this connection, we may recall how for Lenin and the Bolsheviks 
nationality and religion were simply dangerous weapons. Both were 
used by the exploiting classes for propaganda purposes.132 
Theoretically, Lenin was ready to support the idea of national 
self-determination in relation to nations such as Poland and Finland 
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because he believed that the logic of economics would in the end force 
them to ally themselves with larger units. But stressing cultural or other 
differences between nations as such would, Lenin believed, lead in the 
opposite direction. The questions of nationality and religion could not 
be reduced to private, neutral matters. Thus Lenin hinted in his 
pre-revolutionary writings that the nationality and religious questions 
were not "adiaphora", as the bourgeoisie was always ready to exploit 
both for their own purposes. In fact, the logic of the bourgeoisie's class 
position compelled them to manipulate religion and the nationality 
question against the proletariat. Both functioned as dangerous 
ideological weapons of the bourgeoisie against the class-struggle of the 
proletariat.133 
As Gerhard Simon has put it, the very cornerstone of the nationality 
doctrine of the Bolsheviks was that the socialist revolution would 
diminish and end the role of nations as important historical forces. 
Nationalism was by nature a negative phenomenon. It strove to 
overcome class antagonism for the sake of mutual national affiliations 
and mobilized different social strata in the pursuance of a common 
national objective. From an ideological point of view the nationality 
question and religion were both seen as products of the past and 
nationalism especially was seen as an offshoot of developing capi- 
132 	 PSS 23, 318-319.'Te3Hcbi no HauHOHanbHOMy Bonpocy"; PSS 24, 122-123, 125- 
126 "KpHTHvecKHe 3aMeTKH HO HauHOHanbHOMy BonpOcy"; PSS 25, 14-15, 64-
65 "tIoJHTH9ecKHe ypoKH". See also Levin 1988, 12-20. 
133 PSS 21, 402-405 "Z[eMoxpaTHs H Hapo)HHvecrBo B KHrae"; PSS 23, 123-124 
"CenapaTHCTbl B PoccHH H cenaparncrb1 a ABCTpHH"; PSS 23, 145-146 
"11po6y)BaeHHe A3HH"; PSS 25, 298-299, 318-319 "0 Hpase HauHH Ha 
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talism.134 This explains also those moderate opinions of Lenin and 
Stalin concerning the undeveloped Eastern areas. According to their 
thinking, national or religious prejudices could not be overcome by a 
non-existing proletariat in areas where exploited classes had no pol-
itical consciousness whatsoever. In this respect, both Lenin and Stalin 
indirectly acknowledged that the fight against nationalism and religion 
was not the party's prime mission in those areas. 
So, the coalescing of nations was part of a "maximum" programme 
-a long term plan of the Bolsheviks. When classes would wither away, 
national-mindedness would automatically lose its foothold in society. 
To sum up, on the question of nationality and religion Lenin and his 
Bolsheviks opposed granting any ideological concessions; the totality 
of the class-struggle did not leave any room for religious or national 
"private matters". But the reality of the class struggle demanded that the 
fight against both these prejudices should be fought along a general 
political line. In accordance with this pre-revolutionary Bolshevik 	 59 
ideology dealt with religion and nationality as major obstacles in the 
way of a socialist society; but even during the pre-revolutionary period, 
in the face of political reality, the Bolsheviks were able to put their 
ideological presumptions to oneside. According to Lenin's unique 
political pragmatism these two questions were for the most part 
subordinate to the general political objectives of the party itself. 
134 	 Simon 1991, 12-13, 135. See also Polvinen 1990. 91-95 
II "Storm and Wind" — 
religious policy after 
the October Revolution 
and during the civil war 
(1917-1920) 
1. GENERAL BACKGROUND TO 
EARLY SOVIET RELIGIOUS POLICY 
The October Revolution and the battles of the civil war changed the 
character of the party. The distinctions and programmes of the 
pre-revolutionary period, i.e. the differentiation between the party and the 
state, had became obsolete when the Bolsheviks achieved power.' This 
situation created, of course, new kinds of problems which Lenin had 
contemplated in his monograph State and Revolution. On the one hand, 
this pamphlet manifested his understanding of a future socialist Russia 
and reflected his vision of a Bolshevik City of God. On the other hand, 
Lenin introduced practical assignments for the revolution. In State and 
Revolution he wanted to demonstrate that the traditional bourgeois 
mechanics of power and the parliamentary system were only illusions as 
far as the working-class was concerned. A.F. Kerensky's (1881-1970) 
"socialist" government only played into the hands of landowners and 
exploiters.2 
The main question which Lenin put forward in this monograph was 
simple: what kind of state would emerge as a result of a future 
Bolshevik revolution? His answer was partly anarchistic and partly 
1 	 See S8, 30-35; Thrower 1983, 118. 
2 	 Maureen 1979, 216-217, 219; Stites 1989, 43. 
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utopian. He demanded a state where power would be widely spread 
through the mediation of the iron dictatorship of the proletariat. This 
new kind of state would be totally different from the old bourgeois one, 
which, according to Lenin, was simply a manifestation of exploitation 
and coercion.- 
In accordance with this vision of a new society, Lenin declared 
enthusiastically that workers could not adopt the bourgeois state 
mechanism as such, and that the only possible answer was to destroy 
the resistance of the dominant class and its tool of coercion, the state. 
Nevertheless, Lenin believed that during the transition period from a 
capitalist society to socialism workers would themselves take over the 
duties of the state and execute the functions of the administration more 
effectively than the capitalists. Lenin remarked that the Paris Commune 
in 1871 had shown that the workers could govern themselves. So it 
would also be in a future socialist Russia. Unlike the bourgeois system, 
which benefitted only the better-off, the Bolsheviks would create a 	 61 
direct democracy .4 
In State and Revolution Lenin identified official religious or-
ganizations and churches with the bourgeois system. One of the worst 
errors of those who believed in the parliamentary system, he pointed 
out, was their betrayal with regard to religious policy. According to 
Lenin, other Russian socialists such as the SRs and Mensheviks had 
diluted their antireligious ideology under the slogan of "religion — a 
private matter" and sought to make peace with the state church system. 
Thus these "traitors" to socialism wanted to maintain the system of the 
bourgeois state with its privileges and wanted to leave religion as a 
private matter even in relation to the party.5  
Lenin's State and Revolution implied that there would be no room 
for the bourgeois state church and because of the fusion of the civil and 
the public sphere, which this essay demanded, there would, moreover, 
be very little room left for so-called "private religion" either. This was 
justified from an ideological point of view. As David B. Ingram has 
remarked, Marx had once underlined that in a truly democratic new 
state the alienation between civil society and the state would be 
dissolved by the revolution. Political emancipation would thus 
correspond to human emancipation. We may state that in State and 
Revolution Lenin simply interpreted Marx by implying that the 
bourgeois duality between civil society and the state would be settled 
3 	 PSS 33, 7-8. "focytapcTBo H peBOIDowta ; Lapidus 1978, 89; Stites 1989,43-44. 
4 	 PSS 33, 29-31, 40-44, 46, 62-63. "rocyaapcTeo H pesonrouxx". See also 
Vihavainen 1990, 108. 
5 	 PSS 33, 43, 76-77. "rocyaaperso H pewunouHA". 
by the destruction of the bourgeois state system. Revolution would 
dissolve differences between the private and public interests, between 
the "private" sphere of life and "public" life .6 Therefore, the dissolution 
of the state church system represented, in a Leninist sense, more than 
simply the neutral secularization of society. This Leninist scheme could 
be justified also on historical grounds. According to Lenin, the Russian 
bourgeoisie had betrayed democratism and democratic reforms such as 
the secularization of society, and consequently it was the task of the 
Bolsheviks to accomplish them. In addition, this monograph revealed 
that Lenin's state would not adhere to the practice of the parliamentary 
system or democracy as such. The direct democracy of the people 
would follow its own rules.7 
Although Lenin stressed the ultra-democratic features of his future 
society, it was clear that he rejected the idea of open democracy for all 
citizens; the ruling proletariat had a duty to crush the resistance of their 
62 	 former exploiters. Both the theory and practice of the Bolshevik regime 
ruled out the possibility of open democracy in post-revolutionary 
Russian society and in the Bolshevik party as well. Gradually, during 
the course of Bolshevik rule, the democratic ideals of the Russian 
revolutionary tradition were fused with the "Leninist" conspiratorial 
tradition. As a result of clandestine activities and the "Leninist" concept 
of the party, the Bolsheviks had adopted the idea of democratic 
centralism which placed greater weight on the decisions of higher 
bodies over those of lower bodies. In theory the highest organ of the 
Bolshevik party was the congress. It was the only organ empowered to 
decide general political lines and accept party programmes. For the 
intervals between congresses they elected a Central Committee to 
govern the party; to direct the entire work of the party and local party 
bodies. These organs were in actual fact too unwieldy to be effective. 
The congress with its many representatives and even the Central 
Committee were not able to carry out all their official responsibilities. 
Nevertheless, the Central Committee functioned during the 1920s, 
together with the party congress, as an important discussion forum for 
different opinions inside the ruling party. For shaping the religious 
policy of the NEP, press discussions in particular before and during the 
12th and 13th congresses were of crucial importance.8  
On examining early Soviet religious policy, it is apparent how the 
day-to-day governing of the Soviet state (until Lenin's departure) was 
6 	 Ingram 1988, 132-133. 
7 	 Rigby 1989, 8-9. See also Colletti 1972, 220-221. 
8 	 For more on party rules, see, " IIporpaMMbu H ycrasm KIIIIC". I43,1areJlbcrao 
noJ1HTH9ecKot nnreparypb<. 1969. MOCKBa. 
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P.A. Krasikov 
1918-1924 
Organizational structure of Soviet religious—political organs 1917-1929 
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NKYust 
D.I. Kursky 
N.V. Krylenko 
—circulars 
—Journal "Revolyutsya i Tserkov' 
—administrative orders and instructions 
—specialists 
Narkompros 
— Education (non-religious) 
Glavpolitprosvet 
officially concentrated in the Bolshevik government, the Sovnarkom. 
During the intervals between party plenums, policy making instruments 
were divided among three major sections, the Politburo, the Orgburo 
and the Secretariat. The Politburo dealt with current political questions 
and functioned as a Soviet political cabinet after the death of Lenin, 
when the role of the Sovnarkom began to decline. The Orgburo was, 
together with the Secretariat, responsible for organizational and 
practical work inside the party. These two organs were furthermore 
subordinated to the Politburo, but in reality the role of the Orgburo and 
especially the Secretariat became more decisive with the rise of Stalin 
to supreme power.9 
During the civil war the party's relations with religious or-
ganizations and the ideological battle against religion were matters of 
"minor importance".10 The ruling regime was fighting for its survival. 
Decision making with regard to religious policy as well as its practical 
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implementation was not co-ordinated and in many cases overlapped", 
different aspects of religious policy being undertaken by different 
offices. Nonetheless, we may claim that the main burden of civil war 
religious policy was concentrated in two leading departments of the 
Soviet administration: justice and security. The People's Commissariat 
of Justice (NKYust), led by D.I. Kursky (1874-1932) and his deputy 
N.V. Krylenko (1885-1938), had a special subsection called the Eighth 
(later Fifth) Department, better known among the communists them-
selves as the "Liquidation Commission", to deal with early Soviet 
religious policy. Both men had worked together constructing the Soviet 
judicial system and N.V. Krylenko especially belonged to the "hawks" 
when dealing with religious organizations. The "Liquidation Com-
mission" which was formally under their authority was originally, as 
Otto Luchterhand has argued, modified from the commission which 
had planned the separation of church and state.12 This commission was 
headed by a fierce opponent of religion, P.A. Krasikov (1870-1939), 
and had the official duty of supervising the implementation of the 
separation of church and state. Moreover, it used the services of 
different "comrade-experts", such as the former lawyer I.A. Shpitsberg 
9 	 Fainsod 1970, 178-179. 
10 	 Curtiss 1953, 89. 
11 	 Other opinions have also been expressed, e.g., Philip Walters has maintained that in 
relation to the ROC, Soviet antireligious actions were centrally co-ordinated even 
during the civil war. Walters 1993, 6. However, in the light of documentary sources 
now available this view seems to be quite problematic. 
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(1881-1933) and the former priest M.N. Galkin (Gorev).13 
One of the main assignments of this central organ was to publish a 
special circular entitled Revolyutsiya i Tserkov (Revolution and the 
Church). This publication contained legal documents, administrative 
orders and instructions on interpreting the "separation decree" of 1918. 
As one retrospective protocol of the NKYust Central Administration in 
1924 underlined, this organ did not make any distinction between 
legislation and implementation. The "Liquidation Commission" was 
simultaneously preparing, consulting, controlling and directing 
religious policy legislation. Due to its enormous burden of responsi-
bilities, this commission mainly devoted its energy to secularizing 
Soviet society. Among other things it inspected how successful were 
Soviet organs in removing old religious symbols (such as icons) from 
official buildings.14 
Nonetheless, the "Liquidation Commission" did not have any 
special instruments to implement its decisions. In addition, thework of 
this organ took time to get off the ground and was disorganized, as H. 
Meiner has pointed out in his memoirs. As a result of the general chaos, 
this religious policy committee had only seven officials, a fact which 
reveals that the real duty of this organ was simply to consult with other 
Soviet organs. It could not execute its formal obligations effectively 
without help from other organs of Soviet power. Simultaneously with 
its horizontal connections to other party organs, this committee also had 
vertical connections to local Soviet organs. As the correspondence 
between the "Liquidation Commission" and local organs testifies, the 
main burden for implementing the "separation decree" was con-
centrated at local guberniya (district) level or even in local Soviets, 
where the Bolsheviks created local "Liquidation Commissions". The 
central "Liquidation Commission" in Moscow sent out general 
instructions and reports (via Revolyutsiya i Tserkov) informing them of 
how to implement the "separation decree" and local organs in cities and 
the countryside then had the more specific task of interpreting these 
orders. These regional organs worked quite independently and only in 
the most difficult and important cases did they ask Moscow for 
instructions.l5  
13 	 H. Meiner in his reminiscences called I.A. Shpitsberg a "personal enemy of God" 
because of Shpitsberg's fierce antireligious activity. Meiner 1922, 64. See also 
Revolyutsiya i Tserkov 1920, No. 9-12, 96. 
14 	 GARF2 f.353, op.7, d.26a "HapoaHoMy KoMHccapy IOCTHUHH"; GARF2 f.353, 
op.3, d.731 "HapoaHbIN KOMHCCapHaT npocnenteHHA. TOB. M.H. IIOKpOBCKOMy 
(Man 28/19r)". 
15 GARF2 f.353, op.3, d.730 "Dryer. 0 aeslrenbHocrH 5-oraena KynbTOB 
HapKoMlocTa 3a 1923 roa"; Revolyutsiya i Tserkov. 1919. No. 1, 16-26, 39-42; 
Revolyutsiya i Tserkov. 1920. No. 9-12, 70-96. See also Rothenberg 1971, 69. 
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The second leading department of the administration entrusted with 
implementing religious policy during the civil war and later was the 
Soviet security apparatus. Its main duty in religious policy was to 
supervise different religious organizations. The nature of this work led 
them to assume a considerable role in Soviet religious policy. The 
Cheka and its successors in the 1920s, the OGPU, the GPU and the 
MVD (the NKVD's ecclesiastical subsection created in 1922, 
UepKosHblg noltoruen/A, concentrated more on administrative matters 
related to religious organizations),16 supervised religious organizations 
for possible challenges to the Soviet system and implemented the actual 
decisions of the ruling regime. 
All the above-mentioned secret agencies served also as information 
channels for the party by providing information on the activities of 
different religious groups. Secret information sheets, "svodkas", gave 
detailed reports about the mood and atmosphere of Soviet society. 
66 
	
	
Some of these "summaries" indicate that this section of the Soviet 
administration functioned better than many other Soviet organs. For 
example, one such "svodka" in the 1920s shows clearly that after four 
years of civil war the Cheka's informants and agents seemed to have 
penetrated every level of Soviet society. In addition, certain leaders of 
the secret police belonged to various committees and some, like 
Evgeny Aleksandrovich Tuchkov (1892-1957), the leader of the 6th 
section of the Soviet security police, played a prominent role during the 
interrogation of the ROC's top leaders.17 
Moreover, together with these ideologically-motivated communists, 
there were also more conciliatory-minded members of the Bolshevik 
party. Among these we may single out figures such as V.D. 
Bonch-Bruevich, a close friend of Lenin who had studied the Russian 
sectarian movement. After the Bolshevik revolution Bonch-Bruevich 
worked as a key party administrator and was Lenin's executive 
secretary. His special knowledge of and his relationship to Russian 
sectarians enabled him to function as a defender of their interests. As 
another conciliatory-minded top leader inside the Soviet leadership we 
may mention L.B. Kamenev who often favoured a more peaceful 
approach in Soviet religious policy. Perhaps rather surprisingly, during 
the early Soviet period Stalin often favoured a more cautious attitude 
towards religious organizations. 
The Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (NKID) and its head G.V. 
Chicherin (1872-1936) also played a more conciliatory role in Soviet 
16 	 See, for example, GARF1 f.393, op.27, d.1390 (3,4,7), d. 1391, d. 1393. 
17 	 See, for example, GARF1 f.5446e, op.55, d.409 "CBo Ka". See also NR, 34. 
religious policy. The reason for this was obvious: although it felt 
uneasy about its capitalist neighbours, the Soviet regime also looked 
forward to the possibility of escaping from the diplomatic isolation it 
had been placed in after the Bolshevik revolution. This was the main 
reason why the NKID tried to preserve the reputation of the Soviet state 
by favouring a more conciliatory approach towards religious organ-
izations. In accordance with these objectives, Chicherin was able to 
establish good relations between the Soviet state and its eastern 
neighbours and consequently favoured a more conciliatory Soviet 
policies towards Eastern religions.'$ 
Another branch of government which had a natural interest in 
religious affairs was the Narkompros, the Commissariat for Education. 
In theory this office had the task of creating the New Atheistic Man. 
The commissariat of A.V. Lunacharsky was put in charge of organizing 
antireligious propaganda and agitation among the Soviet population. 
Nevertheless, the Narkompros neglected this mission, partly because of 
material and organizational shortages and partly because it had to 
concentrate on its educational duties. As a matter of fact, this office had 
from the beginning of the Soviet regime pressed only for education that 
was non-religious, not antireligious. Although such militant atheists as 
M.N. Pokrovsky worked there, it had gained the reputation of being one 
of the most "conciliatory" of the Soviet organs. This careful and tactful 
attitude towards antireligious work can be seen as a reflection of an 
optimistic attitude towards religion prevailing in the Narkompros 
during the period 1917-1928. Soviet authorities in general believed that 
religion would fade away in time with the revolution.'9 
Partly due to this failure of the Narkompros it was reorganized, 
along with antireligious activities in general, in 1920 with the creation 
of the Glavpolitprosvet (the Central Administration of Political 
Education). This organ was originally supposed to lead all party and 
Soviet propaganda and was supposed to be part of the Narkompros. But 
from the very beginning Glavpolitprosvet competed with the party's 
newly-established Agitation and Propaganda Department (APO), 
which came under the authority of the Central Committee. As part of 
the antireligious battle Glavpolitprosvet established schools, courses, 
rural reading-rooms, workers' universities etc., in addition to under-
taking more openly antireligious activities under the leadership of 
Lenin's wife, N.K. Krupskaya. For example, Glavpolitprosvet organ- 
18 	 See, for example, GARF2 f. 353, op.6, d.9. "HapxoMrocT. TOB. Kpacnxoey 24.Maa 
1922 rona". See also DOBFP, 650-651. "Record by Mr. Gregory of a conversation 
with M. Krassin. Foreign Office April 14. 1921". 
19 	 Read 1990, 99; Holmes 1993, 127-130. 
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ized expeditions along the river Volga on the steamboat Krasnaya 
Zvezda with the purpose of distributing atheist propaganda.20 
The Narkompros based its ideas on the educational concepts of the 
enlightenment, but these encountered disapproval from the communist 
youth. The Communist Youth Organization, the Komsomol, had, 
moreover, an interest in this field and regarded the Narkompros as too 
soft in relation to the educational policy of the Soviet state. The struggle 
between the two for control over antireligious education had many 
manifestations during the 1920s. Debates on antireligious or "non-
religious" education were perhaps the most visible manifestations of 
this conflict, but these constituted only part of the constant battle 
between these two fronts within the ruling regime over antireligious 
policy. On one side there were "doves" who wanted to use conciliatory 
methods in the antireligious battle, while on the other there were 
"hawks", ideologically-motivated Bolsheviks who wanted to get rid of 
68 	 both capitalist society and religion at once.''-' 
2. THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND 
THE CONFLICT OF DIFFERENT 
BELIEFS 
As a result of the victorious October Revolution of 1917, the Bolsheviks 
set up the first Soviet government, the Sovnarkom, to rule Russia and 
transform it into a socialist society. The Sovnarkom was theoretically 
subordinated to the Congress of Soviets and the All-Russian Central 
Executive Committee of Soviets, the VTsIK, but this relation proved later 
to be only a formality and the Bolsheviks acted independently regardless 
of democratic procedures. Nonetheless, the new government was still 
very weak. Petrograd was vulnerable to possible German attack and the 
whole of Russian society was on the verge of collapse. The weak 
Bolshevik regime was compelled to rule primarily by issuing decrees. 
Earlier land and peace decrees had already given them authority over the 
peasant masses. According to Trotsky, the decrees the Sovnarkom 
enacted during the first months of the new Soviet regime, totalling more 
than 600, were intended not simply for conventional legislative purposes. 
20 	 ORTS, 48; Fitzpatrick 1970,175-187,244-255; McNeal 1973,187-192,196-198, 
201-202. According to Christopher Read, the Glavpolitprosvet created sub-organs 
to deal with the theatre, fine arts, literature, photography and cinematography, but 
he does not mention antireligious work. Read 1990, 171-172. 
21 	 Fitzpatrick 1979, 12. 20-22; Walters 1993, 4. 
They were also an effective part of Soviet propaganda. Lenin personally 
hoped that these revolutionary laws would remain as models for future 
revolutionary generations if the Bolshevik government were to be 
crushed by reactionary forces.22 
Church-state relations were tense from the beginning as the land 
decree of 1917 had confiscated all the land belonging to the ROC 
together with that of other major landowners. Of course, in many places 
this decree only reinforced the existing situation; peasants had during 
the autumn of 1917 already taken over land on their own initiative. This 
act, nevertheless, effectively demolished the ROC's economic base and 
embittered senior church leaders. The Bolshevik solution to the 
agrarian question had in any event aroused mixed reaction within the 
ROC. In some places local "white" clergy had co-operated with the 
peasantry, but in other areas the general iconoclasm and disturbances of 
autumn 1917 had engulfed both churches and clergy.23  
The second significant blow dealt against the church was the 
"Declaration of the rights of the peoples of Russia", an act which 
abolished the special privileges based on nationality or religion. Later 
in November, the Sovnarkom announced the confiscation of all 
monasteries, theological seminaries, academies and schools. Further-
more, the new ruling regime published laws on civil marriage, divorce 
and the secularized registration of the population.24 These legislative 
measures, together with the news of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, 
greatly annoyed the leadership of the Orthodox church. The ROC had, 
after all, just gained independence from an autocratic state, convoked a 
Sobor, and elected its own Patriarch. Mutual suspicions between 
church and government gradually increased and the confiscation of the 
printing house of the Holy Synod by the new regime strained relations 
to breaking point.25  
The background to these relations was complicated. Although both 
camps had their moderates who wanted to avoid open conflict, there 
were also militants on both sides who were ready to escalate the 
situation. In the eyes of the Bolsheviks, the ROC was a former ally of 
the Imperial throne and belonged to the category of class enemy. The 
new regime was especially attentive to the political activity of the 
church. The sympathies which church leaders showed, for example, 
towards the imprisoned royal family aroused deep suspicion. This 
22 	 Trotsky 1990 (1930) II, 65-67, 79, 123-124; Carr 1985 I, 125, 355. See also Boiter 
1987, 105. 
23 	 DSV I, 17-20; Simon 1974, 28; Keep 1976, 186-199, 388-392. 
24 	 DSV I, 39-41, 210-211, 247-249; SU I, 131. 
25 	 Curtiss 1953, 37-42; Fletcher 1971, 22. See also Evtuhov 1991, 497-498, 511. 
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ideological antagonism was deepened further by the general chaos and 
public disturbances. For example, just after the Bolshevik revolution 
undisciplined soldiers killed a certain arch-priest Ioann Kochurov in 
Tsarskoe Selo inside his own church. However, these acts of violence 
were not always directed primarily against the ROC. In many cases, 
iconoclastic radicals whom the revolution had elevated to a position of 
leadership did not distinguish between palaces, universities, schools or 
churches.26 
Nevertheless, formal relations between the new government and the 
ROC remained undefined, although the Soviet government was 
preparing for the separation of church and state. The situation was 
exacerbated suddenly when at the beginning of 1918 the new Soviet 
commissar for social affairs, A.M. Kollontai (1872-1952), attempted to 
confiscate the Aleksandr Nevsky monastery in Petrograd for the 
homeless and invalids. The monks refused to hand the monastery over 
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to the Soviet authorities and as a result Kollontai asked the Kronstadt 
marines to take it by force. This attempt failed as the monks were able 
to summon the civilian population to their aid by ringing the bells. In 
the ensuing chaos one monk was killed and several demonstrators were 
wounded.27 
Kollontai's attempt to take over the Aleksandr Nevsky monastery on 
her own initiative occurred at a politically explosive time, as peace 
negotiations were still going on with Imperial Germany and Soviet 
Petrograd was threatened if negotiations failed. Although the Soviet 
government made an unsuccessful attempt to cancel Kollontai's 
operation, the damage had been done. For example, Bonch-Bruevich 
publicly announced that he was not an enemy of the Church and even 
said that he would give his protection to the announced church 
demonstration which might arise out of this incident. As a response to 
these incidents, the ROC organized a religious demonstration28 against 
Soviet power and the newly-elected Patriarch Tikhon (Vasily 
Ivanovich Belavin, 1865-1925) invited believers and the clergy to 
organize the people to defend the church from future attacks. Moreover, 
the leaders of other religious organizations also expressed their 
indignation at the Aleksandr Nevsky monastery incident.29  
Bolshevik newspapers responded angrily to Tikhon's announce-
ment. For example on 28 January 1918 I.I. Skvortsov—Stepanov (1870- 
26 	 Stites 1989, 62-64, 70-76; Alekseev 1991, 23. 
27 	 Kollontai 1974, 331-335; Clements 1980, 131-133; Farnsworth 1980, 100-10I. 
28 	 Curtiss 1953, 48-49; Schapiro 1965, 85-86. 
29 	 Curtiss 1953, 49-50; Regelson 1977, 226-227. See also AGMIR f.2, op.23, 
d.23-25. 
1928), an active Bolshevik propagandist against religion and a 
prominent participant in philosophical debates, described Tikhon in a 
newspaper article with such epithets as "High priest", "Nero", 
"Caligula", "Hannah", "Caiaphas" and accused him of trying to initiate 
a civil war.30 Yaroslaysky also attacked Tikhon in the press by drawing 
on biblical proverbs and declaring that the "black ravens" who defend 
monasteries were worried only because they knew that there would be 
an end to "idling and the sweet life". He ended his article with a 
warning that these "doomed black ravens could not save the bourgeois 
class from peril".31  
But despite this name-calling and invective, the Soviet regime did 
not interfere with the religious demonstration, which brought thousands 
of people onto the streets of Petrograd. This is quite surprising when we 
consider that the Bolsheviks had just disbanded the Constitutional 
Assembly and had suppressed those protesters who a few days prior to 
this had attempted to defend this body. There are some obvious 
explanations for this. Firstly there was a divergence of opinion inside 
the Soviet coalition government. According to E.H. Carr, some senior 
Soviet officials did not like the idea of getting involved in a religious 
war with the ROC and denied that they were persecuting religion as 
such. The idea of a post-revolutionaiy "bloody Sunday" was under-
standably not attractive to the Soviet leaders. In addition, the Bol-
sheviks at the time were in a coalition government with the Left-SRs 
and the latter's representatives in the government underlined the 
importance of respecting the rights of the church. Another reason was 
perhaps that, as Barbara Evans Clements has pointed out, Lenin was 
displeased by Kollontai's hasty and unauthorized actions.32 
Nonetheless, the prestige of Soviet power was at stake. The 
"monastery incident" had placed the ROC and Soviet power on a 
collision course and this, no doubt, also intensified future Soviet 
religious policy legislation. Right after Tikhon's anathema and the 
subsequent disturbances the Soviet government issued a decree, signed 
by Kollontai on 20 January 1918, which declared that the government 
would halt all financial aid to all religious organizations. Simul-
taneously it issued another decree entitled Concerning freedom of 
conscience, ecclesiastical and religious organizations. The Sovnarkom 
had been preparing for the separation of church and state since 
30 	 IPSS, 186-187. "IIonoacKnnti noaxoå'. 
31 	 YI, 13-14. "ileputte aopoHw". 
32 	 Clements 1980, 131-133; Can- 1985 I, 135; Alekseev 1991, 40. See also YI, 15. 
"TAx<enoe ocxop6neHHe"; YIII, 6-7."Ko aceM rpaxcaaHaM'; Kollontai 1974, 
331-335. 
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December 1917, with a committee made up of members such as the 
expert on legal matters P.I. Stuchka (1865-1932), A.V. Lunacharsky, 
professor of law M.A.Reisner (1868-1928), P.A. Krasikov and former 
priest M.V. Galkin (Gorey). The final decree, which was personally 
corrected and supervised by Lenin, was enacted on 23 January 1918.33  
The tensions were reflected in the text of this decree. As John S. Curtiss 
has commented, in publishing this legislative act the new regime 
"established the principle of the completely secular state, made religion 
a private matter, and deprived all religious bodies of their property, 
their legal status, right to maintain schools and subsidies from the 
government."34 
The original draft of this decree had proposed that religion should be 
a "private matter". This paragraph was not, however, included in the 
final and official version of the decree — Lenin had personally deleted it. 
It seems most likely that in doing so he wanted in the short term to 
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avoid legal debates about the word "private". Nevertheless, Lenin 
believed that in the long term the revolution would fuse together the 
private and public spheres of life. His ambiguous model was the 
example of the Paris Commune, which had liberated the state and the 
educational system from the harmful "opium of the people". The final 
version of this decree was entitled: "Concerning the separation of 
church and state and the separation of school and church".35 This law 
resembled to some extent the law of the separation of church and state 
enacted in France in 1905. The difference between these two laws lay in 
their interpretation. The Soviet decree, and especially its implemen-
tation, endangered the whole existence of the church as a social 
institution. This was understandable when we consider that the Soviet 
judicial system was not meant to conform with the formal or the 
bourgeois understanding of legality.36 
The pre-revolutionary party programme of 1903, and especially the 
minimum version, had emphasized the importance of democratic 
reforms and getting rid of the autocracy. But once the Bolsheviks had 
33 	 SU I, 260-261: Pospielovsky 1987, 156. Compare DSV I. 371 and 371-374. See 
also Alekseev 1991, 28-29, 39. 
34 	 Curtiss 1953, 46. 
35 	 See lzvestiya, 21 January 1918, No. 16 (280). 
36 	 DSV I, 371-374; PSS 32, 154-155; Izvestiya, 12 January 1918, No. 8 (272); 
Sypnowich 1987, 308. The difference between Western socialists and Russian 
Bolsheviks is striking concerning this question. For example, Otto Bauer, the 
Austrian socialist leader and an eager initiator of the separation of church and state 
in Austria, questioned the aggressive Bolshevik attitude towards religion and their 
efforts to revise the slogan: "religion is a private matter". McLellan 1987a, 83-84. 
Concerning the French situation after the 1905 separation, see McManners 1972, 
166-167. 
achieved power, the whole pre-revolutionary minimum programme and 
the earlier religious policy demands of that programme became 
obsolete. Instead of formal legislation the "separation decree" was 
aimed at pushing the church both politically and economically to the 
margins of Soviet society. The situation after the Revolution thus 
nullified the premises of the pre-revolutionary programme and as a 
result distinctions between state and party were now artificial.37 
As Lenin had maintained in State and Revolution, the dictatorship of 
the proletariat was a higher form of state. This also implied that, in his 
understanding, theoretical distinctions between different state powers 
would become outdated and the question of the state's neutrality would 
become obsolete; the state would belong to the workers.38 Moreover, 
the Soviet power structure presupposed that Bolshevik party leaders 
would occupy the seats in the Sovnarkom and that all political problems 
would be solved primarily at the level of the party. 
The senior leaders of the ROC soon realized the political challenge 
of this decree and the convoked Sobor declared that it constituted a 
direct attack on the ROC in the name of liberty of conscience and 
announced that those who would be responsible forimplementing the 
decree would be anathematized and excommunicated from the flock of 
believers.39 Nonetheless, there was much inconsistency between theory 
and practice in the implementation of the decree. Due to the serious 
political situation and the divergence of opinion among the Soviet 
leaders, the practical implementation was at first mild, as was the whole 
introduction of the Soviet system from the beginning. Although waves 
of anarchy swept through Russia, the Bolshevik leaders were at the 
beginning quite moderate in their actions and moved only slowly after 
the revolution. For example, the confiscation of industry was initially 
both punitive in nature as well as unco-ordinated.4° 
The moderate introduction of the separation decree reflected the 
weak nature of the Bolshevik regime. It had in fact no means at its 
disposal to see its decrees implemented. The military threat from 
Germany was so intense at the time that even in the "separation decree" 
37 	 Paul B. Anderson and Trevor Beeson have interpreted the religious policy of the 
Soviet era by examining these pre-revolutionary distinctions. However, their view 
that the Bolshevik party made a distinction between the attitude of state and party 
may lead to misleading conclusions in the post-revolutionary period. Compare 
Anderson 1944, 59-61; Beeson 1974, 32-33. See AK, 10-11. 
38 	 Pipes 1980, 243-246. 
39 	 Curtiss 1953, 55-56. 
40 	 Deutscher 1967, 219; Carr 1985 II, 66-73. See also, PSS 37, 139. "VI 
BcepoccHlcKHN 4pe3BbI4aiiHbl171 Cbe3A COBeTOB paOo4Hx. KpeCTbAHCKHX. 
Ka3a4bHX H KpaCHOapMecCKHX AenyTaToB . 
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the government was obliged to recognize that if military units wanted to 
maintain their priests they could do so at their own expense. The best 
example of this coexistence was the convening of the Sobor of the ROC 
in the Kremlin during the first months of Soviet power without 
interference from the authorities.'" 
This relatively peaceful enactment of the separation decree was done 
at the expense of apathy among the population. The official NKVD 
investigation shows that people in general accepted news of the 
separation decree with resignation, although the ROC leaders sought to 
mobilize people to resist the decree.42 These plans failed because the 
Bolsheviks thwarted all attempts to resist their authority and, moreover, 
because the majority of the people were struggling with the general 
chaos gripping the country. Furthermore, in the case of open resistance, 
Soviet officials acted mercilessly and suppressed disturbances with the 
use of armed force. For example, in the Vitebsk district local officials 
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sentenced five people to death for rioting against this decree. These 
penalties were subsequently commuted to jail sentences but this 
incident reveals how Soviet power was already able to control the 
situation. As a Soviet official from the Arkhangelsk district suggested, 
one possible explanation for this passive reaction to the separation 
decree was perhaps the fact that at the same time as the Soviet regime 
passed the decree it showed "foresight in guaranteeing freedom of 
belief for every cult". On this point, Western scholars concur. For 
example, John S. Curtiss has remarked that one reason for the gradual 
and calm introducing of the separation decree was the fact that Soviet 
power "avoided a head-on collision with the church". We may 
conclude that the general mood of the Russian population could 
perhaps be best described as submissive. Or, as we see from I.V. 
Got'e's (1873-1943) memoirs, some members of the intelligentsia 
even hoped that the separation decree would renew the ROC's spiritual 
well-being.43 This conciliatory approach was in line with the relatively 
cautious Bolshevik policy of 1917 and early 1918. Furthermore in early 
1918 the Bolsheviks were looking forward to a "breathing-space" and a 
truce with their class enemies. The period of the Red Terror lay further 
ahead. 
41 	 SU I, 249; Schapiro 1965, 98-99; Hagen 1990, 21, 36-39. 
42 	 GARFI f.3431, op.l, d.550 "fporoson No:2. 3acenaHMst 27 mumps' 1918r. B II 
vac yrpa B EnapxnanbnoM florae". 
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Curtiss 1953, 57; Got'e 1988, 17, 103. On how Soviet officials explained the 
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3. THE "BREATHING-SPACE" AND 
THE CONSTITUTION OF 1918 
This short "breathing-space" constituted a unique era on the eve of civil 
war. The Bolshevik party was restricted mainly to journalistic debates 
with its adversaries. It had not yet systematically suppressed the 
opposition and the press could work relatively undisturbed. The 
motivation behind this policy was the simple fact that the Bolsheviks 
were painfully aware of the destructive anarchistic forces rife in 
Russian society and could see the first signs of civil war. The new 
regime needed stabilization. Before the revolution, communists had 
inspired anarchy among the masses, but they were now anxious to calm 
the situation. After the peace of Brest-Litovsk in December 1917, the 
communists were convinced that they would stay in power but there 
was, nonetheless, a danger that iconoclastic forces would swallow them 
up if order was not restored. As Lenin put it at the 7th party congress, 
the ruling regime needed new tactics for winning time and a political 
breathing-space 44 
According to Vladimir N. Brovkin, this "breathing-space" period 
commenced on 29 March 1918 with the publication of an interview 
with Lunacharsky in Novaya Zhizn, a newspaper of the opposition 
intelligentsia. Lunacharsky stressed that the new regime was ready to 
discuss with "creative forces" and announced that Soviet power was so 
stable that it did not need to use coercive methods to accomplish its 
purposes. Lenin himself proposed that reconciliation with the Russian 
bourgeoisie could be achieved by adopting a kind of state capitalism 
and by utilizing the services of the former owner-class. This relaxation 
towards class enemies can be detected clearly in his relatively moderate 
language from this time on. Former "parasites" were now termed 
"merchants" or "specialists", whom communists could learn from 
when performing their duties. During this "pre-NEP" period the Soviet 
government even started negotiations with former factory owners on 
industrial concessions 45 
This new policy also presented the possibility for a detente between 
the ROC and the new rulers. Representatives of the Sovnarkom hinted 
that there was the opportunity for an agreement between the Soviet 
state and the ROC. Senior officials of the ROC realized the importance 
of these negotiations and authorized a commission with such church 
44 	 PSS 36, 251-252. "3aceaaHHe BLIHK"; KPSS II, 30-32; Brovkin 1987, 77-78. 
45 	 PSS 36,255-258,271-273. "3aceaaHHe BUHK'; Brovkin 1987, 79-80. See also 
Chase 1990,14-15; Trukan 1994, 50. 
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figures as A.D. Samarin (1866-1932) and professor N.D. Kuznetsov to 
conduct these talks. During these sessions with representatives of the 
Sovnarkom, church officials gained the impression that the Soviet 
regime was ready to rethink its separation decree or even to reverse it 4s 
Samarin gave a vivid picture of these negotiations in his report to the 
Sobor. He had expected to see the head of the Soviet government in the 
negotiations but the representatives of the Sovnarkom apologized for 
Lenin not being able to attend these meetings in person. Nevertheless, 
the Soviet delegation was impressive, even if Lenin did not participate. 
On the Soviet side were eminent Bolsheviks such as Bonch-Bruevich, 
Kursky and Lenin's brother-in-law, M.T. Elizarov (1862-1919). The 
general atmosphere was almost cordial and both sides used very 
moderate language. Elizarov even denied that the Sovnarkom had 
adopted a hostile attitude towards the ROC. Instead, he argued the 
Bolsheviks treated all religions, including the ROC, benevolently but 
76 	 would not sanction ecclesiastical influence within the Soviet state 47 
It is obvious that with these negotiations with class enemies the 
ruling regime was attempting to pacify its religiously-minded popu-
lation by emphasizing that communists were not really persecuting or 
harassing the church. This conciliatory tone was characteristic of 
official Soviet propaganda at that time. For example, the Bolshevik 
propagandist N.M. Lukin (N. Antonov) pointed out in an article that the 
ROC had forgotten the teachings of the first Christians and had become 
a tool of the exploiters. The church, when allied with the state, had been 
able to grab riches from the people. The Bolsheviks also pointed out 
that the ROC had persecuted other denominations and served the 
interests of the former state. Therefore people should not believe 
rumours that the new regime was persecuting the church. On the 
contrary, every church, not just the ROC, could now conduct its 
religious life as it wished.48  
Despite the cordial tone in previous negotiations and Bolshevik 
proclamations, the mutual distrust and suspicion between these 
opposing sides was profound. The majority of representatives of the 
Sobor did not want to make any compromises, especially on issues with 
regard to secular marriage and divorce. Moreover, the negotiations 
failed to reach an agreement on the legal status of confiscated church 
property. Many clergymen clearly saw no reasons for moderating their 
46 	 GARFI f.3431, op.l, d.103 (1), I. 36; GARFI f.3431, op.l, d.105 (1), 1. 119. See 
also GARF2 f.353, op.3, d.744 "IIpoToxon AnexcaHap .1)',HMHrpAeBH9 
CaMapHHa". 
47 	 GARFI f.3431, op.1, d.105 (1), 11. 71-77. 
48 	 Lukin 1918,1-2,2-15,25-32. 
demands, believing as they did that the new regime could collapse at 
any moment. On the other hand, the Soviet regime was also unwilling 
to make any substantial concessions to its opponents 49 
Nevertheless, these negotiations were, despite the mutual suspicions, 
the first actual attempt to achieve a modus vivendi or peaceful 
coexistence between the new regime and the ROC. The significance of 
this "breathing-space" and these negotiations lies in the fact that the 
atheist ruling regime was now for the first time adjusting itself to 
Russian reality. The ROC and other religious organizations were still 
an important part of Russian society, and in order to calm the political 
situation in Russia the ruling regime attempted to compromise with the 
former state church. One concrete result of these negotiations can be 
seen in the Soviet legislation of August 1918 which gave specific 
instructions for the separation of church and state, but also attempted to 
avoid offending the religious feelings of the "working masses" 50 
The question of how honestly Soviet leaders attempted to find a 	 77 
peaceful solution with the ROC is of course difficult to answer. It is 
conceivable that from Lenin's point of view the whole campaign was 
only a tactical measure to win time. Lenin had, it should be recalled, 
used the tactics of "pseudo-negotiation" when the Menshevik-
dominated railway union went on strike after the October Revolution. 
The Soviet government was obliged to negotiate with the strikers as a 
diplomatic measure and Lenin spun out these negotiations until such 
time as the new government was able to organize a pro-government 
railway union. On the other hand, it must be said that the task of 
negotiating with the ROC was given to Bolsheviks like Bonch-
Bruevich, for whom compromise would perhaps have been acceptable. 
This reflected, as we have seen earlier, a divergence of opinion inside 
the Soviet government itself; some leaders were more open to 
compromise, while others disliked any signs of compromise with class 
enemies. The so-called Left-Communist group51 opposed any ideo-
logical wavering and insisted that the building of socialism was im-
possible without the destruction of enemies both outside and inside the 
Soviet state.52 
For Lenin ideological compromise was out of the question, but as a 
master of political intrigue he was ready to use any means at his 
49 	 GARFI f.3431, op.1, d.105 (1), 1. 77; GARFI f.343I, op.1, d.550 "IlporoKon 
No:2. 3aceaaxnsi 27 AHsapA 1918r. B II mac yrpa s EnapxHanbuoM forte"; 
Curtiss 1953, 57-59; Blane 1971, 307-308. See also PSS 35, 283-284. "TpeTHH 
BcepoccHiIcKHH Cbe3a Coaeroa P..C.H K. 
50 	 SURa, 685; ORTs, 82-84. 
51 	 For more on Left Communists, see Sakwa 1992, 418-425. 
52 	 Schapiro 1965, 130-135; Carr 1985 I, 188-189; Brovkin 1987, 21-27. 
disposal to secure Soviet power. This flexible approach was based on 
his unique political pragmatism. As he explained to party workers in 
Moscow in November 1918, the party should behave in accordance 
with the political situation. If the petty bourgeoisie resisted, the new 
regime should crush them mercilessly. But if the bourgeoisie wanted to 
co-operate with the Soviet system, the communists should not reject 
their overtures.53  
At the same time as the Bolsheviks were trying to appease the 
bourgeoisie and moderate their policies, Soviet legislative work was 
continuing. Lenin himself did not personally participate in drawing up 
the 1918 Soviet Constitution but he supervised the work and saw it as 
an opportunity to record the achievements of the revolution.54 This 
Constitution abandoned the concept of the neutrality of state power and 
the idea that in regard to religion a state could guarantee the basic rights 
of the individual. The rights of the individual were dependent on the 
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class to which that person belonged. For example, when workers gained 
political freedom they no longer needed any protection, while the class 
of former exploiters did not deserve any civil rights. The latter were 
"lishentsy" (deprived people) with the rights only of second-class 
people. Moreover, the Constitution of 1918 did not recognize any 
concept of "individual" freedom, which smacked of "bourgeois" 
values. According to the general communist view, only a new society, 
without a contradiction between labour and capital, could guarantee 
freedom for the people. Freedom of religion would, it was claimed, be 
best assured by implementing the separation of church and state.55  
So although the 1918 Constitution confirmed freedom of religion for 
every citizen, in reality only the representatives of the working class 
had actual possibilities to exercise that freedom. For example, the right 
to publish, the right to vote, the right to armed service and the right to 
food rations were granted only to the formerly exploited people. 
Businessmen, people who had hired labour, priests, monks and the 
mentally ill were left without basic rights by the Soviet jurisdiction. So 
when the Constitution established the "right to conduct religious and 
atheist propaganda" it represented Bolshevik propaganda more than 
actual religious freedom. In practice, only the representatives of the 
ruling regime had the means to express their views publicly.56 
53 	 PSS 37, 231-233. "Co6paHHe napTHtiHbIX pa60THHK0B MOCKBbI. 1[oKJIBa 06 
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54 	 Unger 1981,2-3,10-13,20-22. 
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This inconsistency between propaganda and reality was clearly 
visible in Lenin's speech to the inhabitants of Krasnaya Presnya on 26 
July 1918 when he once used the term "private matter", an expression 
he had earlier condemned, to express the attitude of the Soviet regime 
to religion. Lenin almost portrayed himself as an advocate of civil 
liberties when he declared that, in accordance with Soviet law, 
everyone may believe or may not, but that the state would be separate 
from religion 57 
This "breathing-space" period did not last long. In early autumn 
1918 the Soviet regime suppressed the newspapers of the political 
opposition and crushed its attempts to gain power by democratic 
means. The Soviet leaders, despite differences among themselves, were 
now willing to sanction anti-Bolshevik soviets. The masses, which had 
been pro-government until then were now more and more turning to the 
opposition and expressions of political antagonism took on even a 
pro-autocratic or religious form. The seeds of civil war were now being 	 79 
sown and after the summer of 1918 both foreign and domestic enemies 
intervened to challenge Soviet power.58  
4. THE CIVIL WAR AND THE 
"ISOLATION OF THE 
ECCLESIASTICAL ENEMY" 
The outbreak of the civil war made the prolonging of the 
"breathing-space" strategy impossible. This became obvious when on 
30 August 1918 F.E. Kaplan (Roidman, 1890-1918) attempted to 
assassinate Lenin. The Bolshevik leaders responded to this violent act 
by organizing their own Red Terror. In order to preserve its power, the 
new ruling regime instigated a systematic campaign of terror against 
potential class-enemies: officers, businessmen, the intelligentsia and 
the clergy.59 
The peculiarity of the Russian civil war (1917-1921) lay in the fact 
that it did not escalate at once. Nevertheless, initial hostilities in time 
expanded into a full-scale war that ultimately caused the ruin of the 
whole of society. The new government had to abandon plans to 
moderate the advance towards socialism and instead resorted to 
57 	 PSS 36, 536. "Peyb Ha MHTHHre B r1peCHeUCKOM pacoHe 26 HK)JIA 1918". 
58 	 Brovkin 1987, 259, 294-296; Figes 1989, 248. 
59 	 Leggett 1986, 67. 
organizing the economy on communist principles - so-called War 
Communism. The nature of this policy was simple. During the course 
of the civil war the Bolsheviks finally nationalized all the means of 
production. In the countryside they introduced emergency measures in 
order to acquire enough grain for city inhabitants and the Red Army. 
This gave rise to many problems, especially in the countryside where 
the Bolshevik method of obtaining grain, the "surplus-appropriation 
system", generated little enthusiasm among the peasants. 
However, with regard to religious policy the period of civil war was 
something of a paradox. Although the waves of violence and 
destruction by iconoclastic elements touched the ROC and other 
religious organizations, their basic functions could be performed 
relatively freely. Even if thousands of bishops, priests, monks and nuns 
perished as a result of anarchy and the Red Terror, the general 
organization of the ROC survived intact. The antagonism between 
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former state church leaders and the Bolshevik regime was of course as 
great as ever. Naturally enough, the leaders of the ROC were aware that 
the restoration of the old order would serve their interests. 
This paradox is even more evident when we examine the activity of 
the Patriarch. Although the leadership of the church had lost its political 
platform when the Holy Sobor was disbanded through lack of resources 
in August 1918, Tikhon could openly criticize the Soviet regime. In his 
message of 26 October 1918 Tikhon accused the Soviet regime of 
instigating general anarchy and violence. The promises which the new 
regime had given had not been fulfilled after one year of Bolshevik 
rule. Tikhon went on to say that the promised freedom had not been 
extended to the ROC and the representatives of the church were paying 
the price of freedom of speech with their lives. The political anathema 
of the Patriarch concluded in the accusation that the Soviet regime was 
totally responsible for the degeneration of Russia. This message caused 
an angry response from the Soviet side, but significantly the Patriarch 
was not touched 60 
This incident perhaps best illustrates the general line of Bolshevik 
religious policy during the civil war. During this struggle for survival 
the Bolsheviks did not want to set religious organizations against the 
new regime. As Lenin explained to an assembly of women workers on 
19 November 1918, the party should handle religious prejudices with 
extreme care and avoid offending religious feelings. In doing so Lenin 
was trying not to provoke a religious war or to embitter those people on 
whose support the Soviet regime was so dependent. He stressed that the 
60 	 Curtiss 1953, 64-65; Regelson 1977, 251-255. 
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Bolsheviks should carry out their antireligious fight with caution and 
conduct it mainly against the root causes of religious prejudices, 
"poverty" and "darkness". This "cautious attitude" was an often-
repeated theme in Bolshevik literature. For example, I.I. Skvortsov—
Stepanov recalled that during its early period of power the Soviet 
regime was very slow to resort to repressive methods against its 
ecclesiastical enemies. Or as The ABC of Communism (the popular 
catechism of the 1919 party programme) put it, this cautious approach 
was justified as a precautionary measure so as not to revitalize or 
mobilize the almost moribund links between religion and nationality6l 
Nevertheless, the ruling regime no doubt did not forget Tikhon's 
religious protest which, from the Bolshevik point of view, differed only 
in its nature from the armed resistance of the White generals. Leading 
Bolsheviks and Soviet organs were constantly reporting on the 
suspicious political activity of the Orthodox clergy and their alliance 
with "black-hundred" groups. The members of the ruling regime were 
especially alarmed by rumours that monks and clergy were organizing 
"brotherhoods" in order to resist Bolshevik power. According to some 
reports, clergy were actively attacking the Soviet regime while at 
thesame time the majority of priests were "hand in glove" with the 
counter-revolutionaries.62 
So it may be noted that the political terror, which the Bolsheviks 
used without hesitation against their political enemies, did not touch the 
ROC or the Patriarch directly. Instead of using terror against the former 
state church the Soviet leaders had chosen to isolate the ROC 
politically. The "isolation policy" expresses clearly the political 
objective of the Soviet regime during the civil war.63 The content of this 
policy was quite simple, as P.A. Krasikov explained in the NKYust's 
periodical Revolyutsiya i Tserkov: the more the forces of reaction 
61 	 RTsKhIDNI f.150, op.l, d.62 "IlepKoBb H rocyaapcTeo B CCCP (1923)"; PSS 37, 
186. "Pevb Ha II BcepoccHlIcKom Cbe3ae pa6oTHHu 19 Hon6pa 1918 r."; AK, 
201. 
62 GARF2 f.353, op.3, d.731 "3aBeayIouteMy oTaenoM. Z1oKnaaHan 3anncxa 25 
ceHTs16ps! 1918", "3aaeaytouteMy oraenoM. ,Iloxnaa.Hast 3anucxa 12 aexa6pa 
1918". 
63 	 This term can be detected also from later Soviet researchers. For example, I. 
Trifonov has remarked that one of the antireligious tactics of the secret police was 
to isolate the ROC from its connections with the forces of reaction. Trifonov 1960, 
31, 33. See also Kenez 1985, 67-69. According to Aleksandr Nezhnyi the political 
line of the secret police during the civil war was to "discredit" the clergy. Russkaya 
Mysl, 20-26 January 1994, No. 4012. Anyway, according to a certain leader of the 
Cheka, T. P. Samsonov (1888-1956), the Soviet security apparatus attempted at 
that time force the high clergy to discredit to religion. NR, 34. "llHebMo 
3aeeayioutero ceKperHbIM oraenoM BLIK T.II. CaMcouoea $.3. ii3ep-
JKHHCKOMy 4. aeKa6psi 1920". 
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attempted to preserve religious beliefs, together with the old order, the 
more the Soviet regime fought against them. According to him, Soviet 
power was not fighting against the churches as such. As a matter of fact, 
all "honest elements" in the ROC and among the sectarians who had 
abandoned mysticism and adopted communist tendencies supported the 
Soviet regime and its work." 
The roots of this "isolation policy" and its ideological justification 
derived from the 8th party congress and the II party programme of 
1919. This congress reflected the moods and methods of "War 
Communism"; in the middle of civil war there seemed to be no room 
for compromise. This changed atmosphere is reflected in the II party 
programme. As Lenin, the main architect of this programme, explained, 
religious propaganda had connections to capital. The task of the party 
was to destroy totally the ties between the exploitative classes and 
organizations for disseminating religious propaganda.65 In the congress 
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this paragraph did not arouse any particular public debate among 
communists. Only P.A. Krasikov wanted to revise the suggested 
version and complained that the draft did not contain any Marxist 
theoretical explanations concerning religion. He also remarked that the 
last sentence of this paragraph concerning the need to avoid hurting the 
feelings of believers might lead to misunderstanding. Believers could 
say that the separation of church and state or church and school was 
hurting their feelings. His remarks were not even discussed and in the 
end the 8th congress accepted only one additional sentence to the 
programme. L.B. Kamenev explained that this particular amendment 
was inserted in order to underline the fact that the disappearance of 
religion would come about as a result of communism. Consequently, 
the best way to fight against religion was to fight for communism.66 
According to the accepted programme and its 13th paragraph, the 
Bolshevik party would not simply be satisfied with implementing the 
separation of church and state. The final target of the party was to 
totally liberate the masses from the prejudices of religion. The 
assumption that religious organizations were rooted in the bourgeois 
class was characteristic of Bolshevik thinking. For example, according 
to Lenin, the exploiters used every possible means to infiltrate every 
level of society. On the one hand, the political machinery of the 
bourgeois state, the educational system and religious organizations 
were all interacting with each other. On the other hand, the bourgeois 
64 	 Krasikov 1920, 6-7; Revolyutsiya i Tserkov, 1919, No. 1, 2-5. 
65 	 PSS 38, 118. "IIpoexr HporpaMMbl PKII(6). IIyHKT nporpaMMw B o6nacrH 
penH11103H6IX oTHOuteHHN". 
66 	 S8, 61-62, 287; Izvestiya, 27 February 1919, No. 45 (597). 
class utilized all the "non-political" organs of the bourgeois state such 
as the educational system, private ownership and the churches in order 
to defraud the people and to stabilize its power. This belief was used to 
justify the separation of the church and school. The ruling regime was 
convinced that enlightenment and education were weapons of the class 
struggle. Science and the liberated educational system now had the task 
of revealing "clerical cheating and superstition". Religion and the 
humanities were the main victims of the Bolshevik educational system. 
The new schools were to become places where the children of workers 
would grow up as the technicians of a new world. They would be free 
and happy without the burden of "bookish knowledge". Once more, the 
accepted party programme warned against harming the feelings of 
believers.67 
The II party programme reflected also the optimism of the Bolshevik 
leaders concerning the possible "withering away" of religion. The ABC 
of Communism was convinced that religion was only a "prejudice" 
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which would die with the advent of a communist society. As a possible 
method of speeding up the decline of religion, this catechism proposed 
conducting antireligious propaganda on a large scale 68  
This religious policy line, which the party adopted during the civil 
war, resembled the attitude which the ruling regime adopted towards 
the neutral intelligentsia and the loyal political opposition. The former 
"exploitative class" was by now crushed, but to some extent the loyal 
opposition was allowed to carry on working in the Soviet organs. In 
accordance with Lenin's scheme, the loyal opposition and neutral 
intelligentsia were to be allowed to continue their work in Soviet organs 
and, as Lenin sarcastically added, Soviet power was not so anxious to 
know what they privately believed. The bourgeoisie could believe in a 
Constitutional Assembly, or in "god" for all that matter, but engaging in 
political activities was strictly out of the question.69 The second and 
much more practical reason for this cautious attitude towards religious 
organizations was the fact that the ruling regime was dependent on the 
peasantry. The soldiers of the Red Army were overwhelmingly of 
peasant origin, and thus more or less religiously-minded people. The 
Soviet regime was particularly keen to appease the much-feared 
67 AK, 179, 197-199; Bukharin—Pozner; Bukharin 1918, 14-15; PSS 38, 95. 
"IIpoeKT nporpaMMsi PKII(6)"; PSS 41, 399-400. "Peyb Ha BCepOCCHtiCKOM 
cOBeWaHHH nOJIHTHpOCBeTOB ry6epxcKHx H ye3aHbIX OTaenoB Hap01[Horo 
o6pa3osaHHn 3 Hos16pA 1920 r."; S8, 330, 347. See also Zinovev 1919, 9-10. 
68 	 AK, 199-200. 
69 PSS 38, 254. "t1pe366I4aFiHoe 3aceaaHHe nneHyMa Mocxoacxoro cosera 
pa60'iHX H KpacHoapMeFicKHX aenyraTOB. ,11.OKnaa 0 BHeWHeM H BHYTpeHHeM 
nOnoJKeHHH COBeTCKON PeCny6JIHKH". 
Cossacks. In its declaration to the "Working Cossacks in the Don, 
Kuban, Terek, Ural, Siberia and Orenburg districts" the VII congress of 
the VTsIK stressed that Soviet power did not want to force Cossacks 
into communes and that it would not tolerate any slandering of 
churches or religion.70 
Such was the political significance of the Russian peasantry that an 
Orthodox priest and future Renovationist leader, V.D. Kranitsky, 
suggested to the NKYust that the Soviet regime enlist peasant priests to 
serve in the Red Army. There is no doubt that in suggesting this 
Kranitsky wanted to show his loyalty towards the ruling regime, but it 
is nonetheless unjust to characterize Kranitsky as a "willing instrument 
in the hands of Tuchkov and the GPU", as Philip Walters has done. 
Kranitsky's motivation appears to have been to discredit the higher 
church leaders in the eyes of the Soviet regime. For example, as a 
representative of the "white" clergy, he reported to officials that church 
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leaders were "fighting conspiratorially" and "under the banner of 
religion" against the revolution. This incident shows clearly how easily 
social contradictions and tensions between "white" and "black" clergy 
could be exploited by the ruling regime.71  
The practical goal of the "isolation policy" was to encourage the 
loyal clergy and to persecute those ecclesiastical organizations and 
authors who were involved in anti-Bolshevik politics. In some 
particular cases Orthodox clergymen were more than willing to 
recognize the Bolshevik revolution. For example, the Archbishop of 
Omsk and Pavlovsk, Silvester, who had earlier in 1919 been a fierce 
anti-Bolshevik and a member of the White ecclesiastical adminis-
tration, in 1920 declared his loyalty to the Soviet regime and explained 
that "the Lord gives power to whomsoever he chooses".72 
The secret police of Soviet power, the Cheka, used more discreet 
methods rather than brute force against its ecclesiastical class enemies, 
in some cases enticing clergymen to become collaborators. But this did 
not rule out the possibility of their using more brutal methods. Lenin 
even toyed with the idea of paying bounties to Ukrainian anarchist 
bands to liquidate resisting clergymen, considering it "an excellent 
plan". The suggested price was 100 000 rubles for each priest killed.73  
70 	 SSR. 140; Lewin 1985, 17-19. 
71 	 Compare GARF2 f.353, op.3, d.795 "0 HanpaBneHHH norm-rim,' CoBercKON 
BnaCTH B OTHOWeHHH K npaBOCnaBHON FoccM icKON LIepKBH" (12/VII 1919)", 
"0 cnyxc6e npaBocnasHoro A.yxoBeHcrBa B KpacxoH ApMHH. 15/8-1919" and 
Walters 1991, 257. See also Freeze 1983, 472-473. 
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Potential leaders of ecclesiastical protests in particular were vigorously 
persecuted after the "breathing-space" came to an end. For example, the 
case of A.D. Samarin and N.D. Kuznetsov is a good illustration of this 
policy. These two authors had earlier conducted negotiations with the 
Soviet regime but in late 1919 they were arrested and charged with 
counter-revolutionary activity. The NKYust's religious expert on the 
"Liquidation Commission", I.A. Shpitsberg, announced that both these 
ecclesiastical authors were "active enemies of the worker-peasant 
revolution" and could not be left to go free. Despite petitions to Lenin 
and several international protests these men were condemned to death, 
but later their sentences were commuted to imprisonment 74 
The Soviet justification for these harsh methods was based on the 
conviction that the "lishentsy" classes were spontaneous enemies of the 
people. As "former people" they were always under suspicion and 
when the ruling regime repressed them it was done in order to prevent 
or punish their "counter-revolutionary" activities.75 The fundamental 
problem in defining the Bolshevik administrative methods during the 
civil war lies in the fact that local terror against churches or religion was 
in many cases sporadic by nature and unpredictable. The difference 
between non-political and political activity was quite narrow. For 
example, one Soviet commentator, N.M. Lukin, remarked already in 
1918 in an article entitled "Churches and the state" that it was essential 
that the "enemies of the revolution" not be allowed to utilize churches 
for political sermons. Moreover, an overenthusiastic sermon might 
have been misinterpreted as a"political demonstration". In addition in 
the conditions of civil war and the general chaos, Bolshevik terror 
tended to be "pre-emptive" in nature. All potential class enemies were 
in danger of being liquidated even before they became engaged in 
actual counter-revolutionary actions.76 
Nonetheless, the public letter of Bonch-Bruevich to the Uniate 
Exarch in Russia, Leonid Ivanovich Fedorov (1879-1935), clarifies in 
more detail the nature of this policy. In his answer to Fedorov, 
Bonch-Bruevich denied that there was any divergence of opinion 
among the Bolsheviks with regard to religious policy. Bonch-Bruevich 
stated that the Soviet government was unanimous on this matter and 
that there were no discordant voices inside the ruling regime with 
regard to the separation of state and church. He also stressed that there 
was no hope of changing this line, but he nonetheless gave guarantees 
74 GARF2 f. 353, op.3, d.744; "Cnpasxå'. "3axniomeHHe no ueny N.386", 
"IIpeuceuarem Coaera Hapo,qHMx KoMHccapHaroB" ; Curtiss 1953, 88. 
75 	 Broido 1986, 30-34. See also Revolyutsiya i Tserkov, 1919, No. 1, 2, 9. 
76 	 Lukin 1918, 33; Pospielovsky 1988, 5-11. 
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that as long as clergymen were not involved in political struggles there 
would be no need for them to fear.77 By means of the isolation policy 
the Bolsheviks tried to direct the activity of the church towards 
non-political goals and the performance of purely religious rites was 
allowed. For example, the Bolsheviks gave permission for religious 
rites to be conducted in the Kremlin during Easter 1919.78  
In addition to this relatively tolerant attitude, Bolshevik religious 
policy also included objectives which caused confusion. The 
dismantling of the political influence of the ROC seemed to require the 
elimination of all public and political manifestations on the part of the 
church. In particular, the ruling regime was concerned about 
ecclesiastical parties or brotherhoods which might work as anti-Soviet 
bodies within Russia. Consequently, the NKYust's Eighth Department, 
together with the security organs, liquidated the so-called Christian 
Socialist Party79 and conducted a decisive fight against monasteries.80 
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The security organs in particular were concerned at the possibility of 
clergy achieving political influence in local Soviet organs. For 
example, the NKVD informed local organs that religious organizations 
should not be allowed to take apart in elections nor should any 
ecclesiastical figures participate in Soviets. A directive that offertory 
collections were to be used only for religious and not for "speculative" 
purposes reveals how deeply officials suspected ecclesiastical 
organizations.81  
The question of the fate of the monasteries along with the opening of 
the coffins of Orthodox saints constituted the most difficult religious 
policy problem of the civil war. The Bolshevik hostility towards 
monasteries can be explained by ideological reasons. The new rulers 
justified their attacks by calling monasteries "nests of counter-
revolution". But there were also practical political justifications. 
Monasteries were difficult to supervise; they had, despite the NKYust's 
confiscations, maintained some economic resources. Especially after 
the 8th congress, this anti-monastery activity became more orchestrated 
and systematic actions aimed at disbanding monasteries received more 
authoritative support from Soviet leaders. Bukharin and E. A. Preob-
razhensky (1886-1937) suggested opening ecclesiastical "mummies" 
as a good antireligious measure. Moreover, Lenin gave his whole-
hearted approval to this suggestion and personally ordered Luna- 
77 	 BB 1, 351-354. "Ha nncbMa CB$11U HHHKy r-Hy JIeoHHay Dejaopoey 31. MapTa 
1919 r." See also Winter 1972, 24-25. 
78 	 Curtiss 1953, 72, 80-82. 
79 	 See, for example, GARF2 f.353, op.3, d.746. 
80 	 See, for example, GARF2 f.353, op.3, d.771. 
81 	 GARF1 f.393, op.27, d.1389,11.3, 44, 1 1 I. 
charsky to turn monasteries near Moscow into homes for homeless 
orphans.82 
Especially after the "breathing-space" and from the beginning of the 
civil war monasteries were in great danger as systematic efforts were 
made to close them down. As N.D. Kuznetsov remarked in his protest 
to Lenin, the attitude of Soviet power towards the monasteries and 
religion seemed to have become more and more hostile from the 
beginning of 1919. Professor Kuznetsov protested in particular that the 
NKYust was violating Soviet laws and accused officials like Shpitsberg 
of initiating this kind of activity.83 As was the case with previous 
protests, this complaint had no effect on Soviet leaders. On the 
contrary, the MVD's Ecclesiastical Department dispatched a special 
order to district (guberniya) level which stressed that monasteries 
should be turned to more "rational use". This would seem to imply that 
a simple matter such as the shortage of suitable accommodation could 
be used to justify the liquidation of the monasteries.84 
Many Bolsheviks held the view that opening the coffins of saints 
preserved in the monasteries was one of the most effective ways of 
undermining the position of the monasteries and the Orthodox faith. 
According to Russian church tradition, the body of a saint would not 
decompose. So in order to expose this belief Bolshevik officials 
organized special openings to which they invited doctors and priests as 
observers. Although records of these openings reveal how decomposed 
and even fake mummies caused embarrassment and loss of faith among 
believers, this activity was, nonetheless, not popular even among 
communists themselves. For example, the decision to open the coffin of 
Sergei of Radonezh was made on a vote of 15 in favour and 14 against. 
In addition, some local organs could modify these activities and take a 
different attitude towards harassing the ROC. For example, according 
to one source from Kashinsky uezd, local officials decided that the 
Soviet regime did not have any right to interfere in the life of religious 
organizations. Consequently, this local congress stressed that the 
opening of the coffins without political preparation could be harmful 
for the revolution.85 
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Nevertheless, the growing activity against the monasteries and the 
desecration of the remains of Orthodox saints embittered senior church 
leaders. On 2 April 1919 Patriarch Tikhon tried to appeal personally to 
Lenin to urge him to end this desecration of the saints. He also declared 
that if the Soviet regime did not stop this activity, the church would 
appeal to the people to defend the saints. In any event, the Patriarch's 
appeal did not have any effect and the damaging publicity from these 
revelations perhaps forced the Patriarch to submit. In an open letter of 8 
October 1920 Tikhon declared that the ROC was not involved in any 
way in the civil war and stated that the church was neutral in relation to 
the opposition. In addition, he claimed that the ROC was not associated 
with any political interests.86 Nevertheless,the Patriarch's appeal failed 
and exposing the "mummy-cult" became part of Soviet legislation on 
25 August 1920.87 
5. OTHER RELIGIOUS 
ORGANIZATIONS DURING THE 
CIVIL WAR 
In order to explore Bolshevik religious policy towards the Russian 
Orthodox Church and put it in perspective, we may contrast Soviet 
religious policy towards the ROC with that towards other religious 
organizations. In the early Soviet period, other religious organizations 
were not usually categorized together with that of the former autocracy, 
and due to their position as religions of national minorities or 
persecuted sects they were generally treated as victims of the former 
system. However, the separation decree was extended to them with 
regard to property and their legal status differed only in the practical 
implementation. For example, in Ukraine the separation decree was not 
promulgated until 22 January 1919 when the Soviet system in Ukraine 
become stable. In addition, this decree also offered the possibility of 
de-Russifying the Ukrainian Orthodox Church by building up 
Ukrainian "twenties", local parishes from below. Local communists 
even sought to undermine the power of the ROC in Ukraine by 
supporting "the Ukrainianization" of the ROC. However, when sup- 
86 	 GARF2 f.353, op.3, d.766 "fIpeuceuaTemo CoBeTa HapoanbIx KoMHccapoa 10. 
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porters of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church organized themselves 
and this movement gained in popularity as a symbol of nationality local 
Soviet officials were alerted to the potential danger and condemned this 
movement.88 
This "zig-zag" policy in Ukraine constitutes just one example of 
local modifications in Soviet religious policy. Moreover, combining 
nationality questions with religious issues complicated the problem. 
For example, in Eastern areas of the Soviet state this was acknowledged 
officially at the highest level of the party. As a letter dated 21 February 
1920 from the Central Committee to all party committees and political 
sections stressed, questions of religion and nationality were partly fused 
together in the East and, consequently, Bolsheviks should take this into 
consideration when working with Eastern nationalities. So in practice 
Soviet religious policy towards the Moslem population was from the 
beginning implemented with care. For example, the Commissar of 
National Affairs, Stalin, combined nationality questions and the 
question of religion by appealing to people of Moslem origin by 
stressing their cultural-religious identity. In his appeal to the "Moslem 
workers of Russia and the East", issued on 24 November 1917, Stalin 
described Moslems as victims of colonialism and allies of the Soviet 
system. This reflected the readiness of the Soviet authorities to make 
concessions to local peculiarities in order to maintain its power in the 
Eastern regions of Russia.89 
The Bolshevik party was even ready to recognize a special section 
for Moslem communists in the RCP(b). On 17 January 1918 Stalin 
established a department within his commissariat devoted to work 
among the Moslem population. This modification of Bolshevik 
ideology leaves many questions open. Some contemporary researchers 
have denied the importance of the term "Moslem nation" when dealing 
with nationality problems in Soviet Russia. For example, Audrey 
Altstadt believes that the use of the above term... 
confuses nationality with religion — raises religion to the level of the 
supreme, perhaps sole, motivating force for millions of diverse 
people...9° 
88 Bociurkiw 1991, 232-233, 235, 244-245; Alekseev 1991, 67. Bohdan 
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89 	 KPSS I, 146-147; SU I, 95-96; Pipes 1980, 156-157. 
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Although her criticism is correct in the modem sense, it seems clear that 
in the early years the Bolsheviks preferred to use this term in preference 
to, for example, "eastern national communists". It was obvious that in 
making this exception the Bolsheviks wanted to establish socialism by 
delaying it until after the civil war. As a matter of fact, one of the 
leaders of the Moslem communist section was a representative of the 
Moslem clergy, Mullah Nur-Vakhitov (1885-1918), the first and only 
Soviet official who came from the ranks of the clergy. Nur-Vakhitov 
even succeeded in establishing an independent communist party in 
Kazakhstan. Later White reaction destroyed this party and resulted in 
the killing of local Moslem communists (including Nur-Vakhitov). But 
as a sign of moderation, when Soviet forces re-occupied these areas in 
1919 one of their first acts was to open all mosques, religious schools 
and to reinforce the "sharia", Islamic law, as part of the local legal 
system.91  
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The motivation for integrating nationality policy with religion was 
obvious: Moscow wanted to stabilize its power in these regions. Lenin 
justified this by a Marxist analysis of the Eastern areas. Communists 
should act carefully and take into consideration their special circum-
stances, showing good will towards local autonomy. They should 
always bear in mind the historical situation; these nations were just 
becoming liberated from the yoke of feudalism and local communists 
should assist the emergence of democratic movements there. The 
question concerning the rights of Moslem clergy remained unresolved 
for a long time. Although they were opposed to Soviet religious 
ideology, the Moslem clergy were granted full political rights in these 
Eastern areas. Lenin himself briefly justified this by commenting that 
communists had no experience of the Moslem clergy as they had of 
Orthodox clergy. For reasons of political necessity the Bolsheviks 
conducted a conciliatory policy towards the Eastern areas and accepted 
this inconsistency in their religious policy 92 In any event, this 
willingness to make concessions decreased in time as the Bolsheviks 
established their hold on the country. For example, in 1919 the special 
Moslem communist organization was integrated with the RCP(b).93  
91 	 Bennigsen & Quelquejay 1967, 139-140; Pipes 1980, 157-158. 
92 	 PSS 38, 158-159. "VIII Cbe3a PKII(6). IloKnau o napTHNHOH nporpaMMe 19 
MapTa"; PSS 39, 304."T0BapHulaM KOMMyHHCTaM TypKecTaHa"; PSS 51, 175. 
"TenerpaMMa T.K. Opa)KOHHKHj{3e H 3anHCKa .TI.,II. TpoUKOMy". See also NR, 
52; McLellan 1987a, 106-107. 
93 	 PSS 39, 326-331."ZIoKnaa Ha II BcepoccHticKOM Cbe3ue KOMMyHHCTH4eCKHX 
oprauusauHy Hapouoe BOCTOKa 22 HO336pn 1919"; DSV I, 367; Bennigsen & 
Quelquejay 1967, 76, 99-100, 144-149; Nahaylo & Swoboda 1990, 32-34. 
For the Jewish population, the October Revolution represented a 
new epoch. Officially the Bolshevik party opposed anti-semitism and 
rejected any kind of oppression based on race or religion. As an early 
decree of 25 June 1918 confirmed, discrimination on the basis of ethnic 
origin would not be allowed in the Soviet-state. The Jewish worker was 
therefore a friend and not a foe as capitalists were. In accordance with 
this early Soviet national policy, the Narkomnats established a special 
department to handle Jewish affairs. And although before the rev-
olution the Bolsheviks had opposed every effort to organize Jewish 
communists separately, they were now allowed to establish their own 
party section inside the RCP(b). Moreover, this section, the so-called 
Evsektsiya, was given the task of conducting propaganda within the 
Jewish working class 94 
The upheavals of the civil war, especially in Ukraine, caused terror 
and suffering among the Jewish population. White interventionists, Red 
bandits and anarchist groups perpetrated organized pogroms against 
Jewish civilians. Various sources testify to the fact that the Whites often 
deliberately harassed the Jewish population and clergymen among the 
White armies achieved a notorious reputation for their aggressive 
anti-semitism. The Bolsheviks did not differ on the ground from the 
Whites but, nevertheless, at the official level the Bolshevik leadership 
attempted to protect the Jewish population and fight against anti-
semitism.95  
The case of the Catholic church in Soviet Russia was more 
complicated. It was not connected with the former state church but 
nonetheless represented a "hostile" national element on Soviet Russian 
territory. Naturally, the disturbances of the Bolshevik revolution also 
effected the Catholic population. Especially in Ukraine Catholics 
suffered considerably from the civil war and as a result of the suspicion 
of local Soviet officials. One possible reason for this suspicion was the 
tense relation between the Catholic hierarchy and the Soviet regime. 
The Catholic clergy, for the most part, refused to acknowledge the 
Soviet separation decree as legal. Moreover, Bolsheviks saw the 
Catholic church and the Vatican as a dangerous ideological enemy and 
as a representative of the bourgeois nationalism of Poland and the 
Baltic countries. When Soviet relations with the Polish government and 
with the Baltic states became aggravated, Stalin advocated, as V.A. 
Alekseev has termed it, a policy of "vengeance and punishment" 
91 
94 	 DSV I, 370-371; DSV III, 93-94; Korey 1963, 78-79. See also AK, 158-259. 
95 	 PSS 38, 242-243; Miller 1970, 94; Pinkus 1988, 54-55. See also Pasmanik 1923, 
185-186, 196. 
 
towards "Polish-Catholics" in Soviet Russia.96 The idea was to "kid-
nap" Catholic priests and bishops and exchange them for Bolshevik 
prisoners from the Baltic countries and Poland. In line with this policy, 
the Catholic archbishop Eduard de Ropp was arrested several times in 
1919 but after massive protests and the gathering of thousands of 
signatures petitioning on his behalf, he was finally set free and later 
exchanged for a significant Polish communist, Karl Radek (Sobelson, 
1885-1939).97 
These attempts to trade well-known Catholic priests for jailed 
communists indicates how the actual religious policy of the Soviet 
Union during the civil war was conducted not for ideological reasons 
but nearly always in accordance with practical political needs as well. 
The primary need of the Bolshevik government was to establish Soviet 
power and in order to do that it was willing to modify its ideology. For 
example, after the October Revolution the Bolsheviks appeased 
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national minorities by giving them national status and promoting their 
autonomy under communist authority. Despite the fact that Moslems 
and Jews both achieved national status in the Soviet apparatus it was 
only done in order to stabilize communist rule in these areas. Indeed, 
the Jewish national communists regarded Jewish traditional heritage as 
a harmful relic. As Zvi Gitelman has remarked, the Evsektsiya showed 
less tolerance towards traditional Jewish institutions than ordinary 
Russian communists did, defining the enemy as the "bourgeois", the 
"clerical" or the "Zionist". In order to prove themselves more loyal than 
others, Jewish communists not only fought against Jewish capitalists 
and rabbis but also against the Hebrew language. Their ultimate goal 
was gradually to assimilate Jews into the Russian population.98  
The one religious group which perhaps gained most from the 
October revolution was the sectarian movement. Bolsheviks regarded 
them as victims of the autocratic system and treated them with kid 
gloves. At the same time certain sectarians hailed the Bolshevik 
revolution with enthusiasm. This benevolent "neutrality" towards 
sectarians is clearly visible in the case of military service. On 4 January 
1919 Lenin personally negotiated an agreement with sectarian leaders 
which in principle released sectarian youths from Soviet military 
service. However, this decision, taken at the highest level of the Soviet 
administration, was not a popular measure among communist officials. 
Archive materials indicate that Lenin's personal supervision of the 
96 	 Alekseev 1991, 120-124. 
97 	 See GARF2 f.353, op.3, d.738; Dunn 1977, 31-32. 
98 	 Gitelman 1971, 324-328; Gitelman 1988, 111-112. See also Levin 1988, 68-73, 
73-78, 80-82. 
activities of Soviet officials was not enough to prevent sectarians from 
being harassed. In many cases, sectarians complained that especially 
the NKYust had little understanding of sectarians in genera1.99 This 
pressure was gradually increased and the majority of the sectarian 
leaders were obliged to give way on this issue. At the congress of the 
Evangelical Christian Union the majority of sectarian leaders decided 
that military service was an obligation they had to accept.100 
In accordance with Soviet benevolent neutrality towards sectarians 
during the civil war they were given the possibility to build up special 
sectarian agrarian communities. When studying the background of 
these initiatives, we must acknowledge the importance of the "N. 
Osinsky memorandum", which constituted a political plan to establish a 
union for the peasantry. Osinsky (V.V. Obolensky, 1887-1938) 
suggested that the "peasant union" should be not a party organization 
but a relatively free association under the hegemony of the communists. 
The premises of this organization should be that peasants would have to 
accept the Soviet system as their only political platform. In the religious 
policy sphere, Osinsky's proposal contradicted earlier Soviet prin-
ciples. For instance, he suggested that religious bonds or religiosity 
should not prevent someone from joining this union. Only political 
connections to the former opposition or the kulaks should exclude a 
person from membership.101  
Osinsky had suggested this on purpose to diminish the influence of 
the SR party among the peasants and to isolate them politically. His 
justification was that by organizing this union the Soviet regime could 
prevent "petty-bourgeois peasants" from infiltrating the communist 
party. According to him, the economic unification of the peasants was 
not enough. As well as promoting the ideological purity of the 
communist party, this plan could strengthen cultural-educational 
elements among the peasants. 1°2 Lenin rejected Osinsky's plan, 
although not totally. He considered it premature and proposed that 
more careful steps be taken in this direction. Nevertheless, it is essential 
to realize the importance of this proposal. Firstly it hints that the 
communist leadership was aware of how significant its relations with 
the agrarian population were. Due to the crisis in food production, good 
99 LS, 259; SU II, 222-223, 419-420; Giduljanov 381-382, 386-387. See also 
GARF2, f.353, op.3, d.780 "IIpeuceuaremo CoBHapKoma TOB. B.ii..lIeHHHy (22/ 
ceHTA6pa 1920)". See also AGMIR f.2, op.23, d.23; Klippenstein 1992, 279. 
100 	 Giduljanov 1971, 378-390. See also Conquest 1968, 100; Sawatsky 1992, 242. 
101 	 TTP I, 452-454. Earlier Soviet legislation had forbidden all agrarian communities 
based on religious ideals. See GARF2, f.353, op.3, d.730 "LlxpxynAptto-Bcem 
3emor tenam (30 oKT516pa 1919)". 
102 	 TTP I, 452, 456. 
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relations with the peasantry were crucial for Soviet power. Secondly, 
this proposal indicates that some Soviet officials, such as Osinsky, did 
not automatically connect the peasants' religiosity with political 
opposition.103 
Osinsky's proposal acknowledged the importance of also gathering 
religiously-minded peasants to work with Soviet power. This idea was 
also supported by a significant representative of the so-called 
communist-sectarians, I.M. Tregubov. Tregubov noted that the Soviet 
regime was encountering considerable problems in the countryside, but 
pointed out that elements of the rural population were ready to 
co-operate with the ruling regime. According to Tregubov these 
sectarian-communists, the "honest and industrious" part of the Soviet 
countryside, were willing to help the Soviet regime. The importance of 
these sectarian-communists was so great that Tregubov was allowed to 
convey greetings from them to the 7th and 8th congresses of the 
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VTsIKs. For example, in his speech to the 7th congress of the Soviets 
Tregubov explained that both sectarians and Bolsheviks had a similar 
objective, i.e. to build communism in Russia. Accordingly Tregubov 
appealed to the Soviet regime that they be allowed to form their own 
party in order to build communism not only in Russia but all over the 
world. In addition, Tregubov expressed his loyalty towards Soviet 
power and appealed to all the sectarians of the world, including foreign 
politicians such as G.N. Lloyd George and W. Wilson, to work for the 
withdrawal of foreign troops from Russia. This identification with the 
political objectives of the ruling regime and expression of loyalty to it 
were perhaps the most characteristic features of relations between 
sectarian-communists and the new regime. For example, in 1920 
Dukhobor communes donated a considerable amount of grain to Soviet 
officials and, according to V.A. Alekseev, Lenin greatly appreciated 
this gesture and adopted a "warm" attitude towards sectarians. Alek-
seev claims that after this Lenin helped sectarian communes through 
the agency of Bonch-Bruevich.104 
It is hard to judge how far this "warm" attitude was put into practice, 
but it is clear that as a result of these initiatives sectarians were able to 
fulfil their dream of creating agrarian communes based on religious 
principles. In the opinion of many scholars these religious communes 
usually functioned better than their secular counterparts. Better 
working methods and better social coherence between members caused 
103 	 TTP I, 458. 
104 GARF2, f.353, op.4, d.418 "Z[oKnaa 3anNCKa o 3KenarenbHOM oreoweHHH 
COBeTCKOH BnaCTH K CenbCKO-X03flNCTBeHHbIM KOJIJIeKTHBaM PYCCKHX 
ceKraHroB (12 Hoa6psl 1920)"; VSS VII, 274-276. See also Alekseev 1991, 113. 
them to prosper economically. Moreover, for many communists these 
enterprises were models for a future socialist society and consequently 
they felt that such communes should be encouraged.to5  
All the above clearly reveals how ambiguous Bolshevik religious 
policy actually was during the civil war. Due to the general political 
situation the Bolshevik party had to maintain good relations with the 
peasantry and as a result the party could only build the foundations of 
an atheist society by legislation. To sum up: the content of the so-called 
"isolation policy" was a draw between doves and hawks. Ideologically-
motivated "hawks" were unable to instigate general attacks against 
religious organizations and official Soviet policy towards religious 
organizations was "neutral". As L.B. Kamenev explained during the 
battles of the civil war, "the best way to fight against religion was to 
fight for communism". Subsequently, the security organs and the 
NKYust were only allowed to minimize the political and moral 
authority of the ROC and it was only after 1919, when the civil war was 	 95 
at its zenith, that they were given a free hand to move against, for 
example, monasteries. Especially in their relations with formerly 
unofficial religious organizations moderate communists were able to 
develop an informal mutual understanding. But as the party programme 
of 1919 explained, antireligious work was preserved as an inseparable 
part of Bolshevik policy. 
105 	 Kolarz 1961, 289-290; Pospielovsky 1984,41; Stites 1989, 212-213. For more on 
Soviet legislation, see SU II, 221-222; Giduljanov, 553-557. 
Ill  Trotsky's control of early 
NEP religious policy 
(1921-1923) 
1. GENERAL BACKGROUND TO 
96 	 RELIGIOUS POLICY DURING THE 
NEP 
By 1921-22 almost all opposition political activity had been driven 
underground, and the consolidation of the one-party dictatorship 
was virtually completed. The Communist Party dominated the 
political life of the country... ) 
As the above quote from Merle Fainsod implies, the one party 
dictatorship did not emerge immediately in October 1917 but gradually 
took shape after the civil war. At the same time the remnants of the 
political opposition were obliged to choose whether they would work 
secretly, withdraw from politics or join the rank of the Bolsheviks. 
Many ex-oppositionists as well as new entrants enlisted in the ruling 
party, which as a result constituted a mixture of the old pre-
revolutionary guard and newcomers who had joined the party later. 
This was a paradox of the post-civil war situation and had an effect on 
the religious policy of the NEP. Although the decision-making process 
was restricted to only one political platform, there were even more 
diverging opinions inside the ruling party than before. During the 
relatively free atmosphere of the 1920s, this army of "disciplined 
revolutionaries" sometimes seemed to be no more than a cover 
organization for competing ideas and different factions.2 
The history of the early NEP (1921-1923) could best be summed up 
1 	 Fainsod 1970, 137. 
2 	 Brovkin 1987, 294-299; Deutscher 1987, 15-18. 
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by stating that the civil war had almost completely ruined Russian 
society. The ruling party attempted to preserve the policy of war 
communism but after the defeat of the White generals and the Polish 
invasion peasants were more and more reluctant to carry the burden of 
the wartime economy. At the same time, the demobilisation of the Red 
Army left thousands of men wandering around the state fomenting 
violent disturbances in the Russian countryside. However, the most 
tragic aftermath of the civil war was the famine which swept over the 
Volga area. Lack of food took its toll, together with typhus. Starving 
people were forced to abandon their villages and thousands of them 
died of malnutrition during this exodus.3  
The political situation was exacerbated when the fortress city of 
Kronstadt challenged Bolshevik rule in March 1921. The previous 
"pride and glory" of the October Revolution, the Kronstadt sailors and 
marines rebelled and demanded an end to the communist dictatorship. 
They accused the Bolsheviks of betraying the ideals of the Russian 	 97 
revolution and of being poisoned by power. The rebellion, which 
started as a protest against the ruling oligarchy, included many political 
demands such as freedom of speech, a free press, free trade and, in 
addition, the right of peasants to buy and sell their land .4 
For the communist party the Kronstadt uprising was like a flash of 
"lightning which opened our eyes"5 and convinced the Soviet leaders of 
the urgency for change. The rebellious sailors of Kronstadt were 
quickly suppressed but the ruling regime realized that it would be 
necessary to grant some of the essential demands of the rebels, which 
they accordingly did during the 10th party congress in March 1921. The 
lesson of Kronstadt was, as Lenin saw it, that the political opposition 
along with White émigrés were behind the banner of the Kronstadt 
rebels and had hoped to destroy Soviet power.6 Although hardly any 
evidence exists to link the Kronstadt rebels with White émigrés, Lenin 
was convinced that exiled Russian monarchists had collaborated, 
together with international capitalism, to manipulate the "petty 
bourgeois instincts" of the rebels in order to bring about the political 
restoration of Czarism. Lenin realized that in order to preserve the 
proletarian dictatorship, the Bolsheviks would have to retreat from 
socialist principles and reduce tension in the Russian countryside. In 
accordance with the procedures of War Communism, the government 
3 	 Curtiss 1953, 106; Figes 1989, 267-268, 321-324, 328-330, 341-342. 
4 	 Getzler 1983, 212-217. 
5 	 PSS 43, 138. "Peyb Ha BcepoccHNCKOM Cbe3Ae TpaHcHopTHbIX pa6oYHX 27 
apa 1921". 
6 	 PSS 43, 4-5, 25-26. "X Cbe3A PKn(ö). Peg}, HpH oTKpb1THH cbe3Aa 8 map-ra". 
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had been confiscating all extra grain from the peasants. The new 
conciliatory line, adopted at the 10th congress, gave peasants the 
chance to pay tax in kind and sell the rest of the grain on the free 
market. With these concessions, the ruling party moved towards a 
mixed economy.7 
At the same time, the government was obliged to restore the 
monetary system, which had been abandoned during the period of War 
Communism. This automatically meant that the state was forced to deal 
with the shortage of hard currency. Printing money was not enough 
when the ruling regime desperately needed to stabilize markets; hard 
currency and valuable metals were required to restore the value of the 
Soviet rouble. The rebuilding of the Soviet economy and the 
maintenance of an armaments industry required money, and at the time 
gold was the only valid medium of exchange for these purposes.8 This 
shortage of hard currency was later to prove fatal for the ROC. Many 
98 
	
	 churches and monasteries had been confiscated by the Bolsheviks in the 
wake of the revolution but a nationwide campaign of collecting 
valuable church items had not yet occurred. 
Naturally enough, these concessions to free trade signified an 
ideological retreat from the immediate implementation of socialism. 
The loyal political opposition which had played an important part in the 
fight against the Whites was satisfied. The abandonment of the harsh 
methods of war communism represented a vindication of their political 
criticism. For them it seemed to prove that the Bolsheviks' "hasty" leap 
towards socialism could not work without the assistance of the 
bourgeois class and the restoration of political freedom. Accordingly 
the opposition demanded that the one-party system should be 
abolished. For Lenin and the majority of the Bolsheviks this was an 
impossible demand and there was no ground for compromise. 
Returning to the parliamentary system with free parties and an 
independent press would lead automatically, they believed, to the 
restoration of capitalism and power to the White generals .9 
The simultaneous suppression of the political opposition and 
concessions to free trade, was another paradox of the NEP (New 
Economic Policy). In a political sense, the content of NEP policy was 
simple. Economic compromises could not go hand in hand with 
political concessions. The logical outcome of this paradox was the 
7 	 Getzler 1983, 213-214, 256-258; Carr 1985 II, 280-283, 299-304. See also, PSS 
43, 4-5, 24-27."X Cbe3a PKII(6). Pe'b npu OTKplATHH cbe3jta 8 MapTa". 
8 	 See RTsKhIDNI f.I7, op.3, d.I64 (Pp 27, 14/5-21); TTP II, 620-624. 
9 	 PSS 44, 105. "HoBble apeMeHa. crapbie OIDH6KH B HosoM an.ae"; PSS 45, 88. "XI 
cbex[ PKII(6)'; Brovkin 1987, 294-299. 
decisive suppression of the remnants of the political opposition. The 
Mensheviks and the SRs were politically liquidated, suppressed or 
exiled at the same time as the ruling party was forced to accept their 
economic critique. Consequently, the communist regime organized an 
ideological and administrative witch-hunt against remnants of the 
political opposition, Mensheviks, SRs and the anti-Soviet intelligentsia. 
The most famous incident of this witch-hunt operation was the "show-
trial" of the leaders of the SR party, which commenced on 9 June 1921 
with extensive press campaigns and propaganda.10 
In actual fact, the NEP engendered a more hostile attitude towards 
religious organizations, which during the civil war had been able to 
preserve their basic functions. Once the Soviet regime began silencing 
its opponents, religious organizations were also in line for suppression 
as such organizations constituted an ideal ideological enemy. The time 
for an ideological attack against religion seemed to be next on the 
agenda." Anyway, liquidating religious organizations which were 
closely linked to the peasant population was a daunting task. Although 
they belonged to the category of enemy, they could not be exterminated 
in the same way as the Mensheviks or the SRs had been. The sources 
reveal that the Soviet authorities acknowledged that under the 
circumstances of the NEP the ruling regime needed to compromise with 
the peasants and as a result acknowledged the need for easing off their 
antireligious propaganda. In theory party officials seemed to under-
stand that they could not diminish the authority of the ROC by means 
of brutal antireligious campaigns if they wanted to appease the 
peasantry.' 2 
Another consequence of this paradox was the party's desire for 
ideological purity. Purges in the party were motivated by the fear of the 
effect of any relaxation among communists. The ruling regime wanted 
also to underline its ideological uniformity. On 9 August 1921 the 
Central Committee held a plenum and ordered that nobody with a 
clerical background could become a party member. Party members 
holding religious beliefs who were from the ranks of the intelligentsia 
and in responsible posts were also to be excluded from membership of 
10 	 Schapiro 1970, 195-196; Carr 1985 II, 176-178; Broido 1986, 159-160. See also 
NR, 48-50. "nHcbMO H.B. BapAIHHa-Mrena,g3e: 06 OTHOHIeHHH K HapTHaM 
MenKOn 6ypKya3HH HanpaBneHHOe B UK PKIl H HCnOnHHTenbHYK) KOMHCCHIO 
MK PKII(6)". 
11 	 TRRR, 54. 
12 	 "...3TOT MOMQHT Onpe.4enneMblN He06X0AHMOCTbK) ,gnHTenbHOrO cornanleHHH 
npOneTapHaTa C KpeCTbnHCTBOM, Onpe,aenReT C06011 H nHHHK) Hamy B BOnpOCe 
06 aHTHpenHrHO3HON nponaraHAe". RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.3, d.1 `BcepoccHllc- 
KOe COBCIqaHHe 3aBe11.y1011IHX arHTOT,qenaMH ry6KOMOB H 06naCTKOMOB PK1I 
7-11 Maa 1921". See also KPSS II, 243. 
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the party if they remained religious. Only uneducated members of the 
party who had defended the revolution during the civil war could be 
allowed to remain in the party, but in such cases other party members 
would be obliged to educate their religious-minded comrades.l3  
Furthermore, along with this ideological purification, it must be 
acknowledged that at the beginning of the NEP the Soviet government 
had in principle recognized the need for tactical relaxation in its 
policies towards religious organizations. After adopting the NEP policy 
the Central Committee sent a special circular which stressed that it was 
not necessary to over-emphasize antireligious propaganda while the 
party was adjusting to NEP. This circular stated that especially when 
dealing with peasants harsh methods should be avoided. The Central 
Committee's circular remarked that excesses in this sphere did not 
usually convince the believing peasant but rather embittered him. A 
special meeting for leading propagandists and agitators, held on 7 May 
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1921, symbolized the birth of the NEP's religious policy. Leading 
communist officials recognized that antireligious propaganda should 
not offend the feelings of believers and should not allow the enemies 
of Soviet power to claim that communists were persecuting people 
for their beliefs.14 This dictate was printed in Pravda on 21 April 1921 
by the secretary of the Central Committee, Yaroslaysky. In it he 
announced to all party committees at the district level that any kind of 
violation of religious feelings of the populace should be avoided.15 
Nevertheless, the party acknowledged at the same time that it needed 
new kinds of methods and instruments in its antireligious fight.16 
During the civil war religious policy was executed without co-
ordination. Nonetheless, once the party had more time to concentrate on 
religious policy, it created a multitude of commissions to deal with 
these matters. The history of these commissions is rooted partly in the 
power struggle within the party and partly in the party's tradition of 
manoeuvring in complex political situations. The Central Committee or 
the Politburo usually created commissions for resolving certain acute 
13 	 KPSS II, 278-280; RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, d.126. "HaMeveHbie MeponpInTHs". 
For protocols dealing with violations the 13th paragraph of the party rules, see 
RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.60, d.52. 
14 RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.3, d.l "BcepoccHicxoe coaewaHHe 3aBe1tylotwHx 
arnTOTA.enaMH ry6KOMOB H O6naCTKOMOB PKII. 7—I1 Man 1921". RTsKhIDNI 
f.89, op.4, d.184 `BceM o6KOMaM. o6n6Iopo H ry6KoMaM P.K.II. o nocTaHOBKe 
a HTHpefHCHO3HOt1 nponaranam. LIHpKynapuo. 6/n". 
15 	 Pravda, 21 April 1921, No. 89. See also PSS 52, 140. "B.M. MonoToBy". 
16 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.60, d.4 "npoTokon. 3acetaHHe KOMHCCHHH npH/ort ene 
nponaraH,t LU.K.PKII no Bonpocy o6 aHTHpennrno3HOh nponaraHae"; 
RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.60, d.29 "IIpoTOKOn 3aceiaHHA KOMHCCHH no aHTHpenH-
rHo3Hoti nponaraiue (28/VII 1921)". 
political problems. Some of them were short-lived, but others 
functioned for many years. This confusion also extends to monographs 
and literature. Some authors state, for instance, that the APO's 
Antireligious Commission was the main co-ordinator of the religious 
policy during the NEP. For example, John Anderson has suggested that 
the APO's Antireligious Commission drew up the general lines of the 
antireligious propaganda together with the Secretariat of Religious 
Affairs, which was subject to the authority of the Central Executive 
Committee.'? Furthermore, Joan Delaney has pointed out the 
importance of the Central Committee's commission for implementing 
the separation of church and state but she bases her conclusions on 
second-hand information.'s Isaac Deutscher has even claimed that 
Trotsky led the Society of the Godless before this organ was officially 
established.19 
As we have already seen, in 1920 the party had attempted to 
intensify this work by creating the Glavpolitprosvet. However, the 	 101 
party's antireligious propaganda and agitation were put under the 
authority of the APO and the Central Committee. Moreover, archive 
sources testify to the fact that in 1920-1922 this work was led by 
Trotsky. The APO had a special Antireligious Commission as well as 
subcommissions and "working troikas" (pa6o'IeI3 rpoHxH) with 
members such as I.I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, Galkin (Gorey), the 
Bolshevik journalist I.P. Flerovsky (1888-1956) and Krasikov. Trotsky 
himself gave directives to this organ, and in addition, formed his own 
commission to assist him in this field.20 
The second important attribute of the NEP's religious policy was the 
special attention which the party paid to relations with sectarians. These 
relations had became more cordial after the VIII congress of the 
Soviets. During that meeting Ivan Tregubov proposed closer co-
operation between the Soviet regime and the "sectarian-communists". 
Lenin himself accepted this proposal and as a result of this in October 
1921 the Commissariat of Agriculture formed an "Organizational 
Commission on the resettlement of Sectarians" (Orgkomsekt) to 
advance sectarian agricultural communes and to obtain land for this 
17 	 Anderson 1991, 690. See also Fouilloux 1992, 929. 
18 	 Delaney 1971, 104-105. 
19 	 Deutscher 1987, 28. 
20 	 See, for example, RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.60, d.4 "npoToxon. 3aceaaHHe KOMHCCHH 
npM oraene nponaraiabi ILK PKII no eonpocy o6 aHTHpeJHrHO3HO4i 
nponaraHae 6/a"; f.I7, op.60, d.29. "IIporoxon. 3aceAaHHe pa6omec rpoHxH no 
aHTHpenereo3Hoti nponarafae 23/IX-21". See especially RTsKhIDNI f.I7, op. 
60, d. 158 "IIpoTOKos. 3aceaaHHA No. AHTHpe11HrH03H013 KOMHCCHH 3 OKT. 
1922 rona 12 vacos aHn" and f. 17, op. 3, d. 280 (Pp 111, 13/3-22). 
purpose2' Later Tregubov published a discussion article in which he 
maintained that sectarians could assist communists in fighting against 
"petty-bourgeois anarchism, the pernicious spirit of private ownership 
and egoism". Tregubov claimed that sectarians had already set up 
model communes and called on communists to support these 
experiments, which could constitute models for larger communes 
later.22 
These conciliatory signs from the party were affirmed by various 
rumours and aroused reaction among the party. According to 
Skvortsov-Stepanov, during the summer of 1921 there were rumours 
which claimed that the party was softening its antireligious work 
because of the introduction of the NEP policy. Skvortsov-Stepanov 
added that Lenin himself had denied these rumours and said that 
antireligious activity should be intensified among the workers and 
especially among the peasants.23  
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The above-mentioned contradictions reflect the difficulty in 
interpreting the content of the NEP policy. Many leading communists 
were painfully aware that the traditional Russian countryside had 
survived the civil war in better condition than the Russian towns and 
cities. The peasantry was, moreover, the backbone of Orthodox culture 
and the ROC had been able to maintain its links with the people. As 
John. S. Curtiss has said, 
The Russian church apparently survived the period of revolution in a 
strong condition. Nonetheless, in the political field it had suffered a 
severe defeat...on the other hand, the legend that the Russian Orthodox 
church was wiped out by the revolution and the civil war had no 
foundation. The vast majority of the population was still strongly 
religious, and although the government was against the church, it 
could do little in the face of the mass support for religion 24 
Although it had lost its political power and nearly all its wealth after 
October 1917, the ROC was simultaneously able to maintain its basic 
role in society and its connections with the rural population. The fate of 
the ROC and the fate of the peasantry were inextricably linked together 
21 	 VSS VII, 228; Izvestiya, 19 October 1921, No. 234. 
22 	 Izvestiya, 15 November 1921, No. 256. See also: GARF2 f.353, op.3, d.766 
"Ilporoxon. 3aceAaHHe 2-ro Kaexa3cxoro o6uecexraHrcxoro cbe31,a 
XpHcrimucKHX peJTH11H03HbIX 061IHH H rpyr (20-HI0HSI 1921)". See also GARFI 
f.5263, op.l, d.55(3) "IIHcbMo B peaaxuero". 
23 	 DO, 9; See also PSS 54, 210. "WM. CKeopuos-CrenaHosy". 
24 	 Curtiss 1953, 104-105. 
and the social roots and the backbone of the ROC, the Russian 
peasantry, as already mentioned, had survived the civil war reasonably 
intact.25  
2. THE CONFRONTATION OF TWO 
BELIEFS - THE "CONFISCATION-
CONFLICT" 
a. The background to this operation and the assault 
organized by Trotsky 
The introduction of the NEP in 1921 could not save the situation in the 
Volga area, which was suffering from severe famine. Although the 
party acknowledged quite early the seriousness of the situation, it could 
do little. On 25 June 1921 the Politburo ordered the setting up a special 
hunger commission of the VTsIK, to be known as Pomgol, to "admit of 
all measures to aid the starving population". But the government soon 
realized the scale of the catastrophe and was obliged to appeal to 
bourgeois charitable organizations for help.26 
The news of the massive famine and widespread hunger alarmed the 
Russian intelligentsia and its spokesman, Maxim Gorky, who appealed 
to the president of the USA for help. Gorky also proposed that the 
Soviet government form a committee with the purpose of assisting the 
hungry and collecting money for the purchase of grain. Herbert Hoover 
responded first and cabled Gorky informing him that the American 
Relief Administration (ARA) had in principle agreed to aid starving 
people in the USSR. Although suspicions were great, the Soviet state 
also gave permission to the ARA to execute its programme of 
assistance. In any event, the Politburo planned special precautionary 
measures to limit the ARA apparatus and was ready to arrest all 
"unreliable elements" of the ARA.27 Despite the mistrust and 
25 	 Isaac Deutscher's remark seems to sum up the situation that prevailed: "...as a 
social class the peasantry alone emerged unbroken. World war, civil war, and 
famine had, of course, taken their toll; but they had not cracked the mainsprings of 
the peasantry's life. They had not reduced its resilience and powers of 
regeneration...The peasantry had preserved its character and its place in society...". 
Deutscher 1987, 7-8. 
26 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.179 (Pp 42, 25/6-21); Pravda, 23 July 1921, No. 160. 
27 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.247 (Pp 87, 31/12-21); Wolfe 1967, 113-114. 
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suspicions of the ruling party Lenin accepted28 Gorky's initiative. On 
29 June 1921 the Politburo decided to invite certain well-known "non-
political" figures to join in an All-Russian Committee of Pomgol for 
assisting starving people. There was nonetheless a conflict between two 
competing motives. The Bolshevik government was aware of the 
political tensions and was worried about the consequences of the 
famine, but it felt compelled to ask the foreign and internal bourgeoisie 
for help. At a meeting of leading communist agitators and 
propagandists in 1921 it was remarked that panic and confusion 
together with "Russian benignity" could assist the class enemy to 
exploit this situation. This mistrust was also reflected in the resolution 
of the Politburo of 12 July 1921 which attempted to limit the role of 
non-communists in the Pomgol. The Politburo decided to give these 
"public figures" only two places on the Pomgol presidium. In addition, 
the communists not only wanted to limit the influence of non- 
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communists in the Pomgol, the Politburo even accepted Kamenev's 
proposal to create special "pure communist groups" inside the Pomgol 
to ensure that it would "develop maximal energy in executing the 
revolutionary measures to help the starving".29 
The above-mentioned distrust complicated the work of the neutral 
Pomgol. Lenin become gradually convinced that these "non-political" 
figures were a political threat to the Soviet state. He believed that the 
activity of the political opposition, which was disguised under the 
semblance of "non-political" work and behind proletarian-like slogans, 
threatened the existence of Soviet power. This was the reason why at 
the meeting of the Politburo on 27 August 1921 Lenin announced that it 
was politically necessary to liquidate the neutral members of the 
Pomgol. As a result, the Politburo decided to empower a representative 
of the Cheka, I.S. Unshlikht (1879-1938), to arrest forthwith the non-
communist Pomgol members.30 
Lenin's suspicions may have had some basis to the extent that non-
communist members of the Pomgol were seen outside Russia as a rival 
government. The famine, the adoption of the NEP-policy and 
concessions to foreign businessmen seemed to indicate theweakness of 
28 	 According to Trotsky, Lenin accepted this initiative in principle because he did not 
consider it "harmful" to Soviet power. TTP I, 392. 
29 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.181 (Pp 44, 29/6-21); 17/3/187 (Pp 50, 12/7-21); f.89, 
op.3, d.1 "BcepoccM icKoe coseiauue 3aBe tyioWHX arHTOTAenaMH ry6KOMOB u 
o6nacTKOMoB P1<1I"; Wolfe 1967, 108-109. 
30 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.195 (Pp 55, 27/8-21). See also PSS 44, 104-107. "HoBbde 
BpeMeHa, cTaphie OWH6KH B HOBOM BHAe"; RP, 331. "JIHKBHuauHA 
BCEPIIOMrOJIA: nncbia E.J.I. KycKoso i K B.H. DHrHep 1921-1922 rr."; 
Wolfe 1967, 114-115. 
the Soviet government. Foreign powers, in fact, sought to establish 
contacts with the neutral Pomgol and saw it as a future government of 
Russia. In the eyes of the ruling regime, this amounted to nothing less 
than treason. Leading Bolsheviks even believed that the ARA was 
undermining Soviet rule and working for its own political goals. On a 
certain level, they were not entirely wrong. For example, the British 
representative to Soviet Russia, Mr. Hodgson, after negotiating with 
these neutral members of the Pomgol, suggested to his government that 
they should direct aid only through those with whom "we are in 
sympathy".31  
Despite the fate of non-communists in the Pomgol, Patriarch Tikhon 
wanted to organize a church campaign for the benefit of starving people 
in the Volga area. At first the Soviet government did not reject his 
approach. On 7 July 1921 the Politburo made no objection to Tikhon 
issuing an appeal for help on the radio. Later in August, Tikhon sent an 
official appeal to the Eastern Patriarchs, the Pope, the Archbishop of 	 105 
Canterbury and the Protestant Episcopal Bishop of New York.32 In 
order to deal with incoming donations, the ROC sought to organize an 
independent All-Russian Church Committee. By this time the wariness 
of the ruling regime seemed to have disappeared because of the 
seriousness of the situation. On 8 December 1921 the Politburo, at the 
suggestion of Kalinin, agreed that religious organizations could be 
allowed to assist in famine relief. The ruling regime, nonetheless, did 
not want too much publicity about this matter and consequently the 
Politburo ordered that this decision should not be publicised.33  
At the same time, the ruling regime was also faced with applications 
from other religious denominations. The Central Moslem Admin-
istration had suggested to Stalin and the Politburo that they could 
donate money to the starving people of the Volga (there were also 
Moslems in this area). In order to deal with this delicate problem, the 
Politburo decided on 5 December 1921 to create a commission made up 
of Kalinin, Stalin and Kursky. This commission gave a guarantee to 
believers that they could organize collections of money to aid famine-
stricken areas. Nevertheless, signalling their suspicion, this com-
mission ordered that ecclesiastical charity should not to be used for 
"religious demonstrations". These concessions were, of course, quite 
extraordinary if we consider what had happened to the neutral members 
of the Pomgol. This co-operation between religious organizations and 
31 	 DOBFP, 714-715; Trifonov 1960, 25-30: Carr 1985 I, 177-179. See also Broido 
1986, 42-43. 
32 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.184 (Pp 47, 7/7-21); Curtiss 1953, 107. 
33 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.242 (Pp 84, 8/12-21). 
the government seemed to represent the start of civil peace. On 9 
February 1922 the Politburo even gave Patriarch Tikhon permission to 
announce publicly that precious church vessels which did not have any 
liturgical value should be donated for famine relief.34 
In any event, the beginning of the "detente" between the ruling 
regime and the religious organizations, as was the case with the 
beginning of NEP policy in general, proved to be rather difficult. At the 
11th congress representatives were critical of their leaders, maintaining 
that with the NEP the party had surrendered to capitalism. Furthermore, 
the general political situation seemed to provide enough grounds for 
ideological suspicions. In late 1921 and in early 1922 émigré church-
men and exiled monarchists organized an ecclesiastical congress in 
Karlovci (in Serbia). The Karlovci Sobor was supposed to deal with 
religious questions outside Russia, but unavoidably it turned its atten-
tion to politics inside Russia. Some of its members expressed a desire 
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for the restoration of the Romanov dynasty in Russia and blamed 
Bolshevik policies for the famine in the Volga region.35 
The activities of the Karlovci Sobor confirmed the suspicions of 
hardline communist leaders. To make matters worse, this meeting sent 
an appeal to the Conference of Genoa asking the world not to recognize 
Bolshevik power. In addition, one eminent representative of the Sobor, 
Metropolitan Anthony of Kiev (Aleksei Khrapovitsky, 1864-1936), 
blamed all the failures and catastrophes in Russia since the revolution 
on Soviet power. Moreover, the Sobor urged all nations to help in 
crushing "Bolshevism" or, as it described it, "the cult of killing, looting, 
and blasphemy".36 From the point of view of the ROC, this incident 
could not have happened at a worse moment, as the hardliners in the 
communist party could not have received a better provocation than this 
belligerent appeal. 
The second international convention which increased attention on 
the Soviet state was the Conference of Genoa which was convened at 
the same time as the Karlovci Sobor. The Soviet state was allowed to 
attend this conference in a semi-official capacity. The Bolshevik 
government regarded this concession as a significant political victory. 
Lenin expressed the view that it gave them a chance to break out of the 
international isolation in which the Soviet state had been placed after 
the October revolution and afforded them excellent possibilities to 
engage in trade. Lenin explained that in a political sense Genoa would 
34 	 RTsKhIDNI f.I7, op.3, d.241 (Pp 83, 5/12-21); f.17, op.3, d.261 (Pp 94, 9/2-22); 
Alekseev 1991, 191-192. 
35 	 Curtiss 1953, 108-110. 
36 	 TRRR, 58-62; Curtiss 1953, 113-114. 
turn out to be a "breathing-space between the bourgeois world and the 
Soviet state". Lenin considered this conference so important that he 
even thought of attending in person.37 
The Bolshevik reaction to the appeal of the Karlovci Sobor to the 
Conference of Genoa was slow in coming. News from the Sobor 
seemed to have reached Moscow in the middle of March 1922 and the 
comments of P.A. Krasikov reveal how deep was the antagonism these 
tidings aroused: 
...for these most Christian brothers hunger is a friend and an ally; while 
a breathing space, a harvest, taking down the blockade, transporting 
bread from abroad is death...38 
But, as Joan Delaney has pointed out, in reference to Trotsky, the plan 
to attack the ROC was already under way. During early 1922 Trotsky 
had been carefully preparing a strategy for confiscating the valuables of 
the ROC.39 In accordance with typical Soviet practice, before every 
important political enterprise a press campaign always took place. 
Thus, from the beginning of 1922 Soviet newspapers started to stress 
that the ROC could do more than simply offer voluntary donations to 
the Pomgol. It seems obvious that this press campaign had the objective 
of preparing the ground for more resolute actions against the ROC. 
Firstly Soviet newspapers pointed out that the valuables of the ROC 
were the property of the people and that the people now needed them to 
save human lives. As A.N. Vinokurov (1869-1944) put it in Izvestiya 
on 26 January 1922: 
The Soviet state has already donated much in the fight against hunger. 
A considerable sum of gold was used up in order to buy grain for the 
starving and otherwise distressed people. Church valuables made 
from gold and silver have until this moment remained unused.. 40 
37 PSS 45, 2-7. "0 MeACayHapOaHOM H BHyTpeHHeM nOAOJKeHHH COBeTCKOA 
Pecny63HxH. Pevb Ha 3aceaaHHH KOMMyHHCTH9eCKON cppaKUHH Bcepoc- 
CHNCKOrO Cbe3aa MeTannHCTOB 6 MapTa' ; Fischer 1967, 553-556. 
38 	 "ronoa anA 3T011 XpHCTHaHHe4InIeI1 6parHH - apyr H C0103HHK. HanpOTHB. 
nepeablWKa. ypoxcatl. CHATHe 6nOKaabl. n0aB03 xne6a H3 3arpaHHubl - 
cMeprb". DO, 107. 
39 	 TTP II, 670-672; Delaney 1971, 108. 
40 "...CoBercKoe rocyaaperao oraano yNce Ha 6opb6y c ronoaoM 6onblllHe 
cpeacraa. He aio 30nOTorO (hOHaa nOUInO Ha 3axynKy CeMAH anA 
rOnOaaK)uHX H apyrHe BHAHbI nOMOn(H. IIepKOBHble 3onOTble H cepe6AHble 
aparOueHHOCTH OCTaK)TCA a0 CHX nOp He HCn03b30BaHHbIMH...". Izvestiya, 26 
January 1922, No.19. 
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The second objective was to get the support of local clergy for the 
coming confiscations. For example, an article published in Izvestiya 
and signed by "a peasant" was directed at ordinary parish priests in the 
countryside. This article, like many of its kind, remarked that it was the 
church leaders and not the ordinary priests who were consciously 
withholding church valuables while Russian people starved. As this 
"peasant" quite eloquently put it: 
Among them [priests] are people who are able to understand the call 
to offer up unnecessary valuables to save our perishing brothers 41 
This press campaign concluded on 11 February 1922 when Pravda 
announced that the VTsIK had decided to confiscate all valuable items 
from churches. Later on 23 February 1922 the VTsIK issued an order 
signed by Kalinin, A.S. Enukidze (1877-1937) and Kursky, entitled: 
i08 
	
	
"Instructions concerning discipline in the confiscation of ecclesiastical 
valuables used by groups of believers." Subsequently, Patriarch Tikhon 
sent a letter of protest to Kalinin and, not receiving an answer, declared 
on 28 February that this kind of confiscation amounted to sacrilege. The 
ingredients for a collision between church and state were all present 42 
It is hardly surprising that the government's ultimatum gave the 
impression of deliberately wishing to escalate the situation. For 
example, Metropolitan Antony in his protest to the VTsIK remarked 
that the Soviet state was altering its policy. According to him, the 
incidents of 1922-1923 showed that the Soviet regime was not simply 
isolating the ROC as it had done earlier. Antony now believed the 
Soviet regime was actually using the internal schism which this policy 
had created inside the ROC to destroy the church 43 
Various explanations have been put forward for the confiscation of 
church valuables. One obvious motivation was the collapse of the 
monetary system. The Soviet state desperately needed valuable metals 
for the restoration of the rouble and for obtaining commodities from the 
West. The task of acquiring funds was originally given to Trotsky and 
he presided over a commission which attempted to confiscate items of 
value from museums as well as to sell off former Imperial property in 
Western countries 44 
41 	 Izvestiya, 1 February 1922, No. 24. 
42 	 This decree was published on 26 and 28 February in Izvestiya VTsIK No. 46, 47. 
See also IzvTsK KPSS 1990 4, 193. 
43 	 RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, d.180. "Bo BIIFIK I'lera. 1923 r". 
44 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.242 (Pp 84, 8/12-21); f.17, op.3, d.257 (Pp 92, 26/1-22). 
Organizational structure of Soviet religious—political organs during the 
"confiscation—conflict" 1922 
Politburo 
Trotsky's 
secret Commission 
Official Pomgol 
local secret "shock organs"/local official Pomgol organs 
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn has suggested that there also existed a 
political motivation to discredit the ROC and confiscate its property. 
According to him, the collection organized by the ROC for famine-
stricken areas constituted a political challenge to the totalitarian system. 
The Bolshevik party could not let the ROC gain further political milage 
by allowing it to donate its valuables voluntarily. Making a 
compromise between the Soviet regime and the church would only 
have "chained the will of proletariat" 45 Solzhenitsyn supports his claim 
by outlining the history of the confiscation events in Petrograd. On 5 
March 1922 the Metropolitan of Petrograd, Veniamin (Kazansky), 
declared that the ROC would hand over everything freely and that 
forceful confiscations would amount to sacrilege. We can see from 
Petrogradskaya Pravda of 9 March 1922 that this co-operative stance of 
Metropolitan Veniamin was positively commended in this Soviet 
newspaper. According to Solzhenitsyn, this idyll of class peace was 
eventually crushed by orders form the top.46 A protocol of the Politburo 
gives some support to this opinion: 
45 	 Solzhenitsyn 1974, 257. I. Avdiev confirms Solzhenitsyn's version of the Petro-
grad events. Moreover, Avdiev emphasizes that Veniamin was shocked when he 
realized how the state was simply confiscating valuables for its own purposes. 
Avdiev 1991, 4-5. 
46 	 Petrogradskaya Pravda, 9 March 1922, No. 54; Solzhenitsyn 1974, 258; Avdiev 
1991, 4-5. 
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...there can be observed great confusion in assessing the behaviour and 
agitation of priests. Our newspapers are favourably quoting only the 
sympathetic calls of priests to help the starving, seeing them as they 
would be loyally executing the decree of Soviet power...it is necessary 
to give instructions to local organs not to allow any ambiguity in this 
question.47  
A decision of the Politburo of 13 March 1922 reveals that Trotsky had 
already prepared his own political strategy for confiscating church 
valuables. The striking similarity between this plan and the previous 
press campaign clearly shows who was the mastermind behind these 
acts. In a special letter of 11 March 1922 to the inner circle of the 
Politburo (Lenin, V.M. Molotov (Skryabin 1890-1986), Kamenev and 
Stalin) Trotsky criticized the confusion over the confiscation process; 
there were too many different organs operating simultaneously in the 
same field. He announced that "his commission", with members such 
as G.D. Bazilevich (1889-1938), M.V. Galkin (Gorey), P.P. Lebedev 
(1872-1933), T.V. Sapronov (1887-1939) and Unshlikht, had dealt 
with this question. Among the members of Trotsky's commission were 
hardliners like R.S. Samoilova-Zemlyachka (1876-1947), who had 
gained a notorious "reputation" in Crimea at the end of the civil war due 
to her harsh methods against class-enemies, and a member of the 
NKYust, P.A. Krasikov. Presumably, because of the economic 
significance of this matter, A.M. Krasnoshchekov (1880-1937) was 
also appointed to Trotsky's commission. He had earlier in 1922 been 
appointed deputy of Finances in order to restore the value of the rouble. 
This commission of Trotsky's had "unanimously" accepted a proposal 
to create a secret "shock commission" to take charge of the confiscation 
process in Moscow. On the orders of Trotsky, this organ was to perform 
all the preparations required. He also demanded that other organs such 
as the Pomgol should acknowledge the authority of his commission 48 
The Politburo accepted Trotsky's proposal together with a scheme to let 
the "Soviet part of the clergy" temporarily join in the organs of the 
Pomgol in order to obtain valuables from the churches 49 
47 	 "B oueHKe no e teHHA H arnTaunn HOVOS Ha6AIoAaeTca 6onbu iaa nyraHHua. 
Hamn ra3eTb1 npHBOAAT I1p0CTo C09yBCTBeHHble npH3bIBbI HO0OB 0 fOMOUIH 
ronoaaloluHM. BHAA B HHX Kai( 6b1 AOrtAAbHOe BbInoJIHeHHe AeKpera COBeTCKON 
BJIacTH...Heo6X04HMo npetnHcam MecTHbIM opraHaM He AonyCKaTb B 3TOM 
Bonpoce HHKaKoh uaycMblcneHHocTH". RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.286 (Pp 117, 2/ 
4-22). For favourable comments on the activity of the clergy, see Petrogradskaya 
Pravda, 7 March 1922, No. 53. 
48 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.280 (Pp 111, 13/3-22). 
49 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.280 (Pp 111, 13/3-22). According to Philip Walters, there 
were "differences at the highest level over the anti-religious strategy and the onset 
The news from Karlovci came at the same time as the Patriarch 
issued his proclamation condemning the plan to confiscate church 
valuables. On 15 March 1922 disorders occurred when officials 
confiscating valuables were obstructed by people trying to defend 
church property (especially in Shuya). Subsequently, according to the 
Bolsheviks, priests began withholding valuables with all the means at 
their disposal and agitating the "dark masses" to act against the Soviet 
regime. In reality, these "dark masses" seemed to act more indepen-
dently than the communists wished to believe. For example, Roger 
Pethybridge tells us that in Roslav people declared that church 
valuables belonged to them and that the priests had no right to give 
them away to the communists. Nevertheless, these disturbances pro-
vided excellent grounds for provocation as there seemed to be reason to 
assume that there existed an "ecclesiastical plot" against the Soviet 
regime. However, some Western scholars have argued that the collision 
between the ROC and Soviet power was mainly a reaction to the 	 111 
political challenge of the Karlovci Sobor.50 On one hand, this as-
sumption could be justified by the Politburo protocol of 9 February 
1922 which gives the impression that this organ favoured a peaceful 
confiscation process. It was announced that Tikhon's proposal to 
donate non-liturgical valuables should be published together with an 
announcement that the clergy could assist the Soviet regime in col-
lecting valuables.51  
Nevertheless, according to Solzhenitsyn, the ruling regime 
unanimously rejected a peaceful option and only some local officials 
were willing to act in co-operation with the ROC. On the one hand, this 
would seem somewhat of an overstatement when one takes into account 
that some members of the ruling regime favoured a non-violent and 
voluntary confiscation of valuables and that only the inner circle of the 
ruling regime was aware of Trotsky's plan. On the other hand, it seems 
too much of a coincidence that the aggressive declarations of the 
Karlovci Sobor and the violent incidents in the Russian countryside just 
happened to coincide with Trotsky's plans. Without doubt, calls by 
émigré clergy for the undermining of the Soviet regime constituted a 
sudden provocation for hardliners in the ruling regime. But Trotsky's 
careful preparations for confiscating church valuables implies that this 
was a conscious battle plan; he had done the groundwork for this 
of NEP brought these differences into sharper focus". Walters 1991, 253. This is, of 
course, quite right, but these differences did not surface while Lenin was still in 
charge. 
50 	 Curtiss 1953, 114; Pethybridge 1990, 39. 
51 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.261 (Pp 94, 9/2-22). 
campaign and kept it well hidden so the foreign press would not get 
wind of it 52 
All the information available testifies to the fact that the practical 
implementation of the confiscation conflict bears Trotsky's hallmark. It 
was partly a tactical measure of his to fund the Soviet regime in a 
desperate situation and partly a political ploy to fight against the ROC. 
Lenin accepted Trotsky's policy whole-heartedly, believing that it 
afforded an excellent opportunity for a political offensive against the 
ROC.53 Nevertheless, the ecclesiastical riots that ensued were so 
serious that bands of rioting believers could be dispersed only by the 
use of armed force. The Shuya incident was an excellent "casus belli" 
for the Soviet regime and even Lenin himself remarked on this in a 
secret letter to the Politburo, stating that this kind of activity by the 
ROC should be suppressed ruthlessly. Lenin urged the Politburo to act 
without hesitation and believed that this was an opportunity to root out 
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the clerical opposition. During the famine the people would accept 
extreme measures by the Bolsheviks and give them a chance to work 
with their sympathy or at least with the neutrality of masses.54 This 
remark of Lenin demonstrates profoundly his personal sentiments 
concerning the ROC, which he considered to be a dedicated enemy of 
Soviet power. The famine provided an excellent opportunity to collect 
funds and exterminate the class enemy of the people in one sweep. He 
also criticised the doubts of his colleagues; at first Rykov, Kalinin and 
Kamenev did not support Trotsky's desire to attack the ROC. 
Nevertheless, Lenin's opinion decided the case in Trotsky's favour. 
The motivation seemed to be, as Mikhail Geller has stated, Lenin's 
hope to strike the ROC a death-blow from which it would never 
recover. In addition, as Lenin remarked in his letter to the Politburo, it 
was essential to keep Trotsky's role in the whole affair hidden. The 
obvious explanation for this was that Trotsky was a Jew and knowledge 
of his involvement might have increased outbursts of anti-Semitism 
among the Russian population.55 
52 	 Delaney 1971, 108. See Trotsky's secret letter to Lenin dated 30 January 1922. In it 
Trotsky hints to Lenin that confiscating the valuables from churches was under 
"political" preparation on different levels (...nourorosnsieresi noj[HTH`tecKn c 
pa3HbIx cropoH...) in order to keep the matter hidden from the foreign press. TTP 
II, 670-672. For information conceming Tuchkov's joumey to Petrograd to inspect 
the situation, see RTsKhIDNI f.4, op.l, d.443a (PCAP 8, 19/12-22), (PCAP 14, b/ 
d). 
53 	 TTP II 1971, 689; Delaney 1971, 108; Jansen 1982, 137, 139-140. 
54 	 IzvTsK KPSS 1990 4, 192-193. This letter had earlier been published in "samizdat" 
literature but official Soviet sources had also given some hint of its existence. See 
Regelson 1977, 280-284; PSS 45, 666-667; BH 12, 244. See also IzvTsK KPSS 
1990 4, 193; RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d. 283 (Pp 114, 20/3-22). 
55 	 Geller 1985, 41-42; IzvTsK KPSS 1990 4, 192. See also Alekseev 1991, 207. 
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The swift reaction of the Soviet authorities to these riots reinforces 
the view that Trotsky was more than prepared to exploit these riots for 
political gain. The principle of "divide and rule" suited the Commissar 
of War very well. Creating a schism among one's political opponents in 
order to crush them later was no strange course of action for Lenin, nor 
for the Bolshevik party in general. After the party congress of 1903 
Lenin had tried to develop a "raskol" (schism) inside the Menshevik 
faction. In similar fashion, promoting the "Living Church" proved very 
effective in weakening the ROC. Furthermore, a loyal church was also 
useful for purposes of foreign propaganda.56 
Plans for confiscating valuables and crushing any possible resistance 
were ready by 20 March 1922 when the Politburo (only Kamenev, 
Stalin, Trotsky and Molotov attended) decided to send a special 
delegation to Shuya in order to inspect the situation. The delegation 
later approved of the way local officials had acted but concluded that 
they were "not energetic and planned" enough to maintain order in the 
town. The same day Trotsky introduced a more precise proposal to the 
Politburo to deal with confiscations and the plan was accepted with 
some additions by the Politburo. This detailed plan for confiscating 
church valuables proposed that the ruling regime should create secret 
local commissions all over the country to carry out confiscations. 
Together with these secret commissions, it also proposed the setting up 
of local commissions which would officially conduct negotiations with 
religious groups.57 
The vice-chairman of this commission was T.V. Sapronov (1887-
1939). Others on the commission like Unshlikht, A.V. Medvedev 
(1884-1940) and Samoilova-Zemlyachka were members of the 
security organs, and M.V. Galkin (Gorey) was the expert on religious 
organizations. Trotsky had demanded from the Politburo that his 
Central Confiscation Commission should work clandestinely and that 
the formal work of this confiscation campaign should be directed 
through the Pomgol. According to his plan, local secret "shock-
committees" should be subordinated to a special leading committee 
which would include Kalinin, Ya.A. Yakovlev (1896-1938), Sapronov, 
Unshlikht, Krasikov, A.N. Vinokurov and G.D. Bazilevich. For day-to-
day work Trotsky proposed creating a committee consisting of 
Yakovlev, Sapronov, Unshlikht and Galkin. He reserved for himself the 
place of co-ordinator by proposing that during weekends this organ 
should meet with him. His instructions for the practical implementation 
of this process put much weight on secrecy. Special local commissions 
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56 	 TRRR, 49-50; Carr 1985 I, 36-37. 
57 	 IzvTsK KPSS 1990 4, 194. 
 
8 
  
should work in secret together with local famine commissions. It was 
also important that the make-up of these official Pomgol commissions 
should not give grounds for chauvinistic remarks. This was probably 
done in order to avoid anti-semitic feelings. Communists of Jewish 
origin working on official commissions might have given rise to an 
increase in anti-semitism among the Russian population. To prepare for 
the confiscation of valuables, local commissions should organize a 
special weekend for agitation and propaganda purposes in particular 
districts. In order to minimize the possible resistance of sections of the 
population, he proposed that agitators in these campaigns should refrain 
from attacking religion as such. Instead they should stress the need to 
help the starving.58 
In his instructions Trotsky placed much emphasis on the importance 
of creating a schism (raskol) within the ranks of the clergy and 
stipulated in his directives that those clergymen who openly supported 
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the confiscation process should receive protection. He reasoned this by 
commenting that although the Bolshevik agitation and propaganda 
should not integrate with the loyal clergymen, it was important to give 
the impression that a considerable part of the clergy was behind the 
actions of the government. He advised that well-known priests should 
not be touched if at all possible, but that they should be told in advance 
that in the case of excesses or rioting by the populace they would be 
held responsible 59 
Politburo protocols inform us that Trotsky dictated the official 
reaction of the ruling regime to the events in Shuya at a Politburo 
meeting on 22 March 1922. As a result of this meeting the ruling 
regime decided then to arrest the Patriarch and the Synod. Nevertheless, 
for tactical reasons this was not done at once, but after a delay of 10-15 
days. Time was probably needed for organizing the press campaign 
against Tikhon. It was also decided at this meeting that the "ring-
leaders" among priests opposing the confiscations were to be shot at the 
same time as information about the church disorders of Shuya, 
Smolensk and Petrograd would be published in the Soviet newspapers. 
Only after these measures had been carried out should the highest 
leaders of the church be arrested. This decision underlined also the 
importance of executing the confiscation process throughout the whole 
country. Presumably for tactical reasons, the Politburo on 23 March 
1922 ordered that no kind of antireligious behaviour should be shown 
during the confiscation of valuables. Moreover, the head of state, 
58 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.283 (Pp 114, 20/3-22); IzvTsK KPSS 1990 4, 194. 
59 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.283 (Pp 114, 20/3-22); IzvTsK KPSS 1990 4, 194. 
Compare also Russkaya Mysl, 20-26 January 1994, No. 4013 and NR, 34. 
Kalinin, was even obliged to call on loyal priests to work in the 
Pomgo1.60 
In accordance with this directive, the Soviet press started 
campaigning against the Patriarch and accused Tikhon of being a 
"Russian Pope" and the Synod of being the "general staff of the 
counter-revolution". The headlines of Izvestiya for 6 May 1922 also 
included news of how lower clergy were protesting against the "princes 
of the Church". Pravda, the party's main newspaper, attacked the 
leaders of the ROC the same day by maintaining that the counter-
revolution was now using religion for its own purposes. On 4 May 1922 
the Politburo, after a short outburst of accusations against the Patriarch 
and the higher leadership of the ROC, ordered the Moscow Tribunal to 
put Tikhon on trial and to mete out the "highest measure of 
punishment" (npHMeHHTb K nonaM Bbuuylo Mepy Haxa3aHHst — i.e. 
execution) against those priests already arrested. This order was carried 
out in part on 9 May 1922, when Tikhon was placed under house arrest 
in the Donskoi monastery.61  
Trotsky's plan to create a schism inside the ROC succeeded. The 
imprisonment of the Patriarch provided the opportunity to organize a 
revolution inside the church. At the beginning of May 1922 the head of 
the 6th section of the GPU, Evgeni Aleksandrovich Tuchkov gathered 
opposition-minded clergy to Moscow and on 12 May 1922 a delegation 
of priests visited Tikhon and accused him of counter-revolutionary 
activity and demanded that he temporarily resign his office. After some 
discussion Tikhon signed a paper renouncing his office temporarily in 
favour of this delegation. Later on 14 May 1922 this group of priests 
announced in Pravda that they had constituted a "Temporary Higher 
Church Administration", VTsU.62 
This clerical revolution, nonetheless, did not receive the amount of 
attention from the party press Trotsky had hoped for. On the evening of 
the same day he wrote a letter to the members of Politburo demanding 
that newspapers should give more coverage of this "loyal group of 
clergy" and he called them, interestingly enough, a "smenovekhist" 
group inside the clergy. He remarked that the ruling regime was not 
60 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.284 (Pp 115, 22/3-22); f.17, op.3, d.285 (Pp 116, 23/ 
3-22). 
61 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.291 (Pp 5, 4/5-22); Izvestiya, 6 May 1922, No. 99(1538); 
9 May 1922, No. 102(1542); Curtiss 1953, 120. 
62 	 Walters 1991, 254; Gousseff 1993, 9-28. See also Pravda, 14 May 1922, No. 106. 
On 13 April 1922 pro-Renovationist Bishop Antony (A.A. Granovsky 1860-1927) 
was accepted onto the central committee of the official relief organization 
(Pomgol). RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.288 (Pp 2, 13/5-22). See especially Tuchkov's 
report to Menzhinsky: RdO, 29-40. 
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giving up its principle of the separation of church and state or diluting 
its philosophical-materialist doctrine, but, nevertheless, he commented 
that it was to the political advantage of communists to see to it that 
these "smenovekhists" should not be harassed by the old clerical 
hierarchies. He stressed that newspapers had a mission to lift the spirits 
of loyal clergy and encourage them to trust that the state would not let 
them be harmed and added that this should be done within the limits of 
the state policy not to attempt to interfere in purely religious disputes 63 
Towards the end of his letter he again criticized Soviet newspapers 
and asserted that Pravda and Izvestiya, while active in commenting on 
the Conference of Genoa, did not pay enough attention when there 
occurred a profound ecclesiastical revolution among the Russian 
people .64  
In the above letter Trotsky evaluated the importance of these 
"clerical smenovekhists". The Smena-Vekh movement (Changing 
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Landmarks) had developed in the West among a group of Russian 
émigré writers and essayists who early in 1921 in Prague elaborated 
their programme in the publication Smena Vekh. This group of 
intellectuals was made up of well-known writers such as N.V. 
Ustryalov (1890-1938) who believed that through the defeat of the 
Whites and the autocracy there could occur the possibility of 
accomplishing a national revival. He believed that the "anti-national 
movement of the Bolsheviks" would become a national one. Moreover, 
Ustryalov did not accept the idea that Bolshevism could be identified 
with demonism. This view had been put forward by the authors of 
another émigré publication, Iz Glubiny (From the Depths), notably P.B. 
Struve (1870-1953), N.A. Berdyaev and S.N. Bulgakov.65 The "Iz 
Glubiny" group rejected Ustryalov's rationalization that the possible 
national revival of Russia would be reason enough for supporting the 
Bolsheviks. As Mikhail Agursky has remarked, Struve rejected 
Ustryalov as a "dangerous seducer".66 
According to Trotsky, the Smena-Vekhists belonged to the "white-
guardist" and reactionary bloc, but nonetheless the Soviet government 
needed their services. They had some common objectives with Soviet 
power but unlike their "fellow-travellers" in literary or military circles 
they were of limited political value. This view implies that "clerical" 
63 	 IzvTsK KPSS 1990 4, 196. 
64 	 IzvTsK KPSS 1990 4, 197. 
65 	 -143 I'nyÖHHbt. C60pH14K cTaTe41 O nyCCKOIi peBOnK1uHH.- 143J.IaTenbCTB0 
PyCCKaA Mblcnb. MocKBa-IIeTporpa,g. 1918. New edition: Ib3AarenbcTso 
MocKoscKoro yHHBepcHrera. CH OcT-BecT KopnopeHmeH. Mocxsa. 1990. 
66 	 Agursky 1987, 240-244, 248; Carter 1990, 46-48. See also Longinov 1985, 281- 
283. 
and secular smena-vekhists were only temporary and tactical allies and 
that Soviet power did not have any obligations towards them. This 
attitude explains how and why the ruling regime treated the Living 
Church as it did 67 
As a result of this temporary alliance liberal priests were able to 
publish their own journal, "The Living Church", from 12 May 1922 and 
to organize themselves officially from 4 July 1922 on by creating an 
official "Living Church" movement inside the ROC. In accordance 
with Trotsky's masterplan, the ruling regime supported this new 
movement and arrested clergymen who did not favour this 
ecclesiastical revolution. It is difficult to see how this could be judged 
an impartial policy as the communist regime sought to influence their 
religious policy.68 Moreover, liberal clergymen were even able to 
convoke an ecclesiastical meeting, a second Sobor, on 29 April 1923 in 
order to deal with the situation. Soviet officials followed the 
development of this assembly very closely and were even ready to 
organize a scandal to discredit the chairman of the Sobor if it proved 
necessary. As a certain Tuchkov 's report to Menzhinsky (1874-1934) 
explains, the ruling regime and its security organs could control this 
congress as much as they wanted. The Sobor gave ardent reassurances 
of its loyalty to the Soviet state, even sending warm greetings to Lenin 
and hailing the Bolshevik revolution.69 
Opposition to the confiscation of church valuables by local 
committees was suppressed immediately and ruthlessly throughout 
Soviet Russia. Lenin's earlier call for the execution of rebellious priests 
was put into effect. In Shuya three people were executed initially and 
many more executions followed later. One example of this terror 
followed the meeting of the Politburon 18 May 1922 when Trotsky 
demanded the "highest measure of punishment" (execution) for six 
priests arrested in Moscow. This was carried out at the same time as 
preparations for the political trials of the leaders of the SR party (held in 
Moscow from 8 June to 7 August 1922) were underway. Although L.B. 
Kamenev attempted to revoke this decision, the Politburo agreed with 
Trotsky and these executions went ahead. Gradually more senior 
67 	 Kemp-Welch 1990, 22-26; Gousseff 1993, 15-16. 
68 	 Curtiss 1953, 134-137; Siegelbaum 1992, 158-159. 
69 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, d.565a (PCAP 20, 4/5-23); RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, 
d.180. "O6pautettne Bennxoro BcepoccHKcKoro npeuco6opaoro coeeutaena. K 
npaunrenbcTBy co1o3a coseTcxnx couxanxcTxyecKxx pecny6nrK. 18. nroxa 
1924"; RdO, 31-33. See also Curtiss 1953, 154-156. "Sectarian-communists" 
supported these actions too; concern over "reactionist" clergymen in the VTsU's 
administration was expressed also in the articles of A. Volkov and I. Tregubov on 2 
August 1922. Izvestiya, 2 August 1922, No. 171. 
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leaders of the ROC in Moscow and Petrograd were arrested as a result 
of the riots arising out of the confiscation process. In Moscow trials 
against clergy took place from 24 April to 7 May 1922 and Tikhon 
himself testified for some of the defendants. The highlight of these 
prosecutions was, nonetheless, the trial against the ROC leaders from 
Petrograd and the forthcoming trial of Tikhon.70 
Both Curtiss and Solzhenitsyn discuss the possible intention of the 
Soviet regime in trying to smash the ROC by charging its highest 
leaders, Tikhon, Metropolitan Veniamin and their associates, with 
counter-revolutionary activity. As we have seen Trotsky and other 
"hardline" members of the Politburo were clearly in favour of this 
scheme. However, pressure for more resolute actions against Veniamin 
came also, according to the archives, from local representatives of the 
secret police. Representatives of the secret police in Petrograd had been 
irritated by Veniamin's prominent role in the collection of valuables 
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and pressed the central organs to arrest him. Moreover, as Dimitry V. 
Pospielovsky has remarked, Veniamin's popularity among the youth 
and workers had no doubt embittered local communist leaders.71  
Although some senior officials of the NKYust attempted to pacify the 
local security organs, his fate was doomed when Trotsky's more 
aggressive line won out among leading communists. It might be 
claimed with good reason that these trials against Petrograd's 
ecclesiastical leaders were among the first political trials in the Soviet 
state. Renovationist clergymen such as Vvedensky (1888—?) and Kra-
nitsky testified against Veniamin and despite Vvedensky making a 
private appeal for mercy to Soviet Prime Minister Rykov, he was not 
able to save Veniamin and the other defendants. On the contrary, these 
appeals were not publicised and the testimonies of these liberal 
clergymen were said to have made a profound impression on the court. 
Despite international protests the trial was conducted till the end. Soviet 
officials attempted to underline that the Soviet regime was not 
persecuting religion as such but simply acting against "counter-
revolutionaries". But as the outcome of this trial Veniamin and four 
other defendants were executed.72 
70 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.293 (Pp 7, 18/5-22); Curtiss 1953, 121, 126. 
71 	 Pospielovsky 1991, 275-276. 
72 	 GARF2 f. 353, op. 4, d.382; "BbInncKa H3 CTeHOrpaMMbl Be9epuero 3aceaannn 
lIerporpaacKoro ry6epucxoro peBonrouHOHoro Tpu6yuana OT 29-ro HrouB 
1922 rona no tevy IIerporpaackux uepKoBunKos". See also DMV; Curtiss 
1953, 122-123, 126-127, and the correspondence between the NKYust and 
Petrograd's local Cheka: GARF2 f.353, op.5, d.255 "YnonuoMoneuHOMy VII OTJt. 
COB.9K.: IIeTporpalt Ty6,texa: YIIOnHOMO9eHHOMy 7-ro orueneu. COB4x. 
foKnaanan 3anuCKan". 
Interestingly enough however, as one of the leaders of the 
Renovationist movement A.I. Vvedensky revealed in his letter to 
Rykov, the position of the Renovationists during these trials was 
complex. In his letter Vvedensky first pointed out how he himself had 
been persecuted by the conservative representatives of the church but 
went on to plead with the Soviet regime not to execute Veniamin. 
Veniamin, he explained, was a weak person who had not been strong 
enough to act against Tikhon; in reality he had never thought of 
overthrowing Soviet power. He revealed that Veniamin had forbidden 
the clergy from entering politics. The "good and weak-minded" 
Veniamin, Vvedensky said, could have been on the progressive side of 
the clergy but the events of spring 1922 proved his undoing. Vvedensky 
also felt that the execution of Veniamin could have unpredictable 
consequences; he would become a martyr. Vvedensky also felt that 
Soviet power was strong enough politically to be lenient towards 
Veniamin and had other ways of isolating him. At the end of his letter 	 119 
he revealed the dual motivation and ambiguous loyalty of the 
"reformers": 
I believe in God — and I think that He will help me. And I believe in the 
Russian people and deeply respect the "peasant-workers" power of the 
people...73  
b. Other religious organizations 
International protests on behalf of the clergymen did not have any 
effect and throughout the summer and autumn of 1922 conservative 
priests and other church dignitaries were arrested for counter-
revolutionary activities and church valuables were confiscated. This 
campaign was not directed solely at the ROC. The authorities also 
attacked other religions; Jews and Catholics, for example, were 
repressed in the same manner as the ROC.74 
The confiscation of the valuables of all religious organizations 
implies that the ruling regime wanted to strike a decisive blow against 
organized religion. Officials of the GPU even attempted to create a 
reformationist group among the Moslem clergy in Russia. This could 
73 	 "HO a Bepyio B Sora — H AyMalo, 9TO OH noMo)KeT MHe. H H Bepyio B pyCCHFt 
HapOA. ray6oxo yBaacawo pa6o9e-KpecTbancKylo BAaCTb Hapo.aHyIo". GARFI 
f.5446c, op.55, d.86. "T.PblKOBy. 25.mo.aa 1922". See also the petition of Bishop 
Antony: GARF2 f.353, op.6, d. 11 "Hpe lceuaTento B.II.H.K 11/7-22r.". For more 
on the personalities and motives of the Renovationist leaders, see Walters 1991, 
256-263. 
74 	 See, for example, TRRR, 171-172. See also ORTs, 51-53. 
be seen as part of an official antireligious campaign of the early NEP 
period. But it may also be argued that the widespread confiscation of 
valuables caused local communist officials to understand this as an 
extension of the civil war policy and as a sign of an overall assault 
against religious organizations.75  
For example, Soviet Jewry was under fierce attack in 1921-22, 
especially from the Jewish section of the communist party, the 
Evsektsiya. These antireligious campaigns of the 1920s were 
conducted exclusively by Jewish communists. As an analogy to the 
"Living Church", Jewish communists created the "Living Synagogue" 
movement and started antireligious and anti-nationalist attacks against 
the "Zionist-Hebrew" front. The Evsektsiya in particular wanted to 
weaken the status of the Jewish religious school, the heder. As Zvi 
Gitelman has remarked, the insecurity of the Jewish communists drove 
them to antireligious campaigns to reassure others of their ideological 
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fidelity. In the atmosphere of the general drive against religion and the 
confiscation of church valuables, Jewish communists felt obliged to 
prove their ideological fervour to their non-Jewish communist 
comrades, although synagogues did not contain the same number of 
valuable objects as were to be found in Orthodox churches.76 
In particular, the situation of Roman Catholics in Russia was tense. 
The great majority of Catholics in Soviet Russia were of Polish origin. 
According to Dennis J. Dunn, there were various factors in Soviet—
Vatican relations such as the ideological motivation, the independence 
of the Catholic church, traditions of mutual dislike between Russians 
and the Catholic church, the Soviet government's suspicion that 
Catholics were planning a "coup" against it, and finally Catholic 
opposition to communist internationalism.77 Nevertheless, when 
evaluating Soviet religious policy towards Catholics, it seems obvious 
that the relation with Catholic Poland was a more significant factor than 
any of the above. The religious policy towards Catholics in the western 
regions of the Soviet state was carried out not solely for ideological 
reasons but also because of the international situation. The Polish-
Russian war and the civil war had greatly exacerbated Soviet relations 
75 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.122, d.443a (PCAP 18, 3/4-23); Gitelman 1971, 331; 
Mailleux 1971, 359-363. 
76 	 See reports on the antireligious campaigns of the Evsektsya. RTsKhIDNI f.89, 
op.4, d.170. "AHTH-KJIepHKaJIbHaA KaMnaHHA/H3 oT9eTa ]Zb EBCeKUHH npH 
PKII 3a nepHOA c 15-ro ceH-no 15 H0516p- 22; AHTH-KJIepHKanbHaA KaMnaHHA/ 
H3BJIe`ieHHA OT9eTa US EBCeKUHH npH UK PKII c 15 HoA6pA-22 r.np. 15-oe 
mumps' 1923 rolta: 0 6opb6e C KJIepHKanH3MOM Ha eBpeHCKO11 yJIHUe. 
Pe30JI101.[HA npHHATaA Ha MHHCKOM Cbe3lte KyJlbTpa60THHKOB. CeHTA6pb 1921 
roua". Gitelman 1988, 116-121. See also Goldelman 1960, 194-195. 
77 	 Dunn 1977, 32-33. 
towards the Catholic church in Soviet Ukraine. 
The peace negotiations between the Soviet state and Poland brought 
to the fore many questions concerning the rights of national minorities 
in Russia and in Poland. During the negotiations Poland insisted on 
cultural guarantees for the Catholic population in western Russia and in 
Ukraine. These cultural guarantees included, according to the Polish 
interpretation, the official recognition of and privileges for the Catholic 
religion. This had been a cause of irritation for the Soviet regime, which 
believed that including religion as a national right for Catholics was 
nothing more than a Polish plot to interfere in its internal affairs — "to 
create a Polish ghetto" inside the Soviet state. Nonetheless the Treaty 
of Riga, which was eventually concluded on 18 March 1921, stipulated 
mutual respect for the culture, language and religion of other national-
ities.78  
Although relations with Catholicism remained tense in theory, the 
Soviet regime was willing to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards 	 121 
Catholics and even negotiate with the Vatican before the Genoa 
Conference in order to escape from international isolation. On 12 
March 1922 representatives of the Soviet state and the Holy See signed 
a written agreement which granted permission to the Vatican's 
emissaries to give assistance to the starving people in the Volga area. 
The Vatican also offered to purchase ecclesiastical objects of value 
confiscated by the Soviet state.79 
Other negotiations were held before the Conference of Genoa in 
May 1922 in which the Vatican tried to obtain guarantees of freedom of 
conscience and religion for its followers and demanded also the return 
of Catholic ecclesiastical property. These negotiations, nonetheless, 
produced few results as the Soviet government was not eager to make 
exceptions in its religious policy.80 
Nevertheless, in this case the interests of the NKID and the NKYust 
collided. The Soviet foreign office (NKID) drew the NKYust's 
attention to the rumoured "extraordinary zealousness of local organs" 
in its religious policy and appealed to the leader of the NKYust, P.A. 
Krasikov, to change this line of policy. The NKID justified this 
interference by pointing out that the spread of such rumours abroad 
could have politically dangerous consequences and explained that the 
78 	 Pravda, 2 April 1921, No. 171; Wandycz 1969, 273-275. See the text of the peace 
treaty and later Polish protests on violations of the religious rights of people of 
Polish origin. GARF2 f.353, op.6, d.9 "YBa)KaeMbal r'ocnouHH 3aMecrHrenb 
HapouHoro KoMHccapa (27. anpena 1922 rona)". 
79 	 GARF2 f.353, op.6, d.9 "B flpe3nauyM BURK/ 1.lewrpanbHaa KOMHCCHa no 
1431,51T1410 UepKOBHbIX net-mom-eV. See also Stehle 1990, 347. 
80 	 TRRR, 92-93; Solchanyk & Hvat 1990, 52. 
Polish government would not hesitate to utilize such rumours in its 
propaganda to Polish peasants in western Ukraine. Or, as the Soviet 
representative in Italy V.V. Vorovsky (1871-1923) in his letter to M.M. 
Litvinov (1876-1951) put it, it was a pity that there seemed to exist 
nobody in Moscow who could understand the importance of relations 
with the Vatican. "Even if Krasikov were to stand firm" against him, 
Vorovsky was ready to improve these relations.81  
On the other hand, the "hawks" in the area of Soviet religious policy, 
and especially P.A. Krasikov, opposed every effort to change the 
religious policy of the Soviet state in relation to Catholics or to the 
Vatican. As he put it, there was no reason to treat Catholicism 
differently from other religions or to ease the conditions of arrested 
Catholics in Russia.82 
As various sources testify, Catholic Poland was seen as a fierce 
adversary of the Soviet state. Relations between the two states were not 
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improved by the fact that Soviet officials thought that Poland 
interpreted the Riga Treaty as a mandate to defend Catholicism (i.e. 
Polish interests) inside Soviet Russia. Archive sources tell us that the 
ruling Soviet regime even toyed with the idea of weakening the 
combination of Polish nationality and the Catholic faith by substituting 
Polish cardinals with Germans or Italians. As a counter-measure to 
undermine Polish activity in this field, Soviet newspapers accused 
Poland of the "brutal violation of the peace-treaty" and, more 
surprisingly, blamed the Polish government for mistreating the 
Orthodox minority on Polish territory.83 The resistance of Catholics 
irritated the Soviet regime, although it tried in many ways to create a 
pro-government Catholic church in the Soviet Union. Soviet officials 
even contemplated the possibility that, if Catholic cardinals were to 
remain unco-operative, Catholic churches might be handed over for the 
use of other religions.84 
The Catholic Church's "lack of locality" and the Polish diplomatic 
intervention, together with reports that the Catholic bishops of Polish 
origin were conducting a counter-revolutionary policy, were probably 
the reasons for the more drastic attacks against the Catholic clergy that 
were to ensue. On 2-3 March 1923, Catholic Archbishop Cieplak 
(1857-1926), Fr. Budkiewicz (?-1923) and certain Catholic priests 
81 	 GARF2 f.353, op.6, d.9 "HapxoMiocT. TOB. KpacHKoBy (24. as 1922)"; 
"3aMHapKOMy TOB. M.M. .IIHTBHHOBy (12. aarycTa 1922)". 
82 	 GARF2 f.353, op.6, d.9 "B Hapoanbin KoMnccapHar HHocrpaHHmx Ben (I I/ 
VIII-22)". 
83 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.364 (Pp 16, 12/6-23); f.17, op.112, d.565a (PCAP 41, 12/ 
12-23). On the Soviet press campaign against Poland, see Izvestiya, 2 August 1922, 
No. 171. 
84 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, d.443a (PCAP 7, 5/12-22); Teodorovich 1960, 86. 
were arrested and charged with counter-revolution. Cieplak and Fr. 
Budkiewicz were subsequently condemned to death but only Bud-
kiewicz was executed.85 
Dennis J. Dunn has described the execution of Fr. Budkiewicz as a 
"quite extreme" measure. He explains this act as the result of the 
"temporary ascendancy of the left wing of the Party" within the Soviet 
government. But according to archive sources, the fate of Budkiewicz 
was decided by the small inner circle of the Politburo — Stalin, Trotsky, 
Zinovev, Kamenev and Tomsky (1880-1936) — and it would be ques-
tionable to characterize them as "leftist". Nonetheless the Bolsheviks, 
as earlier, attempted to utilize highly positioned Catholic clergy as a 
tool in their foreign policy. According to a report by the U.S. 
Ambassador to Warsaw, Hugh Gibson, the Bolsheviks were willing to 
commute these death sentences in exchange for the release of certain 
communists held in Polish prisons. The Polish government, however, 
interpreted this as blackmail and did not take up the offer.86 
3. THE INTERREGNUM OF POWER 
a. 	 The birth of the Commission of Antireligious 
Propaganda, CAP 
During the spring of 1922 Lenin suffered from headaches and 
insomnia, which greatly affected his ability to work. Slowly but surely 
the battle for supreme power began. Although Lenin later recovered 
and returned to his post, it was clear that during the interregnum the 
party and the state were more and more under the influence of other 
leaders. While recovering, Lenin had time to re-evaluate some of the 
characteristics of the Soviet system. On returning to work to take up his 
post as head of the Sovnarkom, he was disturbed by the general 
bureaucratic rigidity around him. Above all, he was alarmed by the 
increased stature and influence of the General Secretary. Stalin's 
ruthless character, as Isaac Deutscher has suggested, may have 
represented for Lenin the cultural backwardness of Russia. Lenin was 
also uneasy about the political situation in Georgia and believed that 
Stalin had resorted to unduly brutal measures during its annexation.87 
85 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, d.443a (PCAP 6, 28/11-22); Mailleux 1971, 362-363. 
86 	 See RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.349 (Pp 1, 3/5-22); TRRR, 135; Dunn 1977, 35. 
87 	 Trotsky 1930, 215-216; Trotsky 1947, 365; Deutscher 1967, 250-252. See also 
Borys 1980, 317-318. 
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So during his last active spell as head of government Lenin began to 
criticise the Soviet system which he had done so much to create. At first 
this criticism was directed against certain malfunctionings on the part 
of the Soviet organs, but later his analysis extended to the whole Soviet 
political system. Lenin's re-evaluation of the Soviet system was 
crystallized in his much repeated appeal for the need for culture inside 
the ruling regime. He stressed the importance of reforming the 
excessive bureaucracy and the backwardness of the Soviet system. 
Lack of culture and education seemed to be everywhere, and unless the 
communists could absorb culture or learn from it they could not hope to 
lead the country. The basic lesson for the ruling regime was to learn 
culture and trade. In his last writings, Lenin also demanded a more 
clearly defined separation between state power and the party. The 
Soviet state should be allowed to work in peace without the pedantic 
intervention of the party.88 His criticism finally escalated into a full- 
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blown political schism between him and Stalin. Lenin reveals in his 
famous "testament" that he was prepared to remove Stalin from his post 
because of his damaging effect on nationality policy and rude personal 
behaviour.89 
Nevertheless, the political confrontation between Lenin and Stalin 
developed slowly. Lenin was preoccupied with other matters, such as 
the battle against possible opponents of Soviet power. He was 
interested especially in taking up the fight against religion. His wife, 
Nadezhda Krupskaya, has explained in her memoirs that during the 
NEP religion had shown some signs of revitalization.° This 
revitalization of the church was due to many different factors. Probably 
the most important reason wasthat the NEP had improved the economic 
welfare of the peasants and as a result they were in a position to donate 
more to religious organizations. Despite the destruction of the civil war 
churches and sects had preserved their roots in the countryside and 
consequently this revitalization process happened quite swiftly. 
The renaissance of the religious organizations and their strength91  
88 	 PSS 45, 61-62."IIHcbMo B.M. Monorosy A11$I nneHyMa IZK PKII(6) c nnaHOM 
nonHT,toKna,ta Ha XI cbeaae napTHH'; PSS 45, 95-97, 104-105, 116."XI cbeau 
PKII(6). Pe'ib npH OTKpbITHH cbealta 27 MapTa". PSS 45, 372-373, 377. 
"1locne tHHe nHCbMa H CTaTbH B.H. JIeHHHa 23 ,geKa6pn 1922r. — 2 Marra 
1923". 
89 	 PSS 45, 344-346, 356-359. "nocneuHHe nHcbMa H cTarbH B.H. JIeHHHa 23 
Jsexa6psl 1922r. — 2 MapTa 1923"; Tucker 1973, 267-273, 275-277; Medvedev 
1989,79-81. 
90 	 Krupskaya 1960, 55-56. See also TRRR, 62-64. 
91 	 Maurice Hindus remarked that during his journey (1923) in Soviet Russia the great 
strength of religious belief among the populace was obvious. The sects especially 
were very active during that time. Hindus 1933, 159-163. 
was so impressive that Lenin was prepared to conduct an antireligious 
mission against them. However, the intensification of the antireligious 
fight was realized in ways different from what he would have wished. 
According to Trotsky, Lenin had planned that he (Trotsky) should lead 
the Soviet antireligious work. In any event, Trotsky had been 
responsible for the "confiscation conflict" and he had supervised the 
APO's antireligious commission and carried out the confiscations of 
church valuables. However, Trotsky was no longer in a position to lead 
religious policy. During Lenin's illness the party apparatus had 
gradually isolated Trotsky from power. For example, in 1923 the pro-
Stalinist Yaroslaysky was nominated to be responsible for antireligious 
work. Commenting later on this appointment, Trotsky said that 
Yaroslaysky's nomination as his "deputy" in the party's antireligious 
work was one of the intrigues aimed against him by Stalin and the other 
members of the triumvirate.92 
This political co-operation in the religious policy sphere between 	 125 
Lenin and Trotsky never materialized. Soon after this Lenin suffered 
another stroke, which paralysed him physically and prevented him from 
engaging in further political activities. However, the fact that he 
planned to work with Trotsky and intended promoting Trotsky to the 
leadership of the antireligious struggle in Russia, suggests that Lenin 
approved the religious policy line of Trotsky more than the methods of 
Stalin's protégé, Yaroslaysky. The rationale for their political co-
operation in this field is understandable; they both placed the same 
emphasis on the priority of culture in building a socialist society in 
Russia.93  
Although Isaac Deutscher can be regarded as a biased commentator, 
his remarks on the common "conservative" interests and ambitions of 
Lenin and Trotsky in relation to cultural life seem to be valid: 
Lenin also repeatedly indicated to the party and the International his 
regard for Trotsky -as an interpreter of Marxism; and he lent 
wholehearted support to the outstanding influence Trotsky exercised 
on Russia's cultural life... Both rejected the ambition of clamorous 
groups of writers and artists, especially of Proletkult, to sponsor a 
'proletarian culture' and 'proletarian literature'. In educational affairs, 
which since the civil war both considered to be of paramount 
importance, and in all matters relating to the advocacy of Marxism, 
both counselled caution and tolerance; and both discouraged firmly 
92 	 Trotsky 1990 (1930), 213. 
93 	 Trotsky 1947, 365. 
the crudity of approach, the conceit, and the fanaticism, which 
influential party members began to exhibit.94 
As general secretary, Stalin was able to outmanoeuvre Trotsky without 
too much difficulty. In the name of co-ordination, the Orgburo 
suggested that there should be a new organ to direct religious policy 
under the control of the Central Committee. Stalin could rationalize this 
decision by claiming that the Politburo was preoccupied with general 
policies and was not able to concentrate on this matter properly. In 
addition, one of the main duties of the newly-elected General Secretary 
was to rationalize the bureaucracy inside the party. Creating one 
centralized organ to co-ordinate the party's antireligious work fitted in 
well with his role as a trimmer of unnecessary bureaucracy in the party. 
But there is no doubt that this was a deliberate tactic of Stalin's to 
undermine Trotsky's position during the power struggle 95  
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Despite Lenin's wishes to put Trotsky in charge of antireligious 
work this new commission was formed without him. The official name 
of this body was the "Commission for Implementing the Separation of 
Church and State under the authority of the Central Committee 
RCP(b)," but later it was referred as the "Antireligious Commission" or 
the "Commission of Antireligious Propaganda" (CAP). Moreover, for 
some unknown reason Trotsky had neglected to attend the APO's 
Antireligious Commission's sessions and its members had asked advice 
from the Central Committee about the future of their commission. If 
Trotsky could not attend, as they suspected was the case, then they 
suggested the APO should organize another commission to handle 
matters related to religious policy 96 
The birth of a new, "non-Trotskyist" antireligious commission, can 
be traced to a meeting of the Politburo on 19 October 1922 when it 
nominated the members to the new commission and defined its 
functions. The CAP (as this commission is referred in this study) was 
obliged to give a report to the Politburo every second week and was 
given extensive powers to execute "religious policy". The Politburo 
also ordered that the CAP should establish links with local sections of 
the GPU, the NKYust and the APO.97 
94 	 Deutscher 1987, 56. Trotsky later claimed that Lenin trusted him totally in political 
matters. AT III, 130. "3asaneHHe". See also Deutscher 1987, 28-29. 
95 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.318 (Pp 32, 19/10-22). 
96 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op. 60, d. 158 "IIporoxon. 3aceuaHHa No. AHrHpeJHrHo3Hoft 
KOMUCCHH 3 oxr. 1922 roa 12 Sacos 
97 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.318 (Pp 32, 19/10-22). The belief that Yaroslaysky was a 
leading figure in this organ from the beginning seems to be erroneous. According 
to archive sources, Yaroslaysky attended these meetings for the first time on 27 
March 1923. Compare Fatev 1988 and RTsKhIDNI f.4, op.l, d.443a (PCAP 17, 
27/3-23). 
The importance of the CAP can be seen from its composition. The 
members of this new commission were veterans in this field. For 
example, I.I. Skvortsov—Stepanov and P.A. Krasikov were nominated 
from the APO's former commission along with P.G. Smidovich (1874-
1935), who was a member of party's special sectarian commission, the 
Orgkomsekt. As well as the above representatives the composition was 
broadened with delegates from the security organs: the leader of GPU, 
V.R. Menzhinsky, T.D. Deribas (1883-1939) and E.A. Tuchkov, 
together with the journalist I.P. Flerovsky. It is important to note that 
Yaroslaysky, although he was later to be the chairman of this com-
mission, was nominated to the CAP only from the beginning of 1923. It 
is also important to realize that the Narkompros never had any actual 
representatives working on the CAP. Moreover, before the liquidation 
of the CAP in 1928 the Orgburo nominated representatives from 
various Soviet organs such as the NKID, the NKVD, the Komsomols 
and the Godless movement, but none from the Narkompros. The mod-
erate political stance of Lunacharsky's Commissariat is perhaps the 
reason for this.98 
At its first meetings the general targets of the CAP were outlined and 
these involved three main tasks. Firstly to confirm directives related to 
the activities of the GPU with regard to liquidating Tikhonite 
supporters; secondly to gain influence over the VTsU; and thirdly to 
sponsor the "Living Church" and the left-wing of the church. 
Moreover, at this first meeting of the CAP, general guidelines for the 
Soviet press concerning religious policy were drawn up 99 In addition, 
this commission was initially engaged in fomenting and supervising the 
schism inside the ROC. For example, the CAP decided to remove 
Tikhonite bishops from their posts and suggested to the GPU that they 
should compromise these clerics. Later this organ formed a commission 
to consider the internal exiling of priests. Furthermore, the CAP also 
examined the possibility of widening the schism inside the ROC by 
recognising autocephalous churches, for example in Ukraine.10° 
In conclusion, Tikhon's release and Stalin's outmanoeuvreing of 
98 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.318 (Pp 32, 19/10-22); f. 89, op. 1, d.11 "BunHCKa H3 
nporoKona No:30. 3aceaaHHsi IIonHr6iopo liK BK1I(6) 06 yTBeP K teHHH E.M. 
5IpocilaBCKoro H apyrnx ' J1eHaMH aHTHpenHCHo3HOH KOMHCCHH". According to 
Sheila Fitzpatrick, ordinary communists saw the Narkompros as "disorganized, 
impractical and excessively sympathetic with the old intelligentsia". Fitzpatrick 
1979, 11. 
99 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, d.443a (PCAP 1, 23/10-22). 
100 	 RTsKhIDNI f.4, op.l, d.443a (PCAP 1, 23/10-22), (PCAP 2, 31/10-22), (PCAP 5, 
21/11-22), (PCAP 11, 30/12-22). The CAP convened from 22 October 1922 to 4 
November 1929. The date of the second CAP meeting was 31 October 1923 and 
not March as O.Yu. Vasileva has suggested. Compare RTsKhIDNI f.4, op.l, 
d.443a (PCAP 2, 31/10-22) and Vasileva 1993, 46. 
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Trotsky represented the end of one era in Soviet religious policy and the 
beginning of the genuine "religious NEP" for the ROC. It is also 
justified to say that the setting up of the CAP reflected the strong 
position of Stalin. During Lenin's illness, Stalin wrested control of 
religious policy from Trotsky. It could be also argued that the CAP was 
a "non-Trotskyist" offspring of the Trotskyist confiscation conflict. 
The CAP, the party's instrument in religious policy, served as a tactical 
centre for religious policy activities. Unlike the NKYust's organs or the 
APO's commission, it had a more effective role in guiding Soviet 
religious policy. 
As was the case with its antecedents, the CAP executed the dual 
policy of supervising and destroying religious organizations. Firstly the 
Bolsheviks supervised the ROC in order to prevent it from challenging 
the ruling regime; they also made active efforts to spread schism inside 
the church. Secondly the ruling regime tried to gain the loyalty of the 
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Russian clergy for the Soviet system. In this way the CAP mixed two 
conflicting components of the religious policy. Symbolizing the 
paradoxical political line of the NEP, the CAP tried to obtain the 
neutrality of the ROC by creating a new pro-government church, but in 
accordance with its atheist "imperative", it rejected both "living" and 
"dead" churches and attempted to bring about the final destruction of 
all religious organizations. Nevertheless, under the conditions of the 
NEP, when the ruling regime wanted to appease the peasants, the role 
of this commission as a board for religious policy affairs was 
emphasized even more. The Politburo concentrated more on general 
political issues and the CAP was allowed to exercise Soviet religious 
policy under the authority of the Central Committee. 
This episode indicates in any event that Soviet religious policy was 
not executed in a vacuum but was always an inseparable part of the 
general political struggle in the Soviet Union. The interpreting of 
Soviet religious ideology and the executing of Bolshevik religious 
policy became more and more the patrimony of those who were 
winners in the political struggle. It is also interesting to see how in the 
early 1920s the succession of power was not yet clear and Stalin's 
protégé Yaroslaysky was not the infallible "pope of atheism" he is 
usually described as in later literature. Behind the scenes the ruling 
regime discussed and intensely debated religious policy matters.1o1 
101 	 See, for example, RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.60, d.438 "IIporoxon no:102. 3ace,gaHHa 
noptxoMHccHH no aHrnpennrno3Holl nponaraaue Ha AepeaHe npH n/orAene 
nponaraH,qw IIKPKII OT 12-ro ueHra6pa 1923 rona". 
8 
b. The fate of Tikhon 
The political defeat of Trotsky and the simultaneous change in the early 
NEP religious policy line are obvious when we study the case of 
Tikhon. His fate also clearly reveals how the party carried out its 
religious policy objectives in practice. Tikhon was arrested but his trial 
did not take place in 1922. The decision to put him on trial was delayed 
several times. However, a protocol of the Antireligious Commission for 
14 November 1922 reveals that the authorities were actively 
contemplating putting him on trial. The members of the security and 
Soviet judiciary, V.R. Menzhinsky, Krasikov and Tuchkov were given 
the responsibility for undertaking the preparations for this tria1.102 
Finally, on 30 January 1923 the CAP decided to deal with Tikhon's 
case on 25 March 1923 and made preparations for official charges to be 
made against him. The list included accusations that Tikhon had been 
systematically fighting against Soviet power, that he had relations with 	 129 
émigré organizations and that he had resisted the confiscation of church 
valuables.103 The cases of both Cieplak and Tikhon were prepared in 
the CAP and it was decided on 6 February 1923 that Cieplak's trial 
would take place in Petrograd before Tikhon's trial in Moscow. 
Tikhon's case had to be further postponed, most likely due to the 
numerous international protests over Budkiewicz's execution.104 
Despite these international protests, on 10 April 1923 the CAP 
ordered that Tikhon be transferred from house arrest to the GPU prison. 
The general procurator, N.V. Krylenko, had already prepared on 28 
February 1923 the official charge in which he demanded the "the 
highest measure of punishment" be meted out to the Patriarch. The 
great trial against the "counter-revolutionary Pope" was approaching 
and tickets were even being printed for this hearing.1°5  
However, the case of Tikhon had by now attracted considerable 
international attention. Tikhon's fate was not only of foreign interest 
but, as a GPU report acknowledged, his arrest had also given rise to 
much concern among the Soviet population. According to this secret 
report, the bourgeois population was spreading rumours of possible 
disturbances and demonstrations during Tikhon's trial. The report was 
also convinced that with foreign assistance businessmen, merchants 
102 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, d.433a (PCAP 4, 14/11-22). 
103 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, d.443a (PCAP 11, 30/1-23). 
104 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, d.443a (PCAP 12, 6/2-23; PCAP 14, sa). Trotsky urged 
Soviet officials to answer these protests as soon as possible. See TTP II, 740. 
105 GARF1 f.5446e, op.55, d.409 "flporoxon. Cos.CexperHo"; RTsKhIDNI f.17, 
op.112, d.443a (PCAP 19, 10/4-23). 
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and the petty intelligentsia were spreading these rumours and were 
planning demonstrations and pogroms. More importantly, Tuchkov, the 
head of the 6th section of the GPU, assumed that, considering the 
attitude of the workers, it was not clear how they would react to the 
trial. Some workers, he felt, would not react all that differently from 
bourgeois elements.106 
These internal reports and the international protests guaranteed that 
the ruling regime was aware of the consequences of executing Tikhon. 
The international repercussions arising out of the execution of 
Budkiewicz had been so great that even the representatives of the 
Comintern were forced to turned to Yaroslaysky and ask for some 
material concerning the religious policy of the USSR in order to calm 
negative reaction abroad.107 
As source material indicates, there was significant opposition within 
the ruling regime to harsh methods in religious policy. Some 
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representatives of the ruling regime even objected to the trial and 
appealed against the condemnation of Tikhon. For example, in his letter 
to the Politburo, and especially to Stalin, the Soviet Prime Minister 
Rykov, remarked that there had been differing opinions inside the CAP 
concerning the case against Tikhon. Rykov stressed that the case should 
be postponed until 23-24 April and that it was the Politburo which 
should decide Tikhon's fate.' °8 
In addition, the Commissar of Foreign Affairs G.V. Chicherin turned 
to the "strong man" of the Politburo, Stalin, to ask him to prevent the 
execution of Tikhon. As justification for his appeal he mentioned that 
the execution of Budkiewicz had harmed Soviet power and because of 
Tikhon's eminent position his execution would cause an even greater 
furore. Commenting on the aggravated political atmosphere in America 
and in England with regard to this case, he also mentioned that France 
was considering bringing the case of Budkiewicz before the inter-
national negotiations in Lausanne. Chicherin also warned that the 
enemies of Soviet power might try to use this case to stir up feelings 
among Polish peasants. The execution of Budkiewicz could be justified 
as a warning to aggressive Polish chauvinism, but the case against 
Tikhon was different. The rest of the world considered it blatant 
religious persecution. According to Chicherin, the key to this inter- 
106 	 GARFI f.5446e, op.55, d.409 "Caoaxa n:l, 17/IV-23; CaoUKa n:2, 17/4-23". 
107 RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, d.161. "Tos. ApocnascKoMy. 14. Mass 1923". The release 
of Tikhon was generally seen as a sign of change in religious policy. For example, 
see GARFI f.5263, op.l, d.55(3) "CTapweMy nomouu MKy npoxypopa 
PecnyOnwKM H 3aM. HapKoMlocTa 19.10.1923." 
108 	 GARFI f.5446e, op.55, d.409. "B IIo.f1HT61Opo — TOB. CTanHHy. 3.anpens 1923". 
See also Pethybridge 1990, 41. 
national solidarity was the fact that the influential Anglican church felt 
itself closer to the ROC than it did to Catholicism.'°9 
In May 1923 a diplomatic note sent by British Foreign Minister N.G. 
Curzon (1859-1925) condemned the Soviet government for practising 
hostile propaganda against the British Empire. This note also protested 
against the imprisonment and trial of Tikhon.110 The Soviet regime 
responded angrily and Yaroslaysky answered Curzon's note, com-
menting that religion was not persecuted more in the Soviet state than in 
England. If in England churches were sometimes turned over for 
secular use, why did Curzon and the Archbishop of Canterbury not 
protest against this? Nevertheless, on 24 April 1923 the trial against 
Patriarch was again postponed." 
This change of mind did not come easily as we can see from 
Politburo documents. On 12 April 1923 the Politburo decided to turn 
down Chicherin's proposal and declared that it did not see any grounds 
for exempting Tikhon from punishment. The Politburo wanted to 
emphasize that foreign pressure would not be allowed to interfere with 
Soviet power. It gave an assignment to the NKID and to the Soviet 
press agency to declare that Tikhon was not only representing the 
ordinary counter-revolution but the "aristocratic-landowning" counter-
revolution as well. The Politburo also decided to give Yaroslaysky the 
task of seeing to it that this information campaign should not interfere 
with the coming trial and also ordered the NKID, the Soviet news-
agency (Rosta), Karl Radek and Yaroslaysky to strengthen counter-
propaganda in relation to the execution of Budkiewicz.112  
Nevertheless, the Soviet regime was obliged to reconsider again its 
decisions. The international reaction and especially the growing 
opposition of eminent communist figures was too much. The Politburo 
modified its earlier decision on 12 June 1923 and accepted a proposal of 
Yaroslaysky's that Tikhon should be informed that his punishment 
could be commuted if he would make a special retraction acknowl-
edging his crimes and expressing loyalty towards Soviet power. 
Yaroslaysky further demanded that Tikhon should accept the 
legitimacy of his arrest, that he should cut off relations with foreign 
"counter-revolutionary organizations", that he should express his 
disapproval of the Karlovci Sobor and other foreign ecclesiastical 
authorities and, finally, that he should accept secular reforms such as 
109 	 GARFI f.5446e, op.55, d.409. "ToB. Grammy. CeKperapro UK PKII. O. anpena 
1923 r". For international protests on behalf of the Catholic priests and Tikhon, see 
TRRR, 127-128, 133-134, 170, 172. 
110 DOBFP, 741-749, 876; Curtiss 1953, 159. 
111 YI, 73. "Jlopa KepsoH H Bor"; Curtiss 1953, 159-160. 
112 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.347 (Pp 61, 12/4-23). 
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those the Soviet regime had carried out with regard to the calendar, 
etc.113 
Yaroslaysky's special letter to the Politburo perhaps best demon-
strates the real motives why the ruling regime opted to release Tikhon. 
Yaroslaysky explained to the Politburo that Tikhon's confession would 
serve as a direct strike against the émigrés. Letting Tikhon go would 
also be a counterbalance to the increasing role of the Renovationists 
and would undermine foreign protests. Moreover, Yaroslaysky also 
believed that if Tikhon were to accept Soviet reforms, it would give rise 
to a new schism inside the ROC.114 
The Politburo accepted Yaroslaysky's suggestion to pardon Tikhon 
if he would "publicly repent of his crimes".115  The CAP held a special 
meeting on 12 June 1923 and decided that this could be done by 
informing Tikhon that he would be released if he admitted his guilt and 
could give assurances that he would be loyal to Soviet power.l l6 
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After interrogations Tikhon agreed and the Soviet press then 
published a statement of his in which he denounced himself for his 
"hostility" to Soviet power and repented of his behaviour. He also 
declared that he was no longer an enemy of Soviet power and con-
demned the émigré clergy.117 Tikhon was released and subsequently 
committed himself to fight against the VTsU.118 
So why this change of mind; why did the ruling regime release this 
"number one enemy of the people"? Possible explanations are many. 
Perhaps Tikhon's official submission and the growing schism inside 
the ROC were enough to satisfy the Soviet regime. Moreover, the 
condemnation of the Patriarch would have made him a martyr inside 
the Soviet state and, more importantly, abroad as we11.119 Neither was 
the public repentance of the Patriarch unique. Some members of the 
political opposition to the Soviet regime had prior to this been allowed 
to avoid punishment by issuing a public statement in which they hailed 
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114 See RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.360 (Pp 12, 14/6-23) and especially its appendix: 
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CBeLteHHs,. Apxunacmipe i. nacm,peh H Bepyloutux. Pe3oJnouHs, Ero 
CBnTeHmecTBa OT 26-H,oHif 1924 ro11a. No: 523". 
119 
	
Carr 1958, 44-45, 195; Curtiss 1953, 159-161; Regelson 1977, 297-298, 308-310. 
Soviet power and condemned their former political activities.) 20 
Mikhail Agursky has argued that the liberation of Tikhon was due to 
foreign diplomatic intervention. But, he continues, 
...such an explanation may account for his release but not for the fact 
that he was given the opportunity to restore his ecclesiastical authority 
and contest the legitimacy of the newly-established pro-communist 
Living Church...121 
For Agursky, the fact that Tikhon was released and could continue his 
ecclesiastical career was part of Stalin's own religious policy. Agursky 
believes that Stalin, who had been educated by the conservative and 
rigid methods of ROC, favoured a more conservative church than did 
the Renovationists. This explanation seems to be only partially 
adequate. It would seem that there is no documentation that would 
support Stalin's favouring the conservative section of the ROC during 
the early 1920s. Nor is there any evidence to show that Stalin favoured 
Tikhon in any way. Moreover, Yaroslaysky, who was one of Stalin's 
loyal proteges in the Soviet leadership, did not especially support 
Tikhon. Moderate members of the ruling regime would appeal to Stalin 
because of his authority over the hard-liners. Thus, the case of Tikhon 
indicates Stalin's growing influence inside the ruling regime. 
The role of the Renovationists in the government's religious policy 
leaves many questions unanswered but it must be stated that the 
Renovationists showed much more independence of mind than they are 
usually given credit for and that they definitely were not "puppets" of 
the communist regime. However, active "collaboration" and "loyalty" 
were often difficult to distinguish from each other. As we can see from 
the documents available, the Renovationists were determined to 
preserve the Orthodox religion to some extent at least, albeit under the 
auspices of Soviet power. In order to achieve this, they were obliged to 
act according to Bolshevik rules and obey their wishes. Nonetheless, it 
would be too much to claim that the ruling regime did not interfere in 
the internal affairs of the ROC, although Curtiss maintains that there 
did not exist any close collaboration between the "Living Church" and 
the Soviet regime: 
...such writers have not submitted documentary proof of these 
allegations, nor has such documentation been available for this study, 
120 Fainsod 1958, 137. 
121 Agursky 1984, 12. 
133 
so that it is not possible to determine the correctness of these 
charges.122 
However, according to archive sources now available, the ruling 
regime was more than willing to co-operate with different religious 
organizations or, to be more precise, to meddle in their internal affairs. 
It was prepared to use reformers for its own political purposes inside the 
Soviet Union.123 Nonetheless, Soviet officials realized that the Living 
Church constituted a possible ideological threat to communism. This 
does not mean that they saw no danger in the Tikhonites. As Tuchkov 
put it in the second meeting of the CAP on 31 October 1922, the ruling 
regime had a mission to enforce the fight against the Tikhonites too. 
Tuchkov also wanted to "purge" Soviet organs of Tikhonites by 
introducing "shock-discipline" against bishops who were in favour of 
Tikhon. However, the ruling regime wished to gain from the clergy the 
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political recognition of Soviet power and the VTsU was utilized as an 
organ which could obtain this recognition. Along with these moderate 
methods, Tuchkov also proposed the use of more resolute measures. In 
his lecture he, for example, proposed asking the Soviet legal organs to 
assist the GPU in fighting against the Tikhonites.124 
It is laborious to explain this dual strategy, i.e. firstly diminishing the 
role of the churches and secondly obtaining their recognition for Soviet 
power. This inconsistent attitude is also reflected in the lecture of 
Skvortsov-Stepanov from that same meeting. He introduced his thesis 
concerning antireligious propaganda by maintaining that for its own 
self-protection the ROC tried to break its connections with the 
autocratic system and to conceal its political objectives under an 
"apolitical" banner. As he put it, the conservatives in the ROC were 
putting their hopes in the restoration of the "old economic system" 
through the rebirth of capitalism in a proletarian dictatorship, and they 
were consequently trying to hide behind socialist slogans and gain 
influence among the masses. He also pointed out that there were some 
groups of clergy who were hoping for the restoration of their privileges, 
122 	 Curtiss 1953, 151. Although Lewis H. Siegelbaum has accused church historians of 
impartiality and blamed them for "hostility" towards Renovationists. However, i.e., 
John S. Curtiss does not see any reason to believe that Renovationists were Soviet 
agents. Siegelbaum 1992, 159. 
123 According to Mikhail Geller and Aleksandr Nekrich the Bolsheviks sought to 
organize "an ecclesiastical international" under the authority of Bolsheviks. Geller 
& Nekrich 1982, 144. 
124 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, d.443a (PCAP 2, 31/10-22). In addition, the CAP 
received constant information from the meetings of the VTsU (GPU sources 
probably) and could take decisions based on this information. RTsKhIDNI f.17, 
op.112, d.443a (PCAP 11, 30/1-23). 
but he stressed that this would not happen as all churches would be 
treated equally in the Soviet state.125 
The reason for this "sour" attitude towards the Living Church was 
the realization that the Renovationists were not the obedient tool of the 
ruling regime that had been expected. Soviet officials realized that the 
Living Church wanted the restoration of its legal rights as a reward for 
its recognition of Soviet power. This can be clearly seen from the letter 
of Kranitsky to Rykov in which he reminded Rykov that, according to 
its own doctrine, the Soviet state should recognize religion as a private 
matter and not support atheism over religious belief.126 For the ruling 
regime, a Renovationist church with near socialist slogans represented 
only a new form of competition. The release of Tikhon and the internal 
schism served rather well the interests of the regime which wanted to 
diminish the role of religion in society. 
Nevertheless, Mikhail Agursky's explanation is adequate when we 
come to discuss the religious policy of the late 1930s and especially the 	 135 
period of World War II. At that time Stalin openly favoured 
conservative, Russian-minded, patriotic clergy but in regard to Tikhon, 
Stalin's preference for conservative-minded clergy is not sufficient to 
explain why he was allowed to maintain his ecclesiastical office. The 
more plausible explanation of this incident was that officials knew well 
that the release of Tikhon from prison would open up an internal war 
inside the ROC. That would make the task of supervision by officials 
easier. As Tuchkov hinted in one of his lectures on religious 
organizations, the ruling regime followed this internal schism very 
closely. He stated that the freeing of Tikhon had led to ecclesiastical 
chaos, which was, if we read between the lines, a welcome outcome for 
the ruling regime. In his lecture, Tuchkov commented on how both 
sides were fighting each other, accusing and reporting on how the other 
side was engaged in counter-revolutionary activity. The role of the 
CAP was, as the sources indicate, to keep the balance between 
Renovationists and Tikhonites. Tikhon's release gave a boost to 
traditionalists in the ROC and in order to maintain a balance between 
Tikhonites and Renovationists, the CAP sanctioned the "tactical" arrest 
of Tikhonites from time to time.127 
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RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, d.443a (PCAP 2, 31/10-22). 
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GARFI f.5446c, op.55, d.340. "YBa>tcaeMblN TosapHul". 
127 	 "...H BYT OT4aHHyIO 6Opb6y 3a 06naAaHHe uepKBaMH. 06BHHAA apyr Apyra B 
KOHTp-peBOnIOUHH TaFiHO H ABHO. AOHOCA apyr Ha Apyra OpraHaM BJIaCTH 06 
aHTH-coaercKHx nocrynKax. RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, d.118. ".goKnaA o 
4epKOBHHKaX H CeKTaX 3a BpeMA C 1-0 HIOnA no-15 CeHTA6pA 23 r"; 
RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, d.775 (PCAP 52, 17/6-24); f.17, op.112, d.775 (PCAP 
53, 2/7-24). 
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4. THE 12TH CONGRESS AS A 
PACESE'TI'ER FOR THE RELIGIOUS 
POLICY OF THE EARLY NEP 
a. 	 Preparations for the 12th congress 
Lenin's incapacity to engage in politics meant that his followers were 
obliged to respond to various political problems without his advice. 
One pressing question concerning religious policy was whether the 
NEP should be extended to the religious sphere in the same way as it 
already had come to encompass the economic and cultural spheres in 
Soviet Russia. The release of Tikhon had been a conciliatory gesture 
but there was, nonetheless, no clear reappraisal of Soviet religious 
policy. 
The inconsistency of the NEP and Lenin's sudden incapacity 
alarmed the ruling regime, which at the beginning of 1923 had time to 
reflect on the progress of the NEP. As Alan Ball has commented, during 
1923 the party adopted a more severe attitude towards the "new 
bourgeois".128 The problem was that the new situation did not provide 
clear guidelines for the party leaders. Consequently, during Lenin's 
illness they attempted to seek to perpetuate his political line. However, 
this proved to be problematic as it had not always been consistent. As 
we have seen above, Lenin rejected any ideological concessions to the 
ROC and to the political opposition and after 1921 the remnants of all 
former political parties, such as the Mensheviks and the SRs, were 
purged. The time for opposition had come an end, and a complete 
submission to the authority of the communist party was demanded.129 
As we have noted above, creating a schism inside the ROC was part 
of Trotsky's tactical plan to facilitate the confiscation of church 
valuables. As Trotsky declared in his "Literature and Revolution" 
(published in June 1923), a revolutionary church cannot exist, and even 
if the "Living Church" had blessed the socialist revolution, this was 
done only in order to conceal its real purpose.13o Trotsky also pointed 
out that the renovation of the church involved bourgeois goals. He 
believed this process was turning the church away from medieval 
forms, involving mythical rituals and shamanism, towards a more 
128 Ball 1987, 39-40. 
129 TTP I, 452-454; Tumarkin 1985, 90. 
130 Trotsky 1991 (1923), 43. 
individualistic relationship with a deity. The "clerical NEP"131  as 
Trotsky characterized it, could be compared to what had happened 
during the NEP in politics generally; if the Soviet NEP involved 
integrating a socialist economy with a capitalist one, then the clerical 
NEP involved attaching a "bourgeois graft to a feudal stem".132 
In E.H.Carr's opinion the above quote of Trotsky epitomizes the 
NEP's religious policy. 
...the rather farfetched comparison rested on the argument that, while 
socialism could ultimately have no truck with religion, concessions 
analogous to those made to capitalists under NEP could be temporarily 
extended to a group which, like Protestants in the west, stood for a 
bourgeois, capitalist and quasi-rationalist revolt against the extreme 
superstitions of the old feudal religion. 
Carr has remarked that international incidents and the new conciliatory 
policy towards the peasants helped to establish a "modus vivendi" 
between a "revolutionary regime and an ancient national institution".133 
However, this interpretation may lead one to the erroneous conclusion 
that the Soviet regime and the ROC actually reached a mutual 
understanding and came to an informal agreement, which was not the 
case. 
Any ideological concession seemed to be impossible at that time 
because Lenin's illness and the uncertainty as regards the succession 
tied the hands of the party leadership. In those conditions the party 
found itself unable to change its ideological commitment to atheistic 
materialism even when dealing with a totally loyal church. 
Nevertheless, it seems inside the party there arose a desire for a more 
conciliatory approach (although no-one openly dared to challenge the 
orthodox Marxist dogma) and more moderate politics. On an individual 
level, it seems obvious that the "right-wing" of the party was not so 
131 The expression "Han uepkosHblh" was also used by Metropolitan Antony in his 
protest to the VTsIK, in which he strongly condemned the new religious policy 
adopted at the beginning of 1923. See RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, d.180 "Bo BLINK I 
"ere. 1923 r". 
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Trotsky 1991 (1923), 43-44. Moreover, Yaroslaysky condemned the "progressive" 
church movement with almost the same arguments as Trotsky. He maintained that 
their public acceptance of the socialist revolution and the programmes of the 
communist party were simply clothes (oüeacua) in which the "Living church" 
disguised itself so that they would appear more acceptable to the workers. The 
proletariat should not be taken in by them, he argued. Instead the 
Godless-movement ought to fight against all religions, to tear away (paao6namarb) 
"all masking colours" and show the true nature of every priest. YI, 67. "B 
unlit THbItl ueeT". 
133 Carr 1958, 41-45. 
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eager to engage in open confrontation with the ROC. For example, 
when we examine Politburo protocols we see that more moderate 
members of the ruling regime, such as Kalinin and Kamenev, proposed 
more conciliatory methods and, what is more surprising, during the 
early 1920s even Stalin himself seemed to be one of the more 
reasonable voices within the ranks of the Bolsheviks with regard to 
religion. There are indications such as the proposition of Osinsky or the 
informal negotiations between Zinovev and Vvedensky that show that 
behind the monolithic ideological facade of the communist party there 
were some leaders who were willing to establish an informal "detente" 
with religion, especially in regard to the peasantry. Moreover, the 
ruling party was obliged to answer the view expressed by a leading 
Swedish communist, S. Hägglund, who suggested that being a member 
of the communist party should not automatically mean that one adhered 
to atheism. The Comintern condemned Hägglund's opinion in its 
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Plenum of 12-23 June 1923, declaring that religion was not simply a 
"private matter" for members of the party and that the communist party 
would always fight against it. Nonetheless, the fact that Hägglund's 
proposition was rejected by the authority of the Comintern platform 
itself underlines the importance attached tothe matter by the Soviet 
authorities.134 
The above rumours concerning an ideological civil peace with 
religion may have played a part in the official rejection of the more 
severe aspects of the antireligious battle in 1923. The "confiscation 
conflict", the so-called "Atheist" carnivals, "Komsomol Christmases" 
and "Komsomol Easters" caused a counter-reaction among Bolsheviks. 
For example, one report of the APO explained how excesses sometimes 
spoiled these events and accused local communists of "amateurish 
activity".135 
The fate of Patriarch Tikhon and the trials against ecclesiastical 
leaders had caught the attention of public opinion inside the Soviet 
Union and, moreover, the outside world was interested in the religious 
policy of the Soviet state. At the same time, the ruling party was 
preparing for its 12th party congress. The party was anxious to find its 
way in the circumstances of the NEP, and in relation to the religious 
organizations the party searched for the right solution to the question 
what kind of religious political line should be adopted during the NEP? 
This theoretical question became a reality when the party confronted 
134 YII, 544-545. "JZoKyMexra". 
135 RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 60, d. 438 "Axrxpenxrxosxasi nponaraxAa no AaxxblM 
yea Mecrxoro onbIra Arnrnpona LIK". See also LS, 248; YIII, 220. "KaK 
aecTx axrxpenxrno3xyro nponaraxay"; Stites 1991, 297-298. 
challenges from national regions. For example, some communists were 
distressed that in Eastern regions of the Soviet state Moslems had 
access to "official" religious teaching. The CAP closely studied these 
reports, which outlined in detail how Moslem clergy were becoming 
more active in the educational sphere. This question received special 
attention because at the same time the ruling regime was preparing to 
debate the nationality question. The typical reaction of party officials to 
this matter can be seen from the protocols of the CAP for 3 April 1923 
in which an attempt was made to suppress the Moslem clergy as a 
politically hostile force. The CAP feared that mullahs had too much 
influence in the Soviet school system and decided to start a press 
campaign against them. In order to reinforce its decision, the CAP 
agreed to send some of its members to the East to fight against the 
"Moslem reaction" and attempted also to "lobby" its case with the 
forthcoming congress. This "lobbying" of congress representatives was 
done by organizing a special "consultation with the most competent 	 139 
local comrades" to discuss matters concerning the Moslem question. 
The main responsibility for "lobbying" the congress in order to change 
the party resolution in religious policy was assigned to the famous party 
historian N.N. Popov (1890-1938). His mission was also to draw up a 
party resolution concerning antireligious propaganda. The CAP 
organized a secret meeting of the most important party officials to 
ensure that "lobbying" inside the congress would also extend to general 
religious policy. During this meeting Yaroslaysky and Popov were 
supposed to give a special lecture to instruct these officials concerning 
religious policy. As a preliminary gesture, the representative of the 
GPU, Ya.K. Peters (1886-1942) was also given the assignment of 
actively meddling in the All-Russian Moslem congress and he was 
given authority to create a "reformist group" inside that congress.136 
These endeavours at "lobbying" by the CAP seemed to have met with 
success as Lenin was not able to attend the 12th congress, which was 
held from 17 to 25 April 1923. His absence allowed his followers a free 
hand to adopt their own policies. 
136 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, d.443a (PCAP 18, 3/4-23); (PCAP 19, 10/4-23). Later on 
19 June 1923, the CAP asked the Central Committee to speed up the approval of 
the resolution concerning antireligious propaganda. RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, 
d.565a (PCAP 25, 19/6-23). 
b. 	 The paradox of the 12th congress: belligerent 
resolutions and conciliatory speeches 
This congress is of some significance in the sense that it adopted 
lengthy resolutions on religion which laid the foundations for religious 
policy in the post-Leninist era. The atmosphere in this congress differed 
profoundly from that of the 11th congress; procedures went very 
smoothly, without dissenting voices from the floor. The triumvirate had 
made a secret deal with Trotsky that their disagreements should be kept 
secret in the name of party discipline. During the congress arguments 
regarding nationality policy reared their head again. The delegates from 
Georgia protested against Stalin's policy towards non-Russian 
nationalities, but in vain. As Carrere D'Encausse has remarked: "the 
congress destroyed Lenin's efforts to settle the national question".137 
The triumvirate was able to control the congress and criticism by some 
140 	 party delegates had little effect on the prevailing attitude. In relation to 
the nationality question, Stalin defended his policy and the critique of 
the Georgians presented by Ukrainian Prime Minister Kh.G. Rakovsky 
(1873-1941) had no real impact on the congress which accepted the 
explanations of the party's General Secretary.138 
The hidden power-struggle cast a shadow on the congress that 
followed. Behind the scenes the triumvirate did its best to reassure the 
party that Trotsky was dangerous and the potential Bonaparte of the 
Bolshevik Revolution. Moreover, Zinovev's speech to the congress 
proved to be of particular significance in that it clarified the general 
political line of the triumvirate for the following NEP period. 
Above all, Zinovev's speech underlined the importance of the 
peasant question. He explained that although the communist party was 
an urban phenomenon by origin and had only worked among workers, 
it also needed to advance in the countryside. He maintained that 
although the party understood in theory the problems of the peasants, 
practical work among the peasantry remained to be done. 
137 Carrere d'Encausse 1982, 151. Jurij Borys's view is even more explicit when he 
remarks that at the 12th congress the party was "looking for a theoretical 
foundation for its centralist policy towards the nationalities, a foundation for its 
negative attitude towards the self-determination principle". Borys 1980, 353. 
138 Deutscher 1987, 97-98. As Frederick C. Barghoom has put it..."Stalin was wise 
enough, however, to cloak this policy in Leninist phraseology and to presentit with 
sufficient regard for the susceptibilities of the non-Russians to avoid needlessly 
antagonizing them". Barghoom 1976, 29. Mikhail Agursky has described Stalin's 
attacks against Russian nationalism and the "Smeno-Vekh" as hypocritical. 
Agursky 1987, 296. 
We are an urban party with origins in workers' quarters...we have just 
began to penetrate the countryside...we know theoretically the 
importance of having proper multilateral relations with the peasants 
but in practice this poses enormous problems for us...139 
Zinovev divided the peasant question into different areas and put the 
nationality question and antireligious propaganda under the same 
heading. According to him, antireligious propaganda had foremost 
significance as a part of the educational question. Furthermore, he 
condemned certain methods of contemporary antireligious propaganda. 
...we do not need "antireligious propaganda" on such a scale. 
Comrades, I do not quite understand why we should agitate in Ukraine 
for the "sabbath" to be celebrated on Monday rather than on Sunday.140 
He concluded by questioning the whole agitation in a similar tone and 
asked the congress to consider the reactions of the Ukrainian peasant to 
the slandering of religion. Instead of the above practices, Bolsheviks 
now needed to concentrate on serious Marxist antireligious 
propaganda. He stressed that the purpose of Soviet power was not to 
harass the peasantry. As examples of harmful practices, he mentioned 
some cases in which party members had involved themselves with 
trivialities in this field. Moreover, Zinovev praised the actions of one 
particular party organ in the Donets guberniya which had prohibited the 
"Komsomol Easter".141 
Zinovev defended his careful approach by arguing that in this area 
communists should be extremely careful because of the importance of 
the peasant question. Communists should educate themselves and this 
would take years. This did not, however, represent an ideological 
retreat or compromise. To quote him again, 
I think that in this area it is necessary [to show] great caution, because 
we should understand the peasant on whom much depends. We shall 
educate him, but this will take years. We shall not retreat one iota from 
139 "MIA - naprHsl ropoacxaa. poAHaulaaca B pa609HX KBapTaJlaX...MbI TOJIbKO 
Ha9aJ1H npOABHraTbCa B AepeBHK1...Mb1 TeOpeTH9eCKH yaCHHJ1H BaJKHOCrb 
I1paBHJIbHbIX B3aHMOOTHOIüeHHF1 C KpeCTbaHCTBOM. HO I1paKTH9eCKH 3T0 
Aaerca c rpoMaaHbIM TpyAOM". S12, 39. 
140 "He HaAO HaM B TaKOM 6OJIb11IOM KOJIH9eCTBe BeCTH 3Ty "aHTHpeJIHrHO3HylO 
nponaraHAy". 51. TOBapHHIH. COBepuIeHHO He nOHHMaK). 3a -lem HaM Hy)KHO 
ÖbIJIO arHTHpOBaTb, 9TO6bI npa3AHOBBJIH Ha YKpaHHe He BOCKpeCeHbe, a 
qOHeAe36HHK". $12, 44. 
141 S12,44. 
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atheistic opinions, not a single iota from Marx, because in this question 
it is necessary to advance with care... )42 
The resolution which the congress adopted in the religious policy 
sphere was in sharp contrast to the conciliatory tone of Zinovev's 
speech. The reason for this inconsistency lies in the fact that the 
resolution had been prepared by Zinovev's political opponent, L.D. 
Trotsky, and by the party's Agitprop section which formulated party 
resolutions on religion and, for example, matters of propaganda, press 
and agitation. This resolution was passed by the congress on 25 April 
1923 without discussion, probably due to the informal agreement which 
Trotsky and the triumvirate had made earlier.143 
Trotsky's more belligerent resolution reflects the mood of the 
"confiscation conflict"1". It declared that the revolution had shaken the 
religious prejudices (npe,apacy tKH) of the large working masses and 
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exposed the counter-revolutionary role of clerical organisations, which 
were in the service of capitalist and autocratic landowners. The 
resolution explains why religion was still such a significant factor and 
gives a vivid portrait of the Soviet society of the NEP period. 
According to Trotsky's resolution, the revolutionary process had been 
not yet changed the peasant economy. Peasants were still heavily 
dependent on nature as they had been since time immemorial. In the 
cities private capitalist production had survived and had even increased 
under the circumstances of NEP. In addition, the resolution made clear 
that the Soviet school system did not function as it shouldin the cities 
and especially in the countryside. These were the reasons why religious 
prejudices still survived in Russia and would survive for some time to 
come. With regard to the position of the ROC, this resolution was 
confident, maintaining that the Orthodox religion and its hierarchy 
were in a state of decay and collapse. On the other hand, the resolution 
noted the growth of sects, whose highest leaders were well-known to 
have contacts with the European and American bourgeoisie.I45  
In these circumstances the work of the party was to finally destroy 
religious belief in all its manifestations among workers and the peasant 
142 "SI AyMaK) . B 3TOF1 06JIaCTH He06X0AHMa...60JlbinaA OCTOpO)KHOCTb, HOTOMy 
9T0 Hy)KHO nOMHHTb 0 KpeCrbAHHHe. OT KOTOpOCO 04eHb H 09e1113 3aBHCHT. 
Mbl ero BOCnHTaeM. HO AAA 3TOro Tpe6yK1TCA rotbi- Mbl He OTKa3bIBaeMCA HH 
Ha Holy OT aTeHCTH4eCKHX B3rJIAAOB. HH Ha Rory OT MapKCa. HO Mbl JxOJINCHbI 
nOMHHTb. '-ITO K 3TOMy BOnpoCy He06X0AHM0 nOAXOAHTb OCTOpO)KHO". S12, 44. 
143 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.60, d.158 "0 nocTaHOBKe aHTHpennrHo3HON arnraunH H 
nponaraHAbl' ; S12, 706. See also Deutscher 1987, 94-95. 
144 	 For the text of the resolution, see KPSS II, 469-472. 
145 	 S12, 716. 
masses. This meant first of all the deepening of systematic propaganda 
which would reveal to workers and peasants the falsehood of religion. 
This resolution tried not to offend the feelings of believers, as to do so 
might lead to conflicting results. It also condemned harsh methods in 
the antireligious work. Moreover it stressed, for example, that 
"scoffing" at the cult objects of belief instead of serious analyses and 
explanations would not accelerate the liberation of the working class 
from religious prejudices.146 
The resolution noted that there was a need for the utilization of 
popular scientific books and literature dealing with the origins and 
history of religions. In addition, the lengthy party resolution claimed 
that new brochures and booklets would be needed to give answers on 
the evolution of the world, life and human relations. These should cover 
the counter-revolutionary role of religion and especially of the Russian 
Orthodox church: its birth and evolution, its position in relation to the 
class-state and the liberation movements among proletarians and 
peasants. They should also stress the importance of working out the 
forms and methods of antireligious work by studying the special 
features of different nationalities. Moreover, this resolution recognized 
that the clergy of other nationalities in Russia had more influence 
among their flock than the Orthodox clergy had among Russians and 
this fact should be taken into consideration when carrying out 
antireligious propaganda among these nationalities.147 
This congress and its resolution involved many contradictory 
elements. Firstly the conciliatory tone of Zinovev was his personal 
initiative to enforce the union of the working class and the peasants. 
Seen in this light, Zinovev's conciliatory speeches and initiatives are 
understandable.148 Secondly his new tone represented a substantial 
change in the party's religious policy and demonstrated how Trotsky's 
religious policy line had been outmanoeuvred. There a number of 
possible reasons for this conciliatory line. It could have been that the 
excesses and acts of hooliganism in the antireligious work during the 
famine of 1921-22 discouraged, as it was feared among communists, 
the peasants from delivering grain to the ruling regime. However, it is 
hard to know whether this new pro-peasant line was due more to the 
urgent need to calm the peasants or whether this neutral religious policy 
was advocated by Zinovev only as an ideological "weapon" against 
146 S12, 716. 
147 	 S I2, 716; RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.367 (Pp 19, 27/6-23). 
148 SI2, 	 45. Zinovev repeated these demands in special brochures (published in 
1925). See, Hosblll senxKHH rlO414H. (Pa6KoposcKoe H cenbxoposcxoe 
.qBHAceHHe). KpblMrocH3.4aT 1925; KaK 60nb11ICBHKH CTpOAT roCYAapcTBo 
pa6o9HX H KpeCTbAH. I'oc.Ii3a• 1925 IVIOCKBa. 
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Trotsky. The question as to whether Zinovev's pro-peasant stance was 
simply an "antithesis" in the struggle for power remains unanswered.149 
The conciliatory speeches of the triumvirate at the 12th congress had 
no effect on the internal life of the party, which continued to tighten its 
ideological purity and expel "unworthy" members from its ranks, 
religious activity being one the grounds for disciplinary measures. In 
the report by the Central Committee it was announced that 383 persons 
had been expelled from the party for participating in some way or 
another in "religious rites". The majority of those expelled, however, 
consisted of people purged for reasons such as "squabbling", "infringe-
ment of party discipline", "malfeasance in office", "criminal activity", 
"drunkenness", "being an alien [class] element", "embezzlement" and 
"speculation and trade". Expulsions for religious activity amounted to 
only 5.1% of the total number (7512 persons) of those expelled, but it 
shows that religion had stubborn roots even within the party itself.15o 
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These purges reflect the concern of the party about any ideological 
relaxation in the face of the class enemy. Because of this danger the 
leadership wanted to preserve the ideological purity of its ranks. 
According to party documents concerning purges, religious weddings 
or having links with a religious organization were sufficient grounds for 
expulsion from the party. Yaroslaysky, as the main executor of party 
purges, had before him numerous cases of decent young communists 
marrying the daughters of factory owners and subsequently forgetting 
their past and getting involved with religious rites.151  
One of the most popular and "entertaining" methods of antireligious 
propaganda were debates. These debates, thought up and sponsored by 
Lunacharsky, were a very popular form of Bolshevik propaganda and 
attracted large audiences. However, conducting these antireligious 
debates caused problems for the Bolsheviks as the other side had to be 
heard too. Sometimes these lectures and debates had the opposite effect 
to that intended when the clergy won the sympathy of listeners. After 
the civil war the ruling party was more cautious about debates, and as 
the Central Committee's circular underlined, "debates which were 
conducted without great preliminary, scientific-enlightenment prep-
arations were more harmful than good". Without proper preparations of 
149 GARFI f. 5263, op. 1, d. 55(3) "CraputeMy noMotuHHxy npoxypopa 
Pecny6nHKH H 3aM.HapxoMrocra 19.10.1923"; E.H.Carr has suggested that the 
slogan "faces to countryside" for Zinovev was only a weapon in the struggle for 
power. Carr 1958, 195. 
150 S12, 794. 
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RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.3, d.67. "LIy)Kaux 3neMeHros B naprHH He uonxcHa 6brrb". 
For other documents on the party purges, see RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.3, d.78; f.89, 
op.3, d.70; f.89, op.3, d.251; f.89, op.3, d.80; f.89, op.3, d.81. 
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this sort, lecturers needed to have great experience, and if no such 
lecturers were on hand debates were unprofitable. Consequently, these 
debates were finally prohibited in the late 1920s.152 
As we can see from the resolutions adopted, the 12th congress 
thought in terms such as survival (nepewHroK) and prejudice 
(npetpaccy toK). Bolshevik ideology and its interpreters perceived 
nationalistic sentiments and religion as relics or vestiges from the evil 
era of the past which would vanish as soon as socialism came of age.153 
For example, P.I. Stuchka in his commentary on the Soviet Constitution 
acknowledged that the nationality question and religion were kindred 
phenomena. According to him, both functioned as opiates for the 
people and communists should fight against them.154 
With regard to both these vestiges, we may note the striking 
resemblance between this Soviet policy and the situation prevailing 
before the Revolution when the ROC attempted to root out pagan 
survivals among the Russian peasantry, not always very successfully. 
This is perhaps one of the best illustrations of how the communist 
regime failed to break with the Russian past; the atheist regime adopted 
the legacy of the past and actually the role of the "state church".155 
With regard to Bolshevik nationality policy, the 12th congress of the 
RCP(b) proved to be a disappointment for the Ukrainian and Georgian 
national communists. Trotsky did not want to commit himself to a fight 
against the nationality policy of Stalin and as a result national 
communists and their supporters were defeated. However, due to 
Lenin's criticism, Stalin was obliged to moderate his condemnation of 
152 RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, d.184 `BceM o6KoMaM. o6A6lopo H ry6KOMaM P.K.1I. o 
nocraHosxe'; Curtiss 1953, 198-199. As Pravda admitted, these disputes set high 
standards for communist lecturers. Pravda, 15 September 1921, No. 205. 
153 Simon 1991, 135. 
154 "Hauo npH3HaTb, `iTO HauHOHaJIHCTH4ecKHe HJIJIIO3HH — 3T0 TOT Ace 
H3BecTHOro po xa OHHyM ItJIA Hapota, npOTHB KOTOpOrO Haao 60pOTbCA 
pemHTeJibHO. HO yMeno. II03TOMy, KOMMyHHCTH9eCKaM naprHA AAA CBOeN 
OpraHH3a4HH BCIOAy Tpe6yer eAHHCTBa. apyrHMH CJIOBaMH — H 3 teCb 
OTBepraer 06bABJleHHe sonpoca ,taCTHMM aejioM". Stuchka 1923, 186. See also 
Stuchka 1923, 157-164; 180-187. In relation to the above, it is interesting to note 
that in defining the term "relics" the Great Soviet Encyclopedia from Stalin's time 
explains it as "traditions and prejudices inherited from capitalist society". The 
Encyclopedia also explains that in socialist society there are still vestiges 
(ocrarxH) of bourgeois ideology to be found, relics of private capitalist 
psychology and morals. Such vestiges were numerous: non-socialist attitudes to 
work and towards to the property of society, violations of Soviet laws and the 
correct socialist way of communal life, careerism, etc. Bourgeois nationalism and 
religious prejudices were also included to this list. BSEc, 409-410. 
155 See Gregory L. Freeze, "The Re-Christianization of Russia: The Church and 
Popular Religion, 1750-1850." Studia Slavica Finlandensia VII. 1990. 
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national communists and the 12th congress approved a resolution 
which condemned both chauvinist communism and the heresy of 
national communists.'56 
But, on other hand, the accepted resolutions confirmed the use of 
conciliatory methods in the antireligious fight. According to the 
resolutions, the party should fight both Russian and non-Russian 
nationalistic vestiges with the help of education and culture. Stalin and 
his Great-Russian protégés in the party had in any event mental 
reservations on this matter, judging the national chauvinism of the non-
Russian republics more harmful than Russian chauvinism. This is also 
reflected in the debate concerning the so-called "Smena-Vekhists". 
During the congress Stalin officially (and hypocritically, as Agursky 
has pointed out) rejected the ideas of the "Smena-Vekhists" while at the 
same time showing interest in their ideas behind the scenes. For both 
Stalin and the émigrés the idea of "one and indivisible Russia" was very 
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acceptable. Stalin had been the main architect of the centralized Soviet 
state and he had been active in the setting up of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR).157 
We may see how the 12th congress tackled the practical im-
plementation of Soviet nationality policy and the religious policy which 
were interlinked. First although the hopes of the Ukrainian and 
Georgian national communists were crushed, the ambiguous results of 
the 12th congress gave national republics the chance to promote their 
own special status, e.g. ethnic equality. Moscow sanctioned the 
promotion of local languages and national cultures, together with the 
active recruitment of national cadres, in order to implant the Soviet 
system in remote areas. In Ukraine and in Belorussia national-minded 
governments advanced the so-called "Ukrainianization" and "Belo-
russification" of their republics. According to Gerhard Simon, the 
"korenizatsiya policy" included as a basic assumption the political 
supremacy of the communist party. The republics could develop their 
own ethnic identity but had to accept the hegemony of the ruling 
regime. Stalin had anyway his own ideas about the "korenizatsiya-
policy"; his long-term objective was to coalesce all Soviet nations 
together.158 
The case of M.H. Sultan-Galiev (1892-1940) symbolizes the 
contradiction between Moscow's long-term plan and the independence 
of local communists. At the 12th congress the majority of communists 
showed little understanding of the complaints of the Georgians. As a 
156 	 KPSS II, 469-473; Carrere d'Encausse 1982, 151-152. 
157 Agursky 1987, 296. 
158 	 Simon 1991, 22-30, 71-72. See also Unger 1981, 50; Subtelny 1990, 387-390. 
result, Stalin was encouraged to exercise his harsh line against 
nationally-minded communists. After the 12th congress was over the 
one important leader of national communism, Sultan-Galiev, was soon 
accused and convicted of founding his own conspiratorial organization. 
He was later, in 1923, expelled from the party for "Pan-Turkism" and 
"Pan-Islamism". As a seal of official disapproval, the assembly of the 
leading party members from national republics and oblasts which met 
from 9 to 12 June 1923 condemned Sultan-Galiev for counter-
revolutionary activities and for having conspiratorial connections with 
Persia and Turkey in order to separate certain Eastern areas from the 
Soviet Union. The assembly considered his actions to be a reaction 
against Great-Russian chauvinism but, nonetheless, insisted that 
Sultan-Galiev had acted against party discipline.159  This official 
condemnation strikes one as strange, coming just after the 12th 
congress. Stalin was the main instigator of this condemnation of 
Sultan-Galiev, but he couched his attack against Sultan-Galiev in words 
that implied a certain degree of tolerance, stating that even his 
"Pan-Turkism" and "Pan-Islamism" would have been forgivable if it 
were not for his anti-party actions.16° 
In reality, one of the main reasons for these serious accusations 
against Sultan-Galiev was the fact that he dared to criticize Stalin 
personally, accusing his "authoritarian" and "chauvinist" Moscow 
communism of being contradictory to the original ideals of com-
munism. Sultan-Galiev had emphasized that the class struggle among 
non-Russians should not involve fighting against local religious beliefs. 
In his opinion, Islam had preserved many important socio-political 
aspects, and mullahs in Eastern areas had cultural and political 
authority which communists should take into consideration. Sultan-
Galiev held the view that mullahs, unlike Christian priests, had 
preserved many democratic features. The youngest of the great re-
ligions, as Sultan-Galiev termed it, had preserved its vitality and its 
psychological importance in the minds of the people. Consequently, 
Sultan-Galiev concluded that without an ideological compromise with 
religion the communist party could not continue its activities in 
Moslem areas. 161  
"Sultan-Galievism" spread among local party officials in the Eastern 
159 IzvTsK KPSS 1990 10, 77; KPSS II, 487-488; Deutscher 1987, 98. 
160 SS 5, 306. "IV COBenIariHe. 0 npasalx H"nesalx" B Haupecny6nHKax H 
o6nacrax. Peva no nepsoMy nyriKry nopaAKa aria coseutaHHa: ",geno 
CynraH-I'anHesa". 10. 1410H5". 
161 Galiev 1960 (1921), 226-231; Bennigsen & Lemercier-Quelquejay 1967, 111— 
116; Simon 1991, 78-79. 
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parts of the Soviet state, even if the leading figure of the movement was 
officially ostracized. For example, we can detect from reports from the 
Tatar-Bashkirian area that local Soviet officials showed little 
enthusiasm for implementing the antireligious campaigns of the early 
NEP. They even openly ruled out the possibility of carrying out large-
scale antireligious propaganda among the local population. They 
sought to placate Moscow by arguing that antireligious teaching needed 
time and the best method of achieving atheism was to teach the natural 
sciences in the schools.162 
This reluctance to carry out antireligious propaganda and these 
"Sultan-Galievist" views were in sharp conflict with Moscow's line. 
The central organs reacted violently when they realized that local 
communists had contradicted their orders to work against religious 
schools. As one official report declared, the continued existence of 
Moslem religious schools was due to local passivity: 
...it is necessary to mention that religious schools did not come into 
existence because the population was [religious] but mainly because 
the nature of the religious schools had not been explained [to the local 
populace], that earlier working comrades did not pay any attention to 
the great number of religious schools...163 
As we can detect from the initiatives of the CAP in this field, the 
activity of the Moslem clergy was seen as a political challenge. Before 
the 12th party congress the CAP tried to "lobby" the party delegates to 
sanction Islamic teachings in the Eastern schools. Nevertheless, after 
the 12th congress the CAP was obliged to acknowledge its defeat and 
sent out a secret circular which sanctioned religious teaching. The CAP, 
nonetheless, demanded that religious "schools" should not be allowed 
in the European parts of Russia and in Siberia.IM 
162 "...BOnpeKH nOnbITKaM H CTpeMJteHHAM HpOBOAHTb aHTHpeJIHCH03Hy10 
nponaraHAy B MHCCOBOM BHAe CpeAH TaT.6am. He BO3M0)KHO". RTsKhIDNI 
f.17, op.61, d.146. "Te3Hcbi npHHATble Ha COBeHLaHHH HHCTpyKTOpOB 110 pa60Te 
CpeAH TaTapO-6amKHp CaMapcKOR ry6epHHH yTBepxCAeHHble AITO ry6KOMa 
PKII/6/". 
163 ....3Aecb He06X0AHM0 ynOMHHaTb, 9T0 peJIHCH03Hble mKOJIbI B03HHKJIH He OT 
TOrO, YTO HaceJleHHe 6bIA0 TaK HacrpOeHo, a 60nbme BCerO OT TOM, 'ITO 
CBOeBpeMeHHo He pa3 -ACHAJIOCb nOJIO%eHHe 0 peJIHCH03HbIX mKOJIaX, OT TOM, 
•ITO panee  pa3pa60TaBIHHe TOB. He 06parHJIH BHHMaHHe Ha 3T0. Aa)Ke BHAA 
nepeA co6oio rpoMaAHoe KOAH9ecrso peJIHrHO3HblX mKOJI...:'. RTsKhIDNI 
f.17, op.61, d.146. "Orter 0 AeATenbHOcrH TaT6a11161opo CaMry6KoMa PKII 3a 
BpeMA or I AeKa6pA 1922 r. no 15 anpeAA 1923 roAa". 
164 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.1, d.443a (PCAP 18, 3/4-23; PCAP 19, 10/4-23); f.17, 
op.112, d.565a (PCAP 21, 15/5-23; PCAP 38, 13/11-23). See also RTsKhIDNI 
f.17, op.3, d.385 (Pp 37, 3/10-23). 
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The main reason for this change of policy was the conciliatory line 
which the ruling regime had adopted at the 12th congress. But it is most 
likely that the creation of a favourable atmosphere among foreign 
Moslem clergy also had something to do with it. The Soviet regime saw 
the "exploited nations" of the East as natural allies in the fight against 
capitalism and tried to establish good diplomatic relations with its 
Eastern neighbours as well as to encourage national liberation move-
ments in these areas. However, Islam was fused with nationality in the 
East and the whole question of Islamic identity constituted an 
ideological problem for the Bolshevik party. Just after the October 
revolution the communist party had appealed to Moslems and had 
exploited Islam by creating a special Moslem commissariat under the 
authority of the Narkomnats lead by an Islamic clergyman Mullah 
Nur-Vakhitov. This was indeed a strange situation. For at the same time 
as the activities of religion were more or less restricted in other parts of 
Soviet Russia, in Eastern areas mosques flourished, the "sharia" legal 
system functioned undisturbed, and mullahs were not restricted in their 
civic rights as clergymen were elsewhere in Russia.165 Lenin himself 
had underlined the importance of taking into consideration local 
circumstances in the East. Class antagonism had not yet developed in 
these areas and communists should first try to get rid of the remnants of 
feudalism. I66 
As Pedro Ramet has acknowledged, the "korenizatsiya-policy" had 
as its political objective the "de-politicization" of the Moslem 
consciousness. Instead of forming larger administrative units in the 
Moslem area the Soviet regime established smaller administrative units 
based on nationality. Bonds of nationality and not of religion or 
language were supposed to be the cement in such Soviet regions as the 
Tatar republic, Uzbekistan and Bashkiria. As a sign of this changed 
policy, in 1920 the Commissariat of Nationalities was reorganized and 
the Commissariat for Moslem Affairs was wound up. Nonetheless, 
religion and nationalism were still useful propaganda tools in Eastern 
areas. For example, the NKID realized the importance of the Moslem 
clergy in moulding public opinion in Moslem countries and attempted 
to utilize them. In his letter to Yaroslaysky dated 10 August 1923 
Chicherin proposed even utilizing the Moslem clergy and Moslem 
165 SU I, 95-96, 258; DSV I, 367; Bennigsen & Lemercier-Quelquejay 1967, 89, 139— 
140, 144-149; Pipes 1980, 156-157. 
166 PSS 38, 158-159."VIII Cbe3u PKI1(6). J-toxnau o naprHriHo>i nporpaMMe 19 
map—ra"; PSS 39, 304."ToBapHntaM KOMMyHHcraM TypxecTaHa; PSS 39, 326— 
329. ,IZOx.fIaA Ha II BcepOCCHHCxOM Cbe3Ae KOMMyHHCTH9eCKHX OpraHH3auHFi 
HapoAOB Bocroxa 22 Hoa6px 1919"; PSS 51, 175. "TenerpaMMa 1'.K. 
OpA0xoHHK14A3e H 3anHCKa ,TI.II• TpOuKOMy". 
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ideology "to enforce there [in Persia] their political line". He believed 
that the Moslem clergy within Soviet boundaries should be forged into 
a "political weapon" for influence over the masses in Persia. Therefore, 
the teachings of Islam, together with the "sharia", should be used for 
preparing the ground for socialism among Moslems.167 
This clarifies the error of Sultan-Galiev and other independently-
minded Moslem communists. They had acted in accordance with the 
idea that unifying the Soviet East would be achieved by utilizing 
religion and language and not primarily through Marxist doctrine. This 
opinion was accepted during the civil war when the Soviet regime 
sought to utilize ethno-religious feelings in order to create a pro-Soviet 
East. It was also of some use in Soviet foreign policy after the civil war 
when the NKID tried to appeal to the people of the East. But during 
peacetime, in the NEP period, it was realized that this thinking was 
harmful inside the Soviet Union. 
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The ruling regime in Moscow was not eager to encourage the idea of 
"Moslem consciousness" once it had stabilized its power. But as a sign 
of the relatively free atmosphere of the early 1920s Sultan-Galiev was 
released in 1924, despite the serious accusations Moscow had levelled 
against him. However, his case indicated that the policy of 
"korenizatsiya", using national culture and language for enforcing 
communism on the Soviet periphery, could not sanction the idea of 
utilizing Moslem religion or national-mindedness as such, except as a 
tactical weapon in building a more centralized Soviet state.168 
The outcome of the 12th congress with regard to religious policy was 
clear. The leading troika was ready to be conciliatory towards the 
peasants and did not want to insult their feelings by sanctioning further 
antireligious assaults. The triumvirate of Zinovev, Kamenev and Stalin 
was also taking over in the religious policy sphere and Trotsky's 
influence was slowly diminishing. 
167 	 RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, d.117 "Toe. SlpocnaBCKOMy 10.8.1923"; Ramet 1989, 32— 
33. See also GARFI f.5263, op.1, d.55(3) "HapxoMlocT TOB. KpacHxoay KonHa 
TOB. MeHN(HCKOMy". 
168 	 RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.3, d.3. "CTaTba no KpacHON SanIKHpHH (I x-a 06naCTHaa 
SaulxHpcxasl KoacpepeHUHa PK1I (6). HanHcannaa ,gna raseTbl IIpaBAa. 
ABTOrpaC1). IVIaIDHHOIIHCHbIH TeKCT". 
c. 	 Trotsky's comments on the 12th congress — the 
justification for Bolshevik rituals and the birth of the 
antireligious press 
Although Trotsky was outmanoeuvred he tried to challenge the 
triumvirate with his journalistic critique. During the early 1920s he had 
been very active in press discussions. In a series of articles published in 
Pravda in 1923, he now began to propose novelties in religious 
policy.169 The approach of these articles could be described as 
educational, emphasizing as they did the importance of enlightenment 
and culture in building socialism in Russia.170 This attitude of his can 
easily be detected in his article "Vodka, Churches and the Cinema", 
which was first published in Pravda on 12 July 1923. In this article he 
underlined the possibilities of the cinema for modern society and 
especially for the antireligious struggle. According to Trotsky, the 
cinema was not only competing with the pub but also with churches and 
he suggested that this contest would ultimately prove fatal for 
churches.171  
In the same context, Trotsky commented on the religious situation in 
the Soviet Union and explained the reason for the persistence of 
religious behaviour among its population. Reviewing the religiousness 
of the Russian working class, he asserted that it was almost non-existent 
and professed the view that church dogmas and the teaching of religion 
had never had a profound impact on the consciousness of Russians. The 
simple explanation was that: 
...there is hardly any religiousness in the Russian working class. In 
fact, it has never been [religious]. The Orthodox church was an 
everyday ritual and bureaucratic organization. It did not succeed in 
penetrating deeply into the consciousness [of the Russian populace] or 
succeed in connecting its dogmas and canons to the inner experiences 
of the masses. The reason for this was the lack of culture of old Russia 
and its church...172 
169 Knei-Paz 1979, 282-283. 
170 See ST XXI, 4-26. 
171 	 ST XXI, 24-25. `BoAKa. uepxo6 H xHHeMaTorpacp". 
172 	 "...penHrxo3HocTH B pyccxoM pa6oHeM xnacce n0`iTH HeT cosepllleHHo. IIa ee 
H He 66130 HHKOrAa no-HaCTOBueMy. IIpaBOCnaBHa6 uepKOBb 6bina 6bITOBbIM 
06pBJJpM H Ka3eHHO4I OpraHH3auHeF1. IIpOHHKHYTb >Be rny6oKO B CO3HaHHe 
CBB3aTb CBOH AOrMaTbl H KaHOHbI C BHYTpeHHHMH nepeJKHBBHHBMH HapOAHbIX 
MaCc en He yAanOcb. IIpH9HHa 3AeCb Ta NCe: HeKynbTYpHOCTb CTapON POCCHH. 
B TOM 9HCAe H ee uepKBH...". ST XXI, 25.ST XXI, 25. `BOAKa. uepKOB H 
KHHeMaTOrpaCp". 
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As a result of this presumed non-religiosity of the Russian working 
class, Trotsky thought that the liberation from the yoke of religion 
would be much easier for the Russian working class than had been 
expected, although he acknowledged that this process would be more 
difficult among peasants than among workers. This was not, however, 
proof of the peasant's deeper and more intimate relations with the 
church. On the contrary, he thought that the peasant's relationship with 
the church was "passive and monotonous". Trotsky was convinced that 
the ROC offered the working class more for its social needs than for its 
spiritual needs and that its role was to give entertainment to the masses. 
Religion was for Russians more a habit than a true conviction. In 
addition, icons were more of a decoration than items of veneration as 
such and workers did not attend churches for religious purposes but 
mainly for entertainment. And entertain the church was most certainly 
able to do! It was "luminous and populous", the priest wore colourful 
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garments and the singing was beautiful. On the other hand, factories, 
families and everyday street-life did not offer the same "social-
aesthetic attraction" as the church did, but nevertheless he believed that 
the working class was not actually very religious. They did not respect 
the religious hierarchy and they did not place any trust in the magic 
power of rituals.173 
We may see how Trotsky assumed that the church was exploiting 
people's need for theatricality; by making use of theatrical methods 
such as vision, hearing and sense of smell. Consequently, Trotsky 
believed that the liberation of the large masses from rituals and 
churches could not be brought about simply by antireligious 
propaganda. He believed that people usually did not have a deep 
attachment to religion but they had desires and aspirations for 
something which was related to 
...the informal, the inert, the consciously unpredictable; related to 
existing, to the spontaneous; related to street idlers who do not waste 
an opportunity to take part in [religious] processes or services, listen 
to music or wave their hands.'74  
173 ST XXI, 25. "BoaKa. uepxoB H KHHeMaTorpa(p". See also Knei-Paz 1979, 284— 
285. 
174 "...ÖeC(popMCHHaA. KOCHBA. He npoBeaeHHaA 9epe3 CO3HaHHe CBA3b ÖbITOBaA. 
aBTOMaTH9eCKaA. H B TOM 9HCJIe CBA3b yJIH9HOr0 3eBaKH. KOTOpbIN He npO9b 
HPH CJIy9ae IIpHHATb y9aCTHe B IlpOgeCCHH HAH TOpJKeCTBCHHOM 
ÖOI'OCJIyJKeHHH. nOCJIyHiaTb neHHe. nOMOXaTb pyxaMH.". ST XXI, 25-26. 
"BOaKa. I(epKOB H KHHeMaTOrpa(p". 
As an alternative, Trotsky suggested that such needs should not be 
destroyed but that they should be substituted by new forms. 
Consequently, it was necessary to produce secular entertainment for the 
masses, and he suggested that the best way of doing this was to 
exchange the entertainment of the church for the cinema. To sum up, 
Trotsky wanted in this article to highlight the difference between the 
old Orthodox tradition and the new communist society; in the fierce 
battle between the icon and the cinema, the latter was predestined to 
win. The cinema, in his opinion, was one of the most effective weapons 
in the antireligious battle.175 
This view of Trotsky's may be justifiably described as being both 
"primitive" and "simplistic". So far the cinema has not substituted 
religion as entertainment.176 However, Trotsky's view reflects the basic 
assumption of the pre-revolutionary Russian intelligentsia which 
believed that Russians, and the workers in particular, were not 
religious. It also coincides with the view of Belinsky and Lenin that the 	 153 
Russian peasants were not pious but rather "superstitious". Other 
Russian writers such as F.M. Dostoevsky (1821-1881) had held quite 
opposite opinions. The reality, as Moshe Lewin has suggested, was 
conceivably a compromise between these two views. The "muzhik" 
believed in God and called himself a "Christian" but knew nothing of 
dogma. His faith was a mixture of pagan and Christian belief.177 
Later in his article "Family and Rituality"178 Trotsky commented 
further on the role of religion in Soviet Russia. He explained that 
clerical organizations had forced even non-believers to acknowledge 
three major stages in the individual's life, birth, marriage and death. 
However, the workers' state had liberated people from these shackles, 
announcing that a citizen could be bom, get married and die without 
having to have recourse to "magic". To convince people of this was not 
easy because "life is much more difficult to strip of ritual than the 
state". Trotsky explained this by commenting that the life of the 
working family was monotonous and exhausting. The drabness of life 
was the main reason for the high consumption of alcohol and church-
going. In order to answer the people's need for theatricality, he 
suggested that the proletarian state should substitute religious feasts 
with revolutionary celebrations.179 
175 ST XXI, 26. `BoAKa. uepKos H KHHeMarorpacp". Or as Krupskaya remarked in 
relation to this question, the new communist morality would finally uproot religion. 
RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, d.186,1.18. See also Ferro 1986, 1-3. 
176 Pospielovsky 1987, 32. 
177 Lewin 1985, 59-62. 
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ST XXI, 39-43. "CeMbs H OÖpAAHOCTb'; Stites 1991. 296. 
Trotsky's above ideas were to see fruition in popular Bolshevik 
ritual-building in the 1920s. As a certain S. Levman remarked in the 
newspaper "Trud", Trotsky's ideas "could lead to new revolutionary 
ceremonies and new social habits".180 
These above writings reveal how in the 1920s Soviet society was 
forming its own hagiography and social forms; zealous communists 
were challenging traditional rituals with their own atheist ceremonies. 
Communists drew on the patterns of their traditional competitor and 
fused them with Marxist understanding when endeavouring to develop 
three new ceremonies as substitutes for religious sacraments. The so-
called "Octobering" (Oktyabrina) was to be a substitute for baptism. As 
a sign of "national and generational revolt against the Greco-Russian 
Orthodox culture" it represented a new atheistic way of life. Likewise 
the Red Weddings signalled emancipation and liberation from the 
clerical yoke. Revolutionary Funerals were the most complex of these 
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new celebrations and resembled their Orthodox equivalents with their 
concept of martyrs, mourners, eulogies and ritual flags. Zinovev, the 
leader in Petrograd, was an able organizer of communist funeral rituals. 
Most of this atheist ritual paraphernalia was abandoned after the 1920s 
and these events "succumbed to dry bureaucratic forms", as Richard 
Stites has put it.181 
We may see how Trotsky, unlike Lenin, underlined the importance 
of social habits and feeling as sources of religious belief. Although he 
denied the importance of religion as such among Russian workers, he 
was ready to acknowledge the relevance of its social aspects for 
workers and especially for peasants. This opinion was based on the 
conviction that people had aesthetic instincts and social needs which 
should be satisfied and he believed that the ruling party should meet 
these demands in the secular arena and substitute the church with the 
cinema. The idea of aesthetic instincts "per se" finds echoes in the 
history of Bolshevism. The "god-builders" earlier in the century had 
experimented in planning revolutionary cults as substitutes for religion. 
After the 1905 revolution Anatoly Lunacharsky and Maxim Gorky had 
considered fusing religious elements with socialism.182 
Moreover, the above ideological contributions of Trotsky in the 
religious policy sphere had much practical significance during this time 
when the battle against religion using coercive methods was not 
producing results. In other words, Trotsky initiated some new ideas in 
the antireligious battle in Russia and these concepts would materialize 
180 Trud, 9 September 1923, No. 202. 
181 	 Stites 1991, 299-305. 
182 	 Stites 1991, 295. See also Stites 1990, 16. 
in debates inside the communist party even after their original creator 
had been cast out as a heretic.183 But during the interregnum and the 
NEP period these ideas were hailed enthusiastically among com-
munists. 
The dilemma of substitutive rituals remained unresolved although 
the party tried to create "revolutionary counter-celebrations" such as 
the "Komsomol Easter" in 1923 and to develop secular places of 
entertainment such as "people's houses", workers' clubs, etc. These 
institutions, nonetheless, did not always satisfy the people. The 
preoccupation with bureaucracy and routine dogged the communist 
ritual-making, which became not so much a form of entertainment as a 
form of antireligious propaganda. We may even state that the 
antireligious campaigns against religion did not undermine the popular 
forms of faith which were based on rites and customs. For the 
traditional peasantry, in particular, everyday life remained more or less 
asit had been until the end of the NEP.184 
Furthermore, the "confiscation conflict" had not destroyed the ROC 
and the aggressive antireligious campaigns of the Komsomols had 
aroused the mass of the peasantry against the excesses of the 
antireligious campaign. The "Komsomol Christmas Carnival" in 1922 
gave rise to general criticism. Even the CAP was obliged to propose 
that these antireligious campaigns should be conducted in a more 
"serious" tone and that members of the Komsomol especially should be 
summoned to hear the political motivation for this campaign. This 
incident reveals how sensitively the ruling party reacted to public 
opinion and how it was even ready to restrict its activities in this sphere 
as a result.185 
We may also see how communist artists introduced these new 
celebrations into their revolutionary art and used old religious motifs in 
their works in order to mock religion or encourage pseudo-religious 
feelings of loyalty towards communism.186  The practical implemen-
tation of these carnivals differed in many places. Contemporary reports 
in the archives reveal the general unenthusiastic mood for this 
campaign in some places. For example, in the Irkutsk and Che- 
183 	 The programmes of the Jewish antireligious circles included, even as late as 1927, 
Trotsky's literary works. See GARFI f.5407, op. I, d.17 Ow -limas( c necra 263) 
"1lporpaMMa,ana eBpehCKHX a HTHpeJIHCHO3HbIX Kpy)KKOB". 
184 Altrichter 1991, 205; Stites 1991, 298-299 
185 Curtiss 1953, 202-203; Stites 1991, 297. See also Young 1989, 160-162, 168-171; 
Geldern 1993, 217. 
186 	 Polonsky 1960, 181; Geldern 1993, 56, 66, 79-81. See, for example, Dimitri Moor, 
A36yKa KpacuoapMetlua. Orten BoeHHON nureparypbl npu peBOn1OUHOHHOM 
BOeHHOM coBere peCny6nHKH. rocytapcTBeuuoe H3taTebCTBO. 1921. MOCKBa. 
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remkhovo districts the antireligious campaign against "Ramadan" met 
with little success. Despite the official optimism, the report in question 
acknowledged the fact that "cultural-enlightenment work" was poor 
and serious study "in the field of antireligious propaganda" should be 
undertaken.' 87 
This abundance of antireligious activity was gradually halted by the 
ruling party after the 12th congress. The Central Committee's 
secretary, Stalin could read the feelings of Soviet society and his party 
very well and in his characteristic style placed the blame for excesses 
on local officials. In his letter to all party bodies he accused local organs 
of "violations" in the antireligious struggle. He explained, for example, 
how some local organs had closed Baptist chapels for "political 
reasons" or because these religious organizations had not fulfilled all 
their registration obligations. According to Stalin, these episodes 
indicated how 
carelessly, unseriously and light-heartedly some local organs of the 
party and state considered so important a question as freedom of 
religious conscience. It seems that these organizations and organs of 
power do not understand the fact that their brutal, indiscreet acts 
against believers, who constitute a huge majority of the population, 
cause incalculable damage to Soviet power and are threatening to 
destroy the achievements of the party...' 88 
Stalin banned the closing of churches, prayer-houses and synagogues 
for failure to comply with "registration formalities". In the name of the 
Central Committee he also forbade the suppression of prayer-houses by 
majority voting of the village assembly and outlawed superfluous 
taxation. Moreover, he prohibited arrests of a "religious character" if 
they were not connected to obvious counter-revolutionary activity. The 
Central Committee also wanted to emphasise that the "uprooting of 
187 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.61, d.132. "CBOAKa 0 Xoae aHTHpenHrHo3HON KaM11aHHH 
"PaMa3aH" B r. IipxyTcxoe H LIepeMxoscKoM paHoHe". See also RTsKhIDNI 
f.17, op.61, d.132. "jloxnaa (Tos. BarayTAHHosa)" and "Te3Hcb1 (Tos. 
,I(HHHy)KaMeTOsa H TOB. I'aynosa)". 
188 "...Kai( HeOCTOpO%HO, He Cepbe3H0. nerKOMbICneHHO OTHOCATCA HeKOTopble 
MeCTHb1e OpraHH3auHH napTHH H MeCTHbte OpraHbl BnaCTH K TaKOMy Ba)KHOMy 
BOnpOCy. KBK BOIIpOc 0 CB06OAe penHrH03HbIX y6e%aeHHli. 9TH OpraHH3auHH 
H OpraHbl BnaCTH. BHAHMO. He nOHHMaffiT, 9T0 CBOHM rpy6biMH, 6eCTBKTHbIMH 
Ae1iCTBHAMH 11pOTHB BepyK)uIHX. nPeaCTBBJIAK)IUHX rpOMaAHOe 60JIbnIHHCTBO 
HaCeneHHB. OHH HBHOCAT HCHC9HCnHMM 71 Bpea COB2TCKON BnacTH, rpo3AT 
COPBaTb AOCTH)KeHHA napTHH B 0611aCTH pa3nOA(eHHA uepKBH H pHCKyIOT 
cblrpaTb Ha pyxy KOHT peBosnouHH". RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, d.184. "BceM 
ry6KOMaM, 06KOMaM, KPaeBbIM K-TaM. Hau. UK H 61opo LIK. L1HPKynSIPHOe 
nHCbMO PM] 30. (O6 OTHOIlleHHH K peJIHrHO3HbIM OpraHH3auHAM) 16.VII-23". 
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religious prejudices" was not dependent on harassing believers. 
Excesses in this area simply reinforced these prejudices when 
communists should be adopting tactful relations with believers. This 
circular stressed that communists should simply present patiently their 
criticism of religion and outline the history of gods, cults and religion. 
Moreover, the Central Committee warned that this policy did not mean 
a weakening of the vigilance of communist organs; they should be alert 
so that religious organizations could not turn religion into a weapon of 
counter-revolution. Furthermore, as a political gesture of conciliation 
and as an exception from the general rule, the Politburo granted 
permission for the opening of religious schools in remote Eastern 
areas.189 
Even the nominal head of state, Mikhail Kalinin, along with other 
party propagandists, was sent to explain this "revised" policy to the 
peasantry and the non-party masses. For example, on 31 July 1923 
Kalinin had to pacify people who complained that their priest had fled. 	 157 
Peasants complained that the Soviet regime seemed to be persecuting 
priests. Kalinin condemned such behaviour and commented that Soviet 
power was not fighting against religion by administrative methods but 
rather by strength of conviction. The mocking of priests or acting 
violently towards them was not communism; it would only make 
priests into martyrs.190 More importantly, he stated that harsh methods 
should be directed only against the politically hostile elements of the 
church; others could work in peace. The Soviet regime would not 
interfere with the beliefs of individuals. 191 
The decline of the brutal antireligious attacks represented also the 
start of more delicate methods in the antireligious fight. Thus it could 
be stated that the birth of the antireligious press was a natural outcome 
of the 12th congress. This need for organized antireligious propaganda 
was already acknowledged by Lenin himself just after the civil war 
when the party had realized that it needed instruments to aid it in atheist 
propaganda. In March 1922 Lenin himself criticised indirectly the 
Narkompros and suggested that the party should create a new journal, 
"Pod znamenem marksizma" (Under the Banner of Marxism), to serve 
in this area. According to Lenin, Lunacharsky's Commissariat had 
189 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.385 (Pp 37, 3/10-23); Yl, 58. "1InaHw IIepKOBHHxoB H 
TaKTHKa TpyASiIlIHXCA". 
190 See Kalinin 1968, 40-41. "H3 6eceAw c npeAcraBHTens1MH HaceneHHSI cen H 
AepeBeHb. paCnOnO)KeHHbIX BOKpyr CTaHI1HH CKOBOpOAHO LIHTHHCKOr1 
)Kene3HON AopOrH". 
191 Kalinin 1968, 41-42. "1,13 6eceAbl C npeACTaBHTennMH HaCeneHHn Cen H 
AepeBeHb, paCROJIO%eHHbIX BOKpyr CTaHIINH CK0B0p0AH0 LIHTHHCKON 
)Kene3HON AOpOrH". 
utilized unsatisfactory methods in this struggle; publishing 18th century 
enlightenment literature was more effective than the "dull and boring" 
Soviet antireligious propaganda.192 
Lenin's request for the production of new antireligious literature was 
effective. The first result of his appeal was the founding in 1922 of a 
non-party publishing house called "Ateist". It specialized in translating 
the works of bourgeois atheists with Marxist commentaries. The 
Moscow party committee published a collection of essays entitled 
"Kommunizm i religiya" (Communism and Religion) and the news-
paper "Nauka i religiya" (Science and Religion), edited by ex-priest 
Mikhail Galkin (Gorey). The disturbances of the "confiscation conflict" 
and open antireligious manifestations did not allow opportunities for 
more peaceful propaganda. 
Although many researchers such as John S. Curtiss have detected in 
the end of the civil war the seeds of the organized antireligious 
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movement, it is perhaps more justified to claim that the failure of the 
hardliners and the CAP to remodel the resolutions of the 12th congress 
and the fact that the party rejected administrative methods in general in 
its antireligious propaganda was the real turning point. The abundance 
of antireligious publications after the 12th congress points towards the 
ideological objectives of the ruling party in this area; the party was to 
concentrate on written propaganda instead of fighting directly against 
religion. 
"Bezbozhnik" (established in December 1922) was published 
weekly and was later to play a leading role in the party's antireligious 
propaganda. After the 13th congress, a special meeting of correspon-
dents and subscribers of `Bezbozhnik" was convened in the autumn of 
1924, where a new society called "The Friends of the Newspaper 
Bezbozhnik" was created. This organization was given the name the 
"League of the Godless" and later it renamed itself the "League of the 
Militant Godless". It was in time to become an auxiliary weapon in the 
process of creating then New Atheist Man from the ashes of capitalism. 
It immediately became a centre of the most ardent antireligious feelings 
and its members were in favour of a more active struggle against 
religious prejudices and vestiges.193 
Other leading party propagandists also created other new papers for 
antireligious propaganda, for example the journal "Antireligioznik" 
was dedicated to more scholarly purposes in the party. Workers had 
their own satirical publications, "Ateist" and `Bezbozhnik u stanka" 
192 	 PSS 45, 23-27. "0 3HaMeHHH BOHHCTByrouter0 MaTepuaJIH3Ma". 
193 	 Compare Sheinman 1988 and Curtiss 1953,205-210. See also Delaney 1971, 114-
116. 
(Godless on the Bench), published by Moscow antireligious circles and 
edited by M.M. Kostelovskaya (1878-1964). This newspaper had close 
links with the "Moscow Society of the Godless" and its editors 
followed their own independent line in the antireligious battle, as we 
can detect from CAP protocols.194  Peasants had their own special 
atheist newspaper, "Derevensky Bezbozhnik", and in time the Uk-
rainians also got their own special atheist newspaper,"Besvirnik".195 
Nonetheless, as Walter Kolarz has remarked, the role of the Godless-
movement was marginal during the first half of the 1920s when the 
ruling regime wanted to pacify peasants by making concessions. 
Moreover, as Joan Delaney has suggested, the organizing of Godless 
cells throughout the country encountered resistance in Ukraine and 
within the Red Army. The obvious reason for this unenthusiastic 
reception was Trotsky's dislike of Yaroslaysky's antireligious line. 
Ukraine had a "pro-Trotskyist" as Prime Minister, Kh.G. Rakovsky, 
and the Red Army was under Trotsky's high-command until 1925.196 
In conclusion we may state that the early NEP period in Bolshevik 
religious policy can be characterized as the rise and fall of Trotsky. He 
led the party's antireligious work and was the mastermind behind the 
"confiscation conflict" in 1921-1922. With the approval of the inner 
circle of the Politburo, Trotsky combined practical and ideological 
objectives in his campaign against the ROC. This attack was carried 
through although at the beginning of NEP the party had acknowledged 
the importance of seeking conciliation with the peasantry and their 
prejudices. The Soviet security organs were able to assist Trotsky in his 
manoeuvre by organizing a schism inside the church and directly 
meddling in internal church affairs. After Lenin's withdrawal from 
politics the position of Trotsky became more vulnerable and inevitably 
Stalin and his allies succeeded in undermining his position in religious 
policy affairs by organizing a new religious policy organ under the 
direct command of the Central Committee. Trotsky's fall was sealed at 
the 12th congress where the "triumvirate" were able to undermine his 
resolution by their conciliatory speeches. This "religious NEP" which 
thus had its origin in this congress had earlier been implemented among 
the national and ethnic religions and some communists in Eastern areas 
even openly sponsored peaceful coexistence with the local religions. 
The reason for the conciliatory attitude of the "triumvirate" was 
apparent. The fate of the party was very heavily dependent on the 
peasants and their grain. The party, consequently, attempted to adopt a 
194 RTsKhIDNI f.I7, op.l 12, d.443a (PCAP 13, 20/2-23). 
195 Curtiss 1953, 210; Delaney 1971, 115. 
196 Kolarz 1961, 8; Delaney 1971, 116. 
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sensitive approach to the peasantry and their prejudices. But along with 
this desire for a peaceful approach other voices could also be heard 
inside the ruling party.197 Critical voices among the communists gained 
strength due to the political events that occurred after the congress. In 
the summer of 1923 there was some political unrest in the industrial 
areas of Moscow and Petrograd. The almost moribund opposition 
attempted to engage in conspiratorial activity and the communist 
opposition within the party also reorganized itself (Workers' Truth, 
Workers' Group). Unexpected strikes and riotous disturbances among 
workers alarmed party leaders and electrified the security apparatus. 
This acute political crisis was at its peak when the news spread of 
Lenin's death on 21 January 1924.198 
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IV The role of religion in the 
power struggle at the 
height of the high NEP 
(1924-1927) 
1. DIVERGING LEADERSHIP AND THE 
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LEGACY OF LENIN 
The death of Vladimir Ilich Lenin on 21 January 1924 symbolized the 
beginning of a new epoch in the Soviet state. The founder of socialist 
Russia was dead and his followers were left alone to continue his work. 
It was characteristic that all the rivals considered the legacy and 
heritage of Lenin as one of the most decisive factors in this struggle. 
During this early stage the party was still heavily under the spell of 
Lenin's personality. Given this fact, none of the communist leaders 
could hope to substitute for the founder of the Bolshevik party. In other 
words, Lenin personified the party (despite his death), and his disciples 
were consequently forced to follow in his footsteps. As a result, the 
Bolshevik party and its leaders could exercise supreme power only 
collectively and along Leninist lines. As Robert Tucker has remarked, 
the absence of the leader and the difficulty in finding correct Leninist 
directions was solved by inventing the cult of the great revolutionary 
and his philosophy that came to known as Leninism.]  
The roots of this cult of Leninism can be traced back to the personal 
charisma of Lenin among communists and non-communists in Soviet 
Russia. He was indeed a popular leader and his name symbolized all the 
positive achievements of the Bolshevik revolution. For the peasant 
massest, his name was linked to the success of the agrarian revolution 
1 	 Tucker 1973, 305, 311; Tucker 1990, 39. 
2 	 Even his old political opponent, L. Martov (Yu.O. Tsederbaum, 1873-1923) 
acknowledged the political charisma which Lenin enjoyed among peasants. Getzler 
1992, 100. 
11 
of 1917 and not even the violence and disturbances resulting from the 
grain collections during the civil war had dented his reputation. Lenin 
was seen by the ordinary people as a "good czar surrounded by bad 
commissars", as a "true Russian among Jewish communists".3 The 
Soviet leadership and Stalin in particular saw this new pseudo-religious 
cult as a means of enforcing the popularity and legitimacy of their own 
position. As Nina Tumarkin has commented in her monograph, "Lenin 
Lives! The Cult of Lenin in Soviet Russia", when Lenin died the party 
tried to fuse religious and political rituals in order to mobilize the 
Russian population .4 
The second important stage in creating the Leninist legacy was the 
adoption of Leninism as the new theoretical doctrine of the party. In 
order to lay the foundation for this doctrine it was declared that Lenin's 
doctrine lived on even though he was dead. These proclamations were 
at the same time pledges of faith and loyalty to the existing system.5  
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Stalin was quite ready to utilize these pseudo-religious, anti-semitic and 
nationalistic feelings in the power struggle. He was, unlike Trotsky, 
Zinovev and Kamenev, a "non-Jewish" member of the ruling regime. 
On many occasions he identified himself as a real "Russian" Bolshevik 
and his Russian party faction emphasized that the successor of Lenin 
could not be Jewish.6 So it was understandable that the cult of Lenin 
came to be one of most important ideological weapons which Soviet 
leaders, and especially Stalin, used in this struggle. This semi-
spontaneous idolizing of Lenin proved highly advantageous for Stalin. 
As the ex-theologian among the Bolsheviks, Stalin was obviously well 
aware of the stubborn religious feelings among the peasants. According 
to Nikolai Valentinov, Stalin had suggested at a decisive Politburo 
meeting that Lenin should be buried in the "Russian way". The question 
of his possible eventual embalmment was discussed for the first time by 
the Politburo in late autumn 1923 (while Lenin was still alive). Stalin 
and Kalinin were enthusiastic supporters of embalming Lenin's body, 
but Trotsky, Bukharin and Zinovev opposed it. During that meeting 
Trotsky pointed out the resemblance of these plans with the traditional 
embalming practices of the ROC and remarked that "scientific Mar- 
3 	 Tumarkin 1983, 109; Valentinov 1991a, 143-144. 
4 	 Tumarkin 1983, 165, 212; Clark 1988, 486. 
5 	 Tumarkin 1983, 165; Valentinov 1991a, 149. 
6 	 Tucker 1990, 41. Trotsky described Stalin's attitude towards anti-semitism as 
"friendly neutrality". Trotsky 1947, 399-400. Using anti-semitic propaganda in the 
interparty struggle was against Bolshevik dogma, which maintained that only 
enemies of Soviet power were willing to make use of the anti-semitic feeling 
among the population. See the slogans: "Bayloii JKHaoB-KOMMyHHCTOB!". TTP I, 
491. 
xism" should have nothing to do with such plans. Nonetheless, when 
Lenin died in January 1924 Stalin's proposal won the day. The body 
was first embalmed and displayed for forty days (the traditional period 
of praying for the dead) and then placed in a special mausoleum? 
The "usefulness" of this official immortalization of Lenin was 
indisputable. The new cult could substitute for old religious mani-
festations in a new atheistic state which had centuries-old Orthodox 
traditions. As we have seen already, the Russian Orthodox Church, the 
former ecclesiastical authority in Russia, had earlier preserved the 
bodies of saints. Isaac Deutscher explains this process of mixing 
Marxist and religious components as a parallel phenomenon to what 
happened during the time of the early church when Christianity spread 
by absorbing and adapting certain elements from paganism. In similar 
manner Western Marxism on coming to Russia also absorbed certain 
elements from the Russian past.8 Despite the protests of Lenin's 
widow, Krupskaya, the world's first Marxist-orientated state decided to 	 163 
sanctify the memory of its founder by embalming him. The mausoleum 
was to be the centrepiece of the civic cult of Lenin .9 
Subsequently, Leninism was slowly but surely promoted as the 
official ideology of the Bolsheviks. So it was not surprising that 
competing leaders published hagiographies10 of the deceased "Vozhd", 
thus producing their own interpretation of Leninism. In particular Stalin 
and Zinovev were eager to draw historical portraits in which they 
highlighted their closeness to (and the distance of others from) the 
deceased leader. Moreover, quotations from the collected works of 
Lenin appeared to be significant factors in the ideological arguments 
wielded in this fierce contest for supreme power. These collected works 
functioned also as guidelines when Soviet leaders tried to find 
justification for differing policies. The memory of Lenin was used more 
and more to "fight the political battles of the movement".11  
Despite the common emphasis on unity and the assertion that it was 
following the "path of Lenin", the party began to disintegrate into 
7 	 Tumarkin 1983, 174-176, 180; Valentinov 1991a, 147-148. 
8 	 Deutscher 1967, 269. Andrei Sinyaysky has commented on the Lenin cult by 
underlining its pseudo-religious dimensions. According to him, Lenin's corpse was 
turned into an artificial holy relic and a mausoleum built for him which was like a 
temple constructed without faith in God. Sinyaysky 1990, 112-113. The religious 
and mystical tone of the communist glorifiers of Lenin manifested itself in various 
forms. Some writers even deified Lenin in such a manner that his figure achieved 
Christ-like features. Nina Tumarkin has noticed the interesting fact that such 
writers were in general of Jewish origin. Tumarkin 1983, 167-169. 
9 	 Tumarkin 1983, 177; Tucker 1990, 38. 
10 	 Gill 1990, 182. 
11 	 Tucker 1973, 306; Tumarkin 1983, 246. 
different factions. This process appeared to be unavoidable. The 
fundamental reason for these differences of opinion was the nature of 
the state itself. Soviet Russia did not fulfil the classical Marxist 
prerequisite for a "socialist country". Instead of an urbanized and 
industrialized socialist society, Russia was an underdeveloped agri-
cultural country burdened by relics from the capitalist era. The general 
communist consensus was that the building of socialism in Russia 
required not only the development of prosperous industry but also a 
thoroughgoing renewal of the society and people. The success of 
socialism demanded throwing off the vestiges of the capitalist period: 
impoverishment, illiteracy, bureaucracy, idleness, debauchery and, last 
but not least, national-mindedness and religiosity. All factions in the 
ruling party were unanimous about the final goal of this atheistic 
society, but the methods espoused by different factions to achieve this 
end varied.12 
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This divergence of opinions had many sources. Before the October 
Revolution the Bolsheviks had possessed democratic traditions which 
enabled them to form factions freely and present competing 
programmes. After the October revolution of 1917 these debates 
continued and various coalitions of party members prospered. The 
so-called "Workers' Opposition" was the first of these groups to 
achieve a more fixed form. Party discipline was achieved, however, at 
the 10th Congress in 1921 when the highest leadership demanded the 
immediate dissolution of all opposition groups on pain of instant 
expulsion from the party. As a result of this, free discussion gradually 
declined and inner democracy within the Bolshevik party was step by 
step ruled out by the party administration. Nevertheless, this 
development was slow and during the 1920s members were free to 
express their opinions to quite an extent.13 
The principal topic for this post-Leninist divergence of party opinion 
was concentrated on the simple question: what was to be fate of 
socialist Russia living under the conditions of the NEP and surrounded 
by the capitalist world? In answer to this question the party divided, as 
Isaac Deutscher has pointed out, into three major factions: the radical 
"left", the Stalinist "centre"14 and the "right". This internal difference 
of opinion originally crystallized around agriculture policies and 
matters concerning industrialization but later it came to cover nearly all 
political matters. Moreover, each opposing faction cited Lenin for its 
own purposes. Despite their unanimous agreement on "following the 
12 	 Tucker 1973, 368-369; Deutscher 1987,37-38. See also Pethybridge 1974, 48-49. 
13 	 Schapiro 1965, 314-317; Deutscher 1987, 228-229. 
14 	 Deutscher 1987, 246. 
path of Lenin" rival leaders had different ambitions and approaches for 
implementing socialism in Russia.15 These labels among the ruling 
regime were also reflected in Soviet religious policy. 
For the Left-Communists and hardliners of the party the NEP in 
general represented an ideological and political retreat from Marxist 
orthodoxy. This Bolshevik "Left" consisted of many differing 
heterogeneous groups with various political ambitions and included 
members such as Preobrazhensky, Yu. Larin (1882-1932), and to some 
extent even Trotsky.16 
The "Left" saw two theoretical threats in continuing the NEP policy. 
The first was connected with the problems of the planned economy. 
The industrialization and development of heavy industry was regarded 
as the only guarantee of maintaining proletarian hegemony in socialist 
Russia. In any event, developing heavy industry without state planning 
was considered an impossible task. The second reason for discrediting 
the NEP was that according to Marxist theory basic economic 
structures determined the "superstructure". The Left-Communists also 
believed that socialist achievements were in danger and that 
petty-bourgeois elements such as kulaks, business-men and priests 
would finally restore capitalism in Russia. The complexity of this 
problem can be seen from the fact that Zinovev, who did not originally 
belong to the Left-Communists, called the NEP policy a "strategic 
retreat" adopted at the 10th Party Congress in 1921.17 Generally 
speaking, the NEP policy was characterized among Left-Communists 
also as a "Peasant-Brest" to describe its temporary political nature. This 
point of view was based on the common fear inside the party that 
economic concessions would give more vigour to the political 
opposition — the Mensheviks and the Social-Revolutionaries.18 The left 
wing of the party demanded the end of the NEP policy, the acceleration 
of industrialization in Russia, and active encouragement for socialist 
revolutions abroad. Funds for this more rapid industrialization were to 
be accumulated from agriculture and the peasants were to be educated 
in the collective use of land.19 
On the other hand, the "Right" of the party wanted to advance at a 
slower pace in building socialism. This "gradualist" faction also wanted 
to build up industry but on the terms of the peasantry. The right-wing 
(e.g. Bukharin, Tomsky and Rykov, etc.) believed that the Soviet state 
15 	 Schapiro 1970, 310, Pethybridge 1974, 6-7; 211-215; Service 1979, 163. 
16 	 Merridale 1990, 27. 
17 	 See, for example, Zinovev 1926, 226, 315. 
18 	 Service 1979, 160; Conquest 1986, 58. 
19 	 Deutscher 1987, 234-238. 
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would survive even if it were to make some compromises with the 
peasants. Only the most essential parts of the economy should be under 
the control of the communist party. The main error the party could 
make was to use coercion in trying to instruct the peasants in the 
collective use of land. The peasants should be treated with special care 
and concern; a proletarian state should not break the alliance between 
the working class and the poor and "middle" peasants. Capitalist and 
petty-bourgeois phenomena among peasants should be tolerated and 
carefully educated away. The main principle should be that everything 
which separated the party from the peasant, was against the interests of 
the party. It was natural enough that the defenders of a more 
conciliatory religious policy were also rightists in the inner-party 
debate.20 
The divergence between "left" and "right" was also reflected in the 
sphere of Soviet philosophy. The right-wing identified itself more or 
166 
	
	
less with the ideas of the Mechanists. According to this Marxist 
philosophical school, economic forces would inevitably lead to one 
final telos and the world was undergoing a process of change in order to 
fmd an equilibrium. They interpreted Marx by underlining the 
antagonism of economic and material forces, which would inevitably 
determine the direction of the system. This opinion suited well 
Bukharin's "determinist" and gradualist position after the introducion 
of the NEP. In religious policy, this view justified conciliatory 
methods; as socialism gradually overcomes capitalism, so too will 
science and enlightenment overcome the "darkness" of religion. It was 
not so vital, therefore, to speed up the antireligious fight when material 
forces would in the long run overcome religion. The second 
philosophical school, so-called Deborinism, was named after its most 
famous proponent, A.M. Deborin (1881-1963). According to 
Deborinism, all change was accomplished by dialectical leaps and 
intense development. In order to make changes in the world or put 
socialism into practice, it was more favourable to create an intensity of 
changes. Thus in religious policy this justified moving more resolutely 
on the antireligious front.21  
Dimitry V. Pospielovsky has to some extent denied the significance 
of these "right" and "left" labels when investigating Soviet religious 
policy and has described their use as confusing.22 When considering the 
20 	 Deutscher 1987, 243; Merridale 1990, 48-49. 
21 	 Wetter 1963, 130-135, 138-142, 144-149; McLellan 1987b, 127-128. See also 
Hecker 1933, 158-167, 176-187. 
22 	 He has this to say on the matter: "Although the Soviets constantly used the labels 
"leftist" and "rightist" in attacking each other, I feel very uncomfortable with these 
confusing terms, especially since their position, at least regarding religion and 
complexity of the power struggle and the "opportunistic" twists and 
turns of some political leaders, this criticism is valid. For example, 
Bukharin was one of the most eager initiators of War Communism in 
the period 1917-1921 though after 1921 he emerged as a pace-setter for 
conciliatory politics. Without being specific it is quite difficult, 
however, to comprehend different arguments in the religious political 
debate inside the ruling party. 
As we have noted before, religion was seen, together with national-
mindedness, as one of the most significant relics (nepexcxrox) of the 
capitalistic era.23 In fact, this attitude expressed a common ideological 
standpoint and nearly everybody in the ruling party accepted it. From 
the beginning of the Soviet era, religious policy in the Soviet state was 
subordinated to the interests of general policy. This meant that during 
the civil war, despite the hostile ideological party doctrine, limited 
activity by the ROC was tolerated after an initial outburst of 
administrative prohibitions. Bolshevik religious policy was conducted 	 167 
using flexible methods.24 During the civil war the regime used 
administrative measures against the ROC only when politically 
necessary. In this sense the campaign of 1921-23 was only a short 
frontal attack against religious organizations. 
Accordingly, the problems in post-Leninist religious policy were 
broadly similar to those in general policy. The dilemma was simple. 
What was the best way to conduct the cultural fight against the relics of 
the capitalistic era in the minds of the peasantry?25 The relation 
between the ruling regime and the peasantry was traumatic for both 
sides. The Bolshevik Party was originally an urban phenomenon; its 
supporters originated from towns and factories. Its rural members were 
sometimes blamed for being under the influence of "petty-bourgeois 
spontaneity" — kulaks and priests. Moreover, the Soviet power had little 
means to put its will into effect in the countryside. Communist 
newspapers and periodicals were sent to the countryside but in many 
cases peasants were illiterate or could read only with great difficulty. 
Instead of local communists the main figures in rural areas were often 
village priests. The influence of the church was a major obstacle to 
socialism. For example, in the census of the population in 1926 there 
were still over 60 000 full-time priests in Soviet Russia and religious 
methods of fighting it, varied quite pragmatically - opportunistically, more in 
terms of practical consideration than in theoretical principles". Pospielovsky 1987, 
31-32. 
23 	 AK, 150-153, 194-195. Bukharin and Preobrazhensky wrote this book when they 
were close to each other politically. Deutscher 1987, 230-231. 
24 	 Wesson 1972, 118. 
25 	 Carr 1958, 44-45; Fainsod 1958, 432. 
rites were usually observed among the peasant masses.26 The alien 
"class-nature" of the countryside created a major dichotomy inside the 
party. Should the party carry on with its "pro-muzhik" line and adopt a 
careful approach to the old relics connected with the peasants, i.e. 
religion, national-mindedness and "non-culturalism" (illiteracy)? 
This discussion followed the lines of the original debate between the 
"Left" and "Right". If the move to a fully socialist society were to be 
rapid, then the obstacles to development should be removed more 
speedily than in the envisaged scheme of the Right. During these heated 
debates different factions tried to analyze the role of the peasants and 
the character of the kulak, the businessman, the believer and the 
sectarian. All the above factors were highly significant when dealing 
with Bolshevik religious policy.27 
Lenin himself had also devoted a great deal of attention to these 
questions. It seems obvious that he had realized the importance of 
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culture in building a socialist Russia. The Cultural Revolution of Lenin, 
as Carrere D'Encausse has remarked, included "the need for a modest 
and coherent advance, rejecting rash theories and untried experiments". 
This "culturalization" was for Lenin getting rid of "oblomovism"; he 
underlined the importance of the co-operative movement as a possible 
solution for achieving socialism in Russia. However, in his last written 
works he recognized the need for "culturalizing" the peasantry as the 
most vital prerequisite for the survival of Soviet power.28 Despite his 
death, Lenin's legacy and his political heritage had an influence on the 
13th congress of 23-31 May 1924. 
2. THE DEBATE ON RELIGION AND 
THE 13TH PARTY CONGRESS 
The debate in question took place two months before the official 
convocation of the 13th congress and it started when M.I. Kalinin 
published in Pravda on 16 and 17 April 1924 his theses concerning 
work in the Soviet countryside. In his proposal, which was later 
accepted as an official resolution in the congress, Kalinin rejected 
administrative methods when dealing with the peasants. His theses 
were intended to stabilize the countryside in accordance with NEP 
policy and accomplish an alliance with the peasantry. The 13th 
26 	 Davies 1980, 51-55; Pethybridge 1990, 67, 359-360. See also SSS II, 97 
27 	 Deutscher 1987, 227. See also Nikitin 1979, 102-103. 
28 	 Carrere D'Encausse 1982, 143-144; Tucker 1990, 31, 42-43. 
congress was a landmark in Soviet religious policy, the party officially 
abandoned earlier aggressive antireligious campaigns and introduced 
antireligious propaganda based on enlightenment and scientific 
explanations. This resolution, with its conciliatory language towards 
the peasants and especially towards sectarians, symbolized the 
continuation of the "religious NEP", adopted earlier in the Soviet 
system.29 
Kalinin's proposals attracted considerable attention inside the ruling 
regime. His "liberal" antireligious methods in particular irritated many 
leading communists. The first response to Kalinin's proposals was an 
article by I.I. Skvortsov-Stepanov published on 25 April 1924.3° 
Stepanov suggested another approach which underlined "sociological" 
explanations in antireligious work in accordance with the ideas of the 
"Mechanistic" school.31 According to Stepanov, the fundamental 
difficulty in Kalinin's draft was the interpretation; it could offer 
grounds for neutralism. The basic argument between Kalinin and 
Skvortsov-Stepanov, however, arose from the sectarian question. 
Stepanov could not agree with Kalinin's favourable opinion of the 
progressive economic role of the sectarian movement or Kalinin's 
proposal to use them as assistants in the Soviet economy.Sectarians 
were not pro-Soviet; these sects were hand in glove with the village 
bourgeoisie. He justified this by remarking that there was no historical 
basis for treating sectarian movements better than other religious 
groups. He admitted that sectarians had played an important role, e.g. in 
Germany in the 15th century and in England in the 16th century, but 
later they had turned out to be exploiters. He also strongly rejected 
Kalinin's notion that sects were "rational" by nature, and claimed that 
they could not benefit Soviet power. Sectarians were simply enticing 
some young people who wanted to gain privileges and be released from 
certain civic duties (such as serving in the army).32 
The difficulty of the sectarian question, as Skvortsov-Stepanov 
remarked, was the social make-up of sects in general. He believed that 
Kalinin's resolution would lead to questions such as: would this or that 
particular sect result in a more stable union between the proletariat and 
peasantry? Skvortsov—Stepanov was afraid there was a danger that this 
resolution would lead to a possible union between the peasantry and the 
29 	 "Te3HcM TOB. KanHHHHa o pa6ore B AepeBHe, ogo6peHHbie LIK PKII". Pravda, 
16 and 17 April 1924, No. 87,88. See also Tirado 1993, 486. 
30 "TprnaAuarbihi nyHKT Te3HCOB o pa6ore B uepeeHe". Pravda, 25 April 1924; 
YII, 537-538. "LloKyMeHTbi". 
31 	 See Pravda, 25 April 1924; YII, 538. ") OKyMeHTbI". 
32 	 Pravda, 25 April 1924, No. 95; YII, 538. "TloxyMexrbi". See also Pospielovsky 
1987, 31. 
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developing bourgeoisie in the villages. In conclusion, Skvortsov—
Stepanov stated that even the possibility of working with sects would 
ultimately lead to negative results. Finally, he proposed the deletion of 
the part of the resolution which dealt with sectarians and further study 
of this question.33  
Stepanov's proposal revealed the basic fear of the ruling regime 
during the NEP: would co-operation with alien elements endanger the 
existence of Soviet power? Stepanov's solution hinted at the 
possibility that the Soviet regime should find out which sectarians 
were pro-Soviet and could be turned into builders of socialism. In 
answer to Skvortsov—Stepanov's critical remarks the moderate party 
leaders attempted to assert that sectarians were mostly composed of 
the exploited elements of the Russian countryside. This can be seen 
for example in the article of the pro-sectarian V.D.Bonch—Bruevich, in 
which he denounced the arguments of Skvortsov-Stepanov and 
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maintained that sectarian organizations in ninety nine cases out of a 
hundred belonged to the poor and middle peasantry. Members of sects 
were usually poor peasants or even belonged to the "Lumpen-
proletariat". The activity of these sects was usually based on collec-
tivism and they fought against socially-harmful phenomena such as 
drunkenness, debauchery, smoking, stealing, narcotics, gambling, etc. 
Moreover, Bonch-Bruevich remarked that the economic situation of 
the sectarians was always better than that of their Orthodox peasant 
neighbours. The reason for this, however, was that their mutual 
co-operation was based in many cases not only on collective methods 
of production but on a communist way of life.34 
Bonch-Bruevich characterized sectarians as an "avantgarde, leading 
population on the agricultural peasant front" and stated that refusing to 
use them in "restoring the economy would not only be peculiar but 
criminal". He also acknowledged the merits of the sectarians in the 
battle against illiteracy and advised the forthcoming congress to hand 
over run-down state farms and communes to them. Finally, he urged the 
Soviet regime to give them "full freedom to comprehensively develop 
themselves". He demanded that Soviet power should give guarantees to 
sectarians and reassure them that they should feel free from every kind 
of "illegal, fault-finding, humiliating" hindrance.35 
This article, written by an prominent representative of the ruling 
regime, was an open recognition of the sectarian movement. But on the 
other hand, the same issue of Pravda contained another article which 
33 	 Pravda, 25 April 1924, No. 95; YII, 538. ".IloxyMeHrbl" 
34 	 Pravda, 15 May 1924, No. 108; YII, 539-540. ",IloxyMexrbI". 
35 	 Pravda, 15 May 1924, No. 108. 
strongly attacked the conciliatory tone of the proposed resolution. In an 
article entitled "Enlightenment, sectarians and prejudices", V. 
Dubovsky argued that enlightenment alone was not the best weapon 
against religion. His attack against Skvortsov—Stepanov 's opinion 
reflected "Deborinist" assumptions. He rejected Skvortsov—Stepanov's 
article and underlined the need for enlightenment and a "sociological 
approach" in Soviet antireligious work. According to Skvortsov—
Stepanov, religion was simply the result of ignorance and darkness. 
But, as Dubovsky also commented, religion was more than lack of 
knowledge, it was: 
...a primary and most dangerous enemy of communism and the 
proletarian dictatorship...36 
The problem of enlightenment lay in the fact, as Dubovsky put it, that 
enlightenment seldom destroyed "god" but more often than not 
"refined" the concept. Only enlightenment combined with the exposing 
of the class nature of religious belief would be an appropriate approach 
to this question. Therefore he urged the ruling regime to 
reveal the injury which they bring to... the class interests of the 
workers, to reveal the dangers which are threatening these interests in 
future...37 
Moreover, Dubovsky did not view sectarians as representatives of the 
poor elements of the village but on the contrary he maintained that 
sectarians were "with the kulak elements of the peasantry". Dubovsky 
was sure that sectarians were eager to educate themselves, for example 
in science and agronomy, only because they hoped to become 
economically as strong as German and Danish peasants. Finally, he 
declared that words like "prejudices" and "superstition" were not 
communist but clerical language; for communists these words should 
be in the same category as "booze, cocaine and syphilis". This article 
portrays clearly the moods of the more class-minded and belligerent 
left-wing of the party. Dubovsky characterized religion as an enemy 
and his language represented the atmosphere of the civil war. Even 
Skvortsov—Stepanov's critical attitude towards religion was not 
enough; Dubovsky condemned Skvortsov—Stepanov for his assertion 
that religion would inevitably die of its own record when the social 
36 	 "...OHa eCTb OaHH H3 rnaBHbIX H onacHei u1HX BparoB KOMMyHN3Ma H 
nponerapcKol4 Lon raTypbl". Pravda, 15 May 1924, No. 108. 
37 	 Pravda, 15 May 1924, No. 108; YII, 540. " ZIoKyMeHmi". 
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roots of religion disappeared.38 
On the eve of the congress Yaroslaysky also participated in the 
debate and wrote an article for Pravda. He declared that the party 
should not grant any extra privileges to sectarians. In this article he 
challenged the views of Kalinin and reasoned that in the proposed draft 
there was no mention of relations between sectarians and antireligious 
work. According to Yaroslaysky, sectarians were now gathering 
counter-revolutionary elements into their ranks and there was no reason 
to deal with them any differently than with other religious organi-
zations. In conclusion he stated that 
This is why we regard this resolution as erroneous. It would be best of 
all if the second paragraph of the 13th point were totally rejected or 
thoroughly revised.39 
172 	 This criticism continued on the second day of the congress when S. 
Minin presented his own article on the party resolution. Like Trotsky 
before him in 1923, Minin denied the importance of religion for the 
peasantry and especially for the Red Army. He agreed with Skvortsov—
Stepanov that Kalinin's resolution did not take into consideration 
different social classes and groups inside the sectarian movement. 
Minin believed that for the poor peasants, the sectarian movement was 
a stage on the road to atheism, but for rich peasants it was a just a new 
kind of religion. There was always a danger that people would join the 
sectarians for economic reasons. Therefore he believed that there was a 
danger that peasant speculators would join the sectarians because of 
their privileged position.40 
The dispute over the above reached a new level when Ivan 
Tregubov, a famous pro-sectarian communist, wrote an article in 
Izvestiya VTsIK defending the conciliatory tone of Kalinin's proposal. 
He pointed out that Lenin himself had proposed co-operation with 
sectarians in building model state farms 41 
These debates give an idea of the relatively free atmosphere of the 
1920s and the above views represent all views on this question. This 
press discussion exposed the different factions in the Soviet religious 
38 	 Pravda, 15 May 1924, No. 108; YII, 541. ".IIoKyMeHTbI". 
39 	 "...BOT nogeMy Mbl CMHTaeM 3Ty nOCTaHOBKy HenpaBHJIbHOFI. ,Tly4llle Bcero 
6buto 6bH STOT BTOpON a63au 13-ro nyHKTa coaepmenno Bb16POCHTb HJIH 
KOpeHHbIM o6pa3oM ero nepepa6oraTb". Pravda, 23 May 1924, No. 115. 
40 	 Pravda, 24 May 1924, No. 116. 
41 RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, d.180. "CoTpyuHviecTBo ceKTaHTOB B coseTexo-
KOMMyHHCTHYeCKOM CTpo TenbCTBe. (BHHMaHHe XIII Cbeaa PK11)"; Izvestiya, 
27 May 1924, No. 119. 
policy. Kalinin's proposal followed the line of the ruling triumvirate, 
while Skvortsov—Stepanov's represented the view of the "Mechanists" 
who believed that enlightenment would inevitably destroy religion. 
Dubovsky, for his part expressed "Deborinist"-like critique of 
class-minded hardliners, while Tregubov, Bonch-Bruevich and 
Lunacharsky were members of the moderate "lobby" inside the ruling 
regime. 
The actual 13th congress began on 23 May 1924 with Zinovev's 
political lecture on the general politics and common aspects of party 
work. This duty had been earlier performed by Lenin and the gesture 
was understood as a clear indication of the succession of power. In his 
opening speech, Zinovev examined contemporary topics in the USSR 
and one of the items to which he draw special attention was party's 
activity in the countryside. One of his main messages in this context 
was that party should enforce its cultural influence there 42 
However, the "left-opposition" close to Trotsky made an effort to 
challenge the triumvirates and the party apparatus. The spokesman of 
the "left" was Preobrazhensky, who accused the party of being 
alienated from the masses, from the younger generation, etc. Preob-
razhensky also demanded more decisive actions against rich peasants. 
The party should also recognize the danger of private capital to 
socialism. However, the congress did not accept these accusations and 
condemned the opposition gathered around Preobrazhensky and 
Trotsky as a "petty-bourgeois deviation" 43 
During the congress Kalinin had the possibility to answer criticism 
which had been delivered in the newspapers." With regard to his 
conciliatory attitude towards the peasantry, Kalinin tried to justify his 
proposals by referring to Leninist guidelines. According to Kalinin, the 
NEP policy had fulfilled its purpose but he also described how the 
improved position of the peasant economy had lead to the social 
differentiation between the poor, middle and rich peasants. Kalinin paid 
attention to the criticism of the left-wing and admitted that during the 
NEP-policy the differences between these classes had widened and 
wealthy peasants had become politically active 45 
He began his justification with quotations from Lenin and draw 
attention to the co-operative movement in general. He remarked that 
communes had flourished during the first revolutionary period but the 
situation then began to deteriorate. Problems concerning individuality 
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and working discipline emerged 46 Kalinin stressed that regardless of 
various problems in the Soviet co-operative movement, the peasant 
question in the Soviet countryside could not be solved by 
administrative methods but only by strengthening the co-operative 
movement further.47 
In this context, Kalinin outlined his initiatives concerning the party's 
attitude to the countryside intelligentsia. For example, during the NEP 
nearly all agronomists were unemployed but the Soviet state could use 
their services in its work in countryside. Kalinin suggested that 
agronomists should also take part in organizing peasant celebrations so 
essential to the peasant's way of life and so occupy the post of "secular 
priests" in peasant society. Peasants for their part should employ 
agronomists instead of the useless priests they had been supporting 
since the revolution. He wondered why the Spring time feast (the Day 
of the Trinity according the Orthodox almanac) could not be a 
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celebration of productivity, etc.48 He also urged that these kinds of 
celebrations, led by agronomists or forestry specialists, should be 
planned in more detail 49 
Kalinin's suggestion seemed to be a compromise between the pro-
posals of Trotsky and Zinovev. Trotsky had earlier proposed organizing 
secular feasts for workers and Zinovev had proposed using the neutral 
and "honest" village intelligentsia (teachers, agronomists, doctors, etc.) 
for Soviet purposes. Moreover, this proposal mirrored the suggestions 
proposed in the XI All Russian Congress of the Soviets when some of 
the representatives demanded that agronomists help more in the Soviet 
countryside. Later in 1925, certain peasant members of the XII All 
Russian Congress of the Soviets underlined the importance of 
agronomy in the antireligious work in the countryside and thought that 
the work of agronomy would automatically diminish the effect of 
the"batyushka".5° 
Kalinin explained his idea by maintaining that it was easy to convert 
peasants to these secular celebrations because the peasantry, according 
to him, was not really religiously-minded. They did not visit the church 
all year around, only during great feasts like Easter. In line with 
Trotsky's earlier claims, Kalinin believed that peasants were not 
genuinely religious but only accustomed to pre-revolutionary forms of 
social life; it was nice to be with other peasants, to chat with others and 
46 	 S13, 438. 
47 	 S13, 442 	 114. 
48 513,447. 
49 	 S13, 447. See also Fainsod 1958, 433. 
50 	 VSS XI, 25; VSS XII, 207-208. Compare ST XXI, 39-43 and Zinovev 1926, 51-
52. 
quarrel with the priest.51  
Kalinin also criticized the approach of Skvortsov—Stepanov's article 
in the religious policy sphere and declared it a "professorial" approach 
to the fight against religious prejudices. Nevertheless, Kalinin agreed 
with Skvortsov—Stepanov to some extent and remarked that the party 
programme should be made more precise. But it should be formulated 
so that it could not allow for a "talmudist" interpretation, so the 
programme itself would not limit antireligious propaganda simply to 
"materialistic explanations" as Skvortsov—Stepanov demanded. As a 
political gibe in Skvortsov—Stepanov's direction he remarked that the 
revolution had created Soviet power and the party was not really the 
party of "professors".52 
In accordance with the general conciliatory methods of the NEP, 
Kalinin urged that the party should adopt more careful policies with 
regard to the churches and religion. He used the example that if before 
the revolution someone had entered a church with his hat on, it would 
have been taken as a great revolutionary demonstration, as it would 
have been a risky deed which could have led to punishment by the 
authoritarian regime. After the October Revolution it would have been 
understood only as children's play. Nevertheless, Kalinin sought to 
refute all accusations levelled against him for advancing a neutral 
attitude toward religion. He declared that restricting the antireligious 
struggle and advocating religious neutrality was incompatible with 
communist party ideology. The party could never be neutral in this 
context; otherwise the enemies of the Soviet power could usurp the 
Soviet machine. While it was proper to abandon earlier administrative 
methods in the antireligious battle, neutrality in this matter was out of 
the question.53  
Kalinin also mentioned examples of "wrong administrative meth-
ods" in earlier antireligious work and pointed out that the persecution of 
religion only revitalized it. Moreover, Kalinin did not agree with 
Skvortsov—Stepanov either who had maintained that the 10 million sect 
members were simply exploiters. He justified this standpoint by 
appealing to the authority of the triumvirate and related how in a private 
conversation Zinovev had acknowledged that these 10 million 
sectarians could not all be kulaks. Kalinin also reminded the 
representatives that during the pre-revolutionary era the party had 
co-operated with sectarians 54 
175 
51 	 S13, 448. 
52 	 S13, 449. 
53 	 S13, 450. 
54 	 S13, 450-451. 
 
This interesting lecture was followed by a speech given by Lenin's 
widow, Nadezhda Krupskaya. In relation to work in the countryside, 
Krupskaya underlined the importance of the village. She criticised 
especially the failures of the NEP system and stressed that class 
struggle in the countryside was inevitable.55. She also drew attention to 
the poor conditions of teachers and emphasised that the party needed 
antireligious propaganda and the correct Marxist attitude in educational 
questions. In relation to this, she complained that poor peasants did not 
have the same possibilities to educate their children as the kulaks. This 
created cultural inequality between the children of the poor peasant and 
those of the kulak. Even more alarming in her opinion was the fact that 
illiteracy was growing.56 
It is intriguing to realize that although the delegates were "haunted 
by the fear of weakening the Party by their differences",57 the congress 
was not yet the monolithic construction it was to become a few years 
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later. For example, a certain delegate, S.A. Bergavinov, criticised the 
moderate approach towards the intelligentsia advocated by Zinovev. As 
his main argument, he remarked that during the civil war teachers had 
collaborated with the kulaks and consequently the party should be 
cautious when using teachers in its cultural work. He also underlined 
the suspicious class origin of teachers. Some 50% of them came from 
clerical families; they were actually sons and daughters of priests. He 
also objected to Kalinin's positive approach to sectarians. First of all, 
sectarians did not pay taxes, they did not serve in the Red Army, and 
they maintained too good relations with the kulaks. He also recognized 
the danger of the sectarian movement if it gained wider support among 
the poorer sections of the population. It was a development that the 
party could not permit and Bergavinov urged that they needed a more 
careful and more intellectual struggle against sectarians.58 
This suspicious and hostile speech indicated the limits of criticism of 
the leadership. Although the triumvirate could unite its followers 
against the critics of the "left", it was not able to silence suspicions 
among ordinary communists when dealing with such delicate questions 
as sects. Despite the conciliatory policy of the NEP, distrust of socially 
and ideologically alien elements was widespread. Communist rep-
resentatives who had just fought a civil war against these ideological 
enemies now felt ill at ease co-operating with them. As one peasant put 
it during the XI All-Russian Congress of the Soviets, the intelligentsia 
55 S13,452-454. 
56 S13,455-457. 
57 	 Carrere D'Encausse 1982, 163. 
58 	 S13, 470-471. See also Agursky 1987, 3; Fainsod 1958, 431. 
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(agronomists) were usually the sons of landowners who instead of 
doing good caused only harm 59 
In the next speech, Rykov, the Prime Minister of the Sovnarkom and 
the representative of the right, tried to calm these fears. He started by 
acknowledging Bergavinov's criticism to some extent, but for the most 
part he denounced these "leftist" views. He criticised Bergavinov for 
attacking the NEP and explained to the congress that the "cessation of 
the NEP" would not be a wise policy. There were over 1 million 
unemployed in the country and the state budget deficit was over 400 
million roubles. Moreover, Rykov explained that the Central 
Committee was aware of the facts about teachers and knew of their 
suspicious social background. Nevertheless, he asserted, this suspicion 
was groundless. Teachers had acknowledged the Soviet system and 
they could be used in the same way as engineers. Thus "every teacher 
should be treated with care, with neutrality".60 
Religious sects were, however, a different matter. Rykov stated that 
sects differed from each other. Consequently, the seeds of revolution 
might be sown in the soil of some religious movements. He reminded 
his audience, as Kalinin had done, that in pre-revolutionary times sects 
had sometimes worked together with the party. Moreover, during the 
period of the newspaper "Iskra", the party drew up a plan for using 
these movements for revolutionary purposes. For this reason, Rykov 
pointed out that: 
Those sectarian tendencies must be used in every possible way. [They] 
are served up with spiritual and religious dressings, undertake 
revolutionary assignments and are sometimes close to abandoning 
private property... 61  
At the end of this discussion a representative of the teachers' union 
brought greetings to the congress. This speech was connected to an 
initiative launch by Zinovev. During his time in Leningrad Zinovev 
had held quite an independent position and he could exercise a 
considerably unconstrained policy 62 He had introduced to the 
Leningrad area his own policy of the "out-stretched hand" and in 
general had invited people from the intelligentsia to join in building the 
59 	 VSS XI, 77; Fitzpatrick 1991, 20; Deutscher 1987, 113-117. 
60 	 S13, 472-477. 
61 	 ..."Te CeKTaHTCKHe Te9eHHA, KOTOpble nOA AYXOBHbIM H peJiHrH03Hb1M COyCOM 
HpOBOASIT peBOJIKHIHOHHb1e UAW-1H H KOTOpble HHOrAa 6JIH3KH K OTpHIIaHHK) 
9aCTHON CO6CTBeHHOCTH, Hy)KHO HCnoJib30BaTb BC59eCKH H LteIlHKOM". S13, 
477. 
62 	 Korey 1963, 254. 
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Soviet state. So it was natural that it was Zinovev who greeted the 
teachers and invited them to work with communists.63  
He did not, however, treat the intelligentsia as a whole. Zinovev 
believed that only the friendly and neutral intelligentsia should be 
addressed with a call for co-operation. Doctors, teachers and 
agronomists were no doubt less suspicious representatives of the 
intelligentsia. Moreover, working with them in the antireligious field 
could be advantageous as they had in many cases a close relation to the 
peasants and could be utilized in the fight against religion and illiteracy. 
Advocates, lawyers, professors and clergy did not belong to the 
"useful" part of the intelligentsia and, for the most part, the ruling 
regime suspected them and regarded them as counter-revolutionaries. 
For example, one party source claimed that the hostile section of the 
intelligentsia had often concealed itself in ecclesiastical councils and in 
the sectarian movement .64  
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Despite critical voices among the party the conciliatory tone towards 
religion and the sectarians was finally accepted along the lines of 
Kalinin's proposal. The final party resolution also included Zinovev's 
call for an "outstretched hand" policy and a conciliatory attitude 
towards the friendly and neutral intelligentsia was officially adopted. 
As Rykov had hoped, the sects were recognized as elements which had 
suffered during the period of Czarism. The main attention at this 
congress was anyway concentrated on a devastating attack against the 
"left" front. The party apparatus and especially the triumvirate chose 
the most natural way of defence; it criticized the "left" for its anti-
peasant policy. 
Kalinin's resolution admitted the relevance of sects. The resolution 
declared also that the party should carry out only non-coercive 
antireligious propaganda in the countryside. Moreover, it underlined 
that the party must "liquidate" all administrative measures in the fight 
against religious prejudices and ban practices such as closing churches, 
mosques, synagogues, playrooms, etc. In accordance with Kalinin's 
proposal, the resolution underlined that the character of antireligious 
propaganda should be based on materialistic explanations of nature and 
63 	 S13, 480. 
64 RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, d.186. "By3bt H aHTHpenHrHo3Haa nponaraH.a'; 
"Merojtbl aHrnpennrao3Hoft nponaraHubl"; S13, 484-485. In accordance with 
this policy, the Politburo decided on 24 April 1924 to improve the economic 
situation of teachers. RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.434 (Pp 86, 24/4-24); RTsKhIDNI 
f.17, op.60, d.755 "I1H(l)opMauHOHHasi caoaKa no nHCbMaM KOppeCnOHAeHTOB 
H 4HTaTene i yYHTenbcKOth ra3eTN "' (5.12.1925)". On party policy towards 
teachers, see Bukharin 1990, 20, 32, "flyrb K COUHanM3My H pa6ove-
KpeCTbflHCKHIi C0103 1925 r"; Bukharin 1989, 163, "3KoxoMHKa nepexottHoro 
nepHoua. Masi 1920 r". 
society. It was important that the peasantry should have things 
explained in familiar terms. Finally, this resolution stressed once again 
that the religious feelings of believers should not be insulted. The final 
victory over religion would be a question of time; it could be achieved 
by the spread of the enlightenment. This kind of careful approach was 
necessary, especially, in the Eastern republics and districts.65  
The congress also recognized the cultural aspect in its work. It was 
important that the peasant population should become acquainted with 
the party's propaganda. So it was not surprising that the fight against 
illiteracy was considered an important part of the resolution. As the 
resolution put it, the fate of Soviet power was dependent on the peasant 
question.66 In the 12th congress the conciliatory tone of Zinovev had 
initiated the "religious NEP", but before the 13th congress the 
Bolshevik party had not officially acknowledged this change. So 
Kalinin's resolution and the aftermath of the above debate indicated 
clearly that the party had entered a new era in its approach to religious 
organizations. This policy had been delayed for two years from the 
beginning of 1921.67 
The importance of the 13th congress was that it constituted a short 
breathing-space in the political struggle over the future of the Soviet 
Union. Both hardliners and moderates interpreted the results of the 13th 
congress in their own way. For the hardliners the resolution represented 
a temporary setback, but moderates saw it as the start of a long and 
steady transition period. On the one hand, the conciliatory resolution of 
the 13th congress represented the semi-official acknowledgement of 
religious organizations and the sectarians. These signals could be 
understood as indications of reconciliation with, in addition, 
church-state implications. It was more than clear that the resolutions of 
the 13th congress could be understood as a "de facto" recognition of 
both the "Living Church" movement and the "Tikhonite" church, 
implying that there was a possibility for lasting civil peace in Soviet 
Russia. 
But was this prelude to a civil peace genuine or only a temporary 
breathing-space masterminded by the triumvirate? The answer to this 
question can perhaps be found from the year 1919 when, according to 
Anatoly Levitin and Vadim Shavrov, Zinovev and Vvedensky at a 
meeting in Petrograd discussed the possibility of achieving an informal 
"concordat" between progressive Orthodox clergy and the Soviet state. 
Zinovev was of the opinion that aconcordat at that time was scarcely 
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possible, but he did not rule out the possibility of such in the future. As 
Zinovev said, 
...and as you know, I do everything in my power to avoid any kind of 
intensification in relation to the churches here in Petersburg... 
Zinovev also acknowledged that Vvedensky's progressive group could 
have great international importance and promised that if they managed 
to organize themselves, communists would support them.68 These 
political initiatives of the 13th congress — the policy of the `out-
stretched hand" and calls for co-operation with the neutral intelligentsia 
— were, however, simply tactics in Zinovev's campaign for the 
leadership of the party. But we cannot exclude the possibility that he 
would have concluded a "concordat" with religious organizations if he 
gained power. In any event, it is undeniable that Zinovev undertook his 
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political initiatives quite independently and even initiated his own 
foreign policy from Leningrad.69 
One of his adversaries and the spokesman of the defeated "left", 
Trotsky, shared the criticism of the results of the 13th congress. He 
published a lengthy article in Pravda on 23 June 1924 (no. 165) entitled 
"Leninism and workers' club" in which he commented on the 
resolution concerning religion at the 13th congress. According to him, 
the antireligious battle during the revolutionary years had been a 
success, but the situation had changed when the propaganda reached a 
politically less conscious stratum in the countryside and cities. He now 
believed that the period of frontal attack in the antireligious battle was 
over and it was time for other methods. This "truce", however, did not 
represent the abandoning of antireligious attacks on a wide front. He 
also defended the religious policy practised earlier, commenting that 
the moves against religion had been justified. He compared this 
situation to conventional warfare and stated that the Bolsheviks were 
now resting after a battle. He warned also that an unprepared frontal 
attack could lead to unpleasant results and cited a story from Norway 
where a hasty antireligious push had complicated the situation inside 
the communist party. This was also the danger when dealing with 
peasants who were more connected to the obsolete economy. Looking 
to the future, Trotsky predicted that the party would finally defeat 
religious prejudices only through the electrification and "che- 
68 	 Levitin & Shavrov 1978, 54. 
69 	 During this time he even exercised his own foreign policy. Wesson 1972, 127-128. 
For more on Zinovev's position as a leader of the Northern Commune, see 
Deutscher 1987, 3-4. See also Carr 1978a, 318-324. 
micalization" of agriculture; simply closing the churches would not 
produce decisive results — on the contrary, it would revitalize religion?° 
The change in the party's religious policy line was clear. For 
example, trade unions were the first to take a more "neutral" stance 
towards religion after the 13th congress. On 9 June the newspaper of 
the Soviet trade unions, "Trud", published a more profound 
interpretation of the decisions of the 13th congress. Firstly it 
commented that in the recent past some local leaders of trade union 
organizations had used certain "abnormal practices" in antireligious 
propaganda.71 But now, Trud declared, the revolutionary trade union 
movement would defend the economic interests of the workers 
irrespective of their nationality, religion or political conviction. 
According to the new line it would be unjust to persecute or expel 
members because of their religious or political convictions.72 
3. TOLERANCE AND AGITATION - 
THE AFTERMATH OF THE 13TH 
CONGRESS 
a. The sectarian movement and the ruling regime at the 
height of the high NEP 
One of the main architects of the Soviet religious policy, Emelyan 
Yaroslaysky, had suffered a setback in both the 12th and 13th 
congresses. The lobbying of the CAP did not persuade the party to 
adopt a firmer attitude towards religion and the resolution of the 13th 
congress granted many "privileges" to the sectarians. As a matter of 
fact, Yaroslaysky criticized the relaxed mood of the 13th congress. For 
example, he claimed that sects had a negative effect on Soviet society; 
they were exploiting labour and were concealing their true nature. 
Yaroslaysky was certain that sectarianism defended only "the will of 
god" and it disguised certain class interests under the banner of 
religion.73 The Soviet state should especially oppose the co-operative 
70 	 ST XXI, 153-155. "J1exxxx3M x pa6ovxe Kny6w". 
71 	 Giduljanov 1971, 25-26. 
72 	 Giduljanov 1971, 27. 
73 	 YI, 93. "Penxrxsx H censKop". See also YI, 95. " LlepxosHxxx B sb16opax". 
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movement of the sectarians which was contributing only to religious 
fanaticism.74 
In his thesis on antireligious propaganda he even found fault with the 
previous ineffective work of the Central Committee.75 Nevertheless, in 
his critique against the communist leadership Yaroslaysky was quite 
moderate. The campaign of appeasing the neutral intelligentsia proved 
also to be an advantageous opportunity for Yaroslaysky as it presented 
him with the chance to call on teachers and agronomists to join in the 
antireligious battle. According to his reasoning, teachers could not, 
even for tactical reasons, be distanced from antireligious propaganda.76 
This criticism reflected the ordinary "leftist" mood of rank and file 
communists at that time. The young intelligentsia and Komsomol 
activists felt frustrated during the "normalcy" of the NEP policy, 
finding themselves with "reduced outlets for their enthusiasm".77 
Nevertheless, the results of the 13th congress did not discourage 
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Yaroslaysky. It is obvious that he interpreted the resolution of the 13th 
congress as a demand for more organized antireligious activities.78  
The Soviet sectarian movement soon realized that the situation had 
changed in the wake of the 13th congress. Sectarians were even allowed 
to publish a review in which they commented on this party resolution 
by stressing that due to the new policy local officials could not use 
earlier administrative methods in their antireligious work. It was also 
remarked that local authorities could not "invent" their own legislation 
for use against religious organizations 79 
After the 13th congress moderate communist leaders sponsored 
74 	 YI, 105. "IJepxoab H rocyAapcTB0 B CCCP". This article was written for the 
German "Jahrbuch far Politik-Wirtschaft and Arbeiterwegegun" in 1925. 
Yaroslaysky's negative view concerning sectarians could be seen clearly from his 
special lecture to the Orgburo, in which he accused sectarians of antimilitarism, 
unwillingness to pay taxes and opposing culture. RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, d.120. "K 
aoxnaay B Opr6iopo 1-XII-242". 
75 	 RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, d.104. "Te3HcbI aoxnata o 3aaa'iax. cpopMax H McTOnax 
aHTHpentinio3HOI1 nponaraxa.bl B ropoae H AepeaHe. MawHHonHcHbLA reKcr. 
(6/a)". 
76 	 RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, d.99 "K Bcecolo3HoMy cbe3ay yyHreneh". 
77 	 Curtiss 1953, 202; Erlich 1960, 174. 
78 	 RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, d.104. "Te3HCu aoxnaaa o 3ana' ax cpopMax H Meroaax 
aHTHpenHrHO3HOH nponaraHabi B ropoae H aepesae. MauiHHonHcHbIsi TeKcr. 
(6/a)". 
79 	 RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, d.186. "IIone3Hbie CBea.eHHA AnA BepyK)lIHx H oco6eHHo 
anA HapoaHbix penHrHO3HbIX 061111111. IIOCTSHOBneHHe XIII Cbe3aa 
PoccHiicKo t KOMM. IIapTHH (BonbuieBHKoB)". In order to secure a conciliatory 
attitude towards sects, Ivan Tregubov sent an article published in Izvestiya to 
Stalin, together with an announcement in which he asked the General Secretary for 
reassurances that sectarians could freely organize their congress. RTsKhIDNI f.89, 
op.4, d.180. "I'eaepanbHoMy cexpeTapto PKII TOB. CTaJIHHy. 3aaBneHHe." 
co-operation with sectarians. The special commission dedicated to 
work among sectarians, the so-called "Orgkomsekt", underlined in a 
memo to Zinovev, Kamenev, Kalinin, Popov and Smidovich the 
importance of the resolution of the 13th congress by suggesting that the 
Soviet government should now give full freedom to all sectarians in 
Russia and guarantee that sectarians could develop their "collective 
life-forms". Moreover, the Orgkomsekt demanded a complete amnesty 
for all sectarians. This indicates that the security organs of the Soviet 
state were slow to comply with the decisions of the 13th congress and 
that the Orgkomsekt complained to the higher leadership that the GPU 
and the NKVD had acted contrary to the objectives of the 
"Orgkomsekt" and had paralysed the work of this commission.80 
These complaints indicate how the ruling regime attempted to adjust 
to the new "class peace". In order to find out who in the sectarian 
movement could be utilized in Soviet work, the party apparatus began 
its official analysis of the sectarian movement. At first the Central 	 183 
Committee's Orgburo gave an order for the drawing up of a special 
circular,81 which was later sent to all party committees. In this circular 
the Central Committee ordered that information be collected 
concerning the state of antireligious propaganda and details of 
sectarians in the Russian countryside.82  
According to this circular, the party should not consider sects as a 
single unit but as a multi-faceted movement. As the circular underlined, 
there were sects which, for example, opposed military service, taxes 
and Soviet cultural activities, but there were also sects carrying out 
important economic and cultural duties. This was the main reason why 
all party organs should adopt a careful and "wise" attitude towards 
sects. It also attempted to pacify party members by remarking that at the 
same time as the sectarian movement was growing, the antireligious 
movement was also experiencing growth. Consequently, responsible 
organs should take this into consideration, together with the resolutions 
of the 12th and 13th congresses, and adopt a more systematic attitude in 
80 	 GARF2, f.353, op.8, d.8 "3anHCKa 0 BOceTaHOBneHHH ,geATenbHOcTH 0006011 
KOMHCCHH "OprxoMceKT- npH HapKOM3eMe H 0006oFi pecpopMe no 
CeKTBHTCKOMy BOnpOCy B CBA3H C nocTaHOBneHNAMH XIII cbe3p,a PKII". 
81 	 RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, d.122 "BunNCKa H3 npoTOKona no: 51, 3acenaHHA 
Opr6copo UK PKII (6) OT 15-XII-24 r". 
82 	 RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, d.184. "IlpHnox<exne No. 2 x unpxynApy No. 78 OT 30 
AHBapA 1925 C. CxeMa No. 2. 0 cOCTOSIHHN aHTHpenHr1103HOFi nponaraHAb[": 
"npHnOHceHHe No. 1 K uHpKynApy No. 78 OT 30 AHBapA 1925 r. CxeMa No. 1 0 
pa3BHTHH cexraacrsa B CCCP". See also RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, d.122. 
"BbcnHcxa N3 nporoxona No. 51, 3ace,gaHHn Opr6iopo LIK PKII (6) or 
15-XII-24r" and f.17, op.112, d.775 (PCAP 62, 16/12-24). 
their antireligious propaganda.83  
The motivation of the inquiry was, as we have seen, to bring the 
"cultural-economic elements of the sectarians into the mainstream of 
Soviet life". However, the religious policy committee of the party, the 
CAP, interpreted the resolution in its own way and on 22 November 
1924 ordered the OGPU to infiltrate the sectarians in order to expose 
their true class nature.84 The CAP was especially alarmed about the 
influence which the sectarian movement exercised among the youth. As 
a result of the new policy, the CAP was not able to restrict the growing 
number of sectarian hospitals, co-operatives and charitable establish-
ments, but it directed that these enterprises should not be afford have 
any official religious recognition.85  
As we can see from the above, the ruling regime allowed sectarians 
to act relatively freely during the high NEP. In accordance with CAP 
protocols, sectarians were granted permission to organize their central 
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administrative functions and they could to some extent get their bibles 
printed. This civil peace of the high NEP did not, however, prevent 
political supervision by the security organs. Security officials 
continued to scrutinize the activities of religious organizations for 
evidence of a threat to the state. On 6 February 1926, for example, the 
CAP gave permission to the Baptists to initiate religious courses not in 
Leningrad as they wished but in Moscow. Or, if we take another 
example, the case of the Mennonites is especially revealing. The 
representatives of this sect attempted to utilize Soviet nationality policy 
for their advantage by declaring themselves Dutch and demanding that 
Soviet officials send them Dutch communists in order to promote the 
Soviet cause in their villages. Moreover, they presented a list of 
demands, which included such things as the building of special 
prayer-houses and religious schools as well as the establishing of 
biblical courses. In other words they demanded nearly the same 
privileges as Moslems had in the Eastern areas. In return, Mennonites 
promised to work for the Soviet economy in their co-operative 
movements. This exceptional manoeuvre embarrassed the Soviet 
authorities, who had of course very few Dutch speaking communists 
83 RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, d.184. "BceM LIK. HauKoMnapTHH. O6n6iopo LIK. 
O6KOMaM. KpaFIKOMaM. ry6KOMaM H OKpyNCKOMaM PKII (6-OB). 0 
CeKTaHTCKOM ABH)KeHHH H 06 aHTHpennrHo3HON nponaraHAe (No. 78 OT 
slumps 1925 rona)". 
84 ...nOpy9HTb OrIIY npOBeCTH pa6ory cpeAH CeKTaHTCTBa no nHHHH MX 
Knaccoro pa3o6na9eHHB. RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, d.775 (PCAP 59, 22/11-24). 
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RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, d.775 (PCAP 59, 22/11-24); f.17, op.112, d.775 (PCAP 
60, 28/11-24). 
among their ranks.86 
The case of the Mennonites was quite unique and their demands 
were promptly turned down. Although the 13th congress had 
acknowledged the importance of sectarians, the ruling regime wanted 
to strip the Mennonites of their religious identity and to turn them 
simply into a national group. As Agitprop sources suggest, the 
Mennonites were allowed to rebuild their agricultural unions and 
strengthen their co-operative movements only under the condition that 
such work would be done without the use of any religious slogans.87 
The major problem concerning the sectarian movement was, 
however, the question of serving in the Red Army. During the high 
NEP, the Soviet security organs and CAP actively concentrated on 
fighting against the anti-militarism of the sectarian movement. For 
example, the GPU was active "to make influence" in sectarian 
congresses so that Soviet sectarians would accept military service as a 
rule.88 However, the case of the Tolstoyans was particularly 
problematic. This sect did not accept any military service at all. The 
problem, however, was that due to its atheistic nature, officials could 
not classify it as a religious sect enjoying exemption from military 
service for religious reasons. As a result, young Tolstoyans were put in 
jail as deserters. This decision was not anyhow unanimous among 
Soviet officials; even a certain so-called "religious affairs specialists" 
inside the ruling regime acknowledged that the Soviet Supreme Court 
and the NKYust had made a mistake when they denied young 
Tolstoyans the possibility of exemption from military service 89 
As already mentioned, the ruling regime began to feel anxious about 
the growth of the sectarian movement. According to one report, the 
growth of the movement among the peasantry coincided with the 
economic rise of the kulaks. At first Soviet officials attempted to 
restrict this growth by encouraging conflicts between the ROC and 
sectarians. This plan was devised by the secret police and on 15 May 
86 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, d.353 (PCAP 69, 6/2-26); GARF1 f.5407, op.l, d.20 
"06 3MHrpauHOHHOM ABHN(CHHH MQHHOHHTOB"; GARF2 f.353, op.8, d.8 "B 
LIeHTpanbHblFi KOMHTeT CCCP. ,1ZOKnaAHaA 3anHCxa": "COuHanbHO- 
peBOnIOUHOHHOe 3Ha`ieHHe CeKTaHCTBa". See also Kolarz 1961, 277-279. 
87 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, d.776 "IIporoxon cOBeuzaHHA no pa6oTe cpeAH 
MCHHOHHTOB flint arernpone UK PK1I (6) OT 28/X-25"; "cexperapeaT LIK 
PKII/6/: (I:paKUHA CenbCKOCOIO3a (HOA6pA 18 AHA 1925)". 
88 	 See RdO, 38-40. 
89 RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, d.165. "0 nOnON(eHHH B CCCP eAHHOMbIHIRQHHHKOB 
JI.H. ToncToro TaK Ha3. ToncTOBueB B OTHOHIeHHH HX OCB06o)KAeHHA OT 
BOeHHOIi CnyN(6b1 no penHrH03HbIM y6eN(AeHHAM"; RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, 
d.353 (PCAP 71, 5/3-26); (PCAP 80, 24/12-26); RTsKhIDNI f. 613, op. 3, d. 197. 
"B H.K.P.K.H. C.C.C.P.". 
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1926 it was introduced to the CAP by Tuchkov. In his lecture to 
members of the CAP he underlined the positive results of this policy. 
There would be no risks to the regime, as this fight would simply result 
in the expression of "dogmatic banalities". This strategy was also used 
in dealing with Renovationists and Tikhonites. The primary aim was to 
"divide and rule", to make the religious-minded fight against each other 
and thus hamper their activities without any direct interference on the 
part of Soviet officials.90 
Creating a schism against politically harmful clergymen was a 
normal tactic of the CAP. Interference and active meddling of this sort 
was such a normal practice that a prominent communist official in 
Soviet Armenia, A.M. Nazaretyan (1889-1938), in a lecture about the 
Armenian church in December 1926, mentioned as a rare occurrence 
that a pro-government opposition had grown up inside the Armenian 
church without the assistance of the ruling regime 91 Moreover, the 
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tactic of fomenting schisms inside religious organizations was also 
utilized in connection with Orthodox organisations abroad. The 
Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Chicherin, suggested in a meeting of the 
CAP that the Soviet regime should organize Renovationist groups 
inside foreign Russian Orthodox religious assemblies in order to turn 
them against old-fashioned clericals.92 
b. The development of the ecclesiastical schism 
Although the 13th congress was conciliatory in its resolutions it did not 
suggest any particular solution to the ecclesiastical schism. The CAP 
kept a watch for possible anti-Soviet manifestations among both the 
Tikhonites and Renovationists and more importantly it tried to preserve 
the balance between them. For example, when the Tikhonites were 
prospering too much, the CAP decided to organize "tactical re-
pressions" against them in order to boost the fortunes of the Reno-
vationists.93  
However, Tikhon's release was a turning point in the Russian 
Orthodox ecclesiastical schism. After that it was clear that the 
Renovationists would gradually be defeated by the Tikhonites, as the 
90 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, d.353 (PCAP 73, 15/5-26); f.17, op.112, d.353 (PCAP 
80, 24/12-26); f.17, op.60, d.793 "CeKTancTso H axTHpennrno3HaA nponaraHga 
(27/30 anpenA 1926 roaa)". 
91 	 RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, d.187. ",iZoKnaAHaA 3anHCKa O COCTOSIHHH ApMAHCKOF`f 
uepxse". 
92 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, d.353 (PCAP 74, 6/6-26). 
93 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.l 12, d.775 (PCAP 53, 2/7-24). 
majority of the laity and the priests were faithful to the Patriarch's 
church. At the same time, the ruling regime took a more reserved 
attitude towards Renovationists. Dimitry V. Pospielovsky maintains 
that informal recognition of the Tikhonite church occurred as a result of 
the failure of the Renovationists to "attract and keep the masses of 
Orthodox believers" 94 
One can, however, also think of other explanations for this change of 
policy. As we have seen earlier, the Renovationists were not as 
submissive as the government believed they would be. For example, 
even the obedient Kranitsky demanded in his letter to Rykov in 1922 
that the Soviet "separation decree" should be altered in Soviet Russia. 
Kranitsky insisted that the state should not support atheism because the 
Bolsheviks had earlier advocated that religion should be a "private 
matter". In addition, the ruling regime was anxious to limit the 
influence of the Renovationists among the population and wanted to cut 
back on its support for them. Kursky, the leader of the NKYust, 
proposed in letter of 21 May 1924 to Soviet Prime Minister Rykov that 
there should be free competition between the Renovationist and 
"Tikhonite" churches.95  
However, this policy of non-intervention in the ecclesiastical schism 
was put to the test when Patriarch Tikhon died on 7 April 1925. Two 
days later, on 9 April 1925, the Politburo decided to publish a short 
announcement concerning Tikhon's death. This announcement was of 
particular significance because it contained Tikhon's famous "last will" 
in which he declared his loyalty to Soviet power. In this will Tikhon 
urged Russian Orthodox believers to join him in welcoming the Soviet 
government; the ROC should not compromise in matters of faith but 
should be sincere in its relations with the Soviet regime. The ROC 
should not fight against the ruling regime but against its own true 
enemies — sectarians, Catholics, Protestants, Renovationists and, 
interestingly, the Godless-movement. It is not possible here to enter 
into a discussion concerning the authenticity of Tikhon's will, but 
whatever the case, the will seemed to serve the interests of the Soviet 
state extremely we11.96 
Tikhon's will did not tarnish his memory among the Orthodox laity. 
His funeral was in fact an outstanding event. As Leonard Hodgson, a 
representative of the British Foreign Office in Russia commented, the 
94 	 Pospielovsky 1984, 54-55, 61. 
95 	 GARFI f. 5446c, op. 55, d.340 "YeaHcaeMviy rosapNut"; f.5263, op. 1, d. 57(1) 
"flpeuceuaremo Cosera HapouxWx KoMNccapoa ros. A.H. PMKoay MR 21. 
1924". 
96 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.496 (Pp 56, 9/4-25); Curtiss 1953, 176. 
187 
funeral of Patriarch Tikhon was a "very remarkable demonstration of 
public feeling". He also noted that all classes of society attended 97 
The veneration shown Tikhon's remains must have come as an 
unpleasant surprise for the ruling regime. The public outburst of 
religious feeling during the funeral ceremonies implied that religion 
could mobilize strong feelings and gather the masses behind it. The 
question of Tikhon's successor proved to be complex as Tikhon had 
nominated three different clergymen as his choices for Locum Tenens. 
After the death of Tikhon, the Renovationists called an All-Russian 
Sobor in which they attempted, as it would seem, to end the schism on 
their own terms. Nevertheless, one of the Locum Tenentes, Peter (Petr 
Fedorovich Polyansky, 1863-1936), the Metropolitan of Krutitsy, 
turned down this offer and made a public announcement rejecting the 
overtures of the Renovationists. Another Locum Tenens, Metropolitan 
of Yaroslavl, Agafangel (Aleksandr Lavrentivich Preobrazhensky, 
188 	 1854-1928) was prevented from taking over the duties of Patriarch in 
Moscow as Soviet officials did not allow him to travel to the capital9$ 
The CAP reacted to Peter's declaration by attempting to organize 
another schism among the Tikhonite clergy and to foment opposition 
against Peter. In order to accomplish this, the CAP tried to "compro-
mise" Peter by using material from the Renovationist meetings. The 
CAP feared that the Tikhonites were allying themselves with 
opposition-minded clergy and accordingly it advised the secret police, 
the OGPU, to put former ecclesiastical leaders such as V.K. Sabler 
(1847-1929) "and other anti-Soviet monarchists" under special 
supervision 99 
Despite its efforts, the CAP did not succeed in creating another 
schism or in undermining Peter's authority among the Tikhonites.This 
was an obvious reason for his subsequent arrest. On 9 December 1925 
the CAP decided to arrest Peter for "carrying on religious policy which 
was clearly hostile to Soviet power". The actual arrest took place on 25 
December 1925.100 At this point, the CAP gave its support to its own 
candidate, the pro-Soviet Metropolitan of Leningrad, Grigory (Nikolai 
Chukov, 1870-1955). In addition, the CAP attempted to strengthen his 
position by organizing a schism among the different Locum Tenentes. 
Although Grigory received the backing of the government, he could not 
get the support of Sergei (Ivan Nikolaevich Stragorodsky, 1867-1944), 
another of the Locum Tenentes, who later claimed to be the supreme 
97 	 BDOFA 8, 30. 
98 	 Curtiss 1953, 179. 
99 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, d.775 (PCAP 66, 11/11-25). 
100 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, d.775 (PCAP 68, 9/12-25). 
authority of the ROC. The CAP answered by arresting all the other 
Locum Tenentes.1°1 
Previous machinations indicate how the ruling regime meddled in 
the internal affairs of the ROC and how it had even attempted to 
nominate its own candidate to the Patriarchal office. As a result of this, 
Tikhon's eventual successor in the Patriarchate, Metropolitan Sergei, 
was obliged to negotiate for years with the Soviet regime and his 
semi-official leadership of the ROC had to be propped up behind the 
scenes by the government as late as May 1927 when Sergei announced 
a "full and unconditional" declaration of loyalty to Soviet power.l°2 
However, one possible reason for Soviet recognition of Sergei may 
have been the realization that the Renovationists were engaged in 
"harmful" activity. The ruling regime had observed that the 
Renovationists were utilizing their favoured position in order to 
distribute propaganda of a "harmful, idealistic-philosophical charac- 
ter".103 In addition, the constant suspicions of the CAP and the arrests 	 189 
of the Locum Tenentes demonstrated how the ruling regime was not 
certain of what kind of religious policy it should adopt. This "zig-zag" 
policy indicates clearly how the regime had not yet made up its mind 
with regard to the ROC and the Patriarchate. One important reason for 
this was the bitter power struggle inside the party. This inconsistency 
was reflected in different ways. For example, moderate officials sought 
to preserve the prestige of the Soviet state abroad and the question of 
removing icons from the walls of the Kremlin caused the intervention 
of Prime Minister Rykov. In his letter to A.S. Enukidze, Rykov 
expressed his concern about the extreme revolutionary fervour of some 
communists concerning this matter. The ruling regime had nominated a 
commission to tackle this problem and, according to Rykov, one of its 
members, Zhidelev, had shown more revolutionary "diligence" than 
understanding and tact. Foreign archaeologists and observers would 
certainly accuse them of "vandalism" if they did not handle this matter 
with care.104 
101 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, d.353 (PCAP 72, 24/4-26); Curtiss 1953, 183. 
102 	 Fletcher 1971, 54-57. 
103 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.l 12, d.353 (PCAP 71, 5/3-26); Curtiss 1953, 184-185; Carr 
1978b, 383. 
104 GARFI f.5446e, op.55, d.735 "Ilpeaceaarenb EeyKea3e A.C.": Conquest 1968, 
19-20. 
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The questions of national minorities and religion after 
the 13th congress 
Another practical consequence of the 13th congress was the 
continuation of the korenizatsiya-policy. As a result of this, local party 
organs were allowed to utilize the services of the loyal intelligentsia 
and even of leftist Moslem clergy in Eastern areas.105 This was a 
considerable concession, which was in sharp contrast to the situation 
pertaining in other parts of the Soviet state. As party historian Popov 
remarked in his lecture to party secretaries in 1924, there was a great 
difference between the practices of central Russia and the more remote 
areas concerning membership of the party. Unlike in Eastern areas, in 
central districts party officials expelled ordinary communists for taking 
part in religious rites.106 
So after the 13th congress religious organizations in the Eastern 
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areas could grow. An official initiative to obtain land for Jewish 
peasants reflects this conciliatory policy. During the high NEP the 
communist regime encouraged Jewish settlers to obtain land for the 
Soviet Jewish population, thus creating an independent Jewish national 
area. In accordance with this policy, the Politburo established a com-
mittee in order to locate a possible homeland for Jewish agricultural 
settlers. This committee with members like Kalinin, M.I. Latsis 
(Sudrabs, Ya. F. 1888-1938), S.V. Kossior (1889-1939), Chicherin, 
V.V. Kuibyshev (1888-1935), S.M. Dimanshtein (1886-1939), Yu. 
Larin and G.I. Petrovsky (1877-1958) made a proposal which 
suggested several possibilities for resettling Soviet Jews. The com-
mittee recommended establishing Jewish agricultural settlements in 
thinly populated areas such as the Crimean peninsula, the Kuban-Azov 
area, Altai, Novorossiisk or in the district of Salskovo.107 This 
memorandum, together with the setting up in January 1925 of a special 
organization, OZET (Society for Settling Jewish Toilers in Agriculture) 
suggested a new kind of policy towards the Jewish population. In 
contrast to common Soviet practice, even "lishentsy" were allowed to 
work in this organization.108 According to this policy, the Jewish 
population could establish their own agricultural collectives in which 
their religious habits would be observed and religious schools could 
function.109 
105 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op. 112, d.473 "MeponpHATHH no npoaeAeHHro B )KH3Hb 
peWeHHN XIII-ro cbe3Aa PKII H LIK no HBgHOHBJIbHOMy Bonpocy". 
106 Popov 1924, 124. 
107 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.546 (Pp 10, 11/2-26); (Pp 39, 8/7-26). 
108 	 See GARF1 f.7541, op.l, d. 12,1. 3. 
109 Kolarz 1961, 377-380; Pinkus 1988, 62-65, 102. 
The motivation for this initiative lay in the fact that in the 
atmosphere of the high NEP some Soviet leaders wanted to resolve the 
Jewish nationality question by giving them the possibility of forming 
their own nation. The idea was, as Mikhail Kalinin outlined it, to 
provide land for working Jews in one particular place. If hundreds of 
thousands of Jews in a compact group were to move into one area, they 
would constitute a nation according to Bolshevik thinking. Forming a 
nation could also resolve their economic problems and would help them 
maintain their national identity. Plans to settle Jews in agricultural 
colonies, however, met great resistance among the local population. 
The only place where no local resistance occurred was the area of 
Birobidzhan in the Soviet Far East.l t° 
The "korenizatsiya-policy" also benefitted the position of the 
Moslem religion, despite the fact that these "privileges" for Islam had 
irritated many communists. After 1921 hardline communists had tried 
unsuccessfully to curtail the religious teaching of the mullahs, but the 	 191 
"lobbying" of the CAP with regard to this matter met with no results. 
The 13th congress represented the official recognition of privileges for 
the Moslem population. One of the most interesting outcomes of this 
was the initiative to utilize the intelligentsia and the reformist Moslem 
clergy with the express purpose of strengthening Soviet power 
inEastern areas. In conclusion we might state that the large Moslem 
population of the Eastern parts of the Soviet state could practise its 
religion freely and without hindrance. During the summer of 1924 the 
Commissariat of Nationalities even sent a special letter in which it 
confirmed the restrictions on the persecution of mullahs. Moreover, 
while this letter to the Tatar-Bashkiria Gubkom bureau forbade the use 
of Soviet premises for religious teaching local officials were even more 
conciliatory than Moscow. For example, in one of their reports to 
Moscow local communists explained that the sympathetic treatment of 
the Moslem clergy was a result of the "social-economic" national 
character of the Moslem religion." 
Moreover, as another local source explained in "Sultan-Galievist" 
mode, the main reason for a different attitude to Islam in remote regions 
was the fact that this religion was a younger religion than others and 
that it had preserved more effective roots in the local population. There 
were also historical reasons. During the autocracy Islam had been 
persecuted for national reasons and local people regarded the Moslem 
110 Gitelman 1988, 142-150. 
111 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.l, d.473. "MeponpHaraa no npoBe,geaHlo B JKH3Hb 
peu[eaHfl XIII-ro cbe3Aa PKII n LIK no HaCIHOHaabHOMy Bonpocy"; 
RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.61, d.167. "B Tar.Bam. 61opo ry6KOM PKII B 
AHTHpe111411103Hy10 KOMHCCHK) rim" UK PKII (6)". 
clergy as national heroes oppressed by the religion of a conquering 
people, i.e. Christians.112 
Although the ideas of Sultan-Galiev had earlier been condemned and 
many influential communists had objected to them, many local 
communists utilized his justifications without any hindrance and linked 
them with the nationality question. So Moscow had to move slowly in 
this sphere. So far, the party's relations with the peoples of the East and 
their religion were motivated by its conciliatory "general Eastern 
policy".113 
This breathing-space of the high NEP, nonetheless, was anyhow 
quite short. Gradually, the ruling regime showed some concern for the 
ideological situation in its Eastern areas where the activity of the 
Moslem clergy was seen as underlining the need for unification in the 
Soviet state. For example, the congress of Moslem clergy in Ufa in 
1926 was seen as a sign of the growing political awareness of the 
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Moslem population. As one surveillance report drawn up by the 
Agitprop maintained, all the activity at this congress was guided by the 
political ambitions of the Moslem clergy. According to the worried 
Soviet officials the Moslem clergy were now trying to gain influence 
among the peasants in order to "fanaticise" them. So it was understand-
able that the XIII All-Russian Congress of the Soviets gave expression 
to the concern of officials in this matter in 1925. This congress 
discovered that the Moslem clergy were obstructing Soviet work in the 
underdeveloped republics. For example, one of its delegates from the 
East declared that the new bourgeoisie was promoting religious ideas 
through the agency of the mullahs. He accused the Moslem clergy of 
fighting for religious schools and engaging in counter-revolutionary 
and anti-Soviet activity. He also remarked that all anti-Soviet, kulak 
elements in the countryside were concentrated around "mullahs" who 
were "very skilfully exploiting the ignorance of the peasant masses".114 
112 	 "...PyKOBQUHTenH MycynbMaHCKON pe.(1HrHH B 6011bIIIHHCTBe. B rna3aX HapQua 
3aHHManH non03KeHHe...yrHeTaeMbIX 3a Ha pou. 3a HauHx)...H C4HTanHCb 
repOAMH...My4eHHKaMH, nepeHOCAHIHMH rHeT H rOHeHHA CO CTopOHbl 
npaBHTenbCTBa H ApyrHX CHnbHel~iWHx penHrHH H B 4aCTHOCTH CO CTOpoHbl 
penarHH...rocnoucTBylolueil HauHH... xpxcrxaHCTBa. RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, 
d.186. "0 Merouax aHTHpenHrH03Ho17 nponaraHubl cpeuH SaulKHpo- 
TaTpacxoro HaceneHHA ABCCP (6e3 HMeHH)". 
113 RTsKhIDNI 1.89, op.4, d.186; "0 Merouax aHTHpenHrxo3HOF1 nponaraHubl 
cpeuH Bamxnpo-rarpacxoro HaceneHHA ABCCP (6e3 HMeHH)'; 89/4/104 
"Te3Hcbl uoKnaA.a o 3aua4aX (popMax H MerouaX aHTHpenHfHO3HO}1 
nponaraHum B ropoue H uepeaxe. MaHtHHonxcHbiH rexcr. (6/u)". As CAP 
sources indicate, sometimes the reason for lack of antireligious work among the 
national minorities was simply shortage of material. RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, 
d.353 (PCAP 73, 15/5-26). 
114 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.60, d.796 "Marepxan o cbe3ue MycuyxOBeHTcsa B Ycpe"; 
VSS XII, 427, 445. 
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Despite this harsh language and the fact that during 1925-26 the 
ruling regime was only step by step abolishing the Islamic (sharia) 
courts the situation in the Eastern republics remained stable until the 
end of the NEP. The resolution of the 13th congress had warned about 
hasty antireligious propaganda in the East and this was the reason why 
communists continued their tactful policy towards the Moslem 
population. A superb example of this careful policy was the speech of 
the nominal head of the Soviet state on 8 February 1925. Kalinin 
explained to his Moslem audience in a very cautious and diplomatic 
manner the reasons why mullahs and kulaks could not take part in 
elections. During this speech Kalinin dealt with the Islamic religion 
with the utmost respect and, using religious arguments, persuaded his 
audience to listen to his appeal for the equality of men and women. 
Kalinin explained that Mohammed had been a very wise man and 
would have written the Koran differently if he had lived in the modern 
era)15 
d. The Soviet regime and Catholics 
The conciliatory religious policy atmosphere was also reflected in 
Soviet relations with the Catholic church, which had worsened since 
the Soviet Union had expelled the representatives of the Vatican famine 
relief mission in 1924. Nevertheless, during 1925 the Soviet regime 
proposed negotiations in order to settle issues on finances, the religious 
education of the Catholic population, the appointment of bishops, the 
promulgation of papal bulls, and general communication between the 
Vatican and the Soviet Union.116 
For many representatives of the ruling regime, any political 
compromise with the Vatican was a bitter pill to have to swallow. As 
Krasikov put it in his letter to the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, 
Chicherin, any concordat with the Vatican would be harmful for 
propaganda and would discredit Soviet power in the eyes of the 
European and American proletariat. According to these hardliners there 
was no need to treat the Vatican any differently from other religious 
organs.' I7 
Despite these warnings an official meeting between Soviet Foreign 
115 Kalinin 1958, 218, 222-223. "H3 6ecetbf c AexKaHaMH KHw.RaKa BaraytHH 
Byxapcxoro yesaa". See also Conquest 1968, 70-71. 
116 Dunn 1977, 36; Conquest 1968, 82-83. See also the protocols of the Politburo 
meeting of 2 December 1924. RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.480 (Pp 40, 2/12-24). 
117 GARF1 f.5263, op.1, d.55(1) "B HapOAHbd1 KOMHCCapHaT no HHOCTpaHHbIM 
AenaM (22. Mapra -24)"; GARF1 f.5263, op. 1, d. 55(2) "B HapxoMHHAen TOB. 
LIH9epHHy HOA6pa 24.23 r.". 
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Commissar Chicherin and Papal Nuncio Pacelli (later Pope Pius XII) 
took place in Berlin, the first on 6 October 1925 and again on 14 June 
1927. These negotiations dealt mainly with the possibility of the legal 
recognition of Catholicism. Simultaneously the Vatican sent its 
emissary Michel d'Herbigny (1880-1957) to the Soviet Union for more 
detailed negotiations. Together with his official duties he had a 
clandestine mission to secretly consecrate new Catholic bishops in 
Soviet Russia. This "dual diplomacy" did not produce lasting results. 
D'Herbigny was able to consecrate some bishops but quite soon, in 
August 1926, he was expelled and the bishops he ordained put in 
prison.118  
According to Dennis J. Dunn these negotiations, nevertheless, reveal 
that the Soviet regime, under Stalin's leadership, had become alarmed 
at the weakening of the mutual agreement formulated in Rapallo in 
1922 and feared an attack from thecapitalist world. In order to "open 
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other avenues of contact with the western world", it would seem that 
the Soviet government was willing to negotiate also with the 
Vatican.119 However, this was not the sole reason for their actions. The 
Soviet government was, of course, anxious to reduce the threat of 
foreign intervention, but the real motivation for this detente seems to 
have been the desire to de-nationalize the Soviet Catholic church which 
was Polish in origin. Moreover, the Soviet regime also exercised dual 
diplomacy. Firstly it bargained with the Vatican and at the same time it 
attacked the nationally-minded cardinals in Ukraine and in Belorussia. 
As we can see from the protocols of the CAP, the ruling regime tried to 
apply its "divide and rule" tactics by creating different blocks among 
the Catholics.12° 
At the height of NEP and during the negotiations between Krasikov 
and Pacelli it was decided at a meeting of the CAP that the Soviet state 
did not propose to make compromises on the decree of 1918 and on 
formal religious policy jurisdiction.121  The negotiations were formally 
broken off in 1926 when the Soviet secret police discovered the 
clandestine activities of d'Herbigny and this intensified the suspicions 
of Soviet hardliners. The second and much more important reason for 
cessation of these negotiations may have been that the internal power 
struggle was turning the Soviet Union in a leftist direction and that 
118 Dunn 1977, 36; Stehle 1990, 348. According to Nicolas Zemov, Rome wanted to 
undermine the ROC and strengthen Uniate Catholics by sending d'Herbigny to the 
Soviet Union. Zemov 1963, 254-255. 
119 	 Dunn 1977, 36. 
120 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, d.775 (PCAP 66, 11/11-25). See also RTsKhIDNI f.89, 
op.3, d.86, 1.12. 
121 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.l 12, d.353 (PCAP 74, 6/6-26). 
Stalin favoured the "Soviet war option". The Catholic church with its 
international connections was a suitable scapegoat.122  The axis of 
nationally-minded Poland and the "aggressive" Catholic church was a 
formidable threat in the minds of the Soviet leadership and this foreign 
danger even had repercussions in antireligious activity and in official 
propaganda. For example, Yaroslaysky's speech in Warsaw to the 
international assembly of freethinkers in 1927 underlined that religion 
and national-mindedness were both understood as dangerous weapons 
used by the capitalist world against the workers. He declared that the 
proletariat of Poland should fight against the two weapons of 
capitalism: religion and nationalism.123  The Catholic church remained 
the most formidable ideological enemy of the Soviet regime until the 
mid-1930s when Stalin attempted to build a common front against Nazi 
Germany and the French communist leader Maurice Thorez, with 
Soviet support, introduced the "policy of the outstretched hand" with 
regard to Catholics.124 
4. THE AGGRAVATED SITUATION 
BEFORE THE 15TH CONFERENCE 
AND THE SEARCH FOR A NEW 
ANTIRELIGIOUS LINE 
The inner-party feud between Trotsky and the triumvirate culminated at 
the beginning of 1925 with the resignation of Trotsky from his post as 
War Commissar. The triumvirate of Zinovev, Kamenev and Stalin was 
now relegated to history. These contenders for power were obliged to 
find new allies and could no longer afford to neglect the criticism of the 
"left", which still had influence among the party's ranks. The defeat of 
the "left" in the 13th congress had dealt leftist policies a severe blow. 
But the younger generation especially was frustrated; the ideologically 
devoted and militant Komsomol movement was longing for a chance to 
122 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, d.353 (PCAP 77, 8/10-26), (PCAP 80, 24/12-26); Dunn 
1977, 36-37. 
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display heroism against class enemies. During the"normalcy" of the 
NEP the Komsomol movement was obliged to wrestle with less heroic 
problems, such as the consumption of vodka and the sexual ethics of the 
younger generation.125 
The relatively free religious policy of the high NEP did not please 
the more ardent members of the ruling regime. In particular, some 
militant Komsomol leaders were often in conflict over official 
restrictions. One of the main targets of their criticism was the Narkom-
pros, the Commissariat of Education, which was seen as too "soft" and 
mild in relation to class enemies. As a matter of a fact, it did not sponsor 
specifically atheist education but concentrated on non-religious teach-
ing without any special emphasis on atheist doctrine.126 
The Narkompros was, nonetheless, also a target of the Komsomols 
as a defender of the vestiges of the old pre-revolutionary society. There 
were also "real enemies" of the people and one of the most formidable 
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of these was the Russian Orthodox Church. It was one of the few 
associations that had survived from the pre-revolutionary period and, in 
1925, even less than hawkish Kalinin had acknowledged this. 
According to him, the ROC was the "only anti-Soviet, legally 
acknowledged organization" in the Soviet Union.127 Nevertheless, the 
militant younger generation was forced to retreat on this issue when the 
communist leadership opted for the policy adopted at the 12th and 13th 
congresses. In accordance with the slogan of "revolutionary legality", 
officials attempted to restrict the most aggressive forms of Komsomol 
activity. As a result, in the Russian countryside and in some Eastern 
Moslem areas the Komsomol movement even became weaker and 
religious organizations gained ground among the population.' 28 
The disintegrating of the senior leadership also had an effect in the 
sphere of religious policy. Before the opening of the 14th conference of 
the RKP(b) in Moscow on 27 April 1925, Yaroslaysky and the CAP 
encountered heavy criticism. M.M. Kostelovskaya, the editor of 
125 	 Baum 1987, 16-23; Fisher 1959, 128-130. See the protocols of the Komsomol VII 
All-Union congress, where the leadership of the Communist Youth directed its 
criticism against "drunkenness and hooliganism" among ordinary Komsomols. 
SSLKSM VII, 28-31. Only a few representatives wamed the congress of the 
danger posed by religion, i.e. religious sects and Moslem clergy. SSLKSM VII, 
90-91; 211. See also RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.85, d.288, II. 68-70, 71. 
126 Fitzpatrick 1979,12-13,22. 
127 	 Kalinin 1968, 43. 
128 	 SSS III, 266-267; Fisher 1959, 128. See also Giduljanov 1971,33-34,239-241 and 
RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.61, d.167 "aa.ArnrnponoM (28.e[oaa 1924)". The CAP also 
condemned the activities of the Komsomol in the antireligious battle. See 
RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, d.775 (PCAP 53,27/-24). For foreign observations, see 
BDOFA 8,20; Pethybridge 1990,351-354,360. 
"Bezbozhnik u Stanka" in Moscow, published an article in Pravda on 
25 January 1925 with the headline "Concerning the mistakes in 
antireligious propaganda". In this article Kostelovskaya condemned 
previous antireligious propaganda as administrative by nature and 
stated that the party's antireligious propaganda had been perverted and 
had declined to the level of confiscating church-bells and closing down 
churches. This "deviation", as Kostelovskaya called it, had been 
promoted by some antireligious workers. Moreover, it had developed in 
accordance with the erroneous principles of not separating politics and 
propaganda from each other. Moreover, Kostelovskaya criticised 
antireligious propaganda as being inconsistent: the propaganda in the 
countryside differed greatly from that in the cities. One way out of this 
problem was, according to Kostelovskaya, abandoning the old methods 
of work in this field.129 
This criticism could be seen partly as a personal attack on Yaros- 
laysky. Nevertheless, the publication of such an indirect attack on 	 197 
official antireligious propaganda reflected the growing influence of the 
left. Ordinary members of the party feltthemselves alienated in the NEP 
conditions and "leftist" slogans gained ground. In this sense, Koste-
lovskaya's article reflected the mood of the independently-minded 
antireligious circles in Moscow and it expressed the feelings of the 
"left" of the party, who were, nonetheless, allowed to voice criticism 
within certain limits, and of party members who were worried by 
bureaucratic attitudes within the party administration.13o 
Yaroslaysky replied angrily to Kostelovskaya's criticism in Pravda 
and described it as a personal attack on himself. In his protest to the 
editorial board of Pravda, he complained that he had not been given the 
opportunity to comment on Kostelovskaya's article. Moreover, the 
CAP, which functioned under Yaroslaysky's leadership, was convened 
in order to condemn the Pravda article.131  
During this meeting Kostelovskaya defended herself by claiming 
that as a member of the party she had the right to express her views in 
Pravda. The main argument she put forward in her defence 
concentrated on the fact that she and other representatives of Moscow's 
antireligious workers had been overlooked in the antireligious work in 
general. Before the 13th congress she had complained about this to the 
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party, but in vain. Kostelovskaya repeated her criticism and stated that 
the CAP itself was occupied only with administrative work and was not 
really active in antireligious propaganda. To some extent her 
complaints seemed justified; although she was a member of CAP, 
Yaroslaysky had hardly bothered to invite her to attend meetings.132 
This episode indicates that behind the scenes there was a tense power 
struggle within the party. Gradually, the official speeches became more 
and more critical of the NEP policy133  and initiatives such as "faces to 
countryside" and "revitalizing the soviets" were forgotten. For 
example, these suspicions were expressed in Yaroslaysky's article 
"Clerics in the elections", published on 29 March 1925. When the 14th 
conference failed to mention churches as possible enemies of the Soviet 
power, Yaroslaysky was, nonetheless, ready to classify them as such. In 
the above-mentioned article he explained the reasons why clerics could 
not vote or be candidates. The church had always served the 
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landowners and capitalists. He also reminded his readers of the history 
of the ROC during the civil war; clerics had at that time cursed Soviet 
power and helped the Whites. After the consolidation of Soviet power, 
priests and sectarians were obliged to conceal their anti-Soviet 
character and preach in more subtle ways against Soviet power.134 
Yaroslaysky's attention and concern seems to have been well 
justified. The Soviet elections of March 1925 were a source of 
disappointment to the ruling party; over two thirds of electorates in 
rural areas did not vote at all. In many places the peasants became 
politically active and demanded independence from the party. These 
demands were intensified in response to Komsomol activity in the 
elections. For the younger generation of Bolsheviks, the Soviet 
elections gave them the opportunity to show their ideological fervour. 
Senior party officials, however, tried to restrict the activities of the 
Komsomol, especially their harassment of the peasants. During the 
village elections the Komsomols had used questionable means in their 
campaigns and the Politburo issued special instructions which 
underlined the importance of fighting against "crude and tactless" 
tyrannizing of peasant voters by the Komsomols.135 
These calls for moderation came too late in many places. The 
132 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, d.775 (PCAP 64, 14/2-25). 
133 	 KPSS III, 177, 189, 238-239; K14, 85, 94-95, 109. 
134 YI, 94-95. "LlepxoBHHKH Ha Bbi6opax". 
135 	 ..: `Heo6XOAHMO 6opOTbCA CaMbIM peulHTenbHblM 06pa3OM C Ha6JIK),gal0- 
WHMHCSI B nOCneAHee BpeMa nOnbITKaMH HOKOTOpbIX KOMCOMOJIbueB rpy6o H 
6ecTaKTHO npouexrosaTb cs010 sonro H36HpaTenaM". RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, 
d.486 (Pp 46, 27/7-25). `BceM O6JIaCTHbIM 6lopo LIK, LIK HauKOMnapTHFf, 
KpaHKOMaM, 06KOMaM, ry6KOMaM H OpyJKKOMaM PKII". 
hard-pressed peasantry had in some areas lynched party officials as a 
result of Komsomol harassment. The political tensions inside the party 
and also the peasant upheavals during the autumn of 1924 in Georgia 
disillusioned the ruling regime. Initiatives of the ruling party to pacify 
the peasantry seemed to be futile.136 In particular the rebellion in 
Georgia traumatized the ruling regime, which tried to calm the situation 
by sending the Soviet president Mikhail Kalinin to the region. He 
attempted to pacify his Georgian audience by outlining, for example, 
the conciliatory line of the Soviet communist party and claiming that 
communists did not want to destroy the Orthodox church by force. For 
them to do so would be folly as history had shown that the attempts to 
convert Georgians to Islam had failed. He also claimed that purging the 
priests and closing down the churches would not be the correct policy; 
the purged priest would only acquire the authority which he now 
lacked. Kalinin remarked that the government had admitted the 
mistakes of local authorities in this area and he declared that the battle 	 199 
against religion should be confined to the ideological level. The 
conciliatory line of this policy was manifested in his calls for a cautious 
policy towards non-party people because even among believers there 
were people who supported the communists.137 
5. THE DEBATE OF 1926 AND THE 15TH 
CONGRESS AS THE HIGHLIGHT OF 
THE NEP RELIGIOUS POLICY 
The 14th congress of the Communist Party was held from 18-31 
December 1925 under the shadow of the above political crisis. The 
situation in this congress was very different compared to earlier party 
meetings as the triumvirate of Zinovev, Kamenev and Stalin was now 
defunct. In this new situation Stalin allied himself with the rightists 
(Bukhann, Rykov and M.P. Tomsky) against the "New Opposition" 
and he gained control of the party through the party apparatus. 
The outcome of the 14th congress was a clear victory for the 
pro-peasant wing of the party.138 Another consequence of the congress 
136 Deutscher 1987, 227-228. 
137 Kalinin 1958, 231-233. "133 6eceabl c KpeCT $1HaMH jtepesnn FaHHpvaKa 
(Ppy3HR)". 
138 S14,517-519,819. 
was that Zinovev and many of his followers in Leningrad were obliged 
to resign from their posts, supporters of Stalin and Bukharin taking their 
places. After the battle in the 14th congress the two ex-triumvirs and 
Trotsky were both in the same situation; the Stalinist apparatus had 
beaten them. So it was therefore natural that these three "oppo-
sitionists" should come together in order to fight against the coalition of 
Stalin and Bukharin.139 
Probably due to the tense political situation, the 14th congress did 
not handle religious political matters as such. Although the CAP had 
made proposals to the 14th congress, it is obvious that the leadership 
did not want to bring this topic before the congress prior to the planned 
meeting of antireligious workers in April 1926.140 
The year 1925 was a watershed in the NEP; the mood of general 
optimism was fading. The harvest of 1925 had been good but the 
marketing had been a catastrophe for the government. The shortages of 
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food supplies and high prices of bread aroused growing animosity 
among the industrialized population. The ruling party had split into a 
small but bitter opposition and the centre-rightist majority. The New 
Opposition had suffered a devastating blow during the 14th congress 
and its members had been expelled from important party offices.141 
The result of this coalition became known as the "Joint Opposition" 
(Zinovev, Kamenev, Trotsky). It organized itself within the party and 
was seeking support from rank and file ordinary party members. At the 
same time the party apparatus tried to suppress the opposition and its 
critics as much as possible. The Joint Opposition rallied against the 
Stalinist apparatus and in favour of inner-party democracy. It urged the 
up-grading of workers' wages and insisted on a more zealous attitude 
against the remnants of the capitalist era. Its main critique concentrated 
on the claim that while the governing clique was making concessions to 
both internal and international enemies, the Soviet state was slowly 
sliding back towards capitalism.142 
Kostelovskaya's protest in March 1925, together with the general 
political crisis inside the party, had given reason for fundamental 
discussion on religious policy matters inside the ruling regime. A 
general meeting of the party's antireligious workers convened in the 
midst of this internal power struggle on 27-29 April 1926 in order to 
find a unified solution for their work. A desire for unity characterized 
139 Deutscher 1987, 259-266. 
140 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, d.775 (PCAP 68, 9/12-25). 
141 	 Deutscher 1987, 271-273. 
142 	 AT II, 54-55."K 9eMy CTpeMHTCA onno3HUHA'; AT II, 74. "Bonpocw H OTBeTbi. 
HanMcaHHble MHOKI aaa nponaraH tbl"; AT II, 83-84. "K nRTHaauaTOi 
napTHHHON KOHCpepeHUHH". See also Deutscher 1987, 271-271. 
this meeting. In accordance with demands of discipline, all speakers 
were haunted by the need for ideological unity but at the same time they 
accused each other of ideological errors. For example, during the 
opening speech the representative of the Agitprop, V.G. Knorin (1890-
1939), underlined the special nature of this meeting and the importance 
of co-ordinating the party's antireligious activity. He pointed out how 
the CAP had wished for more co-ordinated methods in this work and 
claimed that the party could not carry out all its antireligious work 
without assistance. There was a need to make the resolutions of the 13th 
congress more specific; resolutions accepted in earlier congresses were 
of too general a nature and had given rise to the "most diverse 
interpretations and most erroneous deviations". These deviations were 
firstly "liquidating atheist work" and secondly over-emphasizing it. In 
conclusion, Knorin expressed the hope that the 15th congress would 
place the question of religion on its agenda. 
Kostelovskaya was allowed to present her criticism of the religious 
policy the CAP and Yaroslaysky. According to her, problems in the 
religious policy sphere were partly related to the fact that instead of 
tackling ideological questions the 14th congress had concentrated on 
the economy. Her very "leftist" diagnosis of Soviet society underlined 
the threat the countryside posed for socialism in Russia; she believed 
that religion had been revitalizing in the countryside. Moreover, she 
expressed strong criticism of antireligious agitators ("grandees" as she 
termed them) who could not adapt to the contemporary situation. In the 
ensuing debate she indirectly accused Yaroslaysky of taking a 
"deviationist standpoint" and stated that Yaroslaysky's book, "The 
Bible for Believers and non-Believers", was no use whatsoever in 
antireligious work. According to her, Yaroslaysky's booklet was 
simply inspiring people to study Assyrian-Babylonian mythology. On 
the other hand, Yaroslaysky found Kostelovskaya's articles "artificial, 
abstract, theoretical and armchair-learned". However, the main result of 
this meeting was the attention which the ruling regime paid to the 
rumoured revitalization of religion and to the "danger" which the 
sectarian movement seemed to represent.143  
As a result of this meeting a draft programme for use in antireligious 
propaganda was drawn up. This manifesto was a mixture of 
conciliatory and "leftist" viewpoints inside the ruling regime. On the 
other hand, the assembly emphasized that the fight against religion 
could be successful only if the party understood correctly the 
circumstances of religious prejudices. Moreover, it even underlined 
143 See the protocols of this meeting: RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.60, d.791; f.17, op.60, 
d.792. 
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that it was important to abolish "mechanical" methods such as closing 
down churches, confiscating church bells, or organizing the 
antireligious struggle simply on the basis of atheist carnivals or 
demonstrations.144 
Nevertheless, increased criticism of the sectarians was the clear 
result of this meeting. It was concluded that the time for neutrality had 
now passed and it was time to reject the "rightist deviation" in 
antireligious work, which had "idealized the sectarian movement". 
Nevertheless, this meeting condemned also the "left deviation" which 
maintained that all sectarians were counter-revolutionaries. In con-
clusion, this meeting underlined that in accordance with the general 
understanding of the NEP, the main method in the antireligious battle 
was to "class-unmask" the role of religion and carry out cautious 
antireligious work in the countryside. Nevertheless, this meeting 
acknowledged that there had been incorrect interpreting of the 
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resolution of the 13th congress and warned that social activities and 
different co-operative enterprises should be directed towards the Soviet 
system.'45  
The other practical conclusion of this conference was the growing 
pressure against the Moslem clergy, which party officials considered to 
be a harmful element in Soviet society. As we can see from a protocol 
of 7 December 1926, the CAP had designed a plan to fight against the 
Moslem clergy and sent out a circular to inform local officials of this 
change of policy. In addition, on 24 December 1926 the CAP decided to 
limit the extent of religious schools in Moslem areas by restricting 
religious education to children over 14 years of age. 
Later a more precise plan drawn up by Tuchkov was accepted in the 
CAP and at the beginning of 1927 this was sent to the Orgburo. This 
modified plan was not accepted without resistance in the CAP — it was 
eventually passed by 10 votes to 7, a revealing fact which indicates that 
there were a considerably number of moderates inside the CAP. The 
final accepted version included a special mention of the political 
education of local communists; the party wanted to purify its ranks of 
moderate comrades who had restricted antireligious propaganda in 
Eastern areas of the state.146  In this plan, the CAP decided to classify 
144 RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, d.123. "3a11avH H MeroAbl aHTHpenHCH03HOF1 
nponaraHAbl". 
145 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.60, d.793 "Te3HCbI npHHaTbI naprHHHbIM coBeutaHHeM no 
aHTHpenHrno3Hoii nponaraHue 27-30 anpenba 1926"; "CeKTaHTCTBO H 
aHrHpenHreo3Haa nponaraaå'; "3aaayH H MerOAbl aHTHpenHrHo3Ho6 
nponaraHAbl"; " IIpaKTviecxee npeAnoxceHHn no Bonpocy 0 cetcraHrcrse, 
npHHATble Ha aHTHpeAHrH03HOM COBeIIjaHHH npH BKII(6) H aHTHpenHrH03HON 
KoMHecHeR UK". 
146 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, d.353 (PCAP 86, 21/4-27); RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, 
d.353 (PCAP 78, 7/12-26); (PCAP 24/12-26); (PCAP 81, 15/1-27). 
Moslem clergy as "lishentsy". This operation together with economic 
measures against the mullahs and initiatives to enforce cultural 
enlightenment in Eastern areas were signs of change. The party was 
now more ready to tackle the question of Islam. However, this policy 
caused substantial protest among the Moslem population. For example, 
as one protest from "all the Moslems of the village of Ala-Ilda" 
expressed it, villagers simply "could not live" without the services of 
the local mullah.147 
Subsequently, by means of the above plans, the ruling regime 
tightened its grip in relation to the Catholic church. The main reason for 
this was the threat of war, which seemed to justify Moscow's plans to 
go back on its earlier concessions. For example, the nationally-minded 
Ukrainian government was compelled to resign and Moscow sent its 
emissaries to take control. One of these emissaries, Yaroslaysky, 
emphasized to the Ukrainian Central Committee the threat of war; 
Soviet power faced imminent danger from Catholic clericalism and 
Jewish nationalism. At that moment Moscow was not yet ready to 
"Russify" Ukrainians but concentrated more on resolving the Jewish 
question and the problem of people of Polish origin in western border 
areas. In accordance with this policy Yaroslaysky questioned the whole 
"korenizatsiya" policy in relation to the Jewish population. It was 
"amazing" how the Jewish people were allowed to organize an 
"artificial evreizatsiya" policy among the Jewish people. Yaroslaysky 
also criticised the proposal to give the Jews their own schools. As the 
Jewish masses were not willing to learn or use the Jewish language this 
was unnecessary. According to Yaroslaysky, the political and cultural 
situation among people of Polish origin did not favour the Soviets. The 
Komsomol movement was weak, Catholic cardinals acted as the agents 
of the Polish government and local teachers listened to them more than 
to Soviet officials)48  
The question of the sectarians was more complex. The 13th congress 
had accepted the decision that the sectarians could be directed to assist 
the Soviet system. The assembly of leading antireligious workers came 
to the conclusion that sectarian communes and co-operatives should be 
directed towards general co-operative work, which meant that the 
government should encourage only secular co-operatives. The religious 
co-operatives were believed to be exploitative in nature. The assembly 
147 RTsKhIDNI f_89, op.4, d.117. "B Opr6iopo npoexr nocraHOBneHHA. 5IHBapA 
1927"; "Or Bcex MycynbMaH AepeBHH AnaH-I4nAa". 
148 RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.3, d.86. ",I),oKnaA Ha nneHyMe UK KII (6) YKpaHHbl o 
npOBeAeHHH B )KH3Hb peIHeHHn napTHH no HBAHOHanbHOMy Bonpocy. 
CTeHOrpaMMa-MaWHHOnHCHbIH TeKCT C npBBKBMH H noMeTKON asropa". See 
also Krawchenko 1987, 136. 
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accepted the view that it was essential to fight against "idealizing" the 
sectarian movement as a "revolutionary" element.149 
With a resolution adopted in accordance with the above, the CAP 
together with the OGPU held a special meeting on 15 January 1927 at 
which they drew up a battle plan against the sectarian movement. On 
7 April 1927 the Central Committee accepted this circular at a Politburo 
meeting. In its opening paragraph this secret circular pointed out the 
remarkable growth of the sectarian movement and mentioned how sects 
were distracting workers from building socialism. This circular also 
revealed how some kulaks and elements of anti-Soviet organizations 
were hiding under the banner of religion. Therefore, the Central Com-
mittee ordered that the cultural-enlightenment work in those areas 
should be strengthened. The "idealizing" of the sectarians was a de-
viation which communists should fight against at the same time as they 
fought against the ideas that all sectarians were counter-revolution- 
204 	 aries.15o 
This circular promoted the same procedures that were earlier 
implemented in relation to the Mennonites, i.e. sectarian co-operatives 
should conform to the "general line of Soviet life". In accordance with 
this policy it was possible to create co-operatives with sectarians only 
when they lived as a solid mass and under the condition that they would 
follow the general, Soviet co-operative line. Party officials should pay 
attention to the law on the separation of church and state; there should 
be no kind of religious privileges, religious organizations had no 
juridical right etc.151 
The outcome of this special assembly of leading antireligious 
workers and the Central Committee circular show how the question of 
religion was one of the burning issues of late NEP society. The 
resolution of the 13th congress did not meet the expectations of the 
time. Both the opposition and some members of the Stalinist group 
were opposed to the previous resolutions. Consequently, the "Joint 
Opposition" was expressing the general mood of the ruling regime 
when it demanded that the party should conduct a "decisive struggle" 
149 RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, d.123. "IlpaKrHyecxne npeunoxceHHH no AOKnaAy TOB. 
IIyrxueBa Ha aHTHpenxrH03HOM COBeHlaHHH npH Arurnpone UK BKR (6)"; 
"IlpaKrwiecKHe npeAnoxteHHH no Bonpocy 0 ceKraHrCTBe /Ha OCHOB HHH 
MaTepHanOB aHTHpenHrHO3HOr0 coBentaHHA npH LIK H AHTHpennrHo3Hoi 
KOMHCCHH LIK/". 
150 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.627 (Pp 94, 7/4-27). 
151 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.627 (Pp 94, 7/4-27). This slogan "bringing (sectarian 
communes) towards the general co-operative line" (o6ute KooneparHBHaA serb) 
represented the official policy towards sectarians during the years 1926-1927. For 
example, the Mennonites were now campaigned to settle according to "general 
co-operative line". RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, d.353 (PCAP 90, 25/6-27). 
so that representatives of exploitative elements, such as "priests, millers 
and tobacco plantation owners" as one oppositionist Karl Radek termed 
them, would not be allowed to exploit poor peasants.152 
The "Joint Opposition" could not use the public media but it did send 
its emissaries to ordinary party cells to persuade them to resist the party 
leadership. These gestures together with the attempts to form separate 
platforms against the leadership were used to justify the expulsion of 
Trotsky and Zinovev from their official posts and finally from the Party 
itself. When the 15th party congress convened from 2-19 December 
1927 almost no-one from the opposition was allowed attend. 
Expectations before the 15th congress were contradictory. On the 
one hand the "leftist" mood among communists called for more 
resolute action against religion. As an advocate of these opinions and as 
chairman of the CAP, Yaroslaysky had written a letter to Stalin asking 
him to mention the necessity of fighting against the "liquidating 
faction" in the antireligious battle. But on the other hand, Stalin's fight 	 205 
against the "Joint Opposition" required the assistance of the right-wing 
and aggressive gestures against the civil peace of the NEP could have 
caused them to protest.153 
Just before the 15th congress Yaroslaysky attempted to draw the 
party's attention to this question by writing an article warning the 
congress not to weaken the antireligious struggle. According to him, 
there was a special faction inside the party which had interpreted the 
resolutions of the 13th congress as an order to "liquidate" all 
antireligious activity and he blamed the forces of the opposition for this 
deviation. Yaroslaysky declared that those who were now challenging 
the party leadership and "yelling" that the party had given in to the 
petty-bourgeoisie were actually supporting attempts to liquidate 
antireligious activity. He paid special attention to the sectarian 
movement and to the fact that in Eastern areas religious schools were 
prospering and that the Moslem clergy was increasing its activity. As a 
solution he proposed that the congress should form a special 
commission to resolve these questions.tM 
Despite a few dissonant voices in the congress the party unani- 
152 	 AT II, 54-55. "K 9eMy CTpeMHTCA onno3HüHA"; Fitzpatrick 1991, 27-28. 
153 	 "KaK Bbl OTHOCHTeCb K TOMy, '1T06b1 Ha XV cbe3Ae CKa3aTb HQCKOnbKO CnOB B 
nonHT. oT9eTKe 1.1K O HeO6XOAHMOCTH 60pb6b1 C nHKBHABTOpCKHMH 
HaCTpOeHHAMH B o6nacrH aHTHpen. nponaraHAbl..." RTsKhIDNI 89/1/84. 
"IIHCbMa I'I.B.CTBnHHy O BKnK19eHHH B OT9eT )•_[eHTpanbHOrO KOMHTeTa Ha 
XV Cbe3Ae BKH (6) BOnp000B aHTHpenHrH03HO41 nponaraH,abl. (DOTOKOIIHSI. 
(13.XI 1927)". 
154 YII, 218-221. "He ocna6nslfire 6opb6bl c BJIHAHHeM penHrHH. IIpeAnoslceHHe K 
XV cbe3Ay naprnH". 
mously condemned the opposition and its criticism. This congress was 
the highlight of the NEP policy and the climax of the short-lived 
Centre-Right coalition. The main speaker in the congress was Stalin, 
who delivered a speech on the general political situation. Although no 
difference of opinion155 was allowed with regard to the opposition, on 
many matters open debate could take place. 
Despite the wishes of the antireligious workers, Stalin paid only 
scant to the problem of the "liquidating faction" in the antireligious 
struggle. In his political speech to the congress, Stalin mentioned the 
deterioration of the antireligious fight only as a brief "minus" in his list 
of the defects in Soviet society.156 Nevertheless, ordinary represen-
tatives to the congress were able to express their disquiet at the activity 
of religious organizations. 
For example, a certain S.Z. Shchafieva from Bashkiria spoke of the 
increased activity of Moslem clergy in her local area and of the 
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difficulties in the battle against religion. The clergy which exercised 
influence among men and uneducated women (Ha TeMHblx AceHulHH) 
were organizing illegal meetings in mosques and houses. Although the 
local party section had a newspaper with a special section for women, 
the clergy continued to influence them.157 Another speaker, A.G. 
Karaev, a delegate from Soviet Azerbaidzhan, also underlined the 
importance of this question and announced that although the 
communists had driven the priests out through the doors of the school 
they were trying to come back "down the chimney" with the help of the 
communists themselves.158 Karaev also commented on Stalin's lecture. 
The General Secretary had proposed a reduction in the production of 
vodka, but the production of the Koran and sharia-books was not to be 
limited. "...To publish the koran with our own hands, to print 
sharia-books in our state publishing houses — is this not worse than 
vodka?".159 
One of the most revealing examples of connecting the national 
question with the religious policy of the Soviet state was the speech of 
155 	 Merridale 1990, 43. 
156 	 15Zb, 66. 
157 	 S15-1, 172. The one female representative of the party congress, A.A. Artyukhina 
(1889-1969), also underlined the importance of culture among women. S15-I, 
203-206. One important reason for the interest the communist party paid women's 
religiosity was probably the fact that women showed more religious fervour than 
men. Barbara Clements has noted that women played a significant role as 
mediators and defenders of religion both in the cities and in the countryside during 
the civil war. The normalcy of the NEP gave them more opportunities for religious 
activities. Clements 1989, 111. 
158 	 S15-I, 566. 
159 	 S15-I, 566-567. See also S15-II, 932-934. 
N.G. Ivanov, a delegate from the northern Caucasus. He argued that 
these Eastern republics needed help to compensate for their under 
development in the cultural sphere. Ivanov stressed that political 
differentiation in these districts was quite weak due to the continued 
influence of religion and family through the agency of mullahs and rich 
landowners. 16° 
This theme was repeated in the speech of the delegate M.M. 
Nataevich. He stressed that the activity of the Moslem clergy in the 
Eastern republics was alarming, creating its "non-party active" forces 
from believers and not only from kulaks, but also from middle and poor 
peasants. The clergy was attempting to activate this part of the 
population in order to defend religious interests, recruit followers from 
poor peasants and from demobilized Red Army soldiers. Like many 
others, Nataevich pointed out that the clergy had its own religious 
schools which were competing against the Soviet schools.161  
The 15th congress can be seen as a sort of twilight of the NEP policy. 	 207 
The alliance of Right and Centre had denied the need for changing 
Soviet policy, but at the same time this criticism from the Joint 
Opposition had its impact. Stalin wanted to get rid of his former allies 
and very soon after the congress adopted the leftist criticism as a 
weapon against the right-wing. In this situation, moving towards a 
socialist society offered Stalin a rationalization for his own claim to 
power. This offensive, naturally, needed its enemies as well as it 
supporters and religious organizations constituted an ideal scapegoat. 
With the assistance of its General Secretary the ruling party started to 
realize that the clergy was acting illegally, "stirring up the peasantry 
against Soviet power".162 
160 S15-II, 1331. 
161 S15-0,1340-1341. 
162 	 SSS IV, 466. 
V "The Storming of Heaven" 
— The impact of the 
Cultural Revolution and the 
years of the "Great Turn" 
(1928-1929) 
1. THE MOTIVE AND SEARCH FOR 
ALLIES AND ENEMIES 
In the history of Soviet Union, the period from 1928-1929 marked the 
beginning of an enormous transformation. A backward agrarian 
country rose on a trajectory that would eventually make it an indus-
trialized superpower. This "second" Russian Revolution extended to 
every level of society and did not just signify a giant metamorphosis in 
the sphere of economics. These events also modified the cultural 
foundations of the whole nation. 
The semi-official mutual tolerance between religious organizations 
and the ruling regime, which flourished during the high NEP, was 
nearing its end in 1928. The party's need to maintain cordial relations 
with the peasantry personified in the slogan "face to the countryside" 
was replaced by a new policy that became known as "face to 
collectivization". The relatively moderate stance in religious policy 
from 1923-1927 were now revised under the slogan of "The Storming 
of Heaven". This antireligious activity "on an extended front" affected 
all denominations and sects. All religious organizations suffered from 
terror against their leaders and laity. The confiscations of church bells, 
the closure of churches, legislative measures against churches and 
sects, hostile propaganda and acts against Islam and Judaism, were all 
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signs of the ideological assault against obstacles to the Cultural 
Revolution. I 
The forerunner of these incidents was the destruction of the "Joint 
Opposition", completed at the 15th party congress. The triumph of the 
Centre and the Right was, however, short-lived and during the winter of 
1928 the political crisis inside the ruling regime was ready to explode. 
The power struggle had finally reached its third phase. The methods 
employed in this political battle were different to those of earlier 
disputes inside the Bolshevik party. Due to tightened party discipline, 
Bukharin and his followers did not debate publicly but instead were 
obliged to conceal their differing opinions. Nevertheless, loyalty to the 
regime sealed the fate of the right-wing. In the name of party discipline, 
Bukharin and his followers were forced to accept the authority of the 
Central Committee and bow to the demands of its supreme leader, 
Stalin. 
This crisis at the upper levels of the CPSU matured with other 	 209 
serious problems. The harvest of 1927 had been average but the 
peasantry had delivered less grain than expected.2 Their reluctance to 
sell grain was interpreted as a sign of kulak sabotage against the 
socialist state but, more than that, it was also understood as a "casus 
belli" in the conflict between moderates and extremists inside the ruling 
regime. The main ideological argument was the peasant question. 
Stalin and his supporters drew attention to the "critical" grain shortage 
and favoured more drastic acts against the rich peasantry. The Right 
objected to these hard-line policies as much as they could but 
arguments for a more conciliatory policy proved futile. Finally, in April 
1928, Stalin was able to persuade the Central Committee to accept 
coercive methods against the kulaks and well-to-dopeasants in regard 
to grain collection.3  
These "extraordinary methods" of compulsory grain collection 
during the winter and spring of 1928 destabilized the Russian 
countryside. The Central Committee tried at the last moment to soften 
these anti-peasant measures, but in vain. The GPU reported putting 
down 150 spontaneous peasant rebellions during the first half of 1928. 
The normalcy of the NEP period had been broken and the peasantry 
was in uproar.4 In addition to these first signs of a more intensified 
1 	 Conquest 1986, 20-24, 71-72, 83, 101, 112-113; Curtiss 1953, 196, 235-237; 
Slatter 1990, 274-275. 
2 	 Davies 1980, 39. 
3 	 SS 11, 47-48; "0 pa6orax anpenbcxoro o6beJtHHCHHoro nnexyMa UK H UKK". 
Avtorkhanov 1959, 11, 27; Lewin 1968, 217; Viola 1987, 25-26. See also Tucker 
1973, 409 
4 	 KPSS IV, 79; Deutscher 1987, 404 405, 426-427, 441; Davies 1980, 398-399. 
See also Lewin 1968, 229. 
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class-struggle, the Stalinist leadership heightened the political tension 
in the Soviet Union by stressing the imminent threat of war. This 
"Soviet war scare" of 1926-19275 was a fiction created by the Soviet 
propaganda machine. The "Left" opposition used this in its propaganda 
and claimed that foreign capitalists were planning to wage war against 
the Soviet Union and accused, among others, the Catholic Church and 
the Centrist party in Germany of actively planning an intervention 
against the USSR.6 
Stalin took advantage of this situation by staging a show trial against 
technical experts in May-July 1928, the so-called Shakhty case.? This 
political trial was a sign of the more politically turbulent atmosphere to 
come. By organizing an ideological witch-hunt and creating a 
favourable atmosphere for his radical political initiatives, Stalin was 
able to start his "Revolution From Above" or the so-called "Cultural 
Revolution" (1928-1931).8  
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Moshe Lewin has attempted to explain Stalin's motives in this 
context. He has suggested that 
He [Stalin] contrived to create, throughout the country as a whole, 
among the activists, and within the Party in particular, a social and 
intellectual atmosphere in which any kind of resistance was 
impossible, and in which any attack on his political line was doomed 
to failure, not only because it could be put down by police action, but 
because such opposition was construed as a morally reprehensible act, 
which automatically attracted a charge of heresy, and identified the 
critic with the enemy and all his works. The methods reached their final 
apotheosis in the Stalin cult, that combination of police repression and 
semi-magical, quasi-religious orthodoxy which had come to fruition 
during the period of the 'left tum'.9 
In addition, as Robert Tucker has remarked in his monograph "Stalin in 
Power. The Revolution From Above 1928-1941, Stalin's own 
revolution partly resulted from his battle for supreme power but also 
from his psychological ambition to prove himself as great a leader as 
Lenin.10 In any event, Stalin could not execute his far-reaching goals 
5 	 Tucker 1990, 74-76. See also Erlich 1960, 167-168. 
6 	 AT IV, 20. "Haute MeartytiapojtHoe nonoxceHHe H onaCHOCTb BONHb1". 
7 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.677 (Pp 15, 15/3-28). Stalin himself took responsibility 
for this case and supervised it. Avtorkhanov 1959, 28-30. See Stalin's reports to 
the party on the Shakhty-case: SS 11, 35, 53-63. "0 pa6oTax anpenbcxoro 
06be,HHH2HHOr0 nneHyMa UK H UKK". 
8 	 Gill 1990, 117; Tucker 1990, 74-77. See also Fitzpatrick 1984, 10-11; Deutscher 
1987,422; 
9 	 Lewin 1968, 260. 
10 	 Tucker 1990, 44-45, 70-72, 160. 
without the assistance of helpful collaborators and careful planning. 
Stalin needed allies and he could not rely on the right wing of the party 
which had helped him in his battle against the left or the "Joint 
Opposition". He could, nonetheless, rely on the support of the younger 
generation, the Komsomols, who were frustrated during the years of the 
peaceful NEP policy. 
Stalin's call for an ideological battle corresponded with the 
psychological needs of the younger communist generation." During 
1927 and 1928 the Stalinist leadership purged the Komsomol and 
moulded it into an obedient tool and "helper of the party". The 
countryside cells of the Komsomol, which constituted over 50% of the 
organization, were accused of fraternizing with class enemies, such as 
priests. As a result this purge, the Komsomol was ready to enter into a 
more intensified class struggle.12 The younger communist generation 
provided Stalin with a new revolutionary army, a disciplined group of 
cadres, which would carry out his revolutionary goals without 	 211 
hesitation.13 
The second major force of Stalin's revolution consisted of former 
leftists. Although the "Joint Opposition" was politically crushed, Stalin 
was aware of the militant atmosphere among his ex-opponents and 
wanted to utilize the radical spirit of the left wing for his own purposes. 
From the ranks of this older generation there emerged some prominent 
veterans of the antireligious struggle such as N.V. Krylenko and P.I. 
Stuchka.14 This new army of activists, formed from the Komsomols, 
leftists and ordinary communists, was not shackled by old ideas. For 
Stalin they were more than suitable allies, being party-minded and 
obedient to the general supremacy of the party, but in addition, as 
Sheila Fitzpatrick has remarked: 
...hostile to most existing authorities and institutions, which they 
suspected of bureaucratic and objectively counter-revolutionary 
tendencies.l5  
11 	 See, for example, SS 11, 76."O patio rax anpenbcxoro o6be u,ueanoro nnenyMa 
UK it UKK". 
12 	 Carr 1978b, 163-165, 169, 176-182. 
13 	 Baum 1987, 2-3, 18-25; Viola 1987, 24-27, 33-35. As Tucker has remarked, 
"Stalin's commitment to a second revolution made the official image of 
dangerously active external and internal enemies necessary for justifying the 
sacrifices...to this extent, his need for enemies was political, not psychological". 
Tucker 1990, 166. 
14 	 Lewin 1968, 376-377; Tucker 1990, 101-104. 
15 	 Fitzpatrick 1982, 130. 
During the NEP the rank and file communists had been irritated by the 
massive unemployment and economic inequality. They had shared the 
common feeling that the Soviet state was under attack from the 
bourgeoisie. The ideological retreat that the NEP constituted was 
unacceptable to them. According to these communists, the Soviet state 
tolerated too many bourgeois16 specialists, kulaks and priests.17 
Stalin tried to justify the Cultural Revolution, as all other extra-
ordinary measures during that time, with the threat of war. As a result of 
international and internal factors, Stalin stressed, the USSR needed to 
strengthen its cultural work so that the working class could lead the 
country and industry.18 The slogan in this revolution was "belligerent 
class consciousness" on the cultural front and in the battle against 
illiteracy. In reality the Cultural Revolution signified purges made by 
young party activists to "clean" government offices and universities of 
non-proletarian social elements.19 As Sheila Fitzpatrick has argued, one 
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of the primary goals of this revolution was to create a proletarian 
intelligentsia by means of "class war". "Stalin's Revolution" found 
enemies like: 
...the conciliators of peasantry, conciliators of the intelligentsia... 
NEPmen, kulaks, cafe-haunting literati, wreckers, expropriated 
capitalists and foreign spies were all on the same side in the political 
struggle...2° 
The major tool in this profound metamorphoses of Soviet society, the 
new Five Year Plan, was revealed in October 1928, although it was not 
formally adopted until April 1929. This highly ambitious plan for the 
rapid industrialization of the USSR demanded as one of its prerequi-
sites cheap grain from the countryside. Moreover, the plan also needed 
a scapegoat; a fact which proved fatal for religious organizations and 
national minorities. The Bolshevik concept of class struggle21 and the 
16 The common stereotype of "the Soviet new bourgeois" in the communist 
propaganda combined "NEPmen" with Jews or religious activists. Although the 
above were seldom committed to political activities the communist suspected 
them. For the ruling regime they were possible leaders of the capitalist 
counter-revolution. Ball 1987, 110-111, 165-166; Fitzpatrick 1991, 19. 
17 	 Fitzpatrick 1984, 19-23; Viola 1987, 23-24. 
18 	 SS 11, 38. "0 pa6oTax anpenbcxoro o6beaHHeHHoro nneHyMa UK H UKK". See 
Yaroslaysky's speech to the delegation of the foreign freethinkers' movement. 
RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, d.22. "IInaH AOKnaua o6 aHTHpenxrxo3Hoh nponaraHne 
Ha 3aceAaHHH Hcnon6topo COK)3a BOHHCTByKNHHX Be36OHCHNKOB C HHOCT-
paHH011 nenerauHeii I'I.M.1.I. (OpraHHaauHA CBo6ouaMblcn. O6lltecrBa) 
4.11.1927". 
19 	 Tucker 1990, 101. 
20 	 Fitzpatrick 1984, 17. 
21 	 Tumarkin 1985, 90. 
logic of Stalin's own class war doctrine required somebody to be 
blamed for its defects and failures. As Robert Tucker has suggested, 
Stalin's need to relegate kulaks to the category of enemies was mostly 
political but he also had a psychological motivation. Stalin's self-
estimated grandiosity and aggression required supposed enemies. He 
had a psychological craving to project his self-condemnation and self-
hate onto other people.22 
The role of enemy was to be given to one of the most hated class foes 
of socialism — the kulak. Every conflict in the countryside was 
interpreted as a class conflict between poor and wealthy peasants. The 
troublemaking kulak was described as a speculator and an impediment 
to the advance of socialism. This hated foe was not alone, he had allies, 
elements of the old society. In this category of enemies the ruling 
regime also included religious figures who in the eyes of communists 
were forming political groups under the "banner of religion".23  
2. THE IIVIPLEMENTATION 
This activating of younger generation communists had profound 
consequences in the sphere of religious and nationality policy within 
the USSR. It was quite clear that the "second civil war" would affect the 
ROC as well as other religious organizations. As the programme of the 
Comintern declared, one of the special assignments of the Cultural 
Revolution would be the battle against the "opium of the peoples", 
religion.24 
In accordance with this Stalinist scheme, brigades of the Komsomol 
("the closest assistant of the party")25 and other activists poured into the 
countryside at the beginning of 1928 in order to secure the flow of grain 
to the cities and factories. At first these coercive measures in the 
countryside were directed especially against rich peasants and also 
against the private sector. But this was not the exclusive purpose of this 
attack. Komsomols did not come to the countryside simply to bring 
class war but also to "culturalize" the "unculturalized masses" of the 
22 	 Tucker 1990, 94-96; 164-166; SS 12, 90. 
23 	 GARF1 f.5263, op.l, d.58(1) "LlneHy npemittnyMa BLti3K TOB. CMHaoBH`i ; 
Davies 1980, 88, 94, 98-99; Fitzpatrick 1991, 18-24. This development was 
paralleled in other Soviet regions, e.g. the enemies of Soviet power and the allies of 
the "Polish fascism were bourgeois, kulaks, intelligentsia and priests". Pravda, 6 
December 1929, No. 286. 
24 	 YII, 548. "IIoKyMeHTbI". 
25 	 KPSS IV, 162-168. 
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peasants and to eliminate illiteracy. In Bolshevik thinking, the phrase 
"uncultured masses" characterized the Soviet countryside. What 
proved fatal to the religious organizations, was the Bolshevik idea that 
culture represented striving for emancipation from the kingdom of 
darkness (temnoe tsarstvo) to the patrimony of enlightenment (pros-
veshchenie).26 
Thus, during their raids the Komsomols were given a free hand to 
fight against the cultural backwardness of the countryside. These raids 
utilized the methods of persuasion as well as terror and brute force 
against the rich peasants. Many Komsomols saw religion as the 
stubborn mainstay of Russian backwardness andwanted to diminish its 
importance. On the other hand, the peasant population and their 
Orthodox priests saw this campaign against illiteracy as a brutal attack 
on their identity and an example of antireligious harassment. It was no 
surprise that these punitive raids aroused the resistance of the 
214 	 peasants 27 
Stalin's resorting to these rash methods presupposed at first their 
formal acceptance by the majority of the populace of the Soviet 
countryside. Moreover, he compared the crisis situation in the 
countryside to that of 1921 which had resulted in among other things 
the "campaign of confiscating church valuables". At that time Lenin 
had connected the confiscation of church valuables in the name of 
starving people with the antireligious campaign. By doing so Lenin had 
won the sympathy of the majority in the Soviet countryside which had 
then, according to Stalin, accepted the large antireligious campaign 
against the church.28 
During the Komsomol raids, plenipotentiaries attempted to organize 
the rest of the village against the rich by holding official meetings of the 
village assembles (Skhod). The Skhod was supposed to be a 
"quasi-democratic framework for legitimizing the campaign", as R.W. 
Davies has characterized it. It was believed that these assemblies would 
isolate the kulaks with the blessing of the middle and poor peasants. 
When this did not happen spontaneously, the plenipotentiaries 
manipulated their decisions. So during the years 1927-1929 "Skhods" 
were subordinated to the village soviets and kulaks were banished from 
the Skhod as a "harmful" social category of "lishentsy".29 
However, there was a great contradiction between reality and 
26 	 Joraysky 1985, 93-94. See also KPSS IV, 102. 
27 	 Fitzpatrick 1979, 158-162; Baum 1987, 44-45. 
28 	 SS 11, 50. "0 pa6oTax anpenbcxoro o6beuntteaaoro nneeyma UK n UKK". 
29 	 Davies 1980, 404; Conquest 1988, 87-90. See also Lewin 1968, 227; Danilov 
1990,298-299. 
ideology. Middle peasants did not respond eagerly to calls for social 
discrimination against the kulaks but in many places defended them.30 
The answer to this problem was simple; according to Stalin, a kulak 
could persuade middle peasants to follow him because of his leading 
social role in the village. In contrast to the spirit of the NEP, Stalin 
declared that the peasantry was "the last remaining capitalist class"31. 
For Stalin, the disturbances during the grain collections were simply 
signs of the strength of these class enemies. Former exploitative classes 
would never give up without resistance and would attempt to 
reorganize themselves. As Robert Tucker has remarked, the concept 
that internal class war would grow more intense with the advance 
towards socialism is "widely regarded as one idea that was truly 
original with Stalin".32 
For Stalin, the only solution was a socialist offensive against the 
capitalist elements in the cities and countryside. Peaceful conciliation 
between classes could not exist as opposing classes were at war in the 
Soviet Union.33 The logical conclusion of this thinking was that the 
church was to be blamed, together with the kulaks, for class war in the 
village. Understandably enough, priests became the first victims of this 
terror. They were among the first to be deported from the villages 
during the collectivization process, together with the kulaks. Moreover, 
the communist crusade against the peasantry was connected with a 
massive attack against religion.34 
Another reason for coercive methods against priests and other 
leaders of religious organizations is offered by Moshe Lewin. He has 
suggested that Stalin wanted to "weaken any elements which might 
eventually rally an outraged peasantry".35 Stalin seemed to believe that 
30 	 Davies 1980, 406-409; Conquest 1986, 94-96. 
31 	 SS 12, 40. "0 npaeoi yxnoHe B BKII(6)". See also KPSS IV, 108. 
32 	 SS 11, 171-172; "IIneayM UK BK1I(6)". Tucker 1990, 88. 
33 	 SS 12, 90. Yaroslaysky had as early as November, 1927 presented the option of 
advancing towards socialism by means of industrialization, co-operative 
movements, centralization, communist enlightenment, and world revolution. See 
RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, d.22. "IInaH ztoxna. ta o6 aHrxpenHrHo3Ho6 nponaraHae 
Ha 3aceuaHHH 1lcnon6iopo C01o3a BOHHCTByIOUtnx Be36o)KHnxoB c 
HHocrpaHHOI4 nenerauHei H.M.C. (OpraaH3auan CBo6otoMbtcn. O6utecrBa) 
4.11.1927". 
34 	 Davies 1980, 93, 96, 412; Baum 1987, 4-46; Lewin 1984, 63; Conquest 1986, 
202-204. The Great Soviet Encyclopedia described the activities of the clergy 
during the collectivization as partnership with the kulak:"...non 3aH5111 cppoxr Ha 
cropoHe Kyna' ecrBa, 3autHntas ero I1O3HUHH He TOnbKO CJIOBOM, HO H JtenoM. 
Uen Mil pant xynauKHx aHTHCOBeTCKHx BbICTynneHHii npOXojtHn non 
penHCHo3uoI o6onogxO i." BSEa 1934, 188. Or as I. Trifonov has remarked, 
..."kulaks appeared jointly with former whiteguardists, priests, sectarians and other 
counter-revolutionary forces...".Trifonov 1960, 204. 
35 	 Lewin 1985, 107. 
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both the kulak and the priest along with other capitalist elements would 
in every case oppose the building of socialism and would be natural 
leaders of the countryside in a revolt against the communist regime. 
The followers of the kulaks, the "pod-kulak" (the henchmen of the 
kulaks) or "ideological kulaks" were identified as a dark, "uncultured" 
peasant mass under the influence of the priests.36 
The logic of this thinking presumed that kulaks, priests, NEPmen 
and industrial specialists could manipulate the failures of the 
"extraordinary measures" to gain political capital for their own anti-
Soviet objectives. But was this concept of the "bourgeois counter-
attack" only a myth or should historians acknowledge the fact, as Sheila 
Fitzpatrick has done, that the ruling regime had actually uncovered 
evidence that NEPmen and kulaks were strengthening their influ-
ence?37 
It is quite difficult to get to the bottom this question, but the fact 
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remains that one of the fundamental cornerstones in Stalin's Revolution 
was the concept of the "enemy threat" inside the Soviet Union. In line 
with this position, the General Secretary encouraged people to unmask 
hidden foes everywhere. In this process Stalin was assisted by the 
general mood inside the young communist movement, which had even 
during the NEP been preoccupied with the slogan "unmask the class 
enemy".38 At first Stalin was eager to stress that the leadership 
unanimously welcomed these initiatives of the younger generation. 
Accordingly, he urged the "soft" Bukharin to expose those enemies and 
he was sent to the 8th congress of the Komsomols on 6 May 1928 to 
give a lecture on this topic.39 
During this time the struggle for power and politics was being fought 
behind closed doors. Bukharin was obliged by party discipline to act in 
accordance with the will of the General Secretary. So in his lecture he 
tried to combine an apology for the coercive methods favoured by 
Stalin with his own demands for more conciliatory policies towards 
peasants. Bukharin's outward acceptance of Stalinist policy, with its 
concealed criticism, can be seen as the last attempt by him to prevent 
more damage in this sphere. 
He began by identifying the class enemy of the Soviet regime and 
underlined that the kulak was fighting against the dictatorship of the 
working class and turning dissatisfied middle peasants against it. 
Bukharin also stressed that it was clear that it would be necessary to 
36 	 Davies 1980, 400-401; Lewin 1968, 391. See also Trifonov 1960, 205. 
37 	 Fitzpatrick 1991, 29. 
38 	 Fitzpatrick 1991, 27. 
39 	 Fisher 1959, 143. 
strengthen work among the poor peasantry and strengthen their links to 
the middle peasants in order to isolate the kulak. Significantly enough, 
he stressed that this process would take a long time 40 
Bukharin went on to tell the Komsomol conference that legally 
functioning ecclesiastical and sectarian organizations were themost 
naked and evil class enemies. However, it would be stupid to think that 
these organizations had remained unchanged since the revolution; now 
they were using "modern" and "progressive" forms of work and had 
great success even in areas populated by workers. One thing which 
made them dangerous were the educational methods they were using. 
Bukharin also remarked that these organizations were preaching 
against alcoholism and smoking, they were active in cultural work and 
used "good measures" to make political capital.'" 
Bukharin reminded the conference of the great success of the 
sectarian movement and claimed that sectarians had more members 
than the Komsomol movement. His remarks about the dangers posed 
by religious organizations might appear to amount to an open call for a 
more general attack against religion. But that was not the case. In fact 
he pleaded that these organizations not be treated all in the same 
manner as they consisted of different social strata and each had a 
different composition of cadres 42 
Simply persecuting sectarians was wrong as these organizations 
attracted many honest workers. According to Bukharin, only 
counter-revolutionary organizations should be treated with severity, but 
others should be won over to the communists. Bukharin remarked that 
the communists should appeal to sectarians to join them, which would 
of course be a difficult task. Finally he urged that the communist regime 
should strengthen the antireligious battle and propaganda.43  
Bukharin's appeal for a cautious religious policy against the class 
enemies did not satisfy the Stalinist group. The political fight inside the 
communist party came to a head at the end of 1928 and in January/ 
February 1929 during the sessions of the Politburo and the Central 
Committee44 The Politburo and the Central Committee officially 
accepted the Five Year Plan, together with the official anathema for the 
leaders of the Right and demanded that Bukharin and Tomsky be 
relieved of their posts. This incident represented the political 
destruction of the Right and its leaders were compelled to recant 
unconditionally. After the collapse of the "right-deviation" there was 
40 	 Bukharin 1990, 297-300. "Texymxe 3apla,t4 KoMcoMona 6 Maa 1928 r". 
41 	 Bukharin 1990, 301-302. "Texymee 3aaa'stt KoMcoMona 6 Mast 1928 r". 
42 	 Bukharin 1990, 302-303. "Texymxe 3anavx KoMcoMona 6 Maa 1928 r". 
43 	 Bukharin 1990 , 320-321. "Texymxe 3aitaMn KoMcoMona 6 Maa 1928 r". 
44 	 Avtorkhanov 1959, 46-47; Tucker 1973, 410-419. 
217 
no organized opposition inside the communist party. Stalin had 
concluded his victory over his rivals and despite the protests of 
Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky, Trotsky was sent into exile at the 
beginning of 1929 and other leaders such as Kamenev and Zinovev 
were in political isolation. Stalin had won the contest of supreme 
power; he was now the undisputed leader of the CPSU.45  
During these heated confrontations party officials also discussed the 
religious policy line of the party. Yaroslaysky's speech to the Orgburo 
gathering of 10 December 1928 reflects the aggressive tone of the 
Cultural Revolution. The class enemy was working under the guise of 
religious organizations and using the backwardness of agriculture for 
its purposes. The Soviet government was justified in restricting the 
influence of religious organizations which used their religious message 
for counter-revolutionary purposes. Yaroslaysky concluded this speech 
by arguing that Soviet power should follow the example of the French 
218 	 Revolution and avoid adopting a passive attitude towards religion 46 
As a result of this, in January 1929 the Politburo accepted the 
programme for strengthening antireligious work. The text of this secret 
programme repeated the above diagnosis of the heated class struggle in 
the Soviet Union. One of the most interesting remarks of the Politburo 
was the conclusion that religious organizations were taking advantage 
of the internal difficulties in constructing a socialist society. The second 
important point was that the Politburo's programme condemned the 
weak antireligious situation in the trade unions and in the Narkompros. 
By this time, blame for the weak state of antireligious work was one of 
the faults of "rightist" leaders. For example, the Moscow district, which 
was the stronghold of the "rightists", was criticized for being "too 
liberal" by, for example, letting believers build churches 47 
The heightening of the general atmosphere could also be seen in the 
re-organization of Soviet religious policy which was undertaken on 8 
April 1929. Different commissions such as the CAP and the "Liqui- 
45 	 Lewin 1968, 318-325. 
46 	 RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, d.26. "Pe9b TOB. 5ipocnascxoro Ha 3aceaaHHH Opr61opo 
UK BKII (6) 10-XII-28 no Bonpocy o Mepax no ycxneHHIO aHTHpeJIHrHo3HOii 
pa6omi". Later during the power struggle, Yaroslaysky accused Bukharin of 
ideological heresy in religious matters and blamed him for moderating the class 
struggle and the propaganda against religion. RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.753 (Pp 93, 
15/8-29). 
47 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.723 (Pp 61, 24/1-29); 89/4/122 "IIocTaHosneHHe 
flonHT6lopo UK BKII (6). llpoeKT."; 89/4/27 "CTamsi "IIpaBHJIbno 
OpraHH30BaTb 6opb6y c peiHreeh' (H3 AOKnata Ha COKonbHHYeCKoii 
parinaprxoxtpepeHuHH B MOCKBe). MamHHOnHCHbIH TeKCT C npaBKaMH 
HeH3BecTHoro". See also GARF1 f.5407, op.l, d.17 (Ha9HHast c necTa 263). 
"AKunoHepHOMy H3ABTCnbCKOMy 06llteCTBy Se360 KHHK. IINI/1928 r". See 
also Lewin 1985, 97-100; Pens 1991, 772. 
dation Commission" of the APO, which had been working earlier in 
this field, were now unified under the authority of the VTsIK presidium 
under the name "Permanent (working) Commission for the Study of 
Religious Questions" (PCSRQ).48 The first session of this commission 
showed that new winds were blowing in Soviet religious policy. 
Members of this commission demanded new instructions from the 
NKVD which would "answer the demands of our time".49 
3. "CULTURALISTS AND 
INTERVENTIONISTS" 
As we have seen, one of the most significant factors concerning religion 
during that time was the image of the class enemy. While the 
communists attacked enemies within the party (i.e. the "right- 	 219 
deviation") they also sketched a picture of the class enemy they had to 
confront. The primary enemies were, as we have seen above, the kulak, 
the NEP-man and the priest. Now priests were identified as kulaks 
together with peasants who had been involved in commercial activities. 
After the Bolshevik revolution being a clergyman had become a 
"profession" and during the civil war priests were allowed to receive an 
equal share of land if they did not received payments for their religious 
services. Later it was customary for priests to be given land as payment 
for their religious services. According to the new antireligious laws of 
1929, a priest was defined as "one who has other income not deriving 
from work" 50 
The image of the enemy was, nonetheless, quite difficult to define at 
a time when the inner-party witch hunt was intensifying. Significantly 
Yaroslaysky delivered a lecture to the 16th party conference on party 
purges and concerning the antireligious fight.51 This speech is a good 
example of his "centrist" religious policy line. When he commenting on 
48 	 See GARF1 (.1235, op.43, d.67, 1. 313. 
49 	 GARF1 f.5263, op.l, d.5 "ilporoxon No:3. 3aceuaHHs IIocroaHHON KOMHCCHH 
npH IIpe3HliHyMe BIIHK no paCCMOTpeHH1O penHCHO3HMX BonpocoB 31 
geKa6ps 1929 ro1[a". 
50 	 SZR, 641; Lewin 1968, 490; Danilov 1988, 77, 99. 
51 	 Deutscher 1987, 18-19. See also: K16, 606. After the 15th congress Yaroslaysky 
had urged that the battle against religion not be weakened and in the March 1928 he 
published a lengthy article concerning the connections between the cultural 
revolution and antireligious activities. In this article he reasoned that this was due 
to the existence of primitive agriculture which had survived the fall of the 
autocracy. The solution to that problem was the implementation of the "socialist 
culture, which brings about the death for religion". YII, 233. "KynbrypHas 
pesomouast H ani-Hpennrno3Hasi nponaranna". 
the mistakes of local control committees he mentioned the use of icons 
in the houses of workers. He regarded the presence of icons in the house 
of a communist as a sign that this particular communist had not rejected 
religion. But at the same time he stressed that a communist must of 
necessity live with his family and could not demand that they also 
become atheists. Consequently, antireligious work utilizing force was 
not to be recommended.52 
Yaroslaysky gave as an example an incident where a "half-worker 
and half-peasant" had written a letter to a priest asking him to baptize 
his child. This father had greeted the priest with a "communist 
greeting". Yaroslaysky considered the greeting of a priest in such a 
manner to be outrageous. He also described some other areas where the 
situation was even more confused. His list of errors included among 
other things alcoholism, being in company with non-party people, 
family-relations with kulaks and hooliganism. A important section of 
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this list of "errors" condemned religion: attending religious ceremon- 
ies, observing religious feasts, receiving the priest with the cross into 
one's house, good relations with the priest, etc.53  
In conclusion, he demanded the purge of those mistaken elements 
which had fraternized with "alien" elements 54 Yaroslaysky's lecture 
shows how the battle between the "moderates" and the Stalinist 
activists was escalating in the party. Among the victims of the 
hardliners were senior party officials such as Rykov. Nevertheless, 
Rykov defended himself during the congress of the XIV All-Russian 
Soviets in May 1929, stating that the fight against the religious 
narcotics would be successful only with the support of the broad 
masses.55 Later in this congress, Rykov explained that the fight against 
religion should be a popular fight and should be associated with cultural 
development. He warned that to use violent methods in this battle 
would cause only harm, because "decisive methods of battle" should be 
directed only against kulaks and NEPmen. In summing up his 
arguments, he stated that religion would be exterminated only by 
peaceful methods and he stressed that he did not believe that there 
52 "Koraa MbI AyMaeM. yr0 penitrHlo M0)KHO H3rHaTb HaCHnbCTBeHHO. 3T0 
HenpaBHnbHO. a Ha OCHOBe 3TOr0 HenpaBHnbH0r0 B3FJIAAa Aena1)Tca 
COBepIneHHO HenpaBHnbHble BbIBOAbI". K16, 597. 
53 	 K16, 602. Later Yaroslaysky reported to the Central Control Committee that 4.9% 
of peasant communist were ostracized for religious reasons and only 4.2% from 
workers' cells. In Eastern regions the rate was more higher. YII, 294. "IIapTHA 
o4HutaerCA OT HeroJHoro aneMeHTa". The Smolensk Archives give a vivid 
portrait of the purges; ordinary communists, the Komsomols and even members of 
the "Godless"-movement had taken part in religious activities. Fainsod 1958, 413. 
54 	 K16, 606. See also K16, 660. 
55 	 VSS XIV (Z1), 17. See also VSS XIV (ZI), 16-17. 
existed a popular movement for more aggressive methods in 
antireligious work which should be supported, but communists should 
not hurry things too much. Rykov told his audience that it would have 
been possible to close all the churches in the Soviet Union but that this 
was not done because it was felt that it would not be effective in the 
battle against religion.56 
Rykov was interrupted during his speech (something that rarely 
happened to those who were "in favour") and a voice from the floor 
shouted that the masses had themselves carried out the decision to close 
down churches but that he had delayed making a decision and 
"procrastinated" for six months.57 Rykov answered this accusation and 
regretted that some communists had a "peculiar relation" to the 
government, believing that the regime should decide these acts hastily 
and without due consideration.58 Attacks against the Narkompros were 
another revealing example of the Cultural Revolution. Stalinist activists 
often regarded the Narkompros as a defender of the bourgeoisie and the 
intelligentsia. The educational policy of the Narkompros in particular 
aroused hostility on the part of the Komsomol. Although Marxist 
ideology was established as the cornerstone of the Soviet schooling 
system, this did not satisfy all communists. The Komsomols demanded 
that the Narkompros should institute a more ideological education. 
They objected to the fact that Lunacharsky's Commissariat did not 
allow the teaching of atheism in schools but simply favoured 
non-religious (6e3-pesHrHo3HHfI) education. During the spring of 1927 
the League of the Godless launched a campaign against the 
non-religious teaching of the Narkompros. As a result of this prolonged 
debate, in 1929 the Narkompros fell into line behind the other Soviet 
institutions actively combating religion. In the atmosphere of the 
Cultural Revolution the Narkompros was obliged to cease "non-
religious" education and begin atheist teaching in schools. Prior to this 
the Central Committee had ordered that pioneer organizations should 
fight against religious vestiges among school children.59 
The reason for this conflict was not Lunacharsky's flawed 
ideological pedigree, as might be thought from his past, but rather the 
fact that the majority of the children and their parents were religiously-
minded and Lunacharsky wanted to avoid open confrontations with 
56 	 VSS XIV (Z1), 12-14. 
57 	 ...FOJIOC C MecTa: Maccbl BbIHOCHT HOCTaHOBaeHHa 0 3aKpbITHH uepKBeti, a Bbl 
no 6 Mec ueB MapHHyeTe, BOJJoxHTHHYaeTe, He pacCMaTpaBaeTe. VSS XIV 
(Z3), 14. 
58 	 VSS XIV (Z3), 14. See also Fitzpatrick 1992, 119-120. 
59 	 Curtiss 1953,213-214; KPSS IV, 102. See also YIII, 558. "IIpHMe'laHHa"; SSR, 
388. 
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them. He genuinely believed that openly atheist teaching in the 
immediate wake of the October Revolution could have been counter-
productive. The Narkompros had also acknowledged the principle of 
equal rights to education for all (even for the children of priests), which 
did not please the more ardent communists.60 
These explanations could not pacify radical cultural activists. The 
accusations of one particular delegate from the Vladimir oblast in the 
XIV All-Russian Congress of the Soviets perhaps best illustrates the 
nature of their criticism. In his speech he described how higher party 
officials delayed and even obstructed the demands of the masses 
concerning the closing down of the churches and the confiscation of 
church bells. As one unknown communist declared from the floor: 
And then they study [the demands to close down churches], study 
deeply and so deeply that they can not climb out from that depth — [they 
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have been] hindering this for half a year. And when the workers can no 
longer stand this and start to close the churches themselves and take 
away the bells, then the VTsIK will punish us for violating 
instructions...61  
The best evidence for this divergence between moderates and ex-
tremists inside the ruling regime was the II Congress of the Godless 
which convened in Moscow on 10 June 1929. The central issue of the 
congress was that the implementation of the antireligious work had 
given rise to two different opinions inside the movement. The 
"culturalists" centred around the Central Council of the League 
(Yaroslaysky) as well as around the Narkompros (Lunacharsky). In 
their opinion, religion was not simply a political force but also a social 
factor. According to the "culturalists", these facts presupposed the 
policy of education and systematic propaganda in the antireligious 
struggle.62 
60 	 Fitzpatrick 1979,11-13,22-25,42; Fitzpatrick 1991, 20. See also VSS XIV (Z9), 
24. 
61 	 "...A TYT H3y'aIoT. rny60Ko H3y9aIOT H TaK rnydoxo. 9TO He MOryT BbMne3TH 
143 3TOri rny6HHbI,—HO nonrona jtep> ar Rena. MapHHyroT. H Kori.a pa609He He 
Bbinepx(HBBIOT H Ha9HHa1OT caMH 3aKpbMBaTb tiepKBH H CHHMaTb KO-ROM/11a, TO 
131113K Hac KapaeT 3a HapynieHHe HHCTpywo4". VSS XIV (Z11), 26. See also 
VSS XIV (Z11), 27. 
62 	 Peris 1991,714-715. 
63 	 YIII, 430-435,447-449. "foKnan Ha 1314 Bcecoro3HoM cbe3ne 6e36ox<HHKOB"; 
YIV, 75-76. "0 CaMOKpHTHKe B CBS. floKnan Ha 3acenaHHH 14cnon6iopo UC 
CBS. 5 Hon6psr 1929 r." Later on 27 October, he insisted that careful thinking was 
needed in every case where a church was to be closed. YIV, 70. "B HacrynneHHe". 
See also Kalinin 1960 II, 349-355. "Sopb6a c penHrHeii H couxanHCTH9ecKoe 
CTpOtiTenbCTBO. Peib Ha II BCeC0I03HOM Cbe3ne C0103a BOHHCTByIOIIt1X 
6e36o)KHHKOB 14 HK)Hn 1929 r". See also Fainsod 1958, 435. 
In his lecture to the congress, Yaroslaysky warned his listeners 
against unprepared and brutal interventions in the antireligious work. 
Actions such as closing down churches or removing priests without the 
genuine support of the people could be catastrophic. The main target of 
his criticism were militant Komsomol leaders, whom he accused of 
sponsoring too hasty and brutal actions against religion. The Kom-
somols seemed to have adopted a different course to that of the party in 
this area.63  
The Komsomols and especially the representatives of the "Godless" 
organization from Moscow answered this criticism by arguing that 
religion was a direct threat to and the enemy of socialism. These 
"interventionists", as Daniel Penis has called them, were not so 
interested in the dimensions of religion itself but saw it only as a 
counter-revolutionary vestige which should be dealt with by 
administrative methods. Their main argument was that priests and 
religious leaders were deliberately undermining and sabotaging the 
transformation of Soviet society to socialism. In the tense atmosphere 
of the Cultural Revolution they did not limit their criticism to the 
religious organizations, but found scapegoats in the communist party 
too. The older generation of the party leadership especially came under 
pressure. The accusations against Lunacharsky's too mild attitudes in 
the antireligious campaign are a typical example of this.64 
Before the II congress of the "Godless" movement, a certain rep-
resentative of the militant "interventionists" attacked Rykov and 
Lunacharsky for the "right-deviationism" of their antireligious pro-
paganda. In his lecture Yaroslaysky defended both the above accused, 
commenting that Lunacharsky was ready to admit his errors and that 
Rykov had not been a specialist in the antireligious campaign. 
Moreover, Yaroslaysky pointed out to the accusers that Rykov had 
simply said that the religious "narcotic" must be liquidated from the 
"heads of peasants and workers" and that he himself did not see 
anything wrong in this opinion.65  
These serious charges, which reflected the militant atmosphere 
during the Cultural Revolution, were not simply limited to the im- 
64 	 YIII, 557-558. "IIpHMevaHHa'; Peris 1991, 715-716; Tucker 1990, 101. See also 
RTsKhIDNI f. 613, op. 3, d. 197, 11. 20-22. 
65 YIII, 451-452. "foKna,a Ha HH BcecO!o3HOM cbe3ae 6e360aKHHKOB"; Kolarz 
1961, 295-266. For Yaroslaysky's criticism of Tomsky, see YIII, 439-441; 
RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, d.122 "npoexr — pe3omouHH lionwr6iopo UK BKII /6/ 
nO ,gOKnaay o6 HTorax II cbeaaa colo3a Be36OJKHHKOB H pa6ore 
aHrHpenHrHo3HO1 nponaraHabi". See also RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.85, d.288 
"Focyrtaperao H np0(gcoioa 1 (OTBer TOB. TOMCKOMy Te3nCb1 ero K XIV cbe3Ay 
BK1I)" and Kuromiya 1990, 45-46. 
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plementation of antireligious activities. Militant communists also ex-
tended their class war to the domain of philosophy. Charges of too 
lenient a religious policy served as an ideological weapon in the debate 
between the two schools of Soviet philosophy. The opposing schools, 
Mechanistic Materialism and Dialectic Materialism, had been rivals 
among Soviet scholars throughout the 1920s. This philosophical 
schism was finally settled by Stalin on 27 December 1929. In his article 
on the agrarian question Stalin condemned both Mechanism and 
Deborinism and accused some Soviet philosophical theoreticians of not 
having kept pace with rapid developments in the Soviet Union. From 
that moment on, A.M. Deborin was officially ostracised by his op-
ponents, who associated him with the heresy of "Rightist deviationism" 
and accused him of "not heeding Lenin's call for a campaign against 
religion" 66 This search for "heretic" scapegoats epitomized the 
Cultural Revolution67. Leading historians such as S.F. Platonov (1860- 
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1933) and E.V. Tarle (1875-1955) were condemned for giving too 
favourable a picture of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. According 
to Robert Tucker, Stalin was now gradually promoting his concept of 
national Bolshevism.68  
This conference resulted in neither the "interventionists" nor the 
"culturalists" gaining the upper hand. On the one hand, the most 
extreme activities of the "interventionists" were condemned, but on the 
other hand, the "culturalists" suffered a defeat when the conference of 
the "Godless" movement demanded more intensive methods in the 
antireligious battle.69 But for a short time, the "interventionists" 
appeared to be victorious and in April 1929 the combined plenum of the 
Central Committee approved drastic measures against the moderates. 
Bukharin was expelled from his posts in Pravda and on the Comintern. 
During the same plenum of the Central Committee a law was adopted 
which hit different religious organizations hard, especially the 
sectarians who had managed well under the conditions of the NEP. This 
piece of legislation seemed to represent a total victory for the "inter-
ventionists". The law of 8 April 1929 crippled the activities of religious 
66 Wetter 1963, 132-133; Tucker 1990, 148-151. See also YIII, 556. 
"IIpHMeganua'; VSS XIV (Z1), 16-17. 
67 	 The charges of too conciliatory attitudes towards religion were sometimes 
connected to general political accusations. Stalin, e.g. had channels for gaining 
information about all important party figures and could use such information to 
discredit them. Stalin's archives contained a list of errors and misbehaviour. Along 
with the moral vices of drunkenness, addiction to drugs, embezzment, debauchery, 
adultery. Information on religious behaviour was also included. Avtorkhanov 
1959, 111. 
68 	 Tucker 1990, 102-104. See also Fitzpatrick 1992, 119-125. 
69 	 YIII, 558-559. "IIpMMe9axaa". 
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organizations. According to this legislation (§ 4), before undertaking 
any activities religious societies were obliged to register officially. 
Nevertheless, the most important consequence of this law was that it 
forbade religious organizations to undertake any social services (§ 17) 
and restricted religious activities to church buildings and services.70 
In addition, on 22 May 1929 the Soviet Constitution was amended 
by the Congress of the XIV All-Russian Soviets of VTsIK. The existing 
right to conduct religious propaganda was abolished and the amended 
Constitution acknowledged only the "liberty of confession" for Soviet 
citizens. The Congress justified this change by pointing out that 
religious organizations had exploited the older constitution for 
"counter-revolutionary" purposes.71  
These measures had serious consequences together with the 
implementation of a full-scale class war in the countryside during the 
autumn of 1929. Particularly hard hit were the wealthy and ordinary 
peasants who supported religious organizations. During the height of 	 225 
this new "civil war", Stalin himself demanded more resolute actions 
against the class enemies, including priests.72 So it was understandable 
that priests resisting the closure of their church were the first to be 
punished for counter-revolutionary activity. The slogan "the church is 
the kulaks' agitprop" indicates in practice how party activists saw 
religious organizations during this stage of the Cultural Revolution. 
The church was the ideal place for counter-agitation and the anti-Soviet 
agitation which priests were alleged to be conducting. At the same time 
religion and people working in religious organizations were accused of 
all kinds of political crimes. They were found guilty of actively 
disrupting grain deliveries, of undermining Soviet cultural work, of 
creating illegal groupings in order to rebel against Soviet power, of 
"hiding kulaks and Nepmen under the banner of religion", of enticing 
workers and poor peasants to join religious organizations, etc.73 So, 
according to Soviet officials, the closing of this "agil-punkt" was the 
70 	 SURb, 474-483; Alexeev, 1979, 29-30; Conquest 1986, 202-203. 
71 GARF2 f.353, op.10, d.17 "O6bACHHTenbHaA 3anHCKa K npOeKTy 
nOCTaHBAeHHA BCepoCCH{iCKorO Cbe3Aa COBeTOB 0 BHeCeHHFi H3MeHCHHFi H 
j10n0JIHeHHH B KOHCTHTyUHK) PCDCP; SSR, 400 ("...CB06o,ga peAHrH03bIX 
HCnOBep,aHHH H aHTHpeJIHrH03HOt'i npOnaraHj(bi npH3HaeTCA 3a newt 
rpaxAaHaMH."); VSS XIV (Z13), 45. 
72 	 "...Z[OCTHSKeHHe napTHH COCTOHT B TOM, 'ITO HaM yj[aIIOCb OpraHH3oB2Tb STOT 
KOpeHHOli nepedlOM B HeApaX CaMOrO KpeCTbAHCTBa H nOBeCTH 3a C060F1 
IDHpOKHe MaCCbI 6eAHOTbi H Cepej);HAKOB, HeCMOTpA Ha HeHMOBepHbie 
TpyjtHOCTH, HeCMOTpA Ha OT9a51HHOe npOTHBOjte)"iCTBHe BCeX H BCAKHX 
TCMHbIX CHJi, OT KyJiaKOB H nOHOB AO (pHJIHCTepOB H npaBbiX OnnOpTyHHCTOB". 
SS 12, 125. "I'oA BenHKoro nepenoMa". See also Trifonov 1975, 298. 
73 	 Fainsod 1958, 436. See also Fitzpatrick 1992, 129-132. 
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"natural" response to this threat. Together with the above measures, the 
implementation of new taxation rules laid a heavy burden on priests and 
religious organizations.74 
The "Godless" movement was now eagerly mobilizing itself 
together with the Komsomols for collectivization. The Godless 
movement was given the mission of assisting the government to 
undermine the influence of religion among poor peasants. The official 
orders included also a warning not to fanaticize these peasants but 
to work carefully with them. This warning, however, was practically 
nullified by the remark that the poor peasants were often under the 
influence of priests, mullahs and rabbis.75 The leadership of the 
Godless movement was now actively taking part in the collectivization 
in the countryside and advancing its antireligious propaganda without 
restriction. According to its propaganda, clerical and sectarian "circles" 
were also organizing to resist them and the Godless movement was 
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now engaged in the final battle against religion in the Russian 
countryside.76 
Not only the Orthodox church but also other religious organization 
suffered from these raids. For example, during the process of 
collectivization sectarian agricultural communes were disbanded and 
turned into state farms despite their resistance to the last 77 In 
accordance with this policy, the most ambitious plan by the Evangelical 
Christians, the scheme to build the so-called City of the Sun, was 
74 	 Conquest 1986, 202-205; Davies 1980, 228-229. "Interventionists" favoured 
punitive taxation, i.e., for the use of the churches. Yaroslaysky favoured this 
suggestion but it was later temporarily hindered by VTsIK. According to 
representative of VTsIK, P. Smidovich, this suggestion was against the "separation 
decree" and the proletarian state could not accept this kind of "church policy". 
Later when pressure begun to grow this matter was subordinated to Sovnarkom and 
a special committee was formed to resolve this matter. RTsKhIDNI f. 63, op. 3, d. 
d. 197,11. 14, 15-31. 
75 GARF1 f.5407, op.l, d.41 "IIpoeKT — BceM pecny6nnKoM. KpaeBblM. H 
o6naCTHI,IM coBeTaM CBS. 06 aHTHpenHCHO3HOh pa6oTe cpeAH 6aTpa'ecTBa H 
6e1HOTbI.": BCeM pecny6nHKaHcxHM, KpaeBblM, 0651aCTHbIM H ry6epHCKHM 
coBeTaM CBS. 06 r{acTHH. A4eex CBS B npOBeAeHHH npa3AHHKa, AeHb 
ypoxcasl" 23. Mast 1929". 
76 	 For example, see GARF1 f.5407, op.l, d.41. "06 yvacrH opramt3auHH CBS B 
BeceHHei1 npOH3BOACTBeHHO CenbCKo-X03sI113BeHH041 KaMnaHHH. COB. 
CeKpeTHO': "HHCTpyKt1HB RO OpraHH3aUHH H pa6oTe CenbCKON SP-fen/CH colon 
BOHHCTByKHUHX Be360)KHHKOB.: "COBX0311eHTp H UeHTpanbHbtti COBeT coio3a 
BOHHCTByIOWHX 6e36ozHHKOB B CCCP — BCeM COBXO3TpeCTaM H COBXO3aM ; 
":BCeM UHTM H COIO3aM C/X KoonepauHH : "rlpoeKT. Pe3omouBB COBeutaHHsl 
petaxTopoB AepeseHcxxx )KypHanoB H ra3eT H3Aa1OUIHXCsI B MOCKBe. 
cocrosnnueroca 18 Hoa6psl 1929 roas [pi AepeseacxoM oruene BC CBS. 
CCCP". See also KPSS IV, 321. 
77 	 Wesson 1963, 74-76, 208. 
rejected, although it had already received permission from the 
Agricultural Commissariat NKZem in 1927. The formal reason for 
rejecting this plan was, according to the CAP, the anti-Soviet and 
anti-militarist nature of these plans 78 
Subsequently, the Soviet regime attacked the religion of the national 
minorities and justified this attack by the foreign threat. For example, 
the CAP had even drawn up special orders for the NKVD to carry out 
surveillance of religious organizations during a possible war. More-
over, religion and "national-chauvinism" were both seen as basic en-
emies of socialism. For example, on 6 December 1929 Pravda accused 
the Ukrainian "bourgeoisie, kulaks, bourgeois intelligentsia and clergy" 
of being associated with "Polish fascism".79 
Yaroslaysky had also participated in a campaign of "war-psychosis" 
and had demanded already in 1927 the collectivization and "perestroika 
of all economics" as a means of antireligious work.80 In his article on 27 
May 1928 Yaroslaysky demanded the total separation of school and 
church and remarked that in the Eastern areas of the state mullahs and 
Jewish religious teachers were controlling educational activities. The 
mullah was teaching the mother tongue and the Jewish religious teacher 
was promoting the "incomprehensible ancient hebrew". In this article 
he accused both of these not only of breaking Soviet law which required 
the separation of school and church but also of seeking to make political 
capita1.81  
As an epilogue we may note that Stalin's religious policy was based 
on an almost total lack of any ideological justification. He did not, for 
example, profess any particularly atheist conviction. Stalin presented 
very few antireligious arguments and there seems to be no basis for 
such an idea as "Stalin's religious policy". He was relatively indifferent 
to the ideological reasons for the antireligious struggle which, 
considering his own background, is somewhat surprising. When we 
compare two of his documents from this period, one written just before 
the "Cultural Revolution" and the second written in 1930, it is 
astonishing to note that both writings have a relatively conciliatory 
emphasis. In his interview with American communists Stalin stressed 
that it was not necessary to be an atheist to be a member of the party. He 
78 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, d.353 (PCAP 93, 12/11-27); YIII, 560. 
79 	 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, d.353. (PCAP 82, 29/1-27); GARF1 f.5407, op.1, d.17 
(Hammas c nxcra 185). "J1Huo spara": "I3HctoopMauHoHHble nHcbMa 7. 06 
aHTHpenxrxo3Hoy pa6oTe cpeAH Hal.lnoHanbHocTeN CCCP"; Pravda, 6 
December 1929, No. 286. See also Tucker 1990, 104-105. 
80 	 YI, 128-129. "PenxrHsi — mina. spaxcae6Han pa6omeMy ABHNCeHHK)". 
81 YI, 135-136. "He nopa nH uenHKOM ocyuzecTSHTb AexpeT o6 oTAeneHHH 
IDKonbl OT uepxsH' ; Curtiss 1953, 213-214; Powell 1989, 32. See also SSR, 388. 
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added, however, that the party could not be neutral in relation to 
religion because the party stood for science and religion for its part was 
against science 82 
Stalin's correspondence with Maksim Gorky gives a good picture of 
his flexibility in matters concerning religious ideology. Gorky had sent 
a letter to Stalin in which he criticized the antireligious practices in the 
Soviet Union and urged a more intelligent attitude in this work. Gorky 
pointed out that communists should be acquainted not only with the 
history of religion but with the history of the Christian church, religious 
history, and politics related to these matters. He even recommended 
that workers in the antireligious field should study the latest exegetical 
works such as the commentaries of the "Tübingen school", for 
example.83  
In his response Stalin was ready to agree with Gorky and admitted 
that in the Soviet press there was great confusion in the field of 
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antireligious propaganda. He exonerated himself in the eyes of Gorky 
by admitting that sometimes there happened "supernaturally" stupid 
things in this area84 and admitted that this work required learning. Later 
Stalin passed Gorky's letter on to Yaroslaysky for him to answer Gorky 
in more detail. Accordingly Yaroslaysky wrote to Gorky and attempted 
to defend antireligious activity in Soviet Union. Despite many short-
comings in this area he drew Gorky's attention to the achievements in 
the struggle, such as the two million members in the "Bezbozhnik" 
movement.85 
The above correspondence reveals how little the sole ruler of the 
Marxist state was interested in the ideological side of "the Storming of 
Heaven". The man who had ordered the Komsomols to obliterate the 
old agricultural society from the countryside, together with its religious 
roots, was in his letter to Gorky worried about excesses in antireligious 
work. One explanation for this illogical behaviour may be the inter-
pretation put forward by Tucker. In his monograph Tucker describes 
how Stalin praised Ivan the Terrible as a great and wise ruler who had 
liquidated his internal foes and made only one mistake. Each time Ivan 
liquidated a family of feudal lords he would repent for a whole year and 
seek absolution for his sins instead of acting more decisively.86 For 
Stalin there were no such obstacles as God, ideology, friends or 
relatives, and it seems he had no genuine ideological convictions at all. 
82 	 SS 10,131-133. "5eceua c nepsosä aMepHKaHcxoN pa6ogeH aenerauHeN". 
83 	 RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, d.172 "IIHcbMo 1-opbKoro CTanHHy 29.11.1929". 
84 	 SS 12, 176. "IIHcbMo A.M. TopbxoMy". 
85 	 RTsKhIDNI f.89, op.4, d.172 "TOB. A.M. TopbxoMy. 24 RHaapsi 1930r.". 
86 	 Tucker 1990, 227. 
He was able to get rid of his best friends or modify Bolshevik ideology 
when they proved to be obstacles in his path to supreme power. As a 
manifestation of this ideological "eclecticism" Stalin was hailed in the 
newspapers on 21 December 1929 as "Lenin's first pupil" and the 
"Leader (Vozhd)". He was now the sole master of his party — the party 
of unbelief.87 
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87 	 Avtorkhanov 1959, 157; Tucker 1990, 128-129. 
VI Conclusions 
In summing up the development of the party's religious policy during 
the period 1917-1929 we see how there were two competing factors 
which influenced this matter. On the one hand, the ideological 
confrontation between Marxism and religion together with the 
historical background of the Bolshevik party made relations between 
the religious organizations and the Soviet rulers more tense. But on the 
other hand, the general political situation and sudden turns in the power 
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struggle inside the ruling party were anyway more influential in this 
field. When confronting political reality the Bolsheviks were able to 
push their ideology and historical aversions aside. In general we may 
state that the religious policy of the Bolshevik party was orientated 
more by political reality than by ideology. The early decades of Soviet 
power could not only be portrayed not only as the era of merciless 
persecution of the ROC but, especially during the NEP, religious policy 
approach of the communist regime included "soft" techniques. 
Moreover, inside the ruling regime there was a substantial group of 
communist leaders who favoured a more gradual tempo on the path 
towards socialism and in the antireligious struggle. 
Moreover, there are great similarities between Soviet nationality and 
religious policies in theory and practice. From the October revolution 
up till the high NEP the Bolsheviks preferred political manoeuvring to 
extraordinary measures against the "two vestiges of capitalism". In 
order to preserve their own political power the Bolsheviks sought to 
avoid a head-on collision with the former state church, other religious 
organizations and nationalities. So instead of direct attacks, the general 
party line had turned away from its ideological presumptions. And 
where no historical antagonism existed, as was the case with the 
sectarians, the Bolsheviks could show more tact in their religious pol-
icy. 
The explanation for this cautious Bolshevik attitude was obvious; 
after the October Revolution the new government soon realized that the 
ROC was deeply rooted in traditional Russian society. By their early 
legislative acts the Bolsheviks were able to build only some of the 
foundations of the secularized state. Although their ambition was to 
drive religion to the margins of the society, the ROC remained an 
outstanding political force in Soviet Russia during the 1920s. This was 
especially apparent during the civil war when religious questions were 
only of secondary importance to the ruling regime. The Bolsheviks 
were fighting for their survival and the ROC could continue its basic 
functions as before, as long as it did not engage in activities directly 
hostile to the Soviet regime. 
During the civil war period the principle of "isolating the church" 
was the main objective of Bolshevik religious policy. In line with this 
religious policy line and the idea that the civil war was only a 
"transition period", we may note that during the first post-revolutionary 
years Bolshevik religious policy vacillated; there was hardly any 
co-ordination between different state and party organs in this matter. As 
a general practice the Soviet security organs, together with the 
NKYust's "Liquidation Commission", had the main responsibility in 
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the Soviet regime, nonetheless, executed its early religious policy in 
accordance with the political pragmatism dictated mainly by Lenin. 
The justifications for this "isolation policy" were almost identical 
with the explanations of the early Soviet nationality policy. After the 
revolution the Bolsheviks were utilizing national feelings as a means to 
establish their power in Eastern areas of the state and even to spread the 
Soviet system in the East. Accordingly, Jews and Moslems in the 
Soviet East were given the possibility of encouraging their religious life 
by local communists. 
The practical implementation of religious policy during the civil war 
was, as mentioned above, concentrated officially in Soviet judicial and 
security organs. The Fifth (later Eighth) Division of the People's 
Commissariat of Justice had the responsibility for implementing the 
"separation of church and state". Moreover, from the beginning of 
Soviet rule the Cheka and NKVD were keen on supervising religious 
organizations and keeping an eye on their political activities. In the civil 
war conditions the main duty of these organs was to ensure that 
religious organizations were not assisting the White armies. 
However, on religious policy questions the Bolshevik party itself 
was divided into two basic factions. Points of disagreement lay mainly 
in the tactics to be employed in religious policy; no-one in the ruling 
party denied the importance of the class struggle and the fight against 
religion. The main argument of the "doves" was that brutal actions 
against believers and especially against peasants could endanger the 
revolution. Some members of the party, such as Bonch-Bruevich and 
L.B. Kamenev, had influential positions inside the Soviet regime and 
could actually establish more tactful relations with religious organ-
izations. 
The "hawks" were located in the Komsomol and to some extent in 
the NKYust. These organs were filled with more ideologically-minded 
communists. Nonetheless, during the civil war the religious policy of 
the ruling party constituted a compromise between these two factions. 
Terror and violent actions were officially directed only against 
politically hostile clergymen, but on a local level Bolshevik terror 
tended to be "pre-emptive" in nature. In accordance with the "isolation 
policy" the Bolsheviks even attempted to encourage "neutral" priests. 
Only during the most heated battles of the civil war did the Soviet 
regime decide to move against the monasteries. 
After adopting the NEP policy in 1921, the Soviet leadership had 
more time to concentrate on its internal "enemies", such as the 
remnants of the political opposition: the Socialist Revolutionaries and 
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the Mensheviks (both of which had been nearly obliterated as 
functioning parties) as well as the ROC. As a result of this political 
situation, the "religious NEP" was delayed almost two years. During 
this early NEP period (1921-1923) L.D. Trotsky was mainly in charge 
of implementing Soviet religious policy and under his leadership the 
regime turned from the "isolation policy" to the principle of "divide and 
rule". During the deep political and economical crisis of 1921-1922 
Trotsky and Lenin wanted to deal a death blow to the ROC, which 
seemed to be the last bastion of the political opposition. Also the 
desperate lack of hard currency constituted a formidable reason for 
confiscating churches. As a natural outcome of this changed approach 
the ruling regime attempted to destroy the ROC and undermine other 
religions by creating schisms within religious organizations. This plan, 
devised by Trotsky, greatly damaged them and especially the ROC and 
from that time on the ruling regime realized the advantage of 
"meddling" as a tactic in its religious policy. 
During the short interval of 1921-1922 the organizational structure 
of the religious policy organs was radically changed. The Soviet organs 
dedicated to education and enlightenment were unable to produce the 
New Socialist Man without religion. The Narkompros and Glavpolit-
prosvet were unable to gain any authority in religious policy. The party 
took over religious policy affairs and the so-called Agitprop's (APO) 
Antireligious Commission was put in charge of carrying out religious 
policy initiatives. Originally it was led by Trotsky and worked under his 
authority and the authority of the inner circle of the Politburo. The basis 
of Trotsky's authority was Lenin's political support for him. As long as 
Lenin was at the helm Trotsky could execute his own policy in this 
field, but as soon as Lenin became ill his position was undermined. 
Moreover, it seems most likely that only a small inner circle of the 
ruling regime (Trotsky's commission and the inner circle of the 
Politburo: Lenin, Stalin and Molotov) was in charge of the 
"confiscation conflict" of 1921-1922. This operation had two political 
objectives: firstly, the confiscation of valuables from churches was 
done in order to finance Soviet power; secondly, Trotsky's plan had the 
hidden goal of undermining the authority of the ROC. In order to 
weaken resistance among believers he introduced a method of 
fomenting schisms inside all religious organizations in Russia. 
Trotsky's ultimate political objective seemed to be the total destruction 
of the ROC and other religious organizations. 
Trotsky could easily foment a schism within the ROC; social 
tensions between "white" and "black" clergy could easily be exploited 
by the communist regime. Moreover, as a result of the "confiscation 
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neutrality to one of loyalty. The case of Patriarch Tikhon reveals how 
effectively the ruling regime was able to exploit the antagonism 
between the ROC and the Renovationists. 
As already stated, Lenin's illness complicated the situation within 
the Soviet leadership. As soon as Lenin became ill Trotsky's position 
was at risk and the triumvirate had a free hand to alter the direction of 
Soviet religious policy. One of the main reasons was the triumvirate's 
desire to discredit Trotsky during the hidden power struggle. In order to 
do so the triumvirate and especially Zinovev introduced slogans which 
contradicted Trotsky's more aggressive policy by appeasing the 
peasants and the neutral intelligentsia. Moreover, some members of the 
ruling regime, for example from the NKID, had appealed to Stalin to 
pacify the "hawks" in the Soviet leadership. The decline of Trotsky and 
the rise of Stalin was one of the salient features of 1923. Stalin's 
position was further secured when he was appointed General Secretary 
of the party and was given the task of harmonizing different party 
organs. Consequently, it was a simple enough task for him to wrest 
control over the party's antireligious work away from Trotsky. At the 
same time the triumvirate of Zinovev, Kamenev and Stalin halted the 
antireligious campaigns of the early NEP. 
The 12th congress was a turning point in Soviet religious policy. 
Trotsky and his committee had prepared the resolution of the congress 
concerning religious organizations. But Zinovev and the other 
triumvirate members nullified Trotsky's more aggressive resolution 
with their conciliatory speeches. In order to appease the peasants and 
discredit Trotsky's antireligious campaigns during the early NEP, the 
triumvirate adopted a more conciliatory attitude towards religion. This 
also meant that the party was obliged to turn away from the 
antireligious methods of the early NEP to peaceful techniques such as 
propaganda and agitation of high NEP. The 12th congress was from this 
point of view the beginning of the new religious policy, representing 
the start of organized antireligious propaganda in place of adminis-
trative measures. 
As earlier, the Soviet religious policy and the nationality policy were 
linked together; the 12th congress represented also the official start of 
the so-called "korenizatsiya-policy". The birth of this policy was a kind 
of compromise between the hardliners in Moscow and local national 
communists. After the civil war Moscow was more and more reluctant 
to utilize nationality or religion in its internal policy. On the other hand, 
independently-minded local communists were equally disinclined to 
follow Moscow's line. The result was a compromise between these two 
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lines. On one hand, the heresy of "Sultan-Galievism" was condemned 
by Stalin. But on the other hand, the 12th congress gave a free hand to 
national communists to execute the "korenizatsiya policy" advocated 
by Sultan-Galiev. As a result, local Moslem and Jewish populations in 
the East were able to promote their autonomy within the ethnic and 
religious policy spheres. Moderate leaders like Kalinin even attempted 
to solve the Jewish question by searching for locations for a Jewish 
homeland. Furthermore, it was important for Soviet power to execute a 
conciliatory policy in the East because at the same time the NKID was 
attempting to utilize liberal clergy and liberation movements there in 
order to spread communism among Moslems in general. 
Another outcome of the high NEP was that it split the ruling party 
even more clearly into two camps. The political battle between 
moderates and hardliners was intensified during the high NEP and was 
apparent at every level of party life. For example, the split was 
articulated by two different philosophical schools: Mechanism and 
Deborinism. The peasant question was especially problematic and 
could be reduced to the simple question: by what sort of methods 
should socialism be built? 
Subsequently, the struggle for power between different leaders, the 
conflict between "left" and "right", also had an impact on Soviet 
religious policy during that time. To sum up, we may find certain loose 
groups such as the "pro-sectarians" who wanted to promote Russian 
socialist agriculture by means of sectarian communes and working 
methods. There even existed a small group of "sectarian-communists" 
such as I.M. Tregubov and others who openly sponsored co-operation 
between the party and sectarians. Inside the highest leadership of the 
party Bonch—Bruevich and Lunacharsky, and to some extent Kalinin, 
supported this model simply as a tactic for enticing peasants to work 
under socialism. 
Associated with this group were so-called "rightists" such as Rykov, 
Tomsky and Bukharin who wanted a more gradual pace towards 
socialism and sponsored conciliatory methods in their religious policy. 
In time socialism would win, it was thought, and so religion would 
inevitably "wither away". It must be noted that demands for a more 
conciliatory religious policy were often related to internal or 
international events. Moreover, we may mention the Soviet Foreign 
Office, the NKID, which promoted conciliatory policies towards 
religious organizations because of possible international protests. 
The "hawks" for their part were not a monolithic group but were also 
divided into certain camps. The press discussion before the 13th 
congress had already revealed preferences; on the one hand there were 
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of Soviet religious policy and believed that enlightenment would 
finally undermine the "sociological roots" of religion. However, the 
majority of the ideologically-motivated communists preferred a more 
drastic attitude towards religion. According to these "ultimate hawks" 
religion was something like "booze, cocaine and syphilis" and the party 
should get rid of it as soon as possible. 
In summarizing the organizational view of Soviet religious policy at 
the hight of the NEP, we see how the party's religious policy was 
concentrated in special supervisory and governing organs (the CAP and 
the secret police). The Fifth Division of the NKYust was abolished and 
APO's role diminished to zero. As before, the real decisions were made 
in small circles of the party: during Lenin's time, in the Sovnarkom, the 
Politburo, APO and in Trotsky's antireligious commission. Important 
decisions were always taken in the Politburo, and during the high NEP, 
in the CAP. There was real open debate inside the party before and 
during the 12th and the 13th congresses, but in practice religious policy 
decisions were taken in closed party circles. 
The new method which the ruling party had developed during the 
"confiscation conflict" was that of creating a "loyal wing" inside a 
particular religious organization. This method suited better the "peace-
ful" NEP period and often active "meddling" by the representatives of 
the ruling regime produced more effective results than plain terror 
would have. This method revealed, however, the inconsistency of the 
religious policy objectives of the NEP period. Firstly the secret police 
and the CAP functioned as religious policy organs with the "normal" 
duties of granting permits, etc. But along with this "normal" governing 
duty, they had the task of meddling and directing, especially after the 
"confiscation conflict". Finally, these Soviet religious policy organs 
served as "liquidation centres" which attempted to undermine religious 
belief among the Soviet people. 
The main objective of the high NEP religious policy was to create 
loyal churches with pro-Soviet attitudes; in practice this signified only 
promoting an internal schism in the ROC. The Renovationist church 
had only tactical value to the ruling regime. It was at the beginning 
planned as a temporary measure, but when the "loyal" Renovationists 
attempted to secure their position the government abandoned it. The 
declaration of Metropolitan Sergei in 1927 was the climax of this 
successful policy; after 1917 the ROC had gradually transferred from 
"hostility" to neutrality and from "benevolent neutrality" to the uncon-
ditional loyalty of Sergei. 
To sum up, the years of the "high NEP" represented a brief 
236 
	
	
breathing-space for all religious organizations and especially for the 
sectarian movement it was a period of great success. The ruling regime 
also sought reconciliation with the Catholics when "doves" in the party 
were looking for an improvement in relations with the Vatican. In any 
event, both the Soviet regime and the Vatican were more interested in 
double dealing than in any improvement in their relations. Nonetheless, 
we may state that there seemed to be a genuine possibility for a more 
peaceful development in the party's religious policy at that time. In 
addition, the liberal implementation of the nationality policy during the 
years 1924-1927 demonstrates that the party was temporarily seeking 
civil peace. This breathing-space was in any event of quite short 
duration. The open protest of M.M. Kostelovskaya and the religious 
policy debate in 1926 clearly bear witness to this. At the same time, the 
high-NEP reached its peak at the 15th Party Congress in 1927. 
Stalin finally won the struggle for the supreme leadership in 1929 
and established his own personality cult on top of that of Lenin. By 
utilizing the fervour of the younger generation in the party, Stalin was 
able to tum the struggle for power in his favour. The Komsomols were 
eagerly contemplating the desirability of a new civil war and the 
Stalinist leadership was able to utilize this pent-up frustration. The list 
of supposed enemies in this "civil war" also included religious 
organizations. Subsequently, the moderate wing of the ruling regime 
was silenced and by 1929 Stalin's Cultural Revolution was complete. 
The party's antireligious battle was greatly intensified during the 
Cultural Revolution. The Bolshevik party turned more to thepolicy of a 
direct attack on all "class enemies" and religious organizations were 
first in line. Although the moderate "culturalists" attempted to stress the 
importance of peaceful antireligious policies the atmosphere of the time 
favoured the hardline "interventionists" who backed more resolute 
measures against religion. They saw the "culturalists" as betraying the 
Bolshevik revolution by their aspiration to proceed more slowly in this 
matter. It was also a battle between the generations; even Yaroslaysky 
was counted as a "bourgeoisie" by the young ideologically-minded 
"interventionists" who sought to destroy religious organizations all at 
once. 
On an organizational level some of the earlier commissions were 
liquidated and in 1929 their responsibilities were transferred to the new 
"Cult Commission" under the authority of the VTsIK Presidium. It was 
apparent that this new Stalinist organ could be controlled better than the 
CAP which had for example in 1927 voted for its line towards 
Moslems. This change of responsibilities emphasized even more the 
transition of power from the party to the Stalinist administration. So on 
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leader in religious policy affairs. 
When summing up the earlier academic discussion and the results of 
this study we may also see the contradiction in results between studies 
based on public and so-called "samizdat" sources. Due to the lack of 
original sources there have been two different traditions in this field; on 
the one hand there are authors such as Curtiss and Carr who show 
"understanding" towards Soviet explanations and argue seriously using 
Soviet propaganda. This tradition has led sometimes to too "positive" 
evaluations of the real motives and purposes of the Soviet ruling 
regime. On the other hand there are other studies (i.e., Solzhenitsyn, 
Nezhnyi) which are more critical in their evaluations. According to 
these authors the Soviet leadership did not differ from ordinary 
gangsters and Soviet religious policy was nothing but constant purges 
and terror against all religions. Now with new information from the 
archives we can evaluate the decision-making process of the Bolshevik 
party with more precision and specific details than before. In most cases 
archive sources have verified the results of earlier studies but 
sometimes the facts have contradicted received wisdom in this field. 
The picture from the early decades is anyway complex; we may even 
state that Bolshevik religious policy was a synthesis of these two 
opposite opinions. During the early decades the ruling regime was not a 
unanimous and monolithic band of atheists. However, the rep- 
resentatives of Soviet power clearly realized that they were in the 
middle of a class war and on the march to an atheist society. Because of 
this communists could at the same time grant permission for the 
printing of Bibles and then plan how to interfere in and infiltrate 
religious organizations and persecute religious leaders in order to gain 
control over their organizations, divide them and finally destroy them. 
This ambiguity also explains the emergance of these two different 
traditions; both "schools" can justify their views by an abundance of 
arguments. 
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